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Abstract 
This study is an investigation of the function of emotion in the social formation of 
the believers in the Pauline churches. In his letters, Paul speaks often of his own 
emotions, and also promotes certain emotions while banishing others; all this surely 
indicates that emotion has an important role to play within the believing community. 
However, in New Testament studies, the study of emotion is still at an embryonic stage. 
This thesis, which represents the first thesis-length treatment of emotion in the Pauline 
letter corpus, attempts to take the discussion forward. It argues that for Paul, emotions 
are integral to the proper formation and stabilizing of Christian identity and community, 
because they encode structures of belief and influence patterns of sociality.   
Chapter 1 reviews the nascent scholarship on emotion in Paul’s letters and the 
wider New Testament, and also surveys the state of play of emotions research in the 
sciences and social sciences. In chapter 2, we examine emotion in Stoicism, the 
dominant philosophical influence of the day, focusing particularly on joy and grief—the 
two emotions that we take up and investigate exegetically in chapters 3 and 4, which 
concern, respectively, joy in Philippians, and grief in 1 Thessalonians. Finally, in 
chapter 5, we enlist the sociological notion of the “emotional regime” to explore how 
authorized emotions are constructed and reinforced in the Pauline communities. I 
conclude by offering an account of emotion in Paul, contrasting it with Stoic thinking. 
Taking its cue from current emotions research, which highlights the cognitive and 
social dimensions of emotion, this thesis proposes that as Paul sees it, right patterns of 
feeling stem from, and indeed embody, right patterns of belief, and that the social 
display of sanctioned emotions upbuilds the communal life of the believers. 
Furthermore, such right emotions, by squaring felt experience with held beliefs, and 
demarcating social boundaries between Christians and others, have powerful integrating 
and differentiating functions that profoundly influence identity and belonging. These 
conclusions have potentially far-reaching implications for our overall understanding of 
the social formation of the early believers, not least in terms of how a hitherto neglected 
aspect of that socialization—Paul’s emphasis on the affective dimensions of personal 
and communal life—is brought into active conversation with the theological realities 
that were believed to shape all of human existence and the practices that undergirded 
and sustained these beliefs. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Introductory Comments 
The NT attests strongly to the fact that Paul displayed a wide range of emotions 
in his life and ministry, and expected the same from his converts in the churches that he 
had founded. However, the study of emotion in the Pauline letters is still in its infancy; 
and to my knowledge, there is, as yet, no monograph-length treatment of Paul and 
emotion. To date, scholarly work has focused largely on Paul’s rhetorical use of pathos, 
though in recent years there has been a nascent interest in probing the relationship 
between his construals of emotion and early Christian eschatological faith. However, 
more fundamental questions regarding the role of emotion in Paul’s writings have yet to 
be addressed.  
Accordingly, this present investigation aims to get at the heart of what Paul is 
doing with emotion in his communications with his churches. Through historical 
analysis and exegetical study, and in dialogue with present-day social-scientific 
approaches to emotion, I will offer an account of the function of emotion in Paul’s 
letters that engages deeply with his theological discourse and pastoral agenda, while 
also taking careful account of the complexes of sociality, symbolic meanings, and 
cultural influences that shape the sociocultural milieu in which his churches are set. As 
a result, I hope that our overall understanding of Pauline Christianity will be advanced 
in some small way.  
 
1.2. Emotion and Early Christianity: Survey of Research 
1.2.1. Studies of Emotion in the Wider New Testament  
1.2.1.a. Recent Monographs  
There are a number of older studies in the NT that have a specific emotion such 
as love or joy as their focus, but they are targeted at a non-specialist readership.1 As far 
as I am able to discover, there have been in recent years only a handful of monographs 
                                                
1 James Moffatt, Love in the New Testament (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929); William G. 
Morrice, Joy in the New Testament (Exeter: Paternoster, 1984). 
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that have emotion as the main focus for investigation; however, these studies are 
generally wanting in theoretical and analytical depth.  
Stephen Voorwinde’s two monographs both deal with the significance of Jesus’ 
emotions for aspects of Christology: in the first of them, Voorwinde seeks to establish 
that the emotions of the Johannine Jesus throw significant light on the ongoing debate 
surrounding his humanity/divinity, and in its sequel Voorwinde extends his scope to 
include the synoptic gospels in order to ascertain if they together with John’s gospel 
present a coherent picture of Jesus’ emotions.2 However, Voorwinde offers only a 
cursory appraisal of what emotions are: for him, they are experiences of feeling that 
activate and affect behaviour.3 While there is some recognition that emotions emerge 
from situational reasoning, his discussion of them lacks theoretical sophistication.  
In a wide-ranging study, Matthew Elliott applies current research in psychology 
to emotion in the NT writings.4 Elliott’s expressed desire to interpret emotion in the 
light of both modern studies of emotion and how it was understood in its historical 
context is certainly laudable.5 Unfortunately, Elliott’s exegetical approach is somewhat 
facile and in several places amounts to little more than using the biblical material as a 
proof text for his assertions. There is minimal engagement with the Greco-Roman 
sociocultural setting for emotional life. Furthermore, while Elliott stresses that emotion 
is connected to ethics,6 he does not adequately explore its implications for the early 
Christian communities. To be fair, Elliott does acknowledge that his efforts to utilize a 
cognitive approach to understanding emotion in the NT are merely the opening of a 
door into this new realm of research.7 While Elliott’s emphasis on the cognitive basis of 
emotion has certain echoes in my approach, any indebtedness to his work is negligible.   
1.2.1.b. Stephen Barton 
One scholar whose recent short studies are helping to advance the study of 
emotion in early Christianity is Stephen Barton. In 2011, the first of his explorations of 
                                                
2 Stephen Voorwinde, Jesus’ Emotions in the Fourth Gospel: Human or Divine?, LNTS 284 
(London: T&T Clark, 2005); Stephen Voorwinde, Jesus’ Emotions in the Gospels (London: T&T Clark, 
2011). 
3 Voorwinde, Gospels, 3. 
4 Matthew Elliott, Faithful Feelings: Emotion in the New Testament (Leicester: Inter-Varsity, 2005). 
5 Elliott, Faithful Feelings, 124–125. 
6 Elliott, Faithful Feelings, 252–264.  
7 Elliott, Faithful Feelings, 236–237. 
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emotion in the NT was published;8 this article has become a seminal contribution to this 
emerging area of scholarly interest. Barton’s approach is exemplary: after surveying 
recent developments in emotions research in the social sciences, and judiciously using 
these theories to open up the question of early Christian emotions,9 he brings key 
interpretative perspectives to bear on the issue of grief in 1 Thessalonians, situating 
such grief alongside wider sociocultural views of grief in the Greco-Roman world.10 
Using grief as a case study, Barton demonstrates convincingly that early Christian 
eschatological faith and emotional life are intimately connected to each other.11 In not 
insignificant ways, my own theoretical stance takes its cue from some of Barton’s 
proposals: first, that emotions, being cognitive and evaluative, are a form of rationality 
that may offer another avenue towards understanding early Christian rationality as a 
whole; second, that emotions play a role in expressing identity and marking social 
boundaries and points of transition, for example through “feeling rules”; and third, that 
emotions arise in the course of social relations and are integral to processes of social 
engagement.12 Important for Barton as an analytical tool is the concept of the 
“emotional regime” (see section 1.3.2 of my study), the import of which is the capacity 
to locate emotions within wider social-symbolic realities.13  
Barton continues to probe emotion in early Christianity in a subsequent study, 
adopting again a multidisciplinary and broadly constructionist approach to the 
emotions; this time he focuses on joy in Luke-Acts and in Philippians, taking note also 
of the ways in which joy is inflected in earlier biblical tradition.14 Several of Barton’s 
conclusions are especially noteworthy. He argues that while the basis of joy is 
eschatological, “its expression is social, bound up with the quality of ecclesial 
sociality.”15 Moreover, joy is the individual and corporate manifestation of what really 
matters—the progress of the gospel and the progress in faith of those who accept this 
                                                
8 Stephen C. Barton, “Eschatology and the Emotions in Early Christianity,” JBL 130 (2011): 571–
591. 
9 Barton, “Eschatology,” 574–581. 
10 Barton, “Eschatology,” 581–589. 
11 Barton, “Eschatology,” 573; 591. 
12 See esp. Barton, “Eschatology,” 575–581. 
13 Barton, “Eschatology,” 577–578; 589–591. On the “emotional regime,” see section 1.3.2 of my 
study.   
14 Stephen C. Barton, “Spirituality and the Emotions in Early Christianity: The Case of Joy,” in The 
Bible and Spirituality: Exploratory Essays in Reading Scripture Spiritually, ed. Andrew T. Lincoln, J. 
Gordon McConville, and Lloyd K. Pietersen (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2013), 171–193. 
15 Barton, “Spirituality,” 185–187 (quote from 187, emphasis original), 190; see also 183. 
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gospel.16 Furthermore, since joy has to do with an entirely new and countercultural way 
of classifying, and being in, the world, it has to be inculcated and nurtured. Thus, for 
Barton, Philippians is “both a display of joy and a pedagogy in joy.”17  
In a recent essay, Barton explores the relationship between anger and sin in 
Ephesians, concluding that anger has to be understood in the light of the letter’s overall 
moral-theological vision of unity in the Church.18 Again, Barton’s approach is 
instructive: he brings perspectives on anger in Jewish thought and in Greco-Roman 
philosophy into conversation with a careful, contextual reading of Eph 4.26a, while 
being even-handed in his use of modern theories of emotion. Useful too is Barton’s 
highlighting of “the potential for the emotions, as a form of cognition, to be in 
alignment with, and an expression of, the truth,”19 i.e. the realities associated with 
Paul’s notions of divine redemption; and the fact that new ways of feeling, along with 
new ways of thinking and behaving, have to be learnt—which underlines the important 
role that processes of moral instruction and discipleship play in the Church.20 
1.2.1.c. Katherine Hockey 
 In her very recent thesis—which is the first comprehensive, monograph-length 
investigation of the rhetorical use of emotion in a NT letter—Katherine Hockey 
examines the role of emotion in the rhetorical discourse of 1 Peter.21 Using Stephen 
Barton’s work as a springboard for her own approach,22 Hockey ably mobilizes 
developments in modern emotion theories and Greco-Roman philosophical and 
rhetorical teaching on emotions to establish a methodological framework for her inquiry 
that is both theoretically informed and historically sensitive. She argues in her analysis 
of key emotions such as joy, suffering, fear, hope, and shame in 1 Peter that as 
evaluative judgements they are used in particular contexts to rhetorically shape the 
recipients’ interpretation of the world, and thus construct and enforce a new 
                                                
16 Barton, “Spirituality,” 187–188, 191.  
17 Barton, “Spirituality,” 187.  
18 Stephen C. Barton, “‘Be Angry But Do Not Sin’ (Ephesians 4:26a): Sin and the Emotions in the 
New Testament with Special Reference to Anger,” Studies in Christian Ethics 28 (2015): 21–34. See also 
Stephen C. Barton, “Why Do Things Move People?: The Jerusalem Temple as Emotional Repository,” 
JSNT 37 (2015): 351–380, where he explores the relationship between material-symbolic objects and 
emotion; this essay will not be discussed here as its motifs are not of direct relevance to my study.   
19 Barton, “‘Be Angry,’” 33 (emphasis his), citing Eph 1.13; 4.25; 5.9; 6.14. 
20 Barton, “‘Be Angry,’” 33–34. 
21 Katherine M. Hockey, “Seeing Emotionally: An Investigation of the Role of Emotion in the 
Rhetorical Discourse of 1 Peter” (PhD diss., Durham University, 2016). 
22 Hockey, “Seeing Emotionally,” 21.  
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worldview.23 As Hockey maintains, “[t]he positive or negative presentation of each 
emotion creates an emotional regime for the believers which subsequently produces the 
boundaries for their understanding of self and other.”24 This emotional reinforcement of 
the believers’ new realities has profound implications: ethically, it helps to drive the 
believers collectively towards the achievement of desired outcomes; sociologically, it 
repositions them in relation to objects in their revised worldview, which strengthens in-
group bonds and weakens previous societal ties, thereby bolstering their community 
identity; and therapeutically, it helps to concretize a stable and confident outlook on 
their present circumstances of persecution and suffering.25 
1.2.2. Studies of Emotion in Paul 
For much of the twentieth century, discussions by NT scholars surrounding Paul’s 
use of passion language traditionally portrayed him as strenuously rejecting the 
perspectives of Hellenistic philosophy.26 However, this view has been refined in more 
recent scholarship; in the past four decades a growing number of scholars have argued 
that Paul’s references to emotion are best understood in conversation with 
contemporaneous philosophical and literary perspectives on emotion in the Greco-
Roman world. David Aune observes that four areas have received the most attention: 
(1) Paul’s rhetorical use of emotional appeal; (2) Paul’s descriptions of his own 
sufferings and emotional endurance; (3) Paul’s treatment of grief, anxiety, and anger in 
his communities; (4) Paul’s negative assessment of sexual passions.27 To this list I 
would add a fifth category to account for a discernible though still modest measure of 
scholarly interest in very recent years: (5) Paul’s notion of joy.  
In the interests of space, the following discussion of current research is 
necessarily selective. I will limit my attention to categories (1), (3) (with a focus on 
grief), and (5): (1) is the area that has been studied the most and is of some relevance to 
the questions that I am bringing to Paul’s letters; (3) and (5) have to do with grief and 
joy, which form the twin affective foci of my study. Those aspects of research into Paul 
                                                
23 Hockey, “Seeing Emotionally,” 249; see also 133–135, 170–171, 220, 245–246.  
24 Hockey, “Seeing Emotionally,” 249.  
25 Hockey, “Seeing Emotionally,” 253–257. 
26 See the overview in David Charles Aune, “Passions in the Pauline Epistles: The Current State of 
Research,” in Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2008), 222–231. 
27 Aune, “Passions,” 224.  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 6 
and emotion that I do not cover are addressed in Aune’s instructive and still useful 
survey (cited above).  
1.2.2.a. Paul’s Rhetorical Use of Emotional Appeal 
In recent decades, many scholars have mined categories from ancient rhetoric for 
data to bring to the study of Paul’s language of persuasion, though there is still little 
consensus on how best to go about analysing πάθος, or discursive emotional appeal, in 
rhetorical criticism. Good examples of studies that investigate Paul’s rhetorical use of 
πάθος include Edgar Krentz on 1 Thessalonians, Larry Welborn on 2 Corinthians, Lauri 
Thúren on Galatians, and more recently, Oda Wischmeyer on 1 Corinthians.28     
In 2001, the Society of Biblical Literature published a collection of essays 
entitled Paul and Pathos29 that sought to address the question of how to develop 
systematic guidelines for πάθος that would be most apropos for biblical criticism.30 
Following two background essays discussing Greco-Roman rhetoric and πάθος in 
Hellenistic thought are eight essays that examine Paul’s use of πάθος, drawing on 
ancient rhetorical theories (those of Aristotle, and the Roman tradition represented by 
Cicero and Quintilian) concerning emotional appeal. I shall highlight features of certain 
essays that are especially pertinent to my study.  
Stephen Kraftchick argues in his nuanced approach that Paul’s letters suggest that 
his use of πάθος is a hybrid of Aristotle and the Roman tradition.31 On the one hand, 
with the Roman tradition, Paul’s appeals are directed to the emotions rather than being 
arguments from them. On the other hand, Paul’s sensibility for building a community’s 
ethic and well-being puts him closer to Aristotle in the logic behind his arguments: Paul 
                                                
28 Edgar M. Krentz, “1 Thessalonians: Rhetorical Flourishes and Formal Constraints,” in The 
Thessalonians Debate: Methodological Discord or Methodological Synthesis?, ed. Karl P. Donfried and 
Johannes Beutler (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 287–318; Larry L. Welborn, “Paul’s Appeal to the 
Emotions in 2 Corinthians 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16,” JSNT 82 (2001): 31–60; Lauri Thúren, “Was Paul Angry? 
Derhetorizing Galatians,” in The Rhetorical Interpretation of Scripture: Essays from the 1996 Malibu 
Conference, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Dennis L. Stamps (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 
302–320; Oda Wischmeyer, “1Korinther 13. Das Hohelied der Liebe zwischen Emotion und Ethos,” in 
Deuterocanonical and Cognate Literature Yearbook 2011, ed. Renate Egger-Wenzel and Jeremy Corley 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 343–359. See further Aune, “Passions,” 224–225.  
29 Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. Sumney, eds., Paul and Pathos, SBL Symposium Series 16 
(Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001). Most of the essays in this volume were presented at the 
1999 international meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature.  
30 On the role of emotional appeal in the creation of discourse, see generally Jakob Wisse, Ethos and 
Pathos from Aristotle and Cicero (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1989); George A. Kennedy, The Art of 
Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 93–96.  
31 Steven J. Kraftchick, “Πάθη in Paul: The Emotional Logic of ‘Original Argument,’” in Paul and 
Pathos, ed. Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. Sumney, SBL Symposium Series 16 (Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2001), 39–68. 
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is not merely persuading his audience, but using emotional argumentation to provide 
reasons why it is appropriate for a community to take a specific action.32 Kraftchick 
thus seems to recognize the presence of distinctly noetic as well as social elements to 
emotional appeal in Paul; and in his analysis of Galatians he seeks to demonstrate that 
Paul is a pragmatic, innovative rhetor who uses arguments based on emotion in order to 
persuade his readers, and that these arguments are made because the matters under 
deliberation are vital for their continued communal existence.33 
Jerry Sumney concludes from his investigation of Paul’s argumentative strategy 
in 2 Corinthians that he seems to regard emotions as intelligent and discriminating 
aspects of the human personality.34 From the evidence in the letter, Paul probably 
understood as rational his own emotive arguments both for perceiving his actions as he 
wanted the Corinthians to, and for their seeing his opponents’ actions as being 
objectionable.35 Sumney finds that Paul uses widely known rhetorical conventions to 
affect the πάθος of his hearers; these conventions drew largely on Aristotelian 
categories of affect in which emotions were regarded not as irrational but as being 
“based to some degree on beliefs arrived at through the use of reason.”36 A broadly 
similar approach is adopted by James Thompson, who reads Paul’s argument from 
πάθος in 2 Corinthians against an Aristotelian understanding of affect and thus connects 
Paul’s rhetorical strategy to an understanding that emotional response is not irrational 
but is instead “intelligent behaviour open to reasoned persuasion.”37 
Overall, while the essays in the collection arrive at slightly different conclusions 
concerning the extent to which the theories of classical rhetoricians are relevant for 
assessing πάθος in the Pauline epistles, they all highlight the affective dimensions of 
Paul’s thought and represent an effort to understand it in more holistic terms. In 
addition, the authors seem to detect and thus implicitly promote a generally cognitive 
basis for emotion, in so far as they place Paul’s use of πάθος within broadly Aristotelian 
                                                
32 Kraftchick, “Πάθη,” 56. 
33 Kraftchick, “Πάθη,” 57–68.  
34 Jerry L. Sumney, “Paul’s Use of Πάθος in His Argument against the Opponents of 2 Corinthians,” 
in Paul and Pathos, ed. Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. Sumney, SBL Symposium Series 16 (Atlanta: 
Society of Biblical Literature, 2001), 147–160. 
35 Sumney, “Paul’s Use,” 160.  
36 Sumney, “Paul’s Use,” 148; referencing the work of Martha C. Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Emotions 
and Rational Persuasion,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996), 303–304.  
37 James W. Thompson, “Paul’s Argument from Pathos in 2 Corinthians,” in Paul and Pathos, ed. 
Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. Sumney, SBL Symposium Series 16 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2001), 129–130 (quote from 130). 
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categories, which argue for the intelligibility of emotional response. However, more 
work needs to be done to move the discussion of πάθος in the biblical documents 
beyond Aristotle;38 and a more deliberate engagement with modern theories of emotion 
may prove to be fruitful. My study, which is not primarily interested in the rhetorical 
dimensions of Paul’s pathetic discourse, nevertheless seeks both to broaden the 
discussion of Paul’s use of emotion and to take it forward using insights from current 
developments in emotions theory.  
1.2.2.b. Paul’s Treatment of Grief 
The scholar who has probably done the most work in this area is Abraham 
Malherbe, who has demonstrated convincingly that Paul’s approach to the assuaging of 
grief has its parallels in the therapeutic strategies of many of the moral philosophers of 
the day.39 Malherbe focuses in particular on the paraenetic character of Paul’s language 
of consolation in 1 Thessalonians,40 and shows that Paul’s treatment of grief in 1 Thess 
4.13–18 shares many of the features of ancient consolation,41 which was widely 
practised and well attested throughout the Greco-Roman world.42 Malherbe concludes 
that Paul’s consolatory instructions regarding appropriate grief have their basis in his 
understanding of the eschatological events surrounding the parousia of Christ.43  
Several other scholars have also investigated the topos of Paul’s treatment of grief 
in 1 Thessalonians.44 A thought-provoking contribution comes from John Barclay, who 
argues that in 1 Thess 4.13 Paul is not merely trying to moderate the Thessalonians’ 
grief on the occasion of the deaths of some of their brethren, but is literally instructing 
them not to grieve at all.45 As Barclay sees it, for Paul it was crucial that the way that 
                                                
38 As indeed Thomas H. Olbricht, one of the editors of the essay collection, recognizes; see 
“Introduction,” in Paul and Pathos, ed. Thomas H. Olbricht and Jerry L. Sumney, SBL Symposium 
Series 16 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001), 1–3.  
39 On Hellenistic philosophy as therapy, see the survey of literature and examples in Abraham J. 
Malherbe, “Hellenistic Moralists and the New Testament,” ANRW 2.26.1 (1992): 301–304; see Martha C. 
Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994) for an extensive discussion. 
40 Abraham J. Malherbe, “Exhortation in 1 Thessalonians,” in Paul and the Popular Philosophers 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1989), 49–66; Abraham J. Malherbe, Paul and the Thessalonians: The 
Philosophic Tradition of Pastoral Care (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 57–60, 68–81. 
41 Malherbe, “Exhortation,” 64–65; Abraham J. Malherbe, The Letters to the Thessalonians, AB 32B 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 264. 
42 I survey the topos of consolation in antiquity in section 2.5.1.a.  
43 Malherbe, “Exhortation,” 65–66. 
44 See also Barton, “Eschatology,” which I discussed earlier in section 1.2.1.b. 
45 John M. G. Barclay, “‘That you may not grieve, like the rest who have no hope’ (1 Thess 4.13): 
Death and Early Christian Identity,” in Pauline Churches and Diaspora Jews, WUNT 275 (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 217–235. 
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the early believers dealt with death and bereavement marked them out clearly from the 
world around them, since they were, after all, “a community who made a special point 
of being destined to salvation.”46 By specifying how the Thessalonian believers were to 
view and mark death, Paul was taking the first momentous steps towards “making the 
death of a Christian a Christian death,” or, in other words, making death itself a central 
symbol of Christian distinction—a distinction that had everything to do with the 
believers’ theological convictions concerning their eschatological destiny and 
confidence for the future.47 Even if one is not convinced by Barclay’s argument that 
Paul is here completely prohibiting the expressing of grief,48 his primary thesis 
concerning the “christianizing” of death, which he grounds in a careful reading of 
Paul’s theological strategy to quell the Thessalonians’ grief, still holds in the main.49  
In a recent article, Larry Welborn explores λύπη in 2 Corinthians from the 
perspective of Greco-Roman psychagogy.50 He contrasts Paul’s treatment of emotional 
pain with the therapeutic strategies employed by his contemporaries, especially the 
Stoics, and concludes that Paul emerges as the harbinger of change in the ancient 
practice of emotional therapy through how he valorizes λύπη and attributes to it a 
constructive rather than merely utilitarian value in the pursuit of moral progress. For 
Welborn, Paul—who expresses “pain given and pain received” in his letter—had 
“reflected deeply upon the nature and function of the emotions ‘in Christ’,” and found 
his answer in how Christ’s suffering disclosed a λύπη that was in accordance with God’s 
will and led through repentance to salvation.51 Noteworthy in Welborn’s study of 2 
Corinthians is its implied endorsement of a reasoned, ethical basis for λύπη as an 
emotional response, and also its example of contextual sensitivity through the 
widespread use of Greco–Roman literary sources for comparison.  
1.2.2.c. Paul’s Notion of Joy 
In the past few years, several essays by NT scholars have appeared in which 
Paul’s view of joy is central to the discussion.52  
                                                
46 Barclay, “Death,” 234. 
47 Barclay, “Death,” 227–228 (quote from 228), 234; see also 217–218. 
48 I discuss in detail the question of whether or not 1 Thess 4.13 enshrines a prohibition against grief 
in section 4.3.4.  
49 So also Barton, “Eschatology,” 587 n.51.  
50 Larry L. Welborn, “Paul and Pain: Paul’s Emotional Therapy in 2 Corinthians 1.1–2.13; 7.5–16 in 
the Context of Ancient Psychagogic Literature,” NTS 57 (2011): 547–570. 
51 Welborn, “Paul and Pain,” 570.  
52 See also Barton, “Spirituality,” which was discussed in section 1.2.1.b 
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N. T. Wright’s observations about joy in the NT53 highlight its theological 
dimensions as well as its ethical nature. For Wright, the character of early Christian joy 
is definitively shaped by the events surrounding Jesus, while remaining within ancient 
Israelite parameters: this joy has to do with discovering that Israel’s God is now 
fulfilling his promises to bring restoration.54 These ideas are crystallized in Paul’s 
missive to the Philippians. At one level, joy has to do with the bonds of mutual affection 
between him and his converts. But at a deeper level, joy has to do with the resurrection 
and enthronement of Jesus, and the new world that his lordship has inaugurated. Those 
who follow Jesus are part of this new world; and so Paul rejoices—even in suffering, 
for it is “an indication that the new world and the old are chafing together”—and 
summons the Philippians to rejoice with him.55 For Wright, this joy certainly involves 
“internal mental or emotional states”; but he also suggests, while acknowledging that it 
is impossible to prove, that on the basis of Phil 1.27–30 and 4.4–5 Paul might even have 
in mind an outward, public, activity of celebration, perhaps as a kind of protest against 
the celebrations of Kyrios Caesar or pagan religion.56  
Helpful in Wright’s discussion is his reminder that the joy of which the NT 
speaks is capable of overlapping with quite different emotions, such as sorrow, which 
alerts one to the fact that something rather different from “ordinary” joy is envisaged; 
indeed, joy has to do with “the Lord.”57 The basis for joy is thus theological: as Wright 
notes, “[t]he sovereign lordship of Christ frames and renders joyful his [Paul’s] 
reflections on his likely fate (Phil 1.18–26).”58 Wright also alerts us to the sociality of 
joy—that there is a sense in which it is socially generated and also to be socially 
performed. However, his suggestion that Paul is promoting a regular, highly visible, and 
counter-cultural celebration of joy seems rather unlikely, given the belligerent 
environment in which the believers lived.  
In a relatively short yet perceptive essay, Colleen Shantz brings Paul’s notion of 
happiness into interdisciplinary dialogue with recent research on emotion in positive 
                                                
53 N. T. Wright, “Joy: Some New Testament Perspectives and Questions,” in Joy and Human 
Flourishing: Essays on Theology, Culture, and the Good Life, ed. Miroslav Volf and Justin E. Crisp 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2015), 39–61. This collection of essays, the result of a series of consultations 
hosted by the Yale Center of Faith and Culture, represents an effort to help to remedy the paucity of 
contemporary theological reflection on joy. 
54 Wright, “Joy,” 46–49. 
55 Wright, “Joy,” 49–55 (quote from 55).  
56 Wright, “Joy,” 56–58. 
57 Wright, “Joy,” 40–41.  
58 Wright, “Joy,” 53. 
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psychology and other fields.59 Applying Martin P. Seligman’s typology of the three 
kinds of lives that bring people happiness to her reading of Paul, Shantz finds that it is 
the meaningful life (where one looks beyond oneself to a transcendent purpose) rather 
than the pleasurable life or the good life that encapsulates how Paul is able to achieve 
happiness despite his frequent experiences of affliction and turmoil.60 Paul’s 
participation in the Christological pattern of dying and rising allows him to articulate a 
hermeneutic for all of life in which conventional standards of honour are turned on their 
heads: suffering thus becomes “an actual participation in the way of Christ that has 
defeated the powers of death and sin.”61 This revised understanding of meaning and 
happiness in life enables Paul to establish and nurture his new faith communities, which 
in turn generates the happiness that comes from group cohesion and shared values.62 
Shantz’s study is instructive in how she engages in heuristic fashion with the work of 
neuroscientists, psychologists, and social scientists on emotion. Theories regarding 
happiness, the link between cognition and emotion, and the social character of emotion, 
are carefully mapped onto Paul’s experience to produce an account that remains 
grounded in the realities of the text while being alert to viable ways of understanding it 
in more comprehensive terms.63  
1.2.3. Summary 
What we are seeing in NT studies is a budding interest in drawing on resources in 
modern emotions studies to investigate the role of emotion in early Christianity. The 
growing attention to emotion in biblical studies has its parallel in the field of classics, 
with scholars from both disciplines making important contributions as to how the 
                                                
59 Colleen Shantz, “‘I Have Learned to Be Content?’: Happiness According to St. Paul,” in The Bible 
and the Pursuit of Happiness: What the Old and New Testaments Teach Us about the Good Life, ed. 
Brent Strawn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 187–201. The essays in this collection 
originated in a 2009 conference in Atlanta which was part of a five-year project focused on the Pursuit of 
Happiness, hosted by the Centre for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University.  
We should note that while the emotion term that Shantz uses throughout her essay is “happiness” 
(which is in keeping with the theme of the collection and also of the larger project of which it is a part), 
when it comes to her discussion of Paul’s letters she is referring, in actual fact, to “joy.” We shall 
therefore take her references to happiness as a terminological proxy for joy.  
60 Shantz, “Happiness,” 189–197. 
61 Shantz, “Happiness,” 199.  
62 Shantz, “Happiness,” 197–198.  
63 So, for example, Shantz observes that in Phil 3.3–6 Paul lists all the ways in which he had excelled 
according to cultural norms, which in Seligman’s framework would have made for a virtuous life. 
However Paul recounts these details only to reject them (Phil 3.7–8), which Shantz sees as describing a 
twofold loss—his personal honour, and his place within a community that structured his identity. The 
resultant sociocultural isolation would mean that happiness was elusive (“Happiness,” 194–195).  
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emotions were viewed in antiquity.64 This interest arguably provides further evidence 
for what many academics term as an “emotional turn” or “affective turn”—a theoretical 
engagement with emotion since the mid-1990s in the humanities and social sciences65—
which is itself part of a veritable explosion of interest in the academic study of emotion 
in recent decades, an interest that is unusually widespread and remarkably 
interdisciplinary. The eminent development psychologist Jerome Kagan has observed 
that “[t]he corpus of scholarly writing on emotion is so extensive that it would seem 
presumptuous for anyone to assume they could add to the existing record of wisdom.”66 
Indeed, the literature continues to expand at such a breathtaking pace that to offer any 
kind of critical overview of recent theoretical and empirical research on emotion is a 
dauntingly ambitious undertaking. In the section that follows, I can do little more than 
outline the main contours of the arguments surrounding the nature of emotion, 
especially as they pertain to my study. 
 
1.3. Contemporary Emotions Research: Selected Aspects  
1.3.1. Overview 
The study of emotion is complex and continues to be steeped in debates related to 
the definition, constitution, and function of emotion. In a recent survey, Carroll Izard 
canvasses thirty-five prominent academics—representing scientific disciplines 
concerned with emotions research (behavioural and cognitive neuroscience, 
                                                
64 See John T. Fitzgerald, “The Passions and Moral Progress: An Introduction,” in Passions and 
Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 1–2.  
In classics, important book-length examples include Nussbaum, Therapy; Richard Sorabji, Emotion 
and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000); Margaret R. Graver, Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3–4 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2002); Margaret R. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007); Teun Tieleman, Chrysippus’ On Affections: Reconstructions and Reinterpretations (Leiden: Brill, 
2003); Robert A. Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); David Konstan, The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and 
Classical Literature (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).  
Significant collections of essays include Susanna Morton Braund and Christopher Gill, eds., The 
Passions in Roman Thought and Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Juha 
Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, eds., The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1998); John T. Fitzgerald, ed., Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman 
Thought (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008). 
65 See e.g. Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean O’Malley Halley, eds., The Affective Turn: Theorizing 
the Social (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); for more references see Jan Plamper, The History of 
Emotions: An Introduction, trans. Keith Tribe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 63 n.120. 
66 Jerome Kagan, What Is Emotion? History, Measures, and Meanings (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2007), 4. 
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computational cognitive science, and clinical, developmental, and social psychological 
science)—on their working definitions of emotion.67 Based on their responses, Izard 
delineates a composite picture of the main features of emotion: 
Emotion consists of neural circuits (that are at least partially dedicated), response 
systems, and a feeling state/process that motivates and organizes cognition and 
action. Emotion also provides information to the person experiencing it, and may 
include antecedent cognitive appraisals and ongoing cognition including an 
interpretation of its feeling state, expressions or social-communicative signals, and 
may motivate approach or avoidant behavior, exercise control/regulation of 
responses, and be social or relational in nature.68   
While Izard’s findings show that scholars in the psychological and behavioural sciences 
have yet to converge on a consensus definition of emotion, his multivalent description 
indicates the challenges that theorists face in articulating the relationships between the 
various processes that are thought to be integral to emotion. It is interesting that some of 
the scientists who were surveyed opined that emotion may have also a social facet; this 
takes us to the heart of the debate concerning the nature of emotions—whether they are 
universal or socially constructed.  
As Jan Plamper observes, since the mid-nineteenth century at the very latest, 
academic discussion of emotion has revolved around these two polarities: the universal, 
essentialist, trans-historical nature of emotion on the one hand, and its being socially 
conditioned, culturally contingent, and historical on the other.69 Scholars have often 
noted the polarization between universalism and social constructivism,70 and the 
arguments that are made in support of each side of the debate continue to characterize 
the cutting edge of research.71 Certainly, however, as Izard’s survey reveals, it is not as 
if the paradigms themselves have been fleshed out in agreed-upon terms. One of the 
most difficult challenges facing emotions researchers today is how to establish a middle 
ground, by bridging scientific discourse in neuroscience and psychology with the work 
of social scientists and scholars in the humanities. While certain universalist 
conceptions of emotion allow for a degree of cultural contingency,72 in the same way 
                                                
67 Carroll E. Izard, “The Many Meanings/Aspects of Emotion: Definitions, Functions, Activation, and 
Regulation,” Emotion Review 2 (2010): 363–370. 
68 Izard, “Many Meanings,” 367.  
69 Plamper, History, 5, 74. 
70 Plamper, History, 5–6. 
71 On the historical development of both views up to the present day, see Plamper, History, 75–250; a 
succinct analysis of their theoretical underpinnings is in John Corrigan, “Introduction: Emotions Research 
and the Academic Study of Religion,” in Religion and Emotion: Approaches and Interpretations, ed. 
John Corrigan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7–13. 
72 E.g. in studies in social neuroscience on empathy; for discussion see Plamper, History, 248–249.  
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that some cognitive theories leave room for physiological influences,73 a conclusive 
theoretical synthesis of both paradigms remains elusive.74  
1.3.2. Emotions Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities 
It is well beyond the scope of my study to attempt to adjudicate between the two 
paradigms. However, since my approach to emotion revolves around, broadly speaking, 
historical investigation, the constructivism that continues to influence emotions research 
in the humanities and social sciences is of far more direct applicability than the 
universalist paradigm. Social constructionist approaches to emotion have their origin in 
the field of anthropology. Until the publication in the 1980s of influential emotional 
ethnographies, especially those by Michelle Rosaldo, Lila Abu-Lughod, and Catherine 
Lutz,75 that demonstrated that the expression of emotion varied across cultures and that 
people from different cultures had very different feelings, it was widely assumed that 
emotions were prelinguistic and invariant across cultures.76 These new findings, which 
were part of a broader social constructionist trend in anthropology,77 undermined any 
notions of pancultural emotions and ushered constructionist arguments for emotion onto 
centre stage. Thus Lutz, for example, insists that “emotional experience is not 
precultural but preeminently cultural;”78 and Rosaldo, reiterating her views in a 
subsequent, seminal essay, argues that emotion is shaped by thought, and is indeed 
embodied thought—and as such, emotions should be interpreted as processes structured 
by the forms of cognition and reason that arise from a person’s embeddedness within a 
particular sociocultural milieu.79 Since the mid-1990s or so, however, some 
                                                
73 For a recent example see Batja Mesquita and Michael Boiger, “Emotions in Context: A 
Sociodynamic Model of Emotions,” Emotion Review 6 (2014): 298–302. 
74 Perhaps the most well-known attempt is that of William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A 
Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Reddy’s aim is 
to bring together the universalism of cognitive psychology and the social constructivism of the 
anthropology of emotions, but his proposals are not uncontroversial and have been debated by theorists 
on both sides; see Plamper, History, 251–265.   
75 Michelle Z. Rosaldo, Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Notions of Self and Social Life (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980); Lila Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a 
Bedouin Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Catherine A. Lutz, Unnatural 
Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll & Their Challenge to Western Theory (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
76 On the earlier anthropology of emotions, see Plamper, History, 80–98. 
77 On this see Plamper, History, 109–114. This trend is a devolution of what is often known as the 
linguistic or cultural turn, or the advent of postmodernism, within the social sciences and humanities.  
78 Lutz, Unnatural Emotions, 5 (emphasis original). 
79 Michelle Z. Rosaldo, “Towards an Anthropology of Self and Feeling,” in Culture Theory: Essays 
on Mind, Self, and Emotion, ed. Richard A. Schweder and Robert A. LeVine (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 137–157, esp. 137–143. 
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anthropologists have moved beyond these views of emotion to promote, among other 
things, the supersession of dichotomous emotional constructs, and even certain 
universalist tendencies.80 Nonetheless, as Plamper rightly concludes, “no other 
discipline has done so much to shatter the idea that feelings are timeless and everywhere 
the same as has anthropology.”81  
In the related field of sociology, the contemporary interest in emotion began to be 
discernible in the 1970s, with the diminishing influence of grand theory and a turn to 
microsociology. It was arguably the work of Arlie Hochschild82 that marked the 
emergence of the sociology of emotions as a distinct sub-field of study.83 For 
Hochschild, social interactions are construed as a scripted drama in which actors abide 
by “feeling rules” that form the basis for the “emotional work” that they have to 
perform in order to make their feelings conform appropriately to society’s emotional 
norms. Emotional life is regulated through the assessment and modification of personal 
feeling in relation to the operative feeling rules, which set standards of what is owed 
and owing in emotional exchanges.84 Though one might wish for a more nuanced 
account of emotion that grants individual agents more leeway in their responses to 
emotional pressure,85 Hochschild’s basic notion of feeling rules remains influential in 
the sociology of emotions. In his survey of the field, Jonathan Turner notes that since 
the late 1970s the study of emotion has made remarkable progress, and it now stands at 
the forefront of microsociology and, increasingly, macrosociology, with theoretical 
research traditions already in evidence.86  
A recent contribution to the broader field comes from Ole Riis and Linda 
Woodhead, who in 2010 published A Sociology of Religious Emotion, drawing 
inspiration from across a wide range of disciplines that deal with emotion (philosophy, 
psychology, behavioural studies, neuroscience, cultural studies, linguistics, 
                                                
80 For discussion see Plamper, History, 129–130, 136–146. 
81 Plamper, History, 146. 
82 Arlie Russell Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983); see also Arlie Russell Hochschild, “Emotion Work, Feeling Rules, 
and Social Structure,” American Journal of Sociology 85 (1979): 551–575. 
83 So Plamper, History, 123; see here n.198 for major subsequent publications in the field. For an 
overview of how research has developed since, see Jonathan H. Turner, “The Sociology of Emotions: 
Basic Theoretical Arguments,” Emotion Review 1 (2009): 340–354. 
84 Hochschild, Managed Heart, ix–x, 18, 56–75, 85; see also Hochschild, “Emotion Work,” esp. 571–
573. 
85 So e.g. Deborah Lupton, The Emotional Self: A Sociocultural Exploration (London: Sage, 1998), 
169–170. 
86 Turner, “Sociology,” 340; on these research trajectories see Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner, 
eds., Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions (New York: Springer, 2006). 
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anthropology, and sociology) to produce a multidimensional conceptual framework for 
emotion that is attentive to its variegated character.87 They propose a model in which 
emotion is generated in the interactions between individual agents, societal structures, 
and cultural symbols;88 and to consolidate these interactions they posit the concept of an 
“emotional regime.”89 Eschewing the need to choose between scientific or cultural 
approaches to emotion, they argue that recent work in cognitive and neurological 
science and in philosophical phenomenology is further destabilizing the overly 
simplistic dichotomy between these poles.90 For Riis and Woodhead, emotion is “‘both-
and’ rather than ‘either/or’: both personal and relational; private and social; biological 
and cultural; active and passive;”91 it is “a label for a range of coordinated 
psychophysical elements, in and through which we relate to other beings and symbols, 
and in terms of which they relate to us.”92 Furthermore, Riis and Woodhead specifically 
contextualize religious emotion within their conceptual framework, and demonstrate 
comprehensively how religious emotion is integral to, and configured by, its social and 
symbolic relations.93  
1.3.3. Emotion: Nature and Terminology 
To conclude this brief, and necessarily only representative, overview of current 
emotions research, we attend now to the closely related questions of definition and 
terminology. What is meant by “emotion”? And is there a fundamental linguistic unity 
of meaning in the various terms that have represented “emotion” across history, cultural 
space, and disciplinary specialization?  
                                                
87 Ole Riis and Linda Woodhead, A Sociology of Religious Emotion (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 20–53. 
88 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 5–9.  
89 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 10–12. To be sure, the term “emotional regime” is not new. 
William Reddy seems to have introduced it: he defines the term formally as “[t]he set of normative 
emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them; a necessary 
underpinning of any stable political regime” (Navigation, 129). Certainly, as Plamper observes (History, 
265), the term is now often heard in various settings, detached from its context and used for the general 
idea of emotional norms or standards. Riis and Woodhead assign to it a very specific meaning in their 
scheme (see further my discussion in section 5.3.1).   
90 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 24–30. 
91 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 5. 
92 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 47. 
93 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 54–55, 69–73, 93–94. 
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1.3.3.a. The Nature of Emotion and Its Conceptual History 
Plamper observes that the sheer difficulty of defining emotion is often treated as 
its leading characteristic.94 As James Russell writes at the beginning of his introduction 
to a specially designated section of a recent volume of Emotion Review treating the 
matter: “Emotion researchers face a scandal: We have no agreed upon definition for the 
term—emotion—that defines our field.”95 Indeed, even within each of the disciplines 
that study emotion, there is incomplete agreement about what constitutes emotion; this 
state of affairs hampers the progress of research and stymies interdisciplinary work. An 
academic consensus as to what emotion is might be next to impossible to achieve, not 
least because each field of study privileges different aspects of emotion. Nonetheless, 
scholars of different disciplinary commitments continue to try to move the discussion 
forward constructively: examples include, from neuroscience, Joseph LeDoux; from 
psychology, Jerome Kagan; from philosophy, Martha Nussbaum; and the collaborative 
proposals of a philosopher, Kevin Mulligan, and a psychologist, Klaus Scherer.96 My 
own theoretical position follows the eclectic but broadly sociological approach of Riis 
and Woodhead, who present emotion as cognitive, psychophysical stances and 
interventions embedded in complex socio-symbolic structures of meaning.97  
In regard to terminology: the English term “emotion” shares a capacious semantic 
domain with several other commonly used terms. Riis and Woodhead speak for many in 
suggesting that these alternative terms highlight different dimensions of emotion: 
“passions” conveys the power of emotion, “feeling” their embodied aspect, 
“sentiments” the way they relate to character and education, while “affect” 
suggests their passive and reactive dimension. “Emotion” is good at conveying its 
dynamic, motivating force of “e-motion,” but tends to support an individualistic 
conception of emotions as inner states.98 
                                                
94 Plamper, History, 11. Among the studies Plamper cites is Beverly Fehr and James A. Russell, 
“Concept of Emotion Viewed from a Prototype Perspective,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General 113 (1984): 464–486: “everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition” 
(here 464).  
95 James A. Russell, “Introduction to Special Section: On Defining Emotion,” Emotion Review 4 
(2012): 337 (emphasis original). 
96 Joseph LeDoux, “A Neuroscientist’s Perspective on Debates about the Nature of Emotion,” 
Emotion Review 4 (2012): 375–379; Kagan, Emotion; for a summary of its main themes see Jerome 
Kagan, “Once More into the Breach,” Emotion Review 2 (2010): 91–99; Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals 
of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. 1–16; 
Kevin Mulligan and Klaus R. Scherer, “Toward a Working Definition of Emotion,” Emotion Review 4 
(2012): 345–357. 
97 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 29, 47–53. See in my study sections 1.3.2 and 5.3. 
98 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 20. They note also that no one term captures the full complexity of 
what it articulates.  
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These kinds of observations find broad support in Thomas Dixon’s account of the 
conceptual history of the term “emotion,”99 in which he argues that “emotion” displaced 
other more specific terms when, as an everyday word used in common parlance to refer 
to any kind of mental feeling, it was commandeered as a theoretical term in the science 
of the mind in the early nineteenth century.100 Until then, theorists like philosophers, 
physicians, and theologians had tended to use more than one term to refer to those states 
that would later be designated as “emotion.” Influenced by Augustine and Aquinas 
(who were in turn influenced by ancient debates between Stoicism and Christianity), 
these theorists had especially distinguished between “passions,” which were 
involuntary, troubling lusts and desires to be avoided, and “affections,” which were the 
virtues such as love and compassion to which one should voluntarily aspire.101 The 
linguistic ascendancy of “emotion” as a theoretical term in the nineteenth century 
reflected the shifts in institutional and intellectual authority that were occurring: 
the term “emotion” suited the purposes of a self-consciously secularizing and 
scientific cadre of psychological theorists of the late 19th century, detached as it 
was from the centuries of moral and theological connotations that had accrued to 
the terms “passion” and “affection.”102 
 The final stage in the semantic history of “emotion” has been the popularization of 
scientific ideas associated with it, such as “emotional intelligence” and “emotional well-
being,” in ways that have traded on the psychological and medical authority of the 
term.103 
The intellectual history of “emotion” also helps to explain the conceptual 
confusion and debate that has marked so much of emotions research. Here we must 
outline Dixon’s account a little more fully.104 In the early nineteenth century, when the 
new theoretical term “emotion” was first put into use by the philosopher Thomas 
Brown, he championed the notion that “emotions” were vivid feelings that could not be 
embodied in any verbal definition. Brown’s was also an explicitly non-cognitive 
concept of “emotion” in which intellectual thought was separated from feeling. The 
                                                
99 Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of A Secular Psychological Category 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); I refer below primarily to his own précis, published as 
Thomas Dixon, “‘Emotion’: The History of a Keyword in Crisis,” Emotion Review 4 (2012): 338–344. 
100 Dixon, “History,” 339–340; Dixon, From Passions, 109–127. 
101 Dixon, “History,” 339; Dixon, From Passions, 26–61. However, Barbara Rosenwein finds a 
greater overlap between “passions” and “affections,” seeing the presence of a continuum between the 
terms; Barbara H. Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2006), 4. 
102 Dixon, “History,” 342; see also Dixon, From Passions, 233–242. 
103 Dixon, “History,” 343. 
104 Here I summarize Dixon, “History,” 340–342. 
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physician Charles Bell, who regarded “emotions” as certain changes in the mind that 
were manifested in bodily ways, was also influential. Brown’s and Bell’s ideas were 
endorsed by many psychologists and scientists and exercised a formative influence on 
the emotions theories of William James and Charles Darwin. Dixon concludes: 
The founders of the discipline of psychology in the late 19th century bequeathed to 
their successors a usage of “emotion” in which the relationship between mind and 
body and between thought and feeling were confused and unresolved, and which 
named a category of feelings and behaviours so broad as to cover almost all of 
human mental life including as Bain (1859) had put it, all that was previously 
understood by the terms “feelings, states of feeling, pleasures, pains, passions, 
sentiments, affections.”105 
Modern psychology has had to deal with this muddled legacy in which emotional 
feeling and intellectual thought were bifurcated and “emotion” left bereft of a clear 
definition. 
The above discussion of the conceptual history of emotion is germane to our 
discussion because it helps us to be alert to certain unconscious assumptions or biases 
that may be inadvertently carried into the study of emotion in the NT. First, there is a 
popular and academic tendency to dichotomize thought and feeling based on the 
premise that emotion is non-cognitive and irrational compared to properly evaluated 
thinking and volition.106 Second, if emotions are regarded as irrational, then they are 
seen to hamper sensible and intelligent action—which can cause a negative assessment 
or disregard of people or situations in which emotion is evident: “[p]eople tend to see 
emotions as a disruption of, or barrier to, the rational understanding of events. To label 
someone ‘emotional’ is often to question the validity, and more, the very sense of what 
they are saying.”107 Third, with the corporeality of emotions comes the assumption that 
they are natural, and culturally universal. For Hockey, it is not surprising, given all 
these commonly held assumptions, that emotion in NT has been overlooked in modern 
scholarship. The privileging of rationality has led to a trivializing of emotion; and 
furthermore, the assumption that emotions are universal can mean that one makes the 
further assumption that emotions in a text do not need to be thoroughly investigated 
because they can be automatically understood from personal experience.108  
                                                
105 Dixon, “History,” 342–343, citing Alexander Bain, The Emotions and the Will (London: Parker, 
1859), 3.  
106 Here I am indebted to Hockey, “Seeing Emotionally,” 27–29, where she uses the work of 
Catherine Lutz (Unnatural Emotions, 53–80) to highlight Western historical biases that we need to be 
aware of when exploring the writings of an ancient author. 
107 Hockey, “Seeing Emotionally,” 28 (quote from Lutz, Unnatural Emotions, 60). 
108 Hockey, “Seeing Emotionally,” 28–29.  
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1.3.3.b. Emotion and Cognition 
Although definitional and other issues are still debated, present-day emotions 
scholarship in psychology has largely moved beyond the thought/feeling dualism that 
marks non-cognitive approaches.109 The authors of a review to mark Cognition and 
Emotion’s 25th year of publication in 2011 note that “[a]lthough occasional grumbling 
was once heard about ‘cognitive imperialism’ the idea of a cognitive approach to 
emotions is now firmly at the centre of any articulated understanding of emotion.”110 In 
cognitive models of emotion, a typical emotion “combines appraisal, physiological 
change, experience, expression, and action”;111 however, theorists do not agree as to the 
precise number and nature of these components, nor their sequence, in emotional 
arousal.112 But at the heart of all cognitive approaches is the premise that an emotion is 
a judgement of value—an evaluation or appraisal in relation to a person’s needs or 
goals—that gives rise to one or several modes of action readiness.113 As such, cognitive 
theories ascribe great importance to the role of emotions in human life, since they relate 
outer events and other people to inner concerns.114  
1.3.3.c. “Emotion” as a Portmanteau Term 
We end our survey of research by considering if the present-day term “emotion” 
is conceptually equivalent to the terms that were in use in the Greco-Roman world. 
Certainly, “emotion” is a contested word in terms of its precise definition and its nature. 
Yet, as we have also seen, the intellectual history of the term shows that there is 
significant overlap with the other terms with which it is associated. Before “emotion” 
was endowed with its modern meaning by the scientific community in the nineteenth 
century, people spoke more often and more precisely of things like “passions,” 
“affections,” and “sentiments”; all such terms therefore referred to subsets of the ideas 
                                                
109 Non-cognitive theories are still held by a few psychologists; on this see the discussion in Elliott, 
Faithful Feelings, 24–27.  
110 Keith Oatley et al.,“Cognition and Emotion Over Twenty-Five Years,” Cognition and Emotion 25 
(2011): 1345. See also the survey by Izard discussed earlier (section 1.3.1). 
111 Keith Oatley and P. N. Johnson-Laird, “Cognitive Approaches to Emotions,” Trends in Cognitive 
Science 18 (2014): 134; see also Agnes Moors, “Theories of Emotion Causation: A Review,” Cognition 
and Emotion 23 (2009): 626, who aggregates these elements slightly differently and expresses them in 
terms of cognitive, feeling, motivational, somatic, and motor components.   
112 Moors, “Theories,” 627–630; Oatley and Johnson-Laird, “Cognitive Approaches,” 134–137.  
113 Oatley et al., “Twenty-Five Years,” 1345. On appraisal theory generally, see Agnes Moors et al., 
“Appraisal Theories of Emotion: State of the Art and Future Development,” Emotion Review 5 (2013): 
119–124; see also the useful overview in Hockey, “Seeing Emotionally,” 32–35. 
114 Oatley and Johnson-Laird, “Cognitive Approaches,” 134. 
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that today come under the umbrella of “emotion.”115 Terms like “passion” and 
“affection” especially were influenced by Augustine’s and Aquinas’ understanding of 
them; and they were in turn influenced by Stoic philosophical conceptions of those 
states that we would today call emotions—in particular, the passions, and the category 
of “good emotions” called the eupatheiai.116 Thus our conclusion is that all the above 
terms track the same lexical field in overlapping if not strictly synonymous fashion, and 
as such can be represented in my study by “emotion”—a broad, inclusive portmanteau 
word that aggregates the various meanings that are embedded in these alternative terms, 
and can therefore be used in a generic sense to designate all of them. In order to vary 
my prose, and in common with much of academic writing today, I will occasionally use 
words such as “feeling” and “affect” as equivalents for “emotion.” However, I will not 
use “passion” and “affection,” with their moralizing connotations, unless I am referring 
to specific historical contexts where these terms refer to ethical mores.  
 
1.4. Aims of the Study 
We are now in a position to set out the aims of this study and to delineate the 
methodological approach that it will take.  
Our survey of current research in emotion in early Christianity in general, and in 
Paul in particular, reveals that it is still at a very early stage. It was only in 2016 that the 
first full-scale examination of emotion in a NT letter (1 Peter) was produced. Certainly, 
scholarly work on specific emotions in the Pauline letters, carried out in dialogue with 
modern emotions research, is beginning to suggest several things about Paul’s view of 
these emotions—that for him, they have a cognitive, rational basis, that they are linked 
in some way to his theological agenda, and that they seem to be connected also to 
processes of social engagement. However, further work is needed to develop these 
findings and elucidate their implications. In addition, and importantly, more can be done 
to investigate the broader role of emotion in Paul’s writings, beyond its use in 
persuasive discourse.  
These questions drive my study: For Paul, what is the main role of emotion, and 
why is this important for him? Since we will operate on the assumption that emotion is 
cognitive, how precisely are thought, faith, and feeling correlated to each other? What is 
                                                
115 See Rosenwein, Emotional Communities, 3. 
116 These will be thoroughly investigated in the following chapter of this study. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 22 
the rationale behind Paul’s promotion of certain emotions, such as joy, and banishment 
(or at least moderation) of other emotions, like grief? How are “right” emotions fostered 
and “wrong” ones curbed, and long-term emotional dispositions established and 
reinforced? How does Paul’s handling of emotion compare to that of the most 
significant ancient parallel, the Stoics? My study, which is the first thesis-length study 
of emotion in Paul’s letters, aims to fill a gap in present-day NT research by addressing 
precisely these questions, and by taking the discussion forward through the articulation 
of a robust account of the function of emotion in Paul’s writings. I will seek to show 
that Paul regards emotion as being integral to, and an embodiment of, belief, and that he 
also understands emotion to be both socially formed and socially formative. The thrust 
of my argument is that for Paul, emotion plays a critical role alongside belief in the 
shaping of identity and community, and is therefore integral to the proper acculturation 
and social formation of the early Christians—a role that is only beginning to be 
recognized and explored in NT scholarship.  
In broader terms, my hope is that this thesis will make a modest contribution 
towards the much larger enterprise of deepening our understanding of Pauline 
Christianity and the social world of the NT. Furthermore, I hope that this study will be a 
useful example of how appropriate social-scientific resources can be put to use 
alongside exegetical analysis to mount a thoroughgoing historical investigation of 
emotion in the Pauline letters, and that it provides evidence of the value of exploring 
emotion using such tools. In a 2014 journal article surveying the state of play of 
cognitive approaches to emotion, Oatley and Johnson-Laird concluded that for any 
account of emotion, “a central task for future emotion research is to focus on the 
functions of emotions in social relationships.”117 I hope that such a focus will be fruitful 
even in an interdisciplinary investigation like this present one. 
 
1.5. Methodological Approach 
It remains for me to outline how this study is laid out; but first, some general 
comments concerning the theoretical underpinnings of my approach are in order.  
In line with what is now the mainstream understanding of emotion in current 
scholarship, this study adopts a cognitive approach to emotion, which involves, at its 
                                                
117 Oatley and Johnson-Laird, “Cognitive Approaches,” 138. 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 23 
core, a judgement or appraisal of an object’s value that gives rise to some form of action 
tendency. At the same time, as mine is a historical study of emotion, I take also the 
view, prevalent in emotions theories in the social sciences and humanities, that it is 
socially constructed and culturally conditioned. As I see it, an approach to emotion that 
deliberately incorporates the interplay of these two ideas—that emotion is a cognitive as 
well as a social phenomenon—holds much promise for my inquiry because it 
recognizes the personal dimensions of affective response while also being attentive to 
the impact on emotion of social dynamics and cultural influences since, after all, Paul’s 
letters are written to, and for, communities.  
If, as we say, emotion is socially constructed, then it is vital that we are familiar 
with thinking concerning emotion in the first century Greco-Roman world, so that our 
reflection on Paul’s treatment of emotion is firmly tethered to its historical and 
sociocultural context. Accordingly, in the chapter to follow (ch. 2), I will provide a 
comprehensive discussion of the Stoic understanding of emotion and its therapy. We 
will allow the Stoics to speak for themselves (so to speak!), to ensure that we are not 
anachronistically importing modern conceptions of emotion into ancient texts. And in 
the course of our work on Paul in the subsequent chapters of this thesis, we will return 
to this material on Stoicism and interact with it by highlighting points of similarity and 
difference and drawing out their implications. I have chosen to focus my attention on 
the Stoics—and only the Stoics—for several reasons. First, it is commonly held that 
Stoicism was the most important philosophical influence in that era;118 Anthony Long 
notes that “[i]n the Roman world of the first two Christian centuries Stoicism was the 
dominant philosophy among educated pagans.”119 Second, the Stoics were known for 
their explicit emphasis on philosophy as a way of life;120 by any reading, Pauline 
Christianity, too, was at least also a way of life.121 Third, and related to the foregoing, 
there is an astonishingly long-established scholarly tradition of using Stoicism as a 
conversation partner for Christianity, which suggests that juxtaposing the two traditions 
is, as Kavin Rowe elegantly puts it, “a particularly promising way of eliciting creative 
thought about complex cases in which rival traditions negotiate each other’s claims to 
                                                
118 So e.g. Anthony A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1986), 107; F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 16. 
119 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 232. 
120 See John Sellars, The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy, 2nd ed. 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2009), 55–85. 
121 A very recent and intelligently provocative reading of the relationship between emergent 
Christianity and Stoicism as rival traditions of life is C. Kavin Rowe’s One True Life: The Stoics and 
Early Christians as Rival Traditions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). 
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truth through time.”122 Fourth, the Stoics had by far the most fully developed account of 
emotion of the day, which is helpful in terms of constructing comparisons with Paul’s 
views.  
In chs. 3 and 4 of my study I investigate joy in Philippians and grief in 1 
Thessalonians respectively: though both emotions occur across a number of Paul’s 
letters, joy is an especially significant theme in Philippians, and grief in 1 
Thessalonians. Admittedly, due to the constraints of space, I have had to be very 
selective as to which emotions to focus on. Joy and grief have been chosen because they 
are powerful, contrasting emotions that Paul categorically deals with, and at some 
length; in Philippians he expressly commands joy, while in 1 Thessalonians he forbids a 
certain type of grief. The prominence of joy and grief in these letters suggests that they 
have something to do with the thrust of Paul’s theological thinking; and it would 
therefore seem that a careful study of these emotions can help to take us to the heart of 
Paul’s pastoral agenda. In terms of specifics: both chs. 3 (Joy in Philippians) and 4 
(Grief in 1 Thessalonians) will be prefaced by a discussion of the background of the 
letter in question, its genre, and its distinctives—all of which help us to have a sense of 
Paul’s purposes for writing. Moreover, since our study proceeds on the assumption of 
the unity of the letter, this fact will have to be established. In regard to my approach to 
the texts themselves: here in chs. 3 and 4, like in ch. 2, I will not deploy modern 
emotions theories in my reading of Paul beyond their general role in alerting us to the 
cognitive and social dimensions of emotion. Instead, we will endeavour to “hear” him 
on his own terms and in his own historical context through a rigorous exegetical 
analysis of what he has to say. At the same time, we will keep an eye also on what he 
might be trying to do to shape Christian community. Where appropriate, I will introduce 
Stoic thinking as a foil for Paul’s views, so as to make his understanding of joy and 
grief come into even sharper focus.  
Finally, in ch. 5, I bring modern emotions theory to bear on my study. The 
understanding that emotion is related to cognition and that it is not only personal, but 
has also a social cast, suggests that the use of Riis and Woodhead’s sociological model 
of the emotional regime (see section 1.3.2) might be a particularly fruitful means of 
heuristic engagement with how Paul deals with joy and grief. Accordingly, Riis and 
Woodhead’s framework will be discussed in detail, and then used to elucidate how 
                                                
122 See Rowe, One True Life, 3–4 
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desired emotional patterns are produced and reinforced, and how their strength and 
longevity are sustained. I will then correlate these findings to my proposals concerning 
how Paul is using emotion in his letters. To end, I will contrast the Pauline emotional 
regime with Stoic thinking on emotion by bringing together the key findings from this 
and earlier chapters of my study, and in so doing, also highlight the distinctiveness of 
Paul’s account of emotion.  
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Chapter 2. Emotion in Stoicism 
2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will delineate the Stoic understanding of emotion through a 
detailed examination of the primary sources that we have. The trajectory of the 
discussion is straightforward. We begin by considering the broader philosophical 
context, after which I will set out the Stoic account of emotion: we look first at the 
construal of the causation of affective events, and then move on to their overall 
classification of emotion—the Stoics distinguished between the passions, the eupatheiai 
(good emotions), the propatheiai (pre-emotions), and what might be called “moral 
emotions.” Next, Stoic ideals concerning the philosophical therapy of emotion and its 
practical expression will occupy our attention. The chapter will end with an 
investigation of how Seneca and Epictetus viewed grief and joy. 
2.1.1. Translating πάθος 
First, however, some important clarifications are needed in regard to terminology. 
The Stoic doctrine of affective events uses a specific term, πάθος, which in earlier 
Greek philosophical thought had encapsulated a wide-ranging set of phenomena that we 
would today designate by the use of the English term “emotion.”123 However, as we 
shall see in our study, the Stoics applied the term πάθος in a more narrow, technical 
sense: they regarded the πάθη as being inherently wrong and thus a non-normative 
component of the rational human condition. The English word “emotion”—which, as 
we have discussed earlier (see section 1.3.3.c), is used today both in everyday language 
and academic discourse to denote the generic body of experiences that are commonly 
regarded as such—is therefore a potentially misleading translation of πάθος, with its 
ethical connotations.124  
Following the lead of scholars such as Anthony Long and D. N. Sedley,125 Brad 
Inwood,126 Troels Engberg-Pedersen,127 Susanna Morton Braund and Christopher 
                                                
123 According to Diogenes Laertius 5.23 and 5.45, Aristotle and Theophrastus each produced a work 
concerning the πάθη.   
124 LS 1.420: “Passion is … an unhealthy state of mind, not synonymous with emotion in ordinary 
language.”  
125 LS 1.410–423.  
126 Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), 127–128. 
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Gill,128 and others, I have chosen to render πάθος as “passion” instead of “emotion,” 
which is perhaps the more popular translation.129 This allows us to distinguish πάθος as 
a subset of that broad category of human experience that is understood as “emotion” in 
common parlance, which is very useful for our purposes, because we are then able to 
retain in our discussion that same basic understanding of “emotion” as is found in 
language today, and simultaneously assign to “passion” the distinctive contextual 
meanings associated with Stoic theory—which includes the fundamental notion that 
every πάθος is out of place in the life of the wise man.130  
 
2.2. The Broader Philosophical Background 
There is some consensus that in recent decades the salient features of Stoic 
thinking on the emotions have emerged with increasing clarity.131 The founders of the 
Stoic school did not set out to eradicate all trace of emotion in humans; on the contrary, 
identifying false belief as the cause of the experiences of feelings with which they were 
dissatisfied, they sought to determine what the natural feelings of a person should be, in 
the absence of all false belief. Through careful observation the Stoics developed 
psychological explanations for affective responses that harmonized with their ideas 
concerning causation and the physiological basis of mental experiences. These 
explanations were integrated into a comprehensive theory of emotion. 
However, the Stoic theory of emotion cannot be understood in isolation from its 
philosophical context. The Stoics prided themselves on the coherence of their 
philosophy,132 and Stoic thinking on emotions can only be understood by reference to 
their broader theories of psychology, ethics, epistemology, and physics.133 It was an 
organic part of a much larger conceptual framework that the Stoics constructed to make 
sense of human nature and behaviour. A fundamentally important and pervasive 
                                                                                                                                          
127 Troels Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social 
Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990), 170–206. 
128 Braund and Gill, Passions (in the title of their volume).  
129 Used by, for example, Julia Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992), 103–120; Tad Brennan, “The Old Stoic Theory of Emotions,” in The Emotions in 
Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Juha Sihvola and Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1998), 21–70; Sorabji, Emotion; Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval 
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 47–80.  
130 On the Stoic ideal of the sage, see Sellars, Art of Living, 59–64. 
131 Graver, Stoicism, 2; Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 21. 
132 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 108, citing Cicero, Fin. 3.74. 
133 Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 21. 
Chapter 2. Emotion in Stoicism 
 29 
element of that framework is reason; and it is with the Stoic understanding of reason 
that we begin our exploration.  
2.2.1. Rationality, Virtue, and Eudaimonia 
In Stoic thinking, rationality permeated the entire cosmos: divine reason or λόγος, 
which the Stoics equated with universal nature, and with their conception of deity, 
pervaded all things and shaped every event.134 The universe was regarded as an 
organized system that was amenable to rational explanation. Since λόγος was present in 
human beings, the individual person at the essence of his nature shared the property of 
rationality with the cosmos. As such, to live in agreement with nature was to act in 
accordance with the best of human reason.135 The Stoics believed that rational 
contemplation and action would facilitate the living of life according to nature’s 
purposes,136 for nature’s activity was one of perfect rationality.137 Therefore, that which 
was of greatest good for a person was the perfection of his own reason—which led to 
virtue: 
And what quality is best in man? It is reason; by virtue of reason he surpasses the 
animals, and is surpassed only by the gods. Perfect reason is therefore the good 
peculiar to man; all other qualities he shares in some degree with animals and 
plants … What then is peculiar to man? Reason. When this is right and has reached 
perfection, man’s felicity is complete. Hence, if everything is praiseworthy and has 
arrived at the end intended by its nature, when it has brought its peculiar good to 
perfection, and if man’s peculiar good is reason; then if a man has brought his 
reason to perfection, he is praiseworthy and has reached the end suited to his 
nature. This perfect reason is called virtue, and is likewise that which is 
honourable. (Seneca, Ep. 76.9–10) 
Summed up as “the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational,”138 virtue 
was a rational consistency (ὁµολογία, literally, “harmony with reason”) that ensued in 
happiness or eudaimonia (εὐδαιµονία)—which was wholly constituted by virtue.139 To 
                                                
134 See Cicero, Nat. d. 1.39 (=LS 54B); Diogenes Laertius 7.134 (=LS 44B); Seneca, Ep. 124.13–14.  
135 Stobaeus 2.75.11–76.8 (=LS 63B).  
136 Diogenes Laertius 7.130. See also the similar statement in Cicero, Nat. d. 2.37–39 (=LS 54H); here 
Cicero refers to man’s purpose, which is to contemplate and imitate the world, in order to be perfected in 
virtue. 
137 Seneca, Ep. 124.13–14: “that alone is perfect which is perfect according to nature as a whole, and 
nature as a whole is possessed of reason.” 
138 “Τὸ τέλειον κατὰ φύσιν λογικοῦ ὡς λογικοῦ” (Diogenes Laertius 7.94).  
139 Diogenes Laertius 7.89; Plutarch, Virt. mor. 441B–C (=LS 61B). Cicero, in Tusc. 4.34 opines that 
virtue may, in its most concise formulation, be termed “right reason.”  
On the translation of eudaimonia as “happiness,” see Anthony A. Long, “Stoic Eudaimonism,” in 
Stoic Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 181; here Long argues that "happiness" is 
the normal and indeed correct translation of eudaimonia because it includes both the objective features of 
Chapter 2. Emotion in Stoicism 
 30 
be sure, the Stoics admitted that very few would achieve this state of perfect well-
being,140 but they insisted on its possibility; for them, “the case of bad men becoming 
good” was evidence that virtue was teachable.141 If virtue was rational consistency, then 
its opposite, vice, was irrationality that stemmed from aberrant thinking and erroneous 
judgement.142 The Stoic position on the nature of the soul did not allow for degrees of 
virtue and vice. The soul was a unitary whole, and as such its powers were not divisible 
into the rational and the irrational; thus a person’s reasoning faculty was either 
consistent or inconsistent.143 
Eudaimonia was by no means unique to Stoicism: most of the major systems of 
moral philosophy in antiquity are broadly eudaimonist in their structure.144 The Stoics 
share with Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus the general claim that eudaimonia is 
a condition that depends on a person’s beliefs, values, desires, and moral character; 
where they stand alone is in their tenet that eudaimonia consists solely and entirely in 
ethical virtue and is thus not dependent on the possession of goods that partly depend on 
chance.145 In Stoicism, then, the cultivation of rationality was the key to eudaimonia. A 
happy life was a life of perfected reason in accordance with nature; moreover, such a 
condition was within one’s power to achieve 
since they [the Stoics] have perceived the final good to be agreement with nature 
and living consistently with nature, which is not only the wise man’s proper 
function, but also in his power. It necessarily follows that the happy life is in the 
power of the man who has the final good in his power. So the wise man’s life is 
always happy (ita fit semper vita beata sapientis). (Cicero, Tusc. 5.82 [=LS 63M])  
As Long expresses it, the Stoic specification of happiness “involves the fulfilment of all 
desires that it is reasonable for human beings to have”; such a condition is certainly 
attainable provided that one completely limits these desires (and aversions) to the 
domain in which one is capable of being autonomous, i.e. in such things as rationality, 
                                                                                                                                          
happiness (the attainment of good) and its subjective connotations (a profoundly content state of mind). 
See also his Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 190. 
140 See Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fat. 199.14–22 (=LS 61N).   
141 Diogenes Laertius 7.91; Cicero, Nat. d. 2.39.  
142 Stobaeus 2.66.14–67.4 (=LS 61G); Cicero, Tusc. 4.29, 34–35 (=LS 61O); Plutarch, Virt. mor. 
441C–D (=LS 61B); Plutarch, St. rep. 1046E–F (=LS 61F). Long and Sedley note that the principal 
characteristics of vice in the relevant accounts are established by parity of reasoning, with an emphasis on 
inconsistency and ignorance (LS 1.385–386).  
143 LS 1.383, citing Diogenes Laertius 7.127 (=LS 61I).  
144 For a comparative study of ancient Greek eudaimonistic theories see Julia Annas, The Morality of 
Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). On eudaimonism in Stoicism see Long, 
“Eudaimonism,” 179–201; John M. Cooper, “Eudaimonism, the Appeal to Nature, and ‘Moral Duty’ in 
Stoicism,” in Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1999), 427–448; LS 1.398–401. 
145 Long, “Eudaimonism,” 182.  
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judgement, and volition.146 Hence we see that eudaimonia is inextricably linked both to 
reason and virtuous agency;147 indeed, its benefits are constituted by virtue.148  
2.2.2. Stoic Physics and the Pneuma 
Though the Stoics placed much emphasis on the propositional content of human 
mental experience and on the norms that could be established as a result of rational 
evaluation, they insisted also on the physical nature of all events in the mind. For them, 
mental events were always constituted by some kind of psychophysical change. Earlier, 
Aristotle had proposed that when investigating the nature of the psyche, the biological 
and non-biological approaches were both valid: 
But the natural philosopher and the logician will in every case offer different 
definitions, e.g., in answer to the question what is anger. The latter will call it a 
craving for retaliation, or something of the sort; the former will describe it as a 
surging of the blood and heat around the heart. The one is describing the matter, 
the other the form or formula of the essence. (Aristotle, De an., 1.1.403a29–403b3) 
Stoicism adopted Aristotle’s methodological stance and propounded a hypothesis in 
which mental events could be construed either in intentional terms (by articulating their 
propositional content) or in physical terms (by specifying some material shift within a 
somatic locale). Though greater emphasis was placed on the intentional dimensions of 
their theory, the Stoics made significant effort also to explain the processes of the mind 
in physical terms, in a manner that was consistent with their understanding of natural 
science.  
The Stoic belief that the mind was necessarily a material substance and that all 
mental events were also manifested physically came from their claim that anything that 
interacted with a body had to be itself corporeal in some way. Indeed, for the Stoics, the 
tangible bodily reactions that accompanied emotional upheavals were proof that 
thoughts and emotions were also alterations in some kind of psychic material.149 This 
animating mind-material consisted of pneuma (πνεῦµα)—a highly energized compound 
of fire and air. In early Stoicism, Zeno had identified the heat that was in all things as 
the “designing fire” (πῦρ τεχνικόν) which supplied the “seminal principle” (λόγος 
                                                
146 See Long, Epictetus, 191 (emphasis original). 
147 Cooper, “Eudaimonism,” 427–428; Lawrence C. Becker, A New Stoicism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998), 21.  
148 LS 1.399; citing Seneca, Ep. 92.3 (=LS 63F). 
149 Nemesius, De natura hominis, 78.7–79.2 (=LS 45C). On corporealism see also Cicero, Acad., 1.39 
(=LS 45A); Sextus Empiricus, Math. 8.263 (=LS 45B); and the very useful discussion in David E. Hahm, 
The Origins of Stoic Cosmology (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 3–28. 
Chapter 2. Emotion in Stoicism 
 32 
σπερµατικός) that explained their structure and function; indeed the universe as a whole 
was a macrocosm of this structural and functional complexity, because of the presence 
of the designing fire in it.150 However, from Chrysippus onwards, it was the pneuma 
that was assigned this cosmological function and associated with rationality; all things 
owed their identity and properties to the pneuma.151 It was therefore the pneuma that 
endowed humans with all the capacities necessary for life, perception, and response.152 
This helps to account for the readiness of the Stoics to assume a connection between 
human rationality and cosmological ordering: individual living things are parts of the 
cosmos and derive their psychic capacities from the psychic material of the whole.153  
The term psychē (ψυχή), often rendered in English as “soul,” referred to the entire 
innate expanse of pneuma present in a human,154 but in its common and more restrictive 
usage it designated the centralized portion of the pneuma—the hēgemonikon 
(ἡγεµονικόν) or “directive faculty”—that was responsible for what we would call the 
person’s psychological operations.155 Here, cognition was also coordinated with 
locomotion and other motor functions.156 The hēgemonikon was therefore regarded as a 
command centre, located at the heart, which received sensory inputs from, and initiated 
behaviours to, other portions of the psychic material extending into the sense organs and 
limbs.157 In Stoic nomenclature, hēgemonikon is the closest equivalent to our term 
“mind.”  
The Stoic conception of the soul as a centralized system shows similarities to 
contemporaneous medical theories proposed by Praxagoras and the Alexandrian 
physicians Herophilus and Erasistratus. Praxagoras, Herophilus’s teacher, advanced the 
                                                
150 Stobaeus 1.213.15–21 (=LS 46D); Diogenes Laertius 7.135–136 (=LS 46B); Eusebius, Praep. 
evang. 15.14.2 (=LS 46G).  
151 Plutarch, St. rep. 1053F–1054B (=LS 47M); Galen, Intr. 14.726.7–11 (=LS 47N); see further 
Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 152–158. 
152 More specifically, it was the variations in the “tension” (τόνος) between the fire and air in the 
pneuma as they worked together upon the two passive elements of water and earth that explained 
differences in the qualities imparted by pneuma to things; see Graver, Stoicism, 19–21. For a fuller 
discussion see Hahm, Stoic Cosmology, 165–174.  
153 See Hahm, Stoic Cosmology, 163. 
154 SVF 2.885 (=Galen, PHP 7.1.112). 
155 The two meanings of ψυχή are distinguished in Sextus Empiricus, Math. 7.234 (=LS 53F). 
156 The Stoics divided the soul into eight parts: the five senses, the speech and reproductive faculties, 
and the hēgemonikon. See Aetius, Doxographi Graeci 4.21.1–4 (=LS 53H), 4.4.4 (=SVF 2.827); also 
Diogenes Laertius 7.110, where the mind is called δοανοία. 
157 Chrysippus is described as likening it to a spring that flows through the whole body, a tree with its 
branches, and a monarch with his network of spies, in Calcidius, On the Timaeus of Plato 220 (=LS 53G), 
and an octopus and its tentacles in Aetius, Doxographi Graeci 4.21.1–4 (=LS 53H). 
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view that the arteries contained pneuma while the veins carried blood,158 which became 
widely accepted in antiquity.159 Erasistratus distinguished between vital pneuma, which 
flowed through the arteries, and psychic pneuma in the brain and nerves, which was 
responsible for cognition and motor activity.160 Like the Stoics, they made pneuma 
central to their accounts of the soul. Yet the Stoic position was distinctive in several 
respects; one difference was that Chrysippus located the hēgemonikon in the heart (and 
not in the brain).161 The question of the direct influence of the Hellenistic physicians on 
the Stoics remains open.162  
 The hēgemonikon was apparently also attributed with the function of self-
perception. In a valuable account, Hierocles argues that when any part of the body 
moves, parts of the psychē, which was thoroughly mixed together with the body, 
monitors this movement and produces perception. In this way, the hēgemonikon has 
direct awareness of the “non-soul” components of the body and is also indirectly aware 
(through the psychē) of its own movements within these components, and this explains 
why one can sense any change in one’s own being.163  
2.2.3. Stoic Psychology of Knowledge and Action 
The Stoics also provided psychophysical explanations for how information in the 
mind was conceptualized and acted upon. In this psychology of knowledge and action, 
the main elements are impression, assent, and impulse; these generate the action that is 
to be explained.164 The sequence is provided by the Stoicizing Academic Antiochus of 
Ascalon and cited by Cicero,165 who attributes these same ideas to Chrysippus.166 
Further support for these elements as being integral to the Stoic theory comes from the 
                                                
158 Fritz Steckerl, The Fragments of Praxagoras of Cos and His School, Philosophia Antiqua 8 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 10–22. 
159 Galen, PHP 7.5. See also Heinrich von Staden, Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Ancient 
Alexandria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 260–263. 
160 Heinrich von Staden, “Body, Soul, and Nerves: Epicurus, Herophilus, Erasistratus, the Stoics and 
Galen,” in Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity 
to Enlightenment, ed. John P. Wright and Paul Potter (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 87–96, especially 93; 
Staden, Herophilus, 151–161, 247–267. 
161 The localization of the hēgemonikon in the chest, where heartbeat and respiratory function were 
observed, was a natural choice in view of the limited understanding of human physiology in that era. See 
Graver, Stoicism, 22–23; Annas, Mind, 25–26. 
162 For details see Hahm, Stoic Cosmology, 160–163; Staden, “Body, Soul, and Nerves,” 97–105; 
Annas, Mind, 20–26.  
163 Hierocles, Elements of Ethics, 4.38–53 (=LS 53B).  
164 For a comprehensive discussion, see Inwood, Ethics, 42–101. 
165 Cicero, Acad. 2.24–25. 
166 Cicero, Fat. 41–42. 
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fact that they correspond to three of the four powers of the rational soul in Iamblichus’ 
report as found in Stobaeus: here the hēgemonikon is the seat of impression (φαντασία), 
assent (συγκατάθεσις), impulse (ὁρµή), and reason (λόγος).167 
2.2.3.a. Knowledge 
An impression is an alteration that occurs in the psychē through which something 
seems to be present or to be the case.168 The Chrysippan account runs as follows:  
An impression is an affection occurring in the soul (φαντασία µὲν οὖν ἐστι πάθος ἐν 
τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόµενον), which reveals itself and its cause. Thus, when through sight 
we observe something white, the affection is what is engendered in the soul 
through vision; and it is this affection which enables us to say that there is a white 
object which activates us. (Aetius, Doxographi Graeci 4.12.1 [=LS 39B]) 
An impression is thus essentially sentient in nature. Further, in having an impression, 
the mind produces thought that is linguistically formulable and therefore propositional 
(“which enables us to say there is”).169 Elsewhere, the relationship of impressions to 
articulate thought is expressed very clearly: “For impression comes first; then thought, 
which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the 
subject receives from a impression.”170 However this does not imply that the mind 
receives raw data that it then subsequently interprets. All impressions of rational 
persons are rational “processes of thought,”171 and all rational impressions may be 
classified as being either true or false on the basis of the assertions that can be made 
about them,172 which further accentuates their propositional character. These claims 
combine to produce a scenario in which the mind’s stock of conceptions is instantly 
activated upon receiving an impression, such that it presents its object in a 
conceptualized form.173  
In addition, the Stoics had a specific term for the true impression which was 
unmistakably trustworthy because it represented its real object with complete accuracy: 
                                                
167 Stobaeus 1.368.12–20 (=LS 53K). 
168 Graver, Stoicism, 24.  
169 Engberg-Pedersen, Oikeiosis, 147–152, especially 150. 
170 Diogenes Laertius 7.49; I translate φαντασία as “impression” instead of “presentation.” See also 
Sextus Empiricus, Math. 8.70 (=LS 33C). For a succinct discussion of the Stoic argument for a linguistic 
dimension to rationality, see Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 124–125. 
171 Diogenes Laertius 7.51. 
172 Sextus Empiricus, Math. 7.242–246 (=LS 39G). 
173 LS 1.240.  
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this was the “cognitive” or “kataleptic” impression (φαντασία καταληπτική)—literally, 
“impression capable of grasping (its object).”174 Sextus Empiricus reports: 
Of true impressions, some are cognitive, others not (τῶν δὲ ἀληθῶν αἱ µέν εἰσι 
καταληπτικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὔ). Non-cognitive are ones people experience when they are in 
abnormal states. For very large numbers of people who are deranged or 
melancholic take in an impression which is true but non-cognitive, and arises 
purely externally and fortuitously, so that they often do not respond to it positively 
and do not assent to it. A cognitive impression is one which arises from what is 
(καταληπτικὴ δέ ἐστιν ἡ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος) and is stamped and impressed exactly in 
accordance with what is, of such a kind as could not arise from what is not . . . For 
the Stoics say that one who has the cognitive impression fastens on the objective 
difference of things in a craftsmanlike way, since this kind of impression has a 
peculiarity which differentiates it from other impressions. (Math. 7.247–252 [=LS 
40E])175  
As Engberg-Pedersen observes, whether an impression is kataleptic or merely true is a 
difference of degree with respect to the mind’s contribution. The nature of this 
contribution may be elucidated from Sextus’ description of the person having a 
kataleptic impression as one noticing “in a craftsmanlike way” (τεχνικῶς) the 
uniqueness of its properties. The person does this not by having an impression in the 
sense of an image with some special property that marks it outs as veridical, but by 
recalling previous knowledge to help him determine what the thing or event is that 
impinges on his mind. Thus in a kataleptic impression such knowledge is articulated 
more and more precisely until the description of the thing or event that forms the 
impression matches exactly that thing or event.176 
However, to have an impression—whatever its type—is still simply to entertain a 
thought, without any implication of commitment to it. Impression is not belief;177 that 
which transmutes thought into belief is a subsequent mental event called an assent. 
Specifically, one assents to the unique proposition that is intrinsic to, and the proper 
object of, any impression.178 This implies making a commitment to the veracity or 
desirability of the state of affairs that form the content of an impression, and also having 
                                                
174 See LS 1.250–253, in which there is also a useful summary of the debate between the Stoics and 
the Academics concerning the self-certifiability of such impressions. For the sake of consistency, in my 
study I shall refer to these impressions as “kataleptic” impressions.  
175 See also Diogenes Laertius 7.54, who notes that the Stoics regarded the kataleptic impression as 
“the criterion of truth, i.e. the impression arising from what is.”   
176 Engberg-Pedersen, Oikeiosis, 157–160. 
177 See LS 1.239–240, where Long and Sedley helpfully explain that “a Stoic impression in not an 
impression that something is the case—which in modern English, does imply some degree of belief—but 
just the impression of something’s being the case” (emphases theirs).  
178 Stobaeus 2.88.2–3. 
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the capacity to refrain from doing so.179 Assents can be strong or weak: the wise man’s 
strong assent is one that is not only firm and certain but is also irreversible, while the 
weak, less reliable assent of an ordinary person is characterized by precipitancy and 
changeability.180 In regard to kataleptic impressions, the Stoics assumed that the rational 
human being was endowed with the mental ability to make accurate discriminations that 
are congruent with living according to nature. As such, he was therefore naturally 
predisposed to give his assent to such impressions,181 the outcome of which was 
“cognition” or katalēpsis (κατάληψις), i.e., assent to a kataleptic impression.182  
 Drawing together what has been discussed thus far: the Stoic framework for 
understanding the formation of belief in the human mind has two components: 
impression and assent. Any occurrent thought, inclination, desire, or belief that a person 
may have is necessarily some combination of these two components. In Stoic 
epistemology, the highest cognitive state of “knowledge” or “scientific knowledge” 
(ἐπιστήµη) occurs only when an impression is kataleptic and the corresponding assent is 
strong. Though katalēpsis is a necessary condition of knowledge, it is not sufficient to 
constitute it because the cognition has to be impregnable to any thinking that might 
engender a change of mind. All other combinations of impression and assent produce 
“opinion” (δόξα), for our sources also tell us that doxa involves weak assent, or assent 
to what is not kataleptic.183 The Stoic account of these things may be depicted in tabular 
form, which shows how two kinds of assent, to three kinds of impression, result in six 
possible types of beliefs (see Table 1). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
179 LS 1.322; Long and Sedley observe also that Epictetus calls assent “the power to use impressions” 
(Diatr. 1.1.12). 
180 Stobaeus 2.111.18–112.8 (=LS 41G); Plutarch, St. rep. 1057B (=LS 41F). As Graver, Stoicism, 26, 
expresses it: “The ordinary mind is, as it were, a pushover, yielding easily to impressions which the wise 
person would resist.” 
181 Cicero, Acad. 2.30–31, 2.37–38 (=LS 40N). See also Steven K. Strange, “The Stoics on the 
Voluntariness of the Passions,” in Stoicism: Traditions and Transformations, ed. Steven K. Strange and 
Jack Zupko (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 47–48. 
182 Cicero, Acad. 1.40–41 (=LS 40B).  
183 See e.g. Sextus Empiricus, Math. 7.151–157 (=LS 41C); Cicero, Acad. 1.41–42 (=LS 41B); 
Stobaeus 2.111.18–112.8 (=LS 41G); 2.73.16–74.3 (=LS 41H). Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 27, notes that 
as the definition of knowledge is conjunctive, with knowledge and opinion between them exhausting the 
options, DeMorgan’s laws confirm that opinion’s definition should be disjunctive in this fashion. 
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  Impression 
     true false 
  kataleptic merely true  
        Assent 
strong 
knowledge 
katalēpsis (in 
the wise) 
opinion opinion 
weak 
opinion 
katalēpsis (in 
the non-wise) 
opinion opinion 
 
Table 1. Impression and Action in the Formation of Belief.184 
We should note that knowledge requires a strong assent, and can only be found in the 
wise person, whose perfected reason contains no inconsistencies. All beliefs found in 
the non-wise, even if kataleptically true, are merely opinions.  
2.2.3.b. Action 
Having elucidated how the Stoics understood belief to be constructed, we turn 
now to their analysis of action, which centred on the concept of impulse (ὁρµή). An 
impulse was not some vague instinctual urge or underlying drive. It was that 
psychophysical event that caused an action.185 According to Stobaeus: 
What activates impulse, they [the Stoics] say, is precisely an impression capable of 
directly impelling a proper function (φαντασίαν ὁρµητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος 
αὐτόθεν). In genus impulse is a movement of the soul towards something. 
(Stobaeus 2.86.17–19 [=LS 53Q])  
Furthermore,  
They [the Stoics] say that all impulses are acts of assent, and the practical impulses 
also contain motive power. But acts of assent and impulses actually differ in their 
objects: propositions are the objects of acts of assent, but impulses are directed 
towards predicates, which are contained in a sense in the propositions. (Stobaeus 
2.88.2–6 [=LS 33I]) 
                                                
184 Adapted from Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 27. 
185 “Impulses are that activity of the soul’s commanding-faculty which converts its judgements of 
what it should pursue or avoid into purposive bodily movements.” LS 1.420.  
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From this we may learn several things. First, an impulse is stimulated by a “hormetic 
impression” (φαντασία ὁρµητική): one that indicates to the person something that is 
“proper” (καθήκον)—i.e. relevant or appropriate—because it will contribute to his well-
being or the fulfillment of his nature. Second, an impulse is a motion of the psychē 
towards the predicate in the endorsed proposition.186 Third, an impulse is thus a type of 
assent involving impressions that have a special evaluative and practical character: thus, 
on the Stoic theory all occurrent practical attitudes—all desires, intentions, flights, and 
so on—are impulses, and therefore assents to these hormetic impressions.187 Elsewhere, 
our sources tell us that an impulse is the necessary188 and sufficient189 condition of an 
action, and that unless an external obstacle hinders the physical execution of the act, an 
impulse invariably produces an action.190  
That all impulses are acts of assent logically entails a view in which individuals 
are held responsible for their thoughts and desires.191 Indeed, by performing much of the 
work of intention as part of its essential role in human action, impulse “isolates the 
ethically significant aspect of an action.”192 Long and Sedley are correct to argue that 
assent, for the Stoics, seems to be a distinguishing mark of rationality.193 This brings us 
to λόγος: the fourth of the four powers or aspects of the hēgemonikon. To the 
observations that were made earlier concerning the centrality of rationality in Stoic 
thought, we may add a further comment. This uniquely human endowment—decisively 
lacking in animals—fundamentally qualifies the hēgemonikon as a unitary rational 
agent, by making its impressions and impulses rational, and also its powers of giving or 
withholding assent. So we see for example (in relation to human impulse) that 
Chrysippus’ understanding is that it is “reason prescribing action to him … Repulsion 
then is prohibitive reason.”194 While the four powers of the rational soul work 
                                                
186 See also Inwood, Ethics, 51, 272 n.53; Inwood notes that the evidence is relatively uniform in 
revealing that impulses are directed towards action predicates, which confirms their causal role (51). 
187 See Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 28. See also 29, where, using a helpful example, Brennan explains 
the apparent conundrum of how an assent to an impression can be simultaneously a belief (an assent to a 
full proposition, e.g. “the cake is to be eaten by me”) and an impulse (an assent to a predicate contained 
by that proposition, e.g. “to eat the cake”). Impulses and beliefs are both assents, and impulses are 
correlated with beliefs in such a way that the impulse for an action (to eat the cake) and the belief that the 
action is to be carried out by the person (the cake is to be eaten by me) always entail one another. 
However, as Brennan admits, the state of our sources denies us further insight into the details.  
188 Alexander of Aphrodisias, Fat. 183.5–10; Seneca, Ep. 113.2. 
189 Cicero, Acad. 2.108.  
190 On this see Inwood, Ethics, 52; Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 28. 
191 Stobaeus 2.88.2–6 (=LS 33I); Plutarch, St. rep. 1057A (=LS 53S). 
192 Inwood, Ethics, 53. 
193 LS 1.322.  
194 Plutarch, St. rep. 1037F (=LS 53R).  
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seamlessly as a single entity, reason is the key function: it works with impressions 
through an act of assent, thereby shaping impulses.195 Similarly, Long argues that the 
soul's activities of imaging, assenting, and impulsion are modified by λόγος, which is 
the mode of the whole soul’s operation.196  
 
2.3. The Stoic Understanding of Emotion 
2.3.1. The Passions as “Excessive” Impulses 
We are now in a position to detail how the Stoics incorporated affective events 
into their account of mental functioning. The Stoics defined passions as “excessive” 
impulses, or, in other words, particularly compelling motivations towards actions of 
certain kinds. The standard definition as found in Stobaeus’ report runs as follows: 
Πάθος δ᾽ εἶναί φασιν ὁρµὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῷ ἢ κίνησιν 
ψυχῆς <ἄλογον> παρὰ φύσιν (εἶναι δὲ πάθη πάντα τοῦ ἡγεµονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς).  
They [the Stoics] say that passion is impulse which is excessive and disobedient to 
the dictates of reason, or a movement of soul which is irrational and contrary to 
nature; and that all passions belong to the soul’s commanding-faculty. (Stobaeus 
2.88.8–10 (=LS 65A)197  
Since passions are impulses and therefore involve assenting to some hormetic 
impression, it follows that passions depend on the formulation and ratification of 
specific propositions about oneself and one’s surroundings. In effect, the person has 
assented to a false value-judgement—one that is contrary to reason, as is made explicit 
in the statement above—and in so doing issued himself with the excessive impulsive to 
either pursue or avoid something.  
The meaning of “excessive” is explained by Chrysippus in relation to people who 
“overstep the proper and natural proportion of their impulses,” and he illustrates this 
using the imagery of a person walking and running. When the person walks in 
accordance with his impulse, he remains in control of his movements and is able to stop 
or change direction when he wants to; the movement of his legs is commensurate with 
the impulse and not excessive. However, in running, the person loses the sense of this 
control: the movement in his legs “exceeds” the impulse, such that they are carried 
                                                
195 Inwood, Ethics, 52–53. 
196 Anthony A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism,” Phronesis 27 (1992): 50–51. 
197 The same account of παθός as an excessive impulse or irrational and unnatural movement of the 
soul is attributed to Zeno at Diogenes Laertius 7.110 and Cicero, Tusc. 4.11.  
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away by their motion. By analogy, Chrysippus argues, an impulse is excessive if it goes 
beyond the natural control of reason.198  
The important and original insight expressed by the analogy is the continuity, and 
also the difference, between normal, healthy impulses and passions.199 We have already 
seen that in Stoic physiology, any impulse is an effective cause of action. Since reason 
characterizes the hēgemonikon, there is nothing intrinsically irrational about impulses as 
such. However, as Chrysippus insists, the passions are “irrational” because they run 
contrary to the natural limits and dictates of reason; their unnaturalness consists in the 
immoderation of their movement.200 Passions do not stem from ordinary errors of 
fact,201 but are “vicious and uncontrolled reason which acquires vehemence and strength 
from bad and erroneous judgement.”202 
Passions, then, are characterized by their “excess” in terms of the nature of the 
judgements that give rise to them. At the same time, as we have seen, the standard Stoic 
definition of passions also relates this “excess” to the concomitant psychophysical 
movements (“movement of soul”) that form their coordinate definitions. These 
movements are elsewhere described in greater detail, in terms of the four generic types 
of passion with which they are correlated. 
They [the Stoics] say that desire (ἐπιθυµία) is a stretching (ὄρεξις) which is 
disobedient to reason, and its cause is forming an opinion (δοξάζειν) that a good is 
approaching and that when it is present we shall do well by it; this opinion that it is 
really worth stretching for has a fresh power to stimulate irregular motion. Fear 
(φόβος) is a shrinking (ἔκκλισις) which is disobedient to reason, and its cause is 
forming an opinion that something bad is approaching; this opinion that it is really 
                                                
198 Galen, PHP 4.2.10–18 (=LS 65J). The person with an excessive impulse is “not obedient” (µὴ 
εὐπειθῶς ἔχειν) to reason. Another example cited, by Cicero and Seneca, is that people falling from a high 
place do not have control over their movements; they can neither hold back nor delay their physical 
reactions; see Cicero, Tusc. 4.42; Seneca, Ira 1.7.4. 
199 LS 1.420.   
200 Galen, PHP 4.2.10–18 (=LS 65J). See the Stobaean account at 2.89.4–12, where we learn that 
passions, being irrational and disobedient to reason, overpower people with their intensity. This is not to 
say that the process has not been evaluated, as the quoting of a commonly-heard phrase shows 
(“Although I have [better] judgement, nature forces me to do this” [Pomeroy]), but rather that the act does 
not conform to normal rational choices. Commenting on this, Arthur Pomeroy notes that the effect “is to 
reinforce the moral responsibility of individuals for their acts, rather than excuse them as outside their 
control.” (Arius Didymus: Epitome of Stoic Ethics (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 1999), 118 
n.128. 
201 Stobaeus 2.89.16–18 tells us: “All those in the grips of passion turn their backs on reason, not in 
the same way as those who have been thoroughly deceived in any matter, but in a special way (ἀλλ᾽ 
ἰδιαζόντως)” (Pomeroy). Long and Sedley, 1.420, argue that this implies that the pro or contra judgement 
underlying a passion is perfectly natural in itself: the wise man will naturally try to seek or avoid the 
things that form the objects of passions—but he will do so at a walking pace, as it were, i.e. on the basis 
of a properly rational judgement of such things’ moral indifference. In this way, he experiences nothing in 
contrary to his desire or impulse; since he “acts with reserve,” his impulses are rationally regulated so as 
to accord with his environment (see Stobaeus 2.155.5–17=LS 65W). 
202 Plutarch, Virt. mor. 441D (=LS 61B).  
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worth shrinking away from has a fresh power to stimulate motion. Grief (λύπη) is a 
contraction (συστολή) of the soul disobedient to reason, and its cause is forming a 
fresh opinion that a bad thing is present, for which it is appropriate to be 
contracted. Delight (ἡδονή) is a swelling (ἔπαρσις) of the soul disobedient to 
reason, and its cause is forming a fresh opinion that a good thing is present, for 
which it is appropriate to be swollen. (Stobaeus 2.90.7–18 [=SVF 3.394]; my 
translation)203  
As expected, the phrase “it is appropriate” (καθήκει) in relation to contraction in grief 
and swelling in delight corresponds precisely to the description of appropriateness in 
our earlier discussion of the Stobaean account of Stoic impulse (section 2.2.3.b). Just as 
in impulse generally the psychē views some predicate as appropriate and moves to fulfil 
it, so in the passions it sees certain conditions as being appropriate and therefore 
experiences the physical movement associated with the passion. Thus in the passage 
above we note that in grief the person sees “being contracted” as appropriate and 
therefore suffers the type of movement termed a contraction (συστολή); in delight he 
regards “being swollen” as appropriate and so experiences a swelling (ἔπαρσις). Though 
καθήκει is absent in relation to the movements associated with desire and fear, the use 
of language of similar force denotes clearly the presence of appropriateness.204 All these 
alterations in the psychē can be sensed because of its continual proprioceptive 
awareness.205 The precise form of each type of alteration is not important; for our 
purposes it is sufficient to highlight that in the Stoic account some kind of felt 
psychosomatic change accompanies each type of passion.206  
But what precisely is the relationship between these felt movements and the 
judgements that are also involved in affective events? According to Galen, while Zeno 
identified the passions with the contractions, shrinkings, and other psychophysical 
                                                
203 See also the similar accounts in Andronicus, De passionibus 1, Cicero, Tusc. 4.14–15, and 
Diogenes Laertius 7:111–114. Also, in referring to a “fresh” (πρόσφατον) power or opinion, the Stoics are 
stressing its immanent force and immediacy rather than specifying some notion of temporal recentness 
(which Posidonius tries to do; see PHP 4.7.1–5 [=SVF 3.481]; with Inwood, Ethics, 146). The term, used 
frequently of food and also of new corpses, implies that no decomposition has yet set in and that the item 
in question has retained its pristine character; see Nussbaum, Therapy, 381–382.  
204 The idea of appropriateness is wide and not confined to judgements made on moral grounds, 
though, as Sorabji observes, it includes in Cicero, Tusc. 3.83 and Seneca, Marc. 1 the case in which 
mourners come to think that they have a moral duty to react (Emotion, 30). As Graver, Stoicism, 43, 
notes, a reading more consistent with Stoic usage “finds in it only a loose notion of what is fitting under 
the circumstances—what is ‘called for,’ as we might say.”   
205 As discussed at section 2.2.2.   
206 See Knuutila, Emotions, 60–62, for a useful summary of the scholarly interpretations as to the 
precise nature of these psychophysical movements. An expanded list of these movements is provided by 
Galen in PHP 4.2.4–6 and 4.3.2; of note is the term “bitings,” which was long established in Greek usage 
as a way of speaking of the pain of grief. See also Cicero, Tusc. 4:15, where Cicero’s Latin terminology 
for these movements corresponds closely to what Galen reports. For a fuller discussion see Graver, 
Stoicism, 28–34.   
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motions that followed or supervened upon (ἐπιγίγνεσθαι) the judgements, Chrysippus 
subsequently revised the Zenoian view to equate the passions with the judgements 
themselves.207 However, as Graver argues, even though there is certainly a difference in 
wording, there is much similarity in the two accounts: both hold that a passion involves 
a psychophysical change and a judgement. In addition, they describe the relation 
between the two in very much the same way; for Zeno the change supervenes on the 
judgement and would not be a passion if it did not supervene on such a judgement, 
while for Chrysippus the change is induced by the judgement, which would not be a 
passion if such a movement was not produced. The chief difference between the two 
philosophers is in the exact application of the term “passion” within the sequence. In 
reformulating the definition, Chrysippus clarifies what was already implied in Zeno’s 
version: that it is the nature of the judgement that defines what sort of impulse has 
occured.208 Graver concludes that a distinction can therefore be made between the 
passions as judgements (i.e. strictly for their intentional content, which may be either 
true or false), and the feeling one gets from a certain passion. In itself, the feeling 
merely registers the physical event that necessarily occurs with the passion. Moreover, 
because the felt psychophysical event merely supervenes on the judgement, rather than 
being itself the passion, it is possible to experience something which feels like delight or 
fear but which is not actually one of these passions because it lacks the pertinent 
intentional criteria.209 We shall pick this up again in our exploration of the propatheiai, 
or “pre-passions” (section 2.3.3.c).   
2.3.2. The Passions as Value Judgements 
Let us return to our discussion of the passions as judgements of value. More than 
mere supervenient psychic motions, passions—being certain kinds of impulses—
necessarily contain propositional content: evaluative construals of external objects as 
being either advantageous or injurious to oneself.210 These evaluations comprise both an 
                                                
207 Galen, PHP 5.1.4; 4.3.2–3. 
208 Graver, Stoicism, 33. See also Christopher Gill, “Competing Readings of Stoic Emotions,” in 
Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, ed. Ricardo 
Salles (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), 453–454. I concur with Graver and Gill, who do not agree with the 
arguments for a substantive difference between Zeno and Chrysippus in Sorabji, Emotion, 55–65.  
209 Graver, Stoicism, 33–34. 
210 I use the term “external object” to designate those things that are external to one’s sphere of 
control; the Stoic term is ἀδιάφορα (“indifferents”). Although some indifferents may be “preferable” 
(προηγµένα) because they have some sort of positive value, they are still intrinsically indifferents; the fact 
is that nothing is really good except the perfection of one’s reason, which is virtue. See Cicero, Fin. 3.50–
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occurrent element (e.g. “this is desire”) and a dispositional one (“desire is good, and it is 
appropriate to react in an emotional way to it”), and these two elements are brought 
together syllogistically to produce the judgements that are intrinsic to affective 
response. Thus a fundamental feature of the Stoic theory of the passions is its position 
concerning the propriety or impropriety of these judgements, which is based on 
normative claims as to the types of objects that one could legitimately value as a result 
of properly rational thinking. The classification of affective responses proceeds 
accordingly: imperfectly reasoned evaluations give rise to the passions, while there is 
another ideal or “eupathic” class of emotions which are generated through proper 
reasoning.  
The source that illuminates most clearly the interplay between the occurrent and 
dispositional dimensions of the evaluative process is the Stobaean account of the 
causation of affective events at the level of genus that was quoted earlier (Stobaeus 
2.90.7–18). In all four genera (desire, fear, grief, and delight) the person experiencing 
these passions is credited with a belief that something either good or bad is present or in 
prospect. It is important to highlight that here, in the case of grief for instance, the 
judgement is not that “a present thing is bad” but that “a bad thing is present.” As such, 
the evaluative component comes in not because the person makes the decision there and 
then that something is bad, but because the occurrent judgement engages dispositional 
attitudes that are already in place concerning the badness of certain object types.  
However, this ascription of value still does not produce a passion on the Stoic 
account. The Stobaean summary also informs us that in the genesis of the passions, the 
evaluation of a contingent object is followed by a further judgement that some sort of 
predicative response is appropriate under the circumstances. This same sequence is 
found in Cicero’s analysis of the causes of grief. He describes grief as “a belief (opinio) 
that some serious evil is present,” and then adds, 
Specifically it is a fresh belief (recens opinio), and the evil is of such a nature that 
it seems right to be pained by it—seems so, at least, to the person who is suffering 
and who believes that it is appropriate for him to suffer. (Tusc. 3.25 [Graver])211 
More specifically, it is a combination of two judgements that brings about grief: 
But when our belief in the seriousness of our misfortune is combined with the 
further belief that it is right, and an appropriate and proper thing, to be upset by 
                                                                                                                                          
54; Diogenes Laertius 7.104–107. For an overview of the Stoic ethical stance regarding the objects of 
evaluation, see Graver, Stoicism, 46–51.  
211 For the meaning of a “fresh” belief, see Cicero’s own explanation in Tusc. 3.75, where he explains 
that “freshness” relates not only to matters of time but to the vigour of the imagined evil. 
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what has happened, then, and not before, there comes about that deep emotion 
which is distress. (Tusc. 3.61–62 [Graver]) 
Hence Cicero’s claim is that when an external trigger occurs, the conjunction of two 
related judgements—an evaluation of an external object, and a belief in the 
appropriateness of a predicative response to it—generates distress in the person.212   
The Stoic theory is based on the assumption that the object of a passion is either 
good or bad. As we have seen earlier, only behaviour that is rational and therefore in 
accordance with virtue is intrinsically good; behaviour that is irrational is a deviation 
from the norms of nature and reason and therefore intrinsically bad. People who are 
driven by irrational thinking wrongly believe that external objects are of significance in 
their lives, and as a result both their judgements about the value of these objects and the 
appropriateness of their reactions to them are systematically misguided.213  
Therefore, on the Stoic account, the passions are the consequence of reason gone 
astray. The Stoics rejected the Platonic model of a divided soul in which emotional 
conflict was explained by how passion was often at odds with reason.214 Instead, such 
conflict arose from extremely rapid fluctuations in the unitary hēgemonikon;215 Zeno 
uses the ornithological metaphor of “fluttering” to convey this notion of volatility.216 
Thus the dominant Stoic conception of those subject to passion is their instability and 
lack of consistent direction.217 Since human beings are responsible for the state of their 
rationality, they are also held responsible for their passions and any ensuing actions. 
According to Epictetus,  
It is not the things themselves that disturb men, but their judgements about these 
things. For example, death is nothing dreadful, or else Socrates too would have 
thought so, but the judgement that death is dreadful, this is the dreadful thing. 
When, therefore, we are hindered, or disturbed, or grieved, let us never blame 
anyone but ourselves, that means, our own judgements. (Ench. 5; emphasis 
translator’s)218 
                                                
212 This two-component analysis is reiterated, for grief at Tusc. 3.74, 76, 79; and for grief and the 
other generic passions at 4.14. At 4.82, Cicero stresses that grief and the other passions “are a matter of 
belief and are voluntary, and that we experience them because we think it appropriate to do so.”   
213 Knuuttila, Emotions, 59.  
214 Plutarch, Virt. mor. 446F–447A (=LS 65G). 
215 Plutarch, Virt. mor. 441B–D (=LS 61B). 
216 “Therefore every fluttering is also a passion, and likewise, every passion is a fluttering.” Stobaeus 
2.88.11–12 (=LS 65A).  
217 LS 1.422; here attention is drawn to references to the soul’s “weakness” and “lack of tension” in 
Galen, PHP 4.6.2–3 (=LS 65T) and Stobaeus 2.88.22–89.3 (=LS 65C).  For Galen’s and Posidonius’ 
objections to the Chrysippan doctrine of passion, see LS 1.422–423; Engberg-Pedersen, Oikeiosis, 182–
193; Graver, Stoicism, 75–81. 
218 See also Epictetus, Diatr. 1.12.20–21 and Seneca, Ira 2.3.1–2.4 (=LS 65X).  
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For the Stoics, the passions followed directly upon faulty judgements based on a 
mistaken interpretation of one’s mental impressions or an erroneous description of one’s 
experiences.219  
2.3.3. The Taxonomy of the Emotions 
2.3.3.a. The Passions 
As we already know, the Stoic account of the causation of the passions informs us 
that there are four generic ones: desire (ἐπιθυµία), the opinion that something in 
prospect is a good of such a sort that one should reach out for it; fear (φόβος), the 
opinion that something in prospect is an evil of such a sort that we should avoid it; grief 
(λύπη), the opinion that some present thing is an evil of such a sort that we should be 
downcast about it; and delight (ἡδονή), the opinion that some present thing is a good of 
such a sort that we should be elated about it.220 Clearly, these four passions are the 
product of two dichotomies, between present and future, and good and evil, and are 
often depicted graphically by scholars as follows (see Table 2): 
  present in prospect 
good  Delight    Desire  
evil  Grief          Fear         
      
Table 2. The Passions. 
The above generic passions are each further broken down into a number of 
species. The surviving lists of these species are all different, both in terms of the 
number of them included, and their names.221 The unsystematic structure of these lists is 
exacerbated by the presence of overlapping definitions as well as gaps; no reasonable 
amount of emendation would produce anything like the neat taxonomy at the level of 
                                                
219 LS 1.421.  
220 Our main sources are Stobaeus 2.90.7–18; Andronicus, De passionibus 1; Cicero, Tusc. 4.14–15; 
Diogenes Laertius 7.111–114. The four-fold classification was very widely attested; for examples see 
Graver, Stoicism, 231 n.38. 
221 For the canonical definitions see Stobaeus 2.90.19–92.20; Diogenes Laertius 7.111–114; Cicero, 
Tusc. 4.16–21; Andronicus, De passionibus 2–5; Nemesius, De natura hominis 19.229–21.235. 
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genus that is seen in all the Stoic sources. Margaret Graver’s solution to this mystery is 
compelling: she argues that the point of offering such lists can only have been to 
demonstrate that the broad-brush classification by genus could be made fine-grained 
enough to capture the nuances of ordinary emotional experience. This approach 
probably reflected a deliberate choice, made early in the history of the school, that its 
philosophical needs would be better served by a list that included a wide variety of 
everyday terms and definitions than by some neat and exhaustive classification which 
employed unfamiliar language.222 
2.3.3.b. The Eupatheiai 
The Stoics also had a class of emotions that belonged to the person of wise 
understanding: these affective responses are to the passions what the Stoic sage is to the 
ordinary person. The collective term ἐυπάθειαι (the term designated to mean “good 
emotions,” or “proper feelings”)223 is attested from an early date and may have been the 
term used in the early treatises.224 For Inwood, the proper understanding of the Stoic 
ideal of freedom from the passions may be summed up in the slogan “apatheia is 
eupatheia,” from which it follows that a eupatheia is simply the impulse of a fully 
rational person.225 In the psychology of the wise person, then, the eupatheiai were 
analogous to, and indeed replaced, the passions of the non-wise.  
There are three genera of eupathic responses: joy (χαρά), the knowledge that 
some present thing is a good of such a sort that one should be elated about it; wish 
(βούλησις), the knowledge that something in prospect is a good of such a sort that one 
should reach out for it; and caution (ἐυλάβεια), the knowledge that something in 
prospect is an evil of such a sort that one should avoid it.226 The absence of a fourth 
eupatheia follows organically from the Stoic definitions. The corollary of grief would 
have to be the knowledge that some present thing is an evil. The wise, however, can 
                                                
222 Graver, Stoicism, 57–58. 
223 As is common, I will retain the Greek term and speak of eupatheiai or eupathic responses rather 
than use vague language like “good feelings.” 
224 Graver, Stoicism, 51, citing the evidence in Plutarch, Virt. mor. 449A–B; St. rep. 1037F–1038A. 
Inwood, Ethics, 172, notes that it is not clear when the term came to be first used in the Stoa. The main 
(and almost sole) evidence for them is in Cicero, Tusc. 4.11–14, Diogenes Laertius 7.116, and 
Andronicus, De passionibus 1–6.  
225 Inwood, Ethics, 172.  
226 Adapted from Tad Brennan’s reconstruction of the full forms of the eupatheiai. As he notes, we 
have well-attested definitions for the eupatheiai that mirror the impulse-formations for the passions, but 
their full forms must be reconstructed; see Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 34. See also Diogenes Laertius 7.116 
and Cicero, Tusc. 4.12–14.  
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never have the knowledge that some evil was present to them. Putting it another way: 
“the wise never are affected emotionally by anything they regard as, and that in truth is, 
bad.”227 On this basis, there can be no fourth genus of eupathic response.228 We should 
note also that like the passions, within each genus the eupatheiai may be broken down 
into species.229 
Since the eupatheiai gave rise to normative responses, their evaluations are 
necessarily completely accurate, veridical attributions of goodness and badness. In the 
eupatheiai, then, opinion has been replaced by knowledge and external objects or 
indifferents have been rejected in place of genuine goods and evils (which is to say, 
virtue and vice), for the impulses that are correlated with the eupatheiai are wholly 
rational.230 Phenomenologically, as Graver argues, since the eupatheiai are instances of 
the same felt psychic movements, they should resemble the passions at the 
psychosomatic level of description; where they differ at the level of feeling, it should be 
that the eupatheiai are without any sense of conflict or contradiction. However, far from 
being flat and diminished versions of emotions, the eupatheiai are corrected versions of 
them, and as such may be likened to “the easy movements of a powerful athlete, 
forceful but without strain.”231 We may depict the eupatheiai as follows (see Table 3): 
  present in prospect 
good  Joy Wish 
evil  N.A. Caution 
     
Table 3. The Eupatheiai. 
                                                
227 John M. Cooper, “The Emotional Life of the Wise,” in Ancient Ethics and Political Philosophy: 
Proceedings of the Spindel Conference 2004, Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 43 (Memphis: 
University of Memphis, 2005), 180, interpreting Cicero at Tusc. 4.14 (emphasis original).  
228 See Cicero, Tusc. 4.14; and Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 35. 
229 These species are named in Diogenes Laertius 7.116, with full definitions appearing only in 
Andronicus, De passionibus 6.   
230 Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 34–35. 
231 Graver, Stoicism, 52. Similarly, Cooper describes the emotions of the non-wise as “agitated and 
effusive” when compared to the good feelings of the wise, which are “calm, steady, smooth, and so on”; 
“Emotional Life,” 179. 
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2.3.3.c. The Propatheiai  
We have already seen (at the end of section 2.3.1) how it is possible that one 
might experience something which feels like one of the passions but is not actually so, 
because the criterion of intentional judgement is absent. Even before the Stoics came on 
the scene, there was discussion about the relationship between spontaneous 
physiological reactions and thought. Aristotle, for example, observed that involuntary 
movements such as changes in heart rate and sexual arousal responded merely to 
impressions.232 This connection was later also made in a fragment of Chrysippus, 
preserved by Galen, in which he records his observations concerning involuntary 
weeping and cessations of weeping.233 The Stoic founders seem also to have devised 
specific terms like “biting” (δῆγµα) and “troubling” (συνθροήσις) to designate certain 
types of affective responses which did not have the status of genuine emotions because 
they did not meet the assent criterion.234 
The fullest account of feelings that occur in the absence of assent is provided by 
Seneca in Book 2 of On Anger. He gives a succinct presentation of what he takes to be 
the Stoic view of the causation of anger: for him, it is a response that requires both 
impression of injury and assent to that impression. Most interestingly, Seneca also 
refers explicitly to the presence of an involuntary psychological event, a “single mental 
process” (simplex) that “follows immediately upon the impression and springs up 
without assistance from the mind.”235 This prior event—which occurs without the 
mind’s volition—is not the same as anger, which Seneca understands to be a complex 
process that requires the forming of an impression of injury and the thought that one 
ought not to have been wronged and therefore should be avenged.236  
What then is this simplex event? Quite clearly, it is not an impulse, since there is 
no assent. However, this is not to say that one’s cognitive faculties are not involved. 
The event requires some conceptualization of the experience of injury—which draws on 
                                                
232 Aristotle, De an. 3.9.432b26–433a1 and Mot. an. 11.703b–11.   
233 Galen, PHP 4.7.16–17.  
234 See Plutarch, Virt. mor. 449a: here Zeno and Chrysippus are in all probability implicated as those 
who claim that “tremblings and changes of colour” need not be indications of fear but of a “troubling,” 
and that tears are not evidence of grief but only of a “biting.” In Tusc. 3.82–83, Cicero, following 
Chrysippus, explains that the wise person is not susceptible to grief, but allows that a lesser response 
which he terms “the sting and certain minor symptoms of shrinking” (morsus tamen et contractiunculae 
quaedam) is natural to the wise, and can occur with regularity.   
235 Seneca, Ira 2.1.3–5.  
236 Seneca, Ira 2.1.4–5. 
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a sophisticated array of concepts such as personhood, intention, and fairness.237 That 
Seneca conceives of this prior event in rational terms is further confirmed by the 
extensive listing of examples of such events that he furnishes, to demonstrate how fully 
articulate thoughts can come about without meeting the condition of voluntariness.238 
However, such prior events are not passions: 
None of these things which move the mind through the agency of chance should be 
called passions (adfectus); the mind suffers them, rather than causes them. Passion, 
consequently, does not consist in being moved by the impressions that are 
presented to the mind, but in surrendering to these and following up such chance 
prompting. (Ira 2.3.1–2) 
For Seneca, anger has not occurred unless the person judges that a certain response is 
appropriate for oneself, and chooses to act upon this response: 
Anger must not only be aroused but must rush forth, for it is an active impulse; but 
an active impulse never comes without the consent of the will, for it is impossible 
for a man to aim at revenge and punishment without the cognizance of the mind. A 
man thinks himself injured, wishes to take vengeance, but dissuaded by some 
consideration immediately calms down. This I do not call anger, this prompting of 
the mind which is submissive to reason; anger is that which overleaps reason and 
sweeps it away. Therefore that primary disturbance of the mind which is excited by 
the impression of injury is no more anger than the impression of injury is itself 
anger; the active impulse consequent upon it, which has not only admitted the 
impression of injury but also approved it, is really anger—the tumult of a mind 
proceeding to revenge by choice and determination. (Ira 2.3.4–5) 
Clearly, Seneca does not regard the unassented feelings of which he speaks as 
passions.239 As such, these feelings are not only non-culpable experiences, but perfectly 
normal—and indeed, expected—ones in even the wise person.240  
Seneca’s discussion coheres substantially with what Stoic-influenced authors in 
Alexandria wrote about propatheiai or “pre-passions”: involuntary feelings that were 
not to be seen as passions because assent did not accompany the relevant impression. 
The Alexandrian propatheiai tradition appears quite early, in the commentaries of Philo, 
and finds fuller expression later in the exegetical writings of Origen and others.241 The 
                                                
237 Graver, Stoicism, 94–95. 
238 Seneca, Ira 2.2.1–2.3.3. Here he gives twenty-six highly varied scenarios which range from what 
would seem to be crude reflex actions (e.g. recoiling from certain types of touch) to responses that require 
more complex mental processing (e.g. boiling up when others are fighting, or having certain feelings 
when reading of past events, such as Sulla’s proscriptions or Hannibal’s siege after the battle of Cannae).  
239 Seneca’s term for them is principia proludentia adfectibus (“beginnings preliminary to passion”).  
240 Seneca, Ira 2.2.1–3. Elsewhere, Seneca discusses various types of involuntary affects that arise in 
the wise; for him these unassented feelings are “natural” and reflect nature’s intentions for human 
psychology (see Ep. 11.1–2; 57.4–5; 71.29). In Marc. 7 Seneca pursues this idea of “natural” affect and 
argues that it is natural to miss a family member not only in bereavement but in separation; for him it is 
“inevitable” that such partings bring about “a biting and a contraction of even the stoutest minds.”  
241 The term is used by Origen, Jerome, and other Christian writers; see M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: 
Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, 2 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1947), 1.307–308; 
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correspondences in the views of the authors in Rome and in Alexandria concerning 
unassented feelings suggest clearly the influence of a common source: authoritative 
material from the early Stoics, whose precise formulations had been lost. The points of 
similarity include the involuntary nature of such feelings, their dependence on rational 
impression, and their continued occurrence in the wise.242  
Though their theological commitments were markedly different, the writers at 
Alexandria shared with the Stoics a strong interest in providing a description of the 
perfection of human nature. For Philo and the Christian writers, Abraham and the 
incarnate Christ respectively were the prime exemplars of virtue; however, as the 
passions were thought to arise from an irrational valuation of external objects, passages 
of Scripture that seemed to attribute such emotions to these exemplar figures were of 
particular concern. The concept of the propatheiai was sometimes pressed into service 
to help resolve this difficulty.243 One clear instance occurs in Philo’s comments on his 
quotation of Gen. 23.2 (“Abraham came to bewail Sarah and to mourn”); here Philo 
opines that Scripture, which informs the reader that Abraham came to mourn Sarah, 
does not represent him as finally doing so.  
But excellently and carefully does [Scripture] show that the virtuous man did not 
resort to wailing or mourning but only came there for some such thing. For things 
that unexpectedly and against his will strike the pusillanimous man weaken, crush 
and overthrow him, whereas everywhere they merely bow down the man of 
constancy when they direct their blows against him, and not in such a way as to 
bring [their work] to completion, since they are strongly repelled by the guiding 
reason, and retreat. (Philo, QG 4.73) 
To be sure, Abraham is “struck” by “things,” namely, impressions that represent his 
circumstances as evil; however, the equanimity that ensues from his “constancy” and 
state of rationality means that he does not give in to grief, but is only “bowed down” for 
the moment. For Philo, though Abraham experiences involuntary feelings akin to grief, 
his virtuous state is not compromised by the appearance of any passion.244 
To summarize: the concept of the propatheiai allowed the Stoics and those 
influenced by them to accommodate within their overall theoretical framework for 
human psychology those affective reactions that were beyond the voluntary control of 
the agent, and therefore not to be construed as passions.245 According to Seneca, these 
“first movements” (primi motus) cannot be overcome by reason, “although perchance 
                                                
242 See Graver, Stoicism, 102. 
243 Graver, Stoicism, 102–108. 
244 See also Margaret R. Graver, “Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Προπάθειαι,” 
Phronesis 44 (1999): 306–307. 
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practice and constant watchfulness will weaken them.”246 The Roman anthologist Aulus 
Gellius tells the story of an impending shipwreck that some people were facing. In such 
a terrifying situation, it was entirely natural for even the wise person to be beset by 
uncontrollable feelings and physical sensations—“certain swift and unconsidered 
motions which forestall the action of the intellect and reason.” However, by withholding 
assent from any occurrent impressions, he “rejects and repudiates them, and sees in 
them nothing to cause him fear.” Though “his colour and expression have changed for a 
brief moment,” he “keeps the even tenor and strength of the opinion which he has 
always had about mental impressions of this kind.”247  
2.3.3.d. “Moral Emotions” 
There is a fourth category of emotions that our Stoic sources seem to reveal. In an 
often-recounted story, the young man Alcibiades comes to a realization of his errors 
when they are revealed to him by his teacher, Socrates. Alcibiades is deeply remorseful, 
and implores him for help in amending his life.248 Alcibiades’ emotional turmoil is 
precipitated by his acknowledgement of the presence of a genuine evil, namely his own 
vices, not some external object. His response problematizes the supposition that every 
passion is constituted by a false judgement that an external object is good or evil. 
Indeed, the anecdote undermines simultaneously the assumptions for three of the four 
passions: for in addition to the grief that Alcibiades experiences for his present vice, he 
feels also a desire for his future virtue and a fear for his future vice.249 
We have already seen that the four generic passions are concerned with external 
goods, while the eupatheiai have their basis in genuine goods, i.e. virtue and vice. 
However, the experience of Alcibiades resists this classification: while it resembles the 
eupatheia because of the type of object with which it is correlated, it is not the response 
of the wise person, who could not experience any feelings of moral inadequacy.250 Yet 
even those who are non-wise, like Alcibiades, can respond emotionally to integral 
                                                
246 Seneca, Ira 2.4.1–2. 
247 Aulus Gellius, Noct. att. 19.1.17–20 (=Epictetus fr. 9, part). 
248 Cicero, Tusc. 3.77–78; the portrait of Alcibiades appears also in several other sources, e.g. Plato, 
Symp. 215e–216c and Alc. 118b–c, 127d; Plutarch, Alc. 4. Dialogues named Alcibiades were written also 
by the Socratic philosophers Antisthenes, Euclides, and Phaedo of Ellis.  
249 Cicero, Tusc. 3.77. The remaining passion, delight, cannot be veridically orientated, as the other 
three can be, for the same sort of reason that there is no fourth eupatheia: if someone is delighted by the 
true belief that something good is present to them, then it must indeed be so—but this means that they 
must be a sage, who cannot have any sort of passion; see Brennan, “Stoic Theory,” 51.  
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objects that are features of one’s own character. That such responses—remorse over 
one’s vices, the desire for moral improvement, and the fear of future errors—were 
considered by the Stoics to be bona fide psychological events is shown by Chrysippus’ 
and Cicero’s inclusion of them among the phenomena to be considered by a theory of 
consolation, and Seneca’s and Epictetus’ use of them in ethical therapy.251  
In modern psychology, the term “moral emotions” is often used to designate this 
category of affective response.252 However, the Stoic authors did not use such a catch-
all term. Instead, they referred to specific responses, e.g. µεταµέλεια or remorse, which 
Stobaeus defines as “distress over things that have been done, that they were done in 
error by oneself.”253 The ordinary, non-wise person, who constantly did things badly, 
would be expected to experience remorse with much frequency.254 A genus grid of such 
a person’s set of affective responses—not towards external objects as with the standard 
passions, but towards genuine goods or evils as with the eupatheiai—would, like the 
eupatheiai, result in three genera, with remorse instead of joy being the pre-eminent 
one255 (see Table 4).  
  present in prospect 
good 
 
N.A. 
Desire for 
improvement 
evil 
 
Remorse 
Fear of future 
error 
     
Table 4. The “Moral Emotions.” 
The Stoics clearly believed that the responses described for Alcibiades are true to 
life, since even those who are unwise may respond emotionally to integral objects. It 
certainly seems possible that such a person’s responses are at least sometimes generated 
                                                
251 Graver, Stoicism, 192. See e.g. Cicero, Tusc. 3.76; 4.60–62; Epictetus, Diatr. 3.23.27–38; Seneca, 
Tranq. 1.1–17.  
252 See Gabriele Taylor, Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1985); Julia Price Tangney, Jeff Stuewig, and Debra J. Mashek, “Moral Emotions and Moral Behavior,” 
Annual Review of Psychology 58 (2007): 345–372. 
253 Stobaeus 2.102.25–26 (my translation).   
254 Stobaeus 2.102.23–25.  
255 Graver, Stoicism, 195.  
Chapter 2. Emotion in Stoicism 
 53 
on the basis of true beliefs; if so they have the status of καθήκοντα, or the ordinary 
person’s appropriate actions—the same status as other actions that are premised on true 
beliefs about appropriateness.256 Thus it seems that we have good cause to believe that 
the “moral emotions” fall within Stoic parameters for acceptable affective responses to 
integral goods and evils.257 As long as one’s subjective states of feeling are not 
associated with any falsehood or inconsistency, there is no reason why the experience of 
them should be deleterious to the Stoic goal of rational perfection.  
With this, we complete our survey of the Stoic theory of emotion, situating it 
within its wider philosophical context. We now turn to the question of how the Stoics 
treated the problem of emotions that had run out of control.  
 
2.4. The Stoic Therapy of Emotion 
2.4.1. Reason, Nature, and Oikeiōsis 
We have already seen how the Stoics saw the perfection of reason in accordance 
with nature, which was virtue, as the greatest good for a person. Not surprisingly, the 
bedrock of Stoic thinking about emotional therapy was an unyielding belief in the 
dignity of human reason. This belief stems from how nature is regarded as the ultimate 
source of everything that has value, such that the value of anything else in the world, 
like reason, depends upon its relationship to universal nature. Agreement with nature 
denotes positive value, and contrariness to nature the opposite.258 
For the Stoics, reason is not just the foundational element of what makes us 
human, but also, crucially, something that is fully within one’s own power to cultivate 
and control. The attainment of rational understanding did not require any help from 
without, divine or otherwise; indeed, as Seneca tells Lucilius:  
it is foolish to pray for this when you can acquire it for yourself … God is near 
you, he is with you, he is within you. This is what I mean, Lucilius: a holy spirit 
                                                
256 The starting point of appropriate acts is reason; appropriate actions are defined as “all those which 
reason prevails with us to do,” with inappropriate actions defined the opposite way; Diogenes Laertius 
7.108–109; see also Stobaeus 2.85.12–86.4.  
257 Graver, Stoicism, 210–211. 
258 Diogenes Laertius 7.88. For discussion see further Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Discovering the 
Good: Oikeiōsis and Kathēkonta in Stoic Ethics,” in The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, 
ed. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 145–183; 
Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 179–184; Anthony A. Long, “The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics,” in Stoic 
Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 134–155. 
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indwells within us, one who marks our good and bad deeds, and is our guardian. 
As we treat this spirit, so are we treated by it. (Ep. 41.1–2)259 
Martha Nussbaum observes that this is not at all an atheist view: reasoning is not only 
divine internally in the human being, but his piece of the divinity that inhabits the whole 
framework of the universe. Yet it is certainly a rationalist view that repudiates the 
subservience to external anthropomorphic and capricious divinities that were a central 
feature of conventional Roman religion.260 At a fundamental level, reason goes hand in 
hand with the practical choices and decisions that one makes; for the Stoics, the power 
of choice wholly resides within the human person. Epictetus thus asserts: 
Consider who you are. To begin with, a man; that is, one who has no quality more 
sovereign than moral choice (προαίρεσις), but keeps everything subordinate to it, 
and this moral choice itself free from slavery and subjection. (Diatr. 2.10.1–2)261 
Underlying all this was the belief that human beings were predisposed to living 
rationally in the first place, although it was a process of natural development—a process 
that the Stoics termed oikeiōsis. The basic idea was that humans, and indeed all animals, 
possessed a fundamental orientation towards what was best for themselves, towards 
what was truly good. It was the human person’s natural inclination to preserve and take 
care of the things that it saw as belonging to it.262 There were two dimensions of 
oikeiōsis: the personal,263 and the social.264 A young infant had an initial natural bent 
towards self-preservation,265 but between infancy and adulthood were distinct stages of 
rational development in which nature sanctioned modes of thinking and behaviour that 
changed a creature whose responses were purely animal-like and reflexive into an adult 
fully endowed with reason.266 In parallel with increasing maturity came also a natural 
extending of that oikeiōsis to the people around oneself, beginning with one’s children, 
and moving in ever-widening circles to encompass all of one’s social sphere and 
beyond.267 Oikeiōsis can therefore be understood as a sort of continuum: at one end is 
                                                
259 The “holy spirit” which Seneca speaks of is equated with God; Seneca, like his Stoic predecessors, 
identifies God with the material universe: “All of this universe which encompasses us is one, and it is 
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260 Nussbaum, Therapy, 326. 
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the instinctive self-preservation of a young infant, at the other, the outward-looking 
disposition and sociability of a rational adult (the so-called “social oikeiōsis”268), who is 
“designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows.”269 As we might expect, this 
normative account of the development of human nature is grounded completely in a 
singular commitment to a fully reasoned way of life.  
It is on the basis of oikeiōsis that Epictetus poses this rhetorical question:  
who has come into being without an innate concept of what is good and evil, 
honourable and base, appropriate and inappropriate, and happiness, and of what is 
proper and falls to our lot, and what we ought to do and what we ought not to do? 
(Diatr. 2.11.3–4) 
Epictetus goes on to insist that the task is to cultivate that which nature has already 
endowed one with, and also to apply what one knows to one’s circumstances.270 For 
him, one’s innermost moral intuitions could serve as a worthy guide to those things in 
the universe that were truly good.  
2.4.2. Philosophy as Therapy 
The ideals outlined above—that life in accordance with nature and reason is 
man’s chief end, and that the power of reason can be nurtured through the proper 
exercise of choice—are key aspects of Stoic teaching that underscore how philosophy 
was seen to have inherent practical value in everyday life. Seneca commends Lucilius 
for his diligence in his studies and implores him to keep at it, for the point of 
philosophical study is that “you make it each day your endeavour to become a better 
man.”271 There were at least two results that would accrue to those who diligently 
pursued philosophical study. At the societal level, since “the first thing which 
philosophy undertakes to give is fellow-feeling with all men; in other words, sympathy 
and sociability,” there would be greater understanding of, and increased admiration for, 
the philosopher’s mien and behaviour from the people whom he was trying to 
improve.272 At a personal level, philosophy  
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moulds and constructs the soul; it orders our life; guides our conduct, shows us 
what we should do and what we should leave undone; it sits at the helm and directs 
our course as we waver amid uncertainties. (Seneca, Ep. 16.3) 
The point is that philosophical study was thought to bring tremendous practical benefit 
to humanity; this produced an obligation to extend to all the advantages of such an 
education.273 The Stoics therefore paid careful attention to such matters as rhetoric and 
the literary aspects of their teachings, aiming not at philosophical jargon that would 
appeal only to a small elite, but for maximum reach across a general audience.274  
 For philosophical study to be effective, there had to be regular self-scrutiny. 
Living actively in conformity with one’s reason, instead of being passively dominated 
by wrong thinking and habitual dispositions, required constant watchfulness and 
perseverance.275 Indeed, the most general strategy of Stoic therapy was that one had to 
be aware of how one saw one’s circumstances—a priority that Epictetus frequently 
expressed in his cardinal rule of life: “making use of impressions.”276 Hence the task of 
philosophy was to prompt rigorous and sustained reflection that would enable one to 
take charge of one’s own thinking.277 It was the goal of the teacher of philosophy to 
facilitate this process. Like a physician, the teacher’s role was complex; it involved 
exacting work with the pupil: 
Just as it is appropriate for the [physician] of the body to be “inside,” as they say, 
the affections that befall the body and the therapeutic treatment that is proper to 
each, so it is the task of the physician of the soul to be “inside” both of these, and 
in the best possible way. (Galen, PHP 5.2.23–24=SVF 3.471, citing Chrysippus 
[trans. Nussbaum, Therapy, 328–329]) 
Some brief comments should be made regarding the media through which 
philosophical therapy was to be applied. According to Seneca, personal interaction and 
conversation provided the greatest benefit, because “it creeps by degrees into the 
soul.”278 Public fora were not as effective: “Lectures prepared beforehand and spouted 
in the presence of a throng have in them more noise but less intimacy. Philosophy is 
good advice; and no one can give advice at the top of his lungs.”279 Written 
communication was generally inferior to personal communication; Epictetus certainly 
carried out his teaching in oral form—we have his pupil Flavius Arrian to thank for his 
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stenographic record of his teacher’s ipsissima verba. Yet, in what is often regarded as 
the greatest showpiece of Stoic philosophical therapy in action, Seneca’s Epistulae 
Morales, Seneca ingeniously creates within the written text an intimate dialogue 
between teacher and pupil that demonstrates to his readers how epistolary paraenesis 
could be carried out in a way that was effective and fruitful.280  
2.4.3. The Case for Stoic Therapy 
The most comprehensive description of the Stoic view of the passions is found in 
the third and fourth books of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, which have their basis in 
Chrysippus’ understanding of the extirpation of the passions and the therapy of the soul. 
In Cicero’s view, “souls which have been ready to be cured and have obeyed the 
instructions of wise men, are undoubtedly cured”;281 this was the central thrust of 
Chrysippan therapeutic thinking. In book four, after a survey of the Stoic classification 
and definitions of the passions, Cicero draws an analogy between physical and 
psychological ailments:   
Just as when the blood is in a bad state or there is an overflow of phlegm or bile, 
bodily sickness and disease begin, so the disturbing effect of corrupt beliefs 
warring against one another robs the soul of health and introduces the disorder of 
disease. (Cicero, Tusc. 4.23) 
In both cases, treatment was possible. In the case of mental distress, as Cicero 
enunciates,  
there is an art of healing the soul—I mean philosophy, whose aid must be sought 
out, not, as in bodily diseases, outside ourselves, and we must use our utmost 
endeavour, with all our resources and strength, to have the power to be ourselves 
our own physicians. (Cicero, Tusc. 3.6)282 
Indeed, without philosophical intervention, there was no cure.283 As such “diseases of 
the soul” were “both more dangerous and more numerous than those of the body,”284 the 
goal was not only to cut away the external manifestations of the passion, but to “tear out 
all the fibres of its roots.”285 Cicero’s vivid language emphasizes the Stoic ideal of the 
wise man as being completely free from passions of any sort.286 Enshrined in the modus 
                                                
280 For an overview of letter-writing as a means of philosophical paraenesis, see Stanley K. Stowers, 
Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity, LEC 5 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986), 36–40. 
281 Cicero, Tusc. 3.5. 
282 The use of the medical analogy in philosophical therapy, which is more highly developed in 
Stoicism than in the other Hellenistic schools, can be traced to Chrysippus (see Galen, PHP 5.2.22–24).  
283 Cicero, Tusc. 3.13. 
284 Cicero, Tusc. 3.5. 
285 Cicero, Tusc. 3.13, 83.  
286 Diogenes Laertius 7.117.   
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operandi of Stoic philosophical therapy is thus a profound respect for the integrity of the 
reasoning abilities of every person.287 As such, the function of philosophical therapy is 
understood as that of strengthening the soul, or, as Nussbaum puts it, “developing its 
muscles, assisting it to use its own capabilities more effectively.”288  
As we have seen, in the Stoic account of emotion, the judgements which give rise 
to the passions are based on one’s appraisals concerning whether something is good or 
bad, beneficial or baneful. These evaluations are all marked by the ascription of a high 
value to external objects, or things that do not fall under one’s control.289 Of paramount 
importance in Stoic therapy was therefore its insistence that the judgements with which 
the passions are identified are false, because externals are devoid of any intrinsic ethical 
value. Cicero is in agreement with the Stoics that as sick and irrational motions of the 
soul, the passions are injurious to the individual; in several places he provides rhetorical 
illustrations of the morbidity of irrational affective action,290 and contrasts such 
behaviour with the restraint, consistency, and serenity of the wise man.291  
The Stoics advanced several other arguments for their position. One that Cicero 
seems to have found compelling was that passions are never reliable motivations for 
virtuous action.292 In fact, it is the person who is unable to resort to reason who resorts 
to impassioned modes of conduct; such a person is manifestly unwise.293  This notion of 
the non-necessity as well as counter-effectiveness of the passions is supported by a 
slippery slope argument: tiny motions of affect may seem innocuous, but they are 
actually irrational movements that quickly become ungovernable.294 In Cicero’s view, 
when an emotional judgement of any kind is repeated, the soul’s power of reasoning is 
progressively weakened, such that “it is impossible for a disordered and excited soul to 
                                                
287 Epictetus, Diatr. 2.10.1–2. 
288 Nussbaum, Therapy, 317–318, referring to Seneca, Ep. 15. See also Cicero, Tusc. 4.31. 
289 Nussbaum observes that the evaluative beliefs on which the major passions rest “all embody a 
conception of the agent’s good according to which the good is not simply ‘at home’ inside of him, but 
consists, instead, in a complex web of connections between the agent and unstable worldly items such as 
loved ones, city, possessions, the conditions of action;” see Therapy, 370.  
290 Speaking of anger, Cicero asks, “is there anything more like unsoundness of mind than anger? … 
What share have change of colour, voice, eyes, breathing, ungovernableness of speech and act in 
soundness of mind?” (Tusc. 4.52; see also e.g. 4.35, 48). 
291 See e.g. Cicero, Tusc. 4.37.  
292 Cicero uses the example of bravery in battle, which “does not need the backing of irascibility” and 
“stands in no need of loss of temper” (Tusc. 4.53). See also Seneca, Ira 1.12.1–13.5, which concludes 
with Seneca’s argument that “[n]o man is ever made braver through anger, except the one who would 
never have been brave without anger. It comes, then, not as a help to virtue, but as a substitute for it.” 
(1.13.5) 
293 Cicero, Tusc. 4.55. 
294 Knuuttila, Emotions, 77. 
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control itself or stop where it wishes.”295 Furthermore, due to the interconnections 
between the passions, when one experiences an emotional upheaval of some sort, there 
is a ripple effect that brings about alterations in other emotional dispositions.296 Another 
argument concerns the intensely painful feelings that are associated with the experience 
of the passions. The Stoics point out that passions are felt, more often than not, as 
violent pains and upheavals; moreover, the person subject to them feels himself to be in 
a chronic condition of weakness and lassitude.297 
It should be noted that Cicero’s analysis of the passions reflected his personal 
experience of them. He was grief-stricken by the death of his only daughter and first 
child, Tullia, and in book three of the Tusculan Disputations he summarises the rival 
approaches to consolation that he applied and wrote about in his lost Consolatio.  
Some hold that the comforter has only one responsibility: to teach the sufferer that 
what happened is not an evil at all. This is the view of Cleanthes. Others, including 
the Peripatetics, would teach that it is not a great evil. Still others, for instance 
Epicurus, would draw attention away from evils and toward good things, and there 
are yet others who think it sufficient to show that nothing has happened contrary to 
expectation. And the list goes on. Chrysippus, for his part, holds that the key to 
consolation is to get rid of the person’s belief that mourning is something that he 
ought to do, something just and appropriate. Finally there are those who bring 
together all these types of consolation, since different methods work for different 
people. In my Consolation, for instance, I combined virtually all these methods 
into a single speech of consolation. For my mind was swollen, and I was trying out 
every remedy I could. (Tusc. 3.76 [Graver]) 
He continues: 
The most dependable method as regards the validity of its reasoning is that of 
Chrysippus, but it is a hard method to apply in time of distress. It’s a big task to 
persuade a person that he is grieving by his own judgment and because he thinks 
he ought to. (Tusc. 3.79 [Graver]) 
Though Cicero prefers his own eclectic approach he endorses the Chrysippan approach 
as the one which best combines a sound theoretical basis with the possibility of 
success;298 Cicero sees it as superior because attention is placed not on the evaluation of 
an external object but on the assessment of the appropriateness of the emotional 
response itself; he confirms later that dealing with the emotions themselves as the 
                                                
295 Cicero, Tusc. 4.38–42, quote from 41. There are similar arguments in Seneca, Ep. 85.6–16 and 
Epictetus, Diatr. 2.18.1–14.  
296 Cicero, Tusc. 3.19–20. As Nussbaum, Therapy, 398, puts it: “The very same evaluations that 
ground one group of passions ground—given a change of circumstances or a different temporal 
perspective—the others as well.”  
297 Nussbaum, Therapy, 392–394. She cites, by way of example, the description of the angry man in 
Seneca, Ira 1.1.3–5, and also notes that even the alleged positive emotions like joy and love are 
associated with a phenomenology of upheaval and disruption.  
298 Graver, Cicero, 122. On Cicero’s views of the competing approaches, see Knuuttila, Emotions, 74. 
Chapter 2. Emotion in Stoicism 
 60 
starting point is didactically and therapeutically the most efficacious strategy.299 The 
Chrysippan approach helped the individual to recognize that an affective response 
incorporated a voluntary assent to the prescription that one should have such a response. 
It was then possible to demonstrate that such a response was neither fitting nor useful, 
and that it ensued in behavioural patterns that sabotaged the quest for true happiness.300  
2.4.4. Stoic Therapy in Practice 
Having reviewed the arguments in favour of the Stoic position, we can now 
outline the practicalities of their cognitive therapy. The arguments that were mounted 
against the passions and for an ideal of apatheia had a therapeutic function as a general 
orientation, but a focus on the concrete, and the use of instructive examples, together 
with an emphasis on understanding the background and circumstances of the individual, 
were also indispensable components of their approach.301  
A primary task of the teacher was to help his student to reach the goal of rational 
self-determination. This involved the creation of a space, internal to the pupil, for 
critical self-examination: 
Make it, therefore, your study at the very outset to say to every harsh impression, 
“You are an external impression and not at all what you appear to be.” After that 
examine it and test it by these rules which you have, the first and foremost of 
which is this: Whether the impression has to do with the things which are under 
our control, or with those which are not under our control; and if it has to do with 
some one of the things not under our control, have ready to hand the answer, “It is 
nothing to me.” (Epictetus, Ench. 1.5) 
Epictetus here shows his students how to deconstruct an external impression without 
recourse to an emotion-filled reading of it. Elsewhere, he also advises his pupils to 
reject bad impressions and replace them with good ones.302 Alongside these strategies, 
he prescribes other practical exercises, such as putting key Stoic doctrines into action, 
participating in a range of life situations without affective reactions, and preparing for 
eventualities through careful premeditation.303 In addition, as we have observed, 
vituperation of the passions was part of the Stoic approach.  
    In Stoic teaching, the use of example figures is prominent. One reason had to 
do with motivation: portraits of exemplars helped the individual to see that conceptual 
                                                
299 Cicero, Tusc. 4.60–62.  
300 Cicero, Tusc. 3.61–66. 
301 See Knuuttila, Emotions, 78; and esp. Nussbaum, Therapy, 335–341. 
302 Epictetus, Diatr. 2.18.23–26. 
303 See e.g. Ench. 4–5, 9–10; Diatr. 2.2.1–7; 2.13; 2.16; 3.3; 3.8.1–6.   
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notions of right thinking could have concrete expression.304 But as Nussbaum points 
out, the Stoics were concerned not only with getting the general content of an act right, 
but to promote fully virtuous acts. Since this was a highly contextual matter, general 
rules could not guarantee a correct result. Ultimately, what was needed was a strategy 
for rational assessment that would, in a specific scenario, show one “when he should do 
certain things, and to what extent, and in whose company, and how, and why” (Seneca, 
Ep. 95.5). Certainly, exempla had to be supplemented by philosophical explication, but 
they demonstrated as nothing else could what it was to think and act wisely.305 
However, the success of the Stoic method depended also on the pupil’s practical 
response to the sorts of cognitive therapy outlined above. He had to take an active role 
in the introspective supervision of his own motivations, thoughts, and actions.306 
Writing about anger, Seneca highlights the benefits of a regular self-appraisal of the 
quality of one’s actions and moral development: 
Anger will cease and become more controllable if it finds that it must appear 
before a judge every day. Can anything be more excellent than this practice of 
thoroughly sifting the whole day? And how delightful the sleep that follows this 
self-examination—how tranquil it is, how deep and untroubled, when the soul has 
either praised or admonished itself, and when this secret examiner and critic of self 
has given report of its own character! (Seneca, Ira 3.36.2–3)307 
Clearly, what is implied here is that regular self-examination leads to the betterment of 
one’s state, by reducing one’s proneness to unregulated emotional behaviour.308 At its 
heart, Stoic philosophy was not about the promulgation of abstract theory, but was a 
way of life that transformed the individual’s modes of seeing and being. Rigorous self-
examination was integral to this process, because such a transformation required the 
reawakening of the mind’s powers of rational self-consciousness and active vigilance, 
and the discarding of old habits.309  
                                                
304 Cicero, Tusc. 3.79; 4.60.   
305 See Nussbaum, Therapy, 339–340.  
306 Epictetus, Diatr. 4.12; Ench. 33.  
307 See also Epictetus, Diatr. 2.18.12–18. 
308 See also Epictetus, Diatr. 4.12.6. 
309 See further Nussbaum, Therapy, 340–341, and especially Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of 
Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Michael Chase 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 83–86. Hadot notes that no systematic treatise codifying the instructions and 
techniques for what he terms “spiritual exercises” has come down to us; yet the presence of frequent 
allusions to them in Stoic writings suggests that they were very much part of the philosophical 
curriculum. However, we have Philo’s two lists of spiritual exercises (in Alleg. Interp. 3.18 and Heir 
253), which provide us with a fairly complete panorama of Stoic-Platonic inspired therapeutics. Hadot 
aggregates the elements of the two lists into four groups of exercises: first, attention; then meditation and 
the remembrance of good things; then the more intellectual exercises of reading, listening, research, and 
investigation; and finally the more active exercises of self-mastery, accomplishment of duties, and 
indifference to externals.    
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2.5. The Early Roman Empire Stoics on Grief and Joy  
We shall conclude our discussion with a focused examination of how the Stoics 
of the early Roman Empire, who were Paul’s contemporaries, dealt with emotion. Our 
best sources are Seneca and Epictetus; and as Stoicism had by that time become an 
established doctrinal system, moral exhortation rather than matters of theory was their 
concern. Even if for the most part they confirm rather than add to our knowledge of 
Stoic theory, what they have to say furnishes us with invaluable information about what 
it meant to live as a committed Stoic. In order both to give our exploration precision and 
to facilitate the comparisons that we shall later make with Paul’s views, our study will 
be limited to two key emotions: grief and joy. Given the theoretical consistency which 
frames and indeed finesses Stoicism, we can be assured that such a delimitation will not 
disadvantage our study; on the contrary, the use of specific foci will help us to 
appreciate how Stoic therapeutic concepts took on flesh and translated into real life 
practice. 
2.5.1. Grief 
2.5.1.a. Consolation in Antiquity 
By the time of the late Republic and the early Roman Empire, the consolatio—a 
piece of writing which employed rational argument to combat grief and other 
misfortunes—had become a distinct genre with its own tropes.310 A number of 
consolations have come down to us from this period, with the most common type being 
the consolatory letter, examples of which are found within the letter collections of 
Cicero, Seneca, and Pliny, and also among the letters of Apollonius of Tyana.311 In 
addition, six longer works are extant: three by Seneca, two by Plutarch, and one 
                                                
310 Useful general surveys of consolation in antiquity are Robert C. Gregg, Consolation Philosophy: 
Greek and Christian Paideia in Basil and the Two Gregories, Patristic Monograph Series 3 (Cambridge: 
Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1975), 1–50; J. H. D. Scourfield, Consoling Heliodorus: A 
Commentary on Jerome, Letter 60 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 15–33; Paul A. Holloway, Consolation in 
Philippians: Philosophical Sources and Rhetorical Strategy, SNTSMS 112 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 55–83. The literary sources are collected by Carl Buresch, “Consolationum a 
Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia critica,” Leipziger Studien zur classichen Philologie 9 (1886): 1–
170. On the conceptual notion of a consolatory genre in antiquity, see J. H. D. Scourfield, “Towards a 
Genre of Consolation,” in Greek and Roman Consolations: Eight Studies of a Tradition and Its Afterlife, 
ed. Hans Baltussen (Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2013), 1–36. 
311 Cicero, Fam. 4.5; 5.16; 5.18, 6.3; Att. 12.10; 15.1; Ep. Brut. 1.9; Seneca, Ep. 63; 99 (some scholars 
include also Ep. 93); Pliny, Ep. 1.12; 3.21; 9.9; Apollonius of Tyana, Ep. 55; 58.   
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attributed to Plutarch.312 Quite clearly, the practice of consolation was by that time 
already widespread in the Greco-Roman world. Its origin dates to at least the eighth 
century BCE, because consolatory topoi are found as early as Homer313; this means that 
consolation predates the rise of philosophy as a specialized branch of thought. However, 
it was not until the late fifth and early fourth centuries that the problem of grief began to 
be treated in a more systematic fashion—in writings that dealt with death and loss either 
explicitly or indirectly,314 and in several treatises and other types of literature on topics 
that included consolatory aspects.315  
In subsequent centuries, two particularly influential works emerged. The most 
significant early treatise was the Περὶ πένθους of Crantor of Soli, the fourth century 
Academician, which was accorded a paradigmatic status by the many philosophers who 
took it as a model.316 Of at least equal importance for later tradition was Cicero’s 
aforementioned Consolatio, which was also influenced by Crantor’s work.317 C. E. 
Manning notes that the consolatio was a natural literary development of the Hellenistic 
Age, when the prime concern of philosophy was to equip the individual to meet the 
challenges of life, and that it became part of the armoury of all the major schools of 
philosophy.318 Though the range of circumstances that consolers addressed was very 
broad,319 bereavement was the most prevalent subject matter.320 Greco-Roman letters of 
consolation contained traditional materials such as quotations from the poets, examples, 
precepts, and arguments against excessive grieving.321 The content of these arguments 
                                                
312 Seneca, Helv., Marc., Polyb.; Plutarch, Exil., Cons. ux.; Ps-Plutarch, Cons. Apoll. 
313 E.g. in Il. 6.486–489, where Hector attempts to comfort Andromache by appealing to the 
inevitability of fate, or in Il. 24.522–551, where Achilles stresses to Priam that grief is pointless.   
314 From doxographical tradition we learn that death and bereavement were the focus of most of these 
early writings (see e.g. Diogenes Laertius 4.11; 6.15; 6.80; 9.46) but topics such as poverty and exile 
were also given attention (e.g. Diogenes Laertius 2.84; 5.42; 9.20).  
315 These include the Περὶ εὐθυµίας of Democritus (Diogenes Laertius 9.46) and Hipparchus 
(Stobaeus 4.44.81), and the Περὶ παθῶν of Theophrastus (Diogenes Laertius 5.42), Xenocrates (Diogenes 
Laertius 4.11), Zeno (Diogenes Laertius 7.4), Herillus (Diogenes Laertius 7.166), Sphaerus (Diogenes 
Laertius 7.178), Chrysippus (Diogenes Laertius 7.111), and Hecastus (Diogenes Laertius 7.110).  
316 See Cicero, Acad. 2.135; Diogenes Laertius 4.27; and also Fitzgerald, “Introduction,” 9–10. Only 
fragments remain; for details see Holloway, Consolation, 58 n.20. 
317 This too has been lost, but much of its substance is preserved in Tusc. books 1 and 3. Cicero refers 
to his Consolatio at Tusc. 1.65, 76, 83; 3.70, 76; 4.63. 
318 C. E. Manning, On Seneca’s “Ad Marciam,” Mnemosyne Supplement 69 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1981), 12. 
319 Cicero in Tusc. 3.81 names specific situations such as “de paupertate … de vita inhonorata et 
ingloria … de exsilio, de interitu patriae, de servitute, de debilitate, de caecitate, de omni casu, in quo 
nomen poni solet calamitatis.” 
320 It forms the subject-matter of the following extant prose consolationes from the period of the early 
Roman Empire: Cicero, Fam. 4.5; 5.16; 6.3; Att. 12.10; 15.1; Ep. Brut. 1.9; Seneca, Marc.; Polyb.; Ep. 
63; 99; Plutarch, Cons. Ux.; Ps-Plutarch, Cons. Apoll.   
321 Stowers, Letter Writing, 142. 
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tended towards the philosophical commonplace, with platitudes of general application 
such as would find ready acceptance with the bereaved.322 To be sure, each major 
school of philosophy developed its own distinctive position in regard to comforting the 
grieving person; 323 but consolations of the period often displayed a studied eclecticism 
in which school lines were regularly crossed.   
2.5.1.b. Seneca on Grief 
In their approach to the treatment of grief, Seneca’s consolatory writings share 
many similarities with Greco-Roman letters of consolation in general.324 Seneca freely 
utilizes several ideologically neutral stock arguments: e.g., that death is inevitable;325 
that the intensity of grief diminishes over time;326 and that death delivers from present 
and future misfortunes.327 To these we may add standard exhortations to responsible 
behaviour: two common ones were not to neglect one’s familial or public duties, and 
not to complain against God or fate.328 As with philosophical paraenesis generally, the 
use of exemplars featured prominently in ancient consolation.329 In addition, Seneca 
valorizes rigorous philosophical study: “encircle yourself with them as bulwarks for 
your mind in order that sorrow may find no point that will give entrance to you.”330 
These platitudes are accompanied by other arguments that come from a range of 
philosophical traditions, giving ancient consolation its characteristically eclectic quality 
while at the same time reinforcing its intensely practical goal.331 At several places in his 
                                                
322 Margaret R. Graver, “The Weeping Wise: Stoic and Epicurean Consolations in Seneca’s 99th 
Epistle,” in Tears in the Graeco-Roman World, ed. Thorsten Fögen (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 
235. 
323 Cicero in his Consolatio identifies five major theories of consolation: those of Cleanthes, the 
Peripatetics, the Epicureans, the Cyreniacs, and Chrysippus (Tusc. 3.76); for a concise summary see 
Holloway, Consolation, 64–74. 
324 Five of Seneca’s texts are conventionally referred to as coming within the ambit of consolatory 
literature: Marc.; Polyb.; Helv.; Ep. 63; and Ep. 99. On the construction of a Senecan consolatory corpus 
see Marcus Wilson, “Seneca the Consoler? A New Reading of His Consolatory Writings,” in Greek and 
Roman Consolations: Eight Studies of a Tradition and Its Afterlife, ed. Hans Baltussen (Swansea: 
Classical Press of Wales, 2013), 94–95. 
325 Marc. 11; 17.1; Polyb. 1.4; Ep. 99.7–9. 
326 Marc. 8.1–2; Ep. 63.12. 
327 Marc. 19.4–5; 20.6; 22.1–2; Polyb. 9.4–5. 
328 See Holloway, Consolation, 64–65, citing Polyb. 5.4–6.5; Helv. 18.7–8 (on fulfilling familial and 
public duties); and Marc. 10.2; Polyb. 2.2; 4.1 (on not complaining). 
329 Marc. 2.1–4.4; Polyb. 14.1–16.3; 17.1–6;  
330 Polyb. 18.1–2. See also Helv. 17.2–5, where Seneca argues that philosophical study helps one to 
bring an end to grief, for “the grief that has submitted to reason is allayed for ever” (17.2).  
331 As Scott LaBarge observes: “One of the most interesting things about the ancient literature of 
consolation is the range of distinct philosophical schools and traditions represented in it, but more 
interesting still is how schools that are so divergent in other ways seem largely to have converged in their 
treatment of grief. The consensus view is that grief should be indulged as little as possible, and many 
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consolations, Seneca promotes Epicurean therapy by steering the grieving person’s 
mind away from his or her present misfortunes towards more pleasurable experiences, 
such as good recollections of the past332 and thoughts of family, books and reading, and 
Caesar333—all of which should help to compensate for any present misfortune. He also 
modifies this Epicurean approach by connecting the making of pleasant memories to 
discourse on the virtues of the diseased person.334 Elsewhere, Seneca endorses the 
Cyreniac strategy of contemplating possible future evils in order to lessen the shock of 
any sudden calamity.335 Initially associated with the Cyreniacs, in a slightly less bald 
form it was adopted by the Stoics who from the time of Chrysippus maintained that 
foreseen evils strike more lightly.336 More explicitly Chrysippan influences are found in 
Seneca’s arguments against the appropriateness of grief. Scattered across his letters is 
the charge that grieving is useless, and accomplishes nothing whether for oneself or the 
person for whom one mourns.337 Moreover, since grief is inherently irrational, it is 
always beneath human dignity.338 These arguments appear together with another 
distinctively Stoic notion: that false opinion has a key role in fuelling one’s irrational 
grief. Seneca writes, “what tortures us, therefore, is an opinion (opinio), and every evil 
is only as great as we have reckoned it to be.”339   
                                                                                                                                          
thought that ideally we should not grieve at all.” Scott LaBarge, “How (and Maybe Why) to Grieve Like 
an Ancient Philosopher,” in Virtue and Happiness: Essays in Honour of Julia Annas, ed. Rachana 
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teacher must aim to create the right disposition to receive the doctrine; he must lead gently from common 
ground to his own position”; “The Consolatory Tradition and Seneca’s Attitude to the Emotions," Greece 
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than none at all” (Marc. 12.1–3, quote from 3); see also Polyb. 10; Ep. 99.4–5.  
333 Helv. 18–19; Polyb. 8; 12–13.   
334 Marc. 24.1–4; Polyb. 18.7–8. On Epicurean consolatory theory, see Cicero, Tusc. 3.33, 76; 
Manning, “Consolatory Tradition," 79–81; Manning, Marciam, 47–48; more generally, see Nussbaum, 
Therapy, 102–139; Malte Hossenfelder, “Epicurus—Hedonist Malgré Lui,” in The Norms of Nature: 
Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, ed. Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 245–263. 
335 Marc. 9–10; Helv. 5.3. On Cyreniac thinking see Cicero, Tusc. 3.28, 52, 76; Manning, Marciam, 
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336 Manning, Marciam, 60, citing Cicero, Tusc. 3.52.  
337 Marc. 6.1–2; Polyb. 2.1; 5.1–3; 9.1–3; Ep. 99.4; see also Cicero, Tusc. 3.66–67. 
338 Cicero, Tusc. 4.59. The argument that grief is inappropriate and unworthy often takes the form of 
short asides that misfortune should be borne with manly courage: see Marc. 1.1; 7.3; Polyb. 6.2; Ep. 
99.1–2.  
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prescribed.”  
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Does Seneca advocate the complete rooting out of one’s emotions of grief 
(apatheia), or their moderation (metriopatheia)?340 In several places, Seneca evidently 
admits that to grieve is both natural and reflexive. However, he also insists that due 
confines must be placed on one’s grieving. Addressing Marcia, who after three years 
was still mourning her son, Seneca writes,   
“But,” you say, “Nature bids us grieve for our dear ones.” Who denies it, so long 
as grief is tempered? For not only the loss of those who are dearest to us, but a 
mere parting, brings an inevitable pang and wrings even the stoutest heart. (Marc. 
7.1–2) 
The same views are found in Seneca’s consolation to Polybius upon the death of his 
brother. Referring to the sorrow and weeping which constantly intrude upon human life, 
he tells Polybius,   
Thus we spend our lives, and therefore we ought to do in moderation this thing that 
we must do so often; and as we look back upon the great mass of sorrows that 
threatens us behind we ought, if not to end our tears, yet at any rate to keep watch 
over them. (Polyb. 4.3) 
Seneca’s approval of moderate grief is confirmed when he discloses to Polybius that 
“nature requires from us some sorrow … But never will I demand of you that you 
should not grieve at all.”341 Moreover, it is the proper application of reason to one’s 
grief that is effective in curtailing its excessiveness.342  
In the consolationes, Seneca comes across as a defender of metriopatheia. Yet in 
his letters to Lucilius, which were written later,343 his views become more nuanced. At 
the beginning of Ep. 63, Seneca tells his pupil:  
I am grieved to hear that your friend Flaccus is dead, but would not have you 
sorrow more than is fitting. That you should not mourn at all I shall hardly dare to 
insist; yet I know that it is the better way. (Ep. 63.1) 
That for Seneca the expunction of grief is “the better way” is substantiated by the 
revelation later of his regret at weeping excessively, to the point of being “overcome 
                                                
340 “Moderate emotion” (µετριοπάθεια), a view often taken to be Peripatetic or Old Academic, is 
discussed by Cicero in Tusc. 3.22; 3.74; Acad. pr. 2.135 (where it is attributed to Crantor, whose views 
were taken to be the same as Aristotle’s). For its approval see Ps.-Plutarch, Cons. Apoll. 102d (quoting 
Crantor); for Stoic objections see Tusc. 4.38–47 with Graver, Cicero, 163–165. 
341 Polyb. 18.4–5. See also Marc. 3.3. 
342 Polyb. 18.6–7: “Reason will have accomplished enough if only she removes from grief whatever is 
excessive and superfluous; it is not for anyone to hope or to desire that she should suffer us to feel no 
sorrow at all. Rather let us maintain a mean which will copy neither indifference nor madness, and will 
keep us in the state that is the mark of an affectionate, and not an unbalanced, mind. Let your tears flow, 
but also let them cease, let deepest sighs be drawn from your breast, but let them also find an end; so rule 
your mind that you may win approval both from wise men and from brothers.”  
343 Miriam Griffin dates the three consolationes to 39–49 CE, the Epistulae Morales to 64–65 CE; see 
her Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 349–350, 395–400, 518. 
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with grief,” when his friend Serenus died.344 Seneca thus acknowledges that his own 
sorrow had been beyond his ability to quell; subsequently, he—using, twice, in the final 
section the jussive subjunctive verb form (cogitemus, “let us think”)345—casts himself 
in the role of the patient, as he often does in the Epistulae.346 However, Seneca’s 
uncompromising stance is then immediately tempered by his concession that tears are 
forgivable if they remain within one’s power to control them (si ipsi illas repressimus). 
He therefore adjures Lucilius to exercise self-control in the midst of grief: “Let not the 
eyes be dry when we have lost a friend, nor let them overflow. We may weep, but we 
must not wail.”347 Seneca is in Ep. 63 still giving some leeway to grief exercised under 
restraint, but he also seems to want to highlight the danger of allowing that grief to 
descend into unappeasable sorrow—a state to which he had succumbed against his 
better wishes. 
Appearing as a long enclosure within Ep. 99 is Seneca’s letter to Marullus, which 
is the last and also least conventional of his consolations.348 Here, Seneca’s doctrinal 
commitments are foregrounded by his argument that a life of virtue, one that is 
circumscribed by natural rationality, is wholly incompatible with the expressions of 
emotion that are properly called grief. Consolatory arguments from tradition continue to 
be pressed into service, but in more restricted fashion. In accordance with Stoic 
principles, Seneca now explicitly contends that Marullus, despite the death of his son, 
has not suffered any real evil that justifies his grief. In contrast with the hypothetical 
case of the wise man who despite losing an intimate friend (which for the Romans was 
“the greatest blow of all”) still finds joy because of the privilege of having had that 
friendship, the death of a child is an illusory evil—one of those “shadowy troubles over 
which men make moan through force of habit.”349 He chides Marullus for his false 
belief that death is inherently evil,350 and for conforming to societal norms of mourning 
                                                
344 Ep. 63.14. 
345 Ep. 63.15–16. 
346 See Marcus Wilson, “The Subjugation of Grief in Seneca’s ‘Epistles,’” in The Passions in Roman 
Thought and Literature, ed. Susanna Morton Braund and Christopher Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 49. On Seneca’s self-identification as a fellow patient, see e.g. Ep. 27.1; 68.9. 
347  Ep. 63.1. We should note that Seneca continues to use therapeutic arguments from a range of 
schools, e.g. Chrysippus (63.3), the Epicureans (63.4–7), and the Cyreniacs (63.15); for details see 
Manning, “Consolatory Tradition,” 78. 
348 A fact which Seneca himself admits: “I have not observed the usual form of condolence”; Ep. 99.1. 
For a detailed literary analysis of Ep. 99 see Wilson, “Subjugation of Grief,” 48–67. 
349 Ep. 99.3. 
350 Ep. 99.7–13. See also Ep. 74, which concerns virtuous living: in 74.24–26 and 30–31, Seneca 
argues that the integrity of the wise man’s virtue means that even if his friends or children die, no distress 
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behaviour that required an exaggeration of natural responses.351 Seneca does not deny 
that there are indeed natural responses—tears, changes in facial expression, and felt 
inner pain—that accompany bereavement; in fact, he pre-empts the charge of 
inhumanitas by saying that it is unnatural to suppress these responses.352 For him, then, 
certain natural expressions of bereavement are associated with a life of virtue; but grief 
and some of its accompanying practices are clearly excluded.  
Seneca continues by stating that there are two forms of weeping which occur in 
the wise person’s experiences.353 One type are the tears that emerge “by their own 
force,” being “wrung from us by the necessity of Nature” at those times when the 
immediacy and intensity of one’s loss is most keenly experienced.354 Earlier, in our 
examination of the propatheiai (see section 2.3.3.c), we saw how the Stoic founders 
apparently distinguished from genuine emotions another level of affective response, for 
which a special terminology was used. These “bitings” and “troublings” were 
involuntary sensations that lacked the necessary belief structures to make them passions 
as defined by the Stoics. We also discussed how Seneca applied this “pre-emotion” 
concept in his De ira. Here, in Ep. 99, he is merely restating his position and lending 
further support to the older Stoic stand.  
It is the second category of tears which now concerns us. Noting that such tears 
“fall by consent,” and that they come about “when we muse in memory of those whom 
we have lost,” Seneca contends that they express positive rather than negative feelings, 
and as such may be likened to tears of joy: tunc oculi velut in gaudio relaxantur.355 I am 
persuaded by the view of several scholars who suppose that Seneca, in referring to tears 
as a voluntary reaction of the wise person, is drawing on his understanding of the Stoic 
doctrine of eupathic response.356 The eupatheiai, as we have already seen, are impulses 
which result from fully accurate assessments of goodness and badness. In Margaret 
Graver’s hypothesis, the mention of joy (gaudium) at Ep. 99.1 is confirmation of this 
supposition, because joy figures prominently in Seneca’s writings as that feature of the 
                                                                                                                                          
is experienced, for “the sage will retain the firm belief that none of these things is evil, or important 
enough to make a healthy mind break down.” (74.31).   
351 Ep. 99.16–17. 
352 Ep. 99.15. 
353 Ep. 99.18–19.  
354 Seneca gives as examples the initial news of an untimely death and the final embrace before a 
body’s cremation. 
355 Ep. 99.18–19 
356 See Graver, “Weeping,” 244–248; Graver, Stoicism, 101; Gretchen Reydams-Schils, The Roman 
Stoics: Self, Responsibility, and Affection (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 140–141. 
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wise person’s inner experience that corresponds to pathological delight in the non-wise 
person.357 Graver emphasizes that as a matter of procedure the best indication that 
Seneca means to refer to an existing doctrine lies less in his exact choice of words than 
in the inclusion of a key word within the relevant conceptual frame. He has already 
stated that the wise response to the death of a friend is joy, occasioned by memories of 
the friendship (Ep. 99.3–4); as such, this same joy is to characterize the response of the 
person at Ep. 99.18–19.358  
If a type of grief that could be considered a eupatheia is indeed in view here, the 
question is whether this is one of those points where Seneca is marshalling ideas from 
Stoic tradition and putting them to use, or an innovation in which he takes his Stoic 
inheritance in a new direction. Graver is open to the developmental view, but does not 
want to dismiss the former possibility. She cites a passage in Philo’s On the Migration 
of Abraham (Migration, 156–157) in which Philo gives a physicalist explanation of 
joyful tears which strongly resembles Ep. 99.18–19, and suggests that it is entirely 
reasonable to suppose that Philo’s explanation is one he remembered from reading 
Chrysippus—who had, according to Galen, provided phenomenological explanations 
for affective sensations including those of fear, distress, confidence and joy. If Philo’s 
language reflects old Stoic material referring to tears of joy, then Seneca’s presumably 
does as well. 359 For Reydams-Schils, Seneca is walking a fine line between the well-
established categories of his Stoic predecessors and breaking new ground. In Ep. 99.20–
21, Seneca speaks of proper behaviour even in grief which results in tears that do not 
impair the dignity and authority of the wise man. Reydams-Schils sees in this an 
attempt by Seneca to move beyond traditional Stoic categories to posit an acceptable 
counterpart to grief that is analogous to joy: a fourth eupathic response, concomitant 
with the correct use of reason—which in effect fills the empty box in the symmetric 
schema of the Stoic doctrine of the eupatheiai.360  
To summarize: Seneca’s consolatory writings demonstrate that he made use of 
the majority of theories of that era, Stoic or otherwise, provided that they suited his 
                                                
357 Graver, “Weeping,” 244–245, notes that the concept appears as early as Vit. beat. 4.2–5 and is 
explained in relation to integral goods at some length in Ep. 23.1–6 and 27.2–3; furthermore, in Ep. 59.2 
it is clearly marked as Stoic (ad nostram albam), with the Stoic definition also quoted. 
358 Graver, “Weeping,” 245. 
359 Graver, “Weeping,” 246–248, referring to Galen, PHP 4.7.3–4. Concerning the extent of Philo’s 
knowledge of Stoic views on emotion, see David Winston, “Philo of Alexandria on the Emotions,” in 
Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. Fitzgerald (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2008), 201–220. On eupathic joy specifically, see Philo, QG 4.15–16, 4.19, 4.101.  
360 Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 140–141, and also 136.  
Chapter 2. Emotion in Stoicism 
 70 
purpose in writing to a particular addressee. However, our evidence also clearly 
indicates that Seneca was not afraid to push back the boundaries of Stoic thinking. By 
advocating a position of moderate emotion, he was not merely parroting Peripatetic 
theory. Much more than that, as Reydams-Schils elegantly words it,  
Seneca is struggling to find a way compatible with Stoic doctrine to tell Cicero 
(and indirectly Plato) that even in public and at a burial not only a mother but also 
any philosophically inclined human being has neither to be stone-faced nor stone-
hearted in order to preserve dignity and virtue.361  
Despite being bound by the rhetorical and contextual limitations of the consolatory 
genre in which he was working, Seneca was trying to find a place in Stoicism for the 
wise person’s weeping—the non-culpable, eupathic antithesis of pathological grief.  
2.5.1.c. Epictetus on Grief 
We now turn to Epictetus, who did not pen a consolation per se. In his 
understanding and treatment of the emotions, Epictetus endorses fully the teachings of 
his Stoic forebears. Since his protreptic addresses are works of informal moralizing 
rather than explanations of Stoic moral theory, he avoids technicalities in his writing 
and also does not proffer an explicit theory of the emotions. Nevertheless, his position 
clearly reflects orthodox Stoicism: the passions are, in his view, the consequence of 
erroneous judgements and the misuse of reason.362 In Epictetus’ scheme, a key term is 
prohairesis (προαίρεσις), which Long translates as “volition”—“the purposive and self-
conscious centre of a person”; for Epictetus, nothing except this God-given rational 
faculty of evaluation, choice and action truly belongs to the human person and lies 
within the ambit of his or her control.363 All other things in life, including external 
circumstances whether prima facie good or bad, are not in one’s control and are 
therefore ultimately not of any real concern. This fundamental distinction allows 
Epictetus to correlate human autonomy with his cardinal rule of “making the right use 
of impressions”; indeed, as Long expresses it, Epictetus insists that “impressions have 
                                                
361 Reydams-Schils, Roman Stoics, 141.  
362 On Epictetus and emotion, see Long, Epictetus, 244–254; Anthony A. Long, “Epictetus on 
Understanding and Managing Emotions,” in From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and 
Roman Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 377–394; and Edgar M. Krentz, “ΠΑΘΗ and ΑΠΑΘΕΙΑ 
in Early Roman Empire Stoics,” in Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought, ed. John T. 
Fitzgerald (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 126–131. 
363 Quote from Long, Epictetus, 207; on the concept of prohairesis (including its relationship with the 
hēgemonikon), and its translation, see 207–220, 232–233. A succinct discussion of the various aspects of 
prohairesis is found also in Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Self-Sufficiency and Power: Divine and Human 
Agency in Epictetus and Paul,” in Divine and Human Agency in Paul and His Cultural Environment, ed. 
John M. G. Barclay and Simon J. Gathercole (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 120–121. 
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only the effects that we permit them to have.”364 The upshot of all this is that the person 
who chooses to live within the sphere of his prohairesis (and who therefore necessarily 
also upholds the notion that any occurrent external event is to be set in the context of a 
divinely benevolent ordering of the universe) is able to experience uncurbed 
tranquility.365   
Epictetus’ position as outlined above is seen very clearly in his Diatr. 3.3, in 
which he discusses how the good and virtuous man, working upon his own 
hēgemonikon, can succeed in the task of dealing with his impressions in accordance 
with nature (3.3.1). Right action consists in acting within one’s sphere of volition 
(prohairesis) and disregarding all external situations that fall outside one’s ability to 
control them (3.3.14–16). Epictetus acknowledges the fact that it is all too easy to be 
“caught gaping straightway at every external impression that comes along” (3.3.17). Yet 
it is possible, through the vigilant appraisal of one’s judgements, to maintain in every 
situation a state of equanimity: 
if we see a man in grief, we say, “It is all over with him”; if we see a Consul, we 
say, “Happy man”; if we see an exile, “Poor fellow”; or a poverty-stricken man, 
“Wretched man, he has nothing with which to get a bite to eat.” These, then, are 
the vicious judgements which we ought to eradicate; this is the subject upon which 
we ought to concentrate our efforts. Why, what is weeping and sighing? A 
judgement. What is misfortune? A judgement. What are strife, disagreement, fault-
finding, accusing impiety, foolishness? They are all judgements, and that, too, 
judgements that lie outside the province of moral purpose (prohairesis), assumed 
to be good or evil. Let a man but transfer his judgements that lie within the 
province of the moral purpose (prohairesis), and I guarantee that he will be 
steadfast, whatever the state of things about him. (3.3.17–19)366 
However, such a state of unflappable self-composure is not tantamount to a 
callous detachment from other people and the misfortunes that may befall them. 
Epictetus insists that in one’s relationships and dealings with others, one “ought not to 
be unfeeling (ἀπαθῆς) like a statue,” and couples this stance with the characteristically 
Stoic notion of appropriate action (τὸ καθῆκον) (Diatr. 3.2.4). Elsewhere he makes it 
clear that one should not hesitate to show sympathy to a grieving person, and, if the 
occasion warrants it, even “groan with” (συνεπιστενάζω) the person. However, to this he 
immediately appends a caveat: “be careful not to groan also in the centre of your being” 
(Ench. 16). Hence one can—and in fact, should—grieve with the bereaved person, but 
not to the extent that one’s imperturbability is imperiled. For Epictetus, the correct 
                                                
364 Long, Epictetus, 216. 
365 See John M. G. Barclay, “Security and Self-Sufficiency: A Comparison of Paul and Epictetus,” Ex 
Auditu 24 (2008): 61–62. 
366 On training oneself to deal with impressions, see also Diatr. 3.8.1–6. 
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performance of one’s social roles has both an outward and inward orientation;367 in 
other words, the human person’s attitudes and actions towards others are to be 
structured by a judicious sociability that both reflects one’s appropriate duty to others 
and maintains the integrity of one’s volition and freedom. We should therefore be 
affectionate (φιλόστοργος) towards others, but without becoming abject, broken-
spirited, dependent on another, slavish, or miserable (Diatr. 3.24.58–59). As John 
Barclay observes, “the Stoic, while bound in a network of duties to others, is never 
bound by anything he needs from them.”368  
It comes as no surprise that Epictetus does not have very much to say about the 
practical therapy of grief.  The wise man has no place in his life for grief, and the Stoic 
teacher’s task is to help his students rid themselves of this and other passions—all of 
which are evidence of the presence of mistaken judgements of value.369 Specifically, in 
Epictetus’ view, grief is the result of a false judgement that death is something 
terrible.370 Furthermore, the control of grief is a problem for the individual: “Now 
another’s grief is no concern of mine, but my own grief is” (Diatr. 3.24.23). Even 
though one may strive to help others in their grief, it is one’s own freedom from 
disturbance that is paramount (3.24.24). Beyond this, Epictetus shows no further 
interest in how one might comfort the bereaved. Contrasting him with Seneca, Marcus 
Wilson notes that for Epictetus there is no place for rhetorical persuasion or for the 
adaptation of multiple arguments to the particular character and situation of the 
bereaved. Seneca is more alert to the overwhelming power of grief and far more ready 
to address the grief of others than to focus exclusively, as Epictetus urged, on the 
control of the individual’s own mind.371 It is interesting that in Seneca and Epictetus a 
common set of conceptual apparatuses led to the construction of partially divergent 
practical philosophies of grief. We can already see here that Stoicism made room for a 
more rich and complex emotional life than is often assumed.  
                                                
367 Long, Epictetus, 237. 
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369 See e.g. Epictetus, Diatr. 4.1.111–112, where he speaks of the need to “purify” one’s judgements 
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2.5.2. Joy 
2.5.2.a. Joy as a Eupathic Response  
We have already seen how on the Stoic account the eupatheiai were that set of 
perfected emotions, free from the grounds of criticism on which the passions were 
rejected, which were regularly the experience of the wise person. John Cooper argues 
that the doctrine of eupathic responses arose early in the development of Stoicism as a 
reaction against the accusation that the Stoics were insensitive to certain situations in 
which attachments to or aversions from certain people or things were justified.372 Given 
the defensive context in which this aspect of Stoic theory was worked out, it is not 
surprising that we have only limited details about how precisely the eupatheiai would 
function in a perfected human life. It seems that the Stoics did not develop the theory 
very far as a positive account in its own right of what they certainly regarded as 
important aspects of the moral life.373 This means that we have considerably less 
information about Stoic thinking on joy, for example, compared to the material on grief 
that we have already discussed. Yet I think that our sources do still allow us to 
adumbrate what the Roman Stoics—or more precisely, Seneca, since Epictetus does not 
seem to say very much here—thought about joy as a eupathic response.  
But first, it is helpful at this point to summarize very briefly what earlier Stoicism 
has to tell us about joy. Unlike its eupathic relations, wish and caution, joy does not 
motivate actions of pursuit or avoidance; it is instead a reactive response. Putting 
together the accounts in Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, and Andronicus, we learn that joy is 
a feeling of “rational uplift” or “elation” (εὔλογος ἔπαρσις) at being in the presence of 
true goods—that is, virtue itself, virtuous deeds, and their essential accompaniments.374 
Since wise people are, on Stoic principles, continually aware of their own virtuous 
condition, and since this awareness never fails to generate actions that are wholly 
virtuous, the wise will experience a steady joy both at their condition and its practical 
expression.375  
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374 See Cicero, Tusc.4.13; Diogenes Laertius 7.116; Andronicus, De passionibus 6.  
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2.5.2.b. Seneca on Joy 
Seneca’s fullest exposition about joy is found in Ep. 23, where he describes what 
true joy is and how it can be achieved through the application of philosophy. He begins 
his letter to Lucilius with the assertion that joy (gaudium) is both the “foundation” and 
“pinnacle” of a sound mind and that joy may be found “if we have not placed our 
happiness in the control of externals” (qui felicitatem suam in aliena potestate non 
posuit).376 Seneca is in effect restating standard theory about the eupatheiai, for in the 
person of wise understanding, joy and its fellow eupathic responses emanate from fully 
veridical judgements of the goodness or badness of genuine goods or evils. Such a wise 
person, whose actions are always fully coordinated with the proper exercise of virtue, is 
able to experience eupathic joy consistently. Seneca writes: 
Real joy (gaudium), believe me, is a stern matter. Can one, do you think, despise 
death with a care-free countenance, …? Or can one thus open the door to poverty, 
or hold the curb on his pleasures, or contemplate the endurance of pain? He who 
ponders these things in his heart is indeed full of joy; but it is not a cheerful joy. It 
is just this joy, however, of which I would have you become the owner; for it will 
never fail you … do the one thing that can render you really happy (felicem): cast 
aside and trample under foot all those things that glitter outwardly and are held out 
to you by another or as obtainable from another; look toward the true good (verum 
bonum), and rejoice only in that which comes from your own store. And what do I 
mean by “from your own store”? I mean from your very self, that which is the best 
part of you. (Ep. 23.4–6)  
Seneca clearly sees joy as the affective state that especially marks the normative human 
agent. Yet this state is only accessible to Lucilius when he is transformed by moral 
progress, whose aim is virtue; thus the “true good” in which he is called to rejoice is his 
potential for virtue—the “best part” of him. Elsewhere, Seneca reaffirms his thinking: 
writing to console his mother during his exile, he reminds her that as the human person 
is already imbued with such a potential, she is able to actualize it and achieve joy 
through the judicious evaluation of external goods:  
Nature intended that we should need no great equipment for living happily; each 
one of us is able to make his own happiness (beatum). External things are of slight 
importance, and can have no great influence in either direction. Prosperity does not 
exalt the wise man, nor does adversity cast him down; for he has always 
endeavoured to rely entirely upon himself, to derive all of his joy (gaudium) from 
himself. (Seneca, Helv. 5.1–2) 
The parallels with Ep. 23 may be readily discerned. There, the joy that Seneca has 
in view is a joy that is to be “born” in one’s being—as he tells Lucilius: “Volo illam tibi 
domi nasci” (Ep. 23.3). This joy has no commerce with “objects of cheer” (hilaritates) 
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that are superficial and transient; while these things may possibly elicit laughter, they do 
not reflect the presence of real joy. As Seneca emphasizes, joy causes the wise person’s 
soul to be “happy and confident, lifted above every circumstance” (Ep. 23.3).377 
We find analogous ideas in Seneca’s De Vita Beata, which was written for his 
elder brother Gallio.378 Here Seneca considers the question of how true happiness (i.e. 
in a eudaimonist sense) is to be obtained. He argues that the answer is to be found in 
living according to nature (Vit. beat. 3.1–3; 8.1–2). The result is a life of inner harmony, 
ruled by reason, where there is constancy in one’s perceptions and convictions. The 
“highest good”—a life of virtue—is attained, and in consequence “no crookedness, no 
slipperiness is left to it, nothing that will cause it to stumble or fall” (8.5). Untouched by 
external goods, the person experiences “unbroken tranquillity and enduring freedom” 
(3.3–4)379 and “a boundless joy (gaudium) that is firm and unalterable” (3.4), a joy that 
“is deep and issues from deep within, since he finds delight in his own resources, and 
desires no joys greater than his inner joys” (4.4). In this and the examples cited earlier, 
Seneca’s conception of joy is in keeping with standard Stoic thought about eupathic joy.  
However, as Margaret Graver has recently argued, there is a passage (Ep. 66) in 
which Seneca’s construal of joy does not fully square with the usual Stoic account.380 
Here Seneca speaks of “deriving joy from the dutiful behaviour of one’s children and 
from the well-being of one’s country” (gaudere liberorum pietate, patriae incolumitate, 
66.37). That this joy is an affective responsive is shown by the use of terms that reflect 
Stoic theory concerning sensed alterations in the psychē: thus, for example, this joy is 
“effusive and expansive” (remissa et laxa, 66.12) and involves a “natural effusion and 
expansion of the mind” (naturalis animi remissio et laxitas, 66.14).381 Graver theorizes 
that gaudium here in relation to the safety of one’s homeland and the piety of one’s 
children is an occurrent response of the virtuous mind to what the Stoics would term as 
preferred indifferents. It is not another name for the delight that an ordinary person 
experiences, even though similar affective sensations may be experienced, because the 
ordinary person’s response is predicated on the assumption that these objects are good. 
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The wise person knows that they are preferred indifferents, yet responds to them with 
real joy, as a “natural effusion of the mind.” Thus there appears here to be a divergent 
Stoic account of how normative affect works.382  
Our evidence earlier tells us that Seneca is certainly committed to the idea of joy 
as that emotional state which especially characterizes the wise person. Yet, if Graver is 
correct, what we have here in Ep. 66 is an effort by Seneca to account for the possibility 
of occurrent, wise joy that is based on the presence of non-integral goods. As in the 
curious case of the wise person’s weeping (section 2.5.1.b), Seneca reveals himself as a 
Stoic philosopher who is unafraid to show his ingenuity while broadly remaining within 
school boundaries.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
The Stoic understanding of personhood was wholly integrated within a 
philosophical framework in which the entire universe—all of nature—was understood 
to be shaped and ordered by divine rationality. The goal of life therefore consisted in a 
life in agreement with nature, the result of which was eudaimonia. This meant the 
rational selection of those things which accorded with nature, or, in other words, the 
perfection of virtuous agency. Since rationality characterized the human soul, one’s 
emotional states, far from being irrational drives, were primarily specified by their 
cognitive content. Emotions embodied certain ways of interpreting the world. However, 
in the non-wise, imperfections of rationality gave rise to the passions—which were false 
judgements about the value of external goods. As the Stoics were committed to rational 
self-determination, the passions, which violated the integrity of human agency, had to 
be extirpated.  
Yet not everything that we would today consider an “emotion” was considered by 
the Stoics to be a passion that required elimination; there were other classes of affective 
response—the “good emotions” or eupatheiai, the “pre-emotions” or propatheiai, and 
also what one might term the “moral emotions”—which were deemed to be appropriate 
and indeed even normative. Alongside these we might place also the curious instance of 
the wise person’s weeping, which seems to have been the eupathic antithesis of 
pathological grief. The Stoics have long been caricatured as being almost inhumanly 
                                                
382 Graver, “Anatomies,” 135–136 (quote from 136). 
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disengaged from the emotions that make life and its relationships meaningful. In fact, 
our sources suggest that they allowed—and perhaps even deliberately made room for—
a considerable variety of affective states and thus for a rich and complex emotional life.   
The passions, however, were problematic and had to be eradicated. Since they 
arose from false beliefs, it was thought that the treatment of the mind was the best way 
to achieve this. Stoic cognitive therapy was in part a philosophical analysis of what the 
passions were, and in part a battery of cognitive devices (which were often not 
philosophical, and often shared with other schools) for attacking the objectionable 
aspects of emotion. The work was performed by the coaction of both parts of the 
therapeutic package.383 However, is important to note that the chief demand of Stoic 
ethics was not that one should suppress or deny one’s feelings, but that one should 
perfect one’s rational core. A proper understanding of Stoic axiology makes it clear that 
the Stoics did not seek to attain apatheia only because of the disruptive effects of 
emotional disquiet, but because no rational person would want to continue to believe 
that which was false.  
 
                                                
383 See Sorabji, Emotion, 160. 
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Chapter 3. Joy in Philippians 
3.1. The Background to Philippians  
3.1.1. Overview 
Philippians is one of Paul’s384 most personal letters, one in which we may readily 
observe in his writing the heartfelt emotions that arise from the close relationship that 
he enjoys with this community of believers. The Philippians, who have been so 
supportive of Paul, are “his beloved and longed-for brothers and sisters” and his “joy 
and crown” (Phil 4.1).385 These strong feelings of affection have their basis in the 
Philippians’ stalwart participation in the gospel mission—an active partnership or 
mutual relationship (κοινωνία) that is both spiritual and practical. In the course of this 
partnership, the Philippian Christians have repeatedly sent to Paul moneys to support 
his work of ministry (4.15–16), thereby demonstrating their commitment to their 
common cause. Most recently one of their members, Epaphroditus, had been tasked to 
bring to Paul a financial gift and also to be of general service to him (4.10, 18; 2.25–
30). Epaphroditus had fallen dangerously ill, either along the way to Paul or in his 
company,386 but now that he is recovered, Paul is sending him back. The return of 
Epaphroditus thus provides Paul with the opportunity to send a letter to the Philippians.  
Internal evidence suggests that Paul has several inter-related purposes for 
writing.387 He expresses joy over the Philippians’ support and acknowledges their gift, 
                                                
384 The Pauline authorship of Philippians has only very rarely been questioned. In the nineteenth 
century, F. C. Baur challenged Paul’s authorship (Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ, trans. Allan Menzies, 
2nd ed. [London: Williams & Norgate, 1875], 2, 45–79), but his conclusions were rejected by later NT 
scholarship. More recently, Darrell Doughty’s argument in “Citizens of Heaven: Philippians 3.2–21,” 
NTS 41 (1995): 102–122, that the letter fits better a post-Pauline setting has not found favour with other 
scholars.  
385 As Gordon Fee notes, that the vocative ἀδελφοί means “brothers and sisters” in the Pauline letters 
is made clear from Phil 4.1–2, where Paul uses this vocative and then specifically addresses two women. 
Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 109 n.9.  
386 Paul Holloway argues that the most reasonable way to read Paul’s statement in 2.30 that διὰ τὸ 
ἔργον Χριστοῦ µέχρι θανάτου ἤγγισεν παραβολευσάµενος τῇ ψυχῇ is that in bringing the gift from Philippi 
Epaphroditus became sick and, rather than stopping to recover, pressed ahead, so that Paul did not not 
need to suffer from need in prison; Consolation, 25. However, nothing conclusive can actually be said 
about when or where Epaphroditus fell ill or recovered.  
387 There is considerable scholarly opinion concerning the occasion of the letter; see especially Fee, 
Philippians, 29–38; Markus Bockmuehl, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians, BNTC 
(London: A & C Black, 1997), 33; Gerald F. Hawthorne and Ralph P. Martin, Philippians, Revised ed., 
WBC 43 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2004), lv–lvii; G. Walter Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians, 
PiNTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 19–30. However, it seems to me rather difficult—and perhaps 
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commends Epaphroditus (and Timothy), provides the Philippians with an update of his 
own situation, and addresses aspects of theirs that he is concerned about. Reporting his 
own situation, Paul repeatedly mentions being “in chains” (1.7, 13, 14, 17). However, 
instead of curtailing the progress of the gospel, as the Philippians might have expected, 
his incarceration, most likely in Rome,388 and the circumstances surrounding it are 
turning out for its very advancement (1.12–14). In relation to the situation affecting the 
Philippian believers, Fee argues convincingly that at least two matters—suffering 
because of current opposition, and some sort of internal unrest—coalesce in some way 
as the driving force behind the letter’s two blocks of hortatory material (1.27–2.18 and 
3.1–4.3).389 In his letter to the Philippians, then, Paul produces a multi-faceted message 
that brings together pastoral sensitivity and the practical outworking of doctrine: a 
message of solidarity, encouragement, hope, and the possibility of joy even in turmoil 
and suffering.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
altogether unnecessary—to make a case for a single factor, from among several inter-related ones, to 
form the occasion for writing. 
388 The question of the place of writing remains controversial, but is ancillary to my study. I follow 
many scholars in favouring the traditional view of a Roman provenance: see, notably, Morna D. Hooker, 
“The Letter to the Philippians,” NIB vol. 11, ed. Leander Keck (Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 473–475; 
Fee, Philippians, 34–37; Bockmuehl, Philippians, 25–32; Moisés Silva, Philippians, 2nd ed., BECNT 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005), 5–7.  
However, there are a number of recent commentators who opt for Ephesus: examples include Frank 
Thielman, “Ephesus and the Literary Setting of Philippians,” in New Testament Greek and Exegesis: 
Essays in Honor of Gerald F. Hawthorne, ed. Amy M. Donaldson and Timothy B. Sailors (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2003), 205–223; Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, xxxix–l; Bonnie B. Thurston and Judith 
M. Ryan, Philippians and Philemon, SP 10 (Collegeville: Liturgical, 2005), 28–30; Charles B. Cousar, 
Philippians and Philemon: A Commentary, NTL (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2009), 9–11.  
For a Caesarean origin, see Ernst Lohmeyer, Die Briefe an die Philipper, an die Kolosser und an 
Philemon, 14th ed., KEK 9 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1974), 3–4, 15–16. 
389 Fee, Philippians, 29. He notes that both of these matters appear in the initial imperative of 1.27–
28: “that you stand firm in the one Spirit, striving together as one person for the faith of the gospel, 
without being frightened in any way by those who oppose you” (emphases his), followed by a clause 
explaining their suffering (1.29–30) and by an appeal to have the same mindset (2.1–2). These same verbs 
(“stand firm”; “have the same mindset”) are used in the appeals that conclude the second hortatory 
section (4.1–3). For Fee, these two concerns, viz. suffering and disunity, bookend Paul’s hortatory 
material. Fee also finds it noteworthy (29 n.77) that these two matters are taken up in two monographs as 
providing the key to what drives the letter, in each case seeing the one as the primary cause over against 
the other: L. Gregory Bloomquist, The Function of Suffering in Philippians, JSNTSup 78 (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1993); Davorin Peterlin, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians in the Light of 
Disunity in the Church, NovTSup 79 (Leiden: Brill, 1995). 
Much scholarly attention has been devoted to the determination of the identities of the opponents to 
whom Paul alludes in 1.14–17; 1.27–28; 3.2, 18–19. Interpreters generally take the view that Paul is 
referring to Judaizers, especially in ch.3; see the succinct analysis in Jerry L. Sumney, “Studying Paul’s 
Opponents: Advances and Challenges,” in Paul and His Opponents, ed. Stanley E. Porter (Leiden: Brill, 
2005), 25–29. 
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3.1.2. Literary Integrity  
Our discussion so far has assumed that Philippians is an integral whole and that 
our reconstruction of its occasion applies to it in its totality. However, the matter of the 
integrity of canonical Philippians has attracted considerable scholarly interest, with 
some arguing that it is a composite of several letters.390 Their case rests primarily on the 
construal of two seemingly abrupt transitions within the letter. The first is the sharp 
change of tone at 3.1–2, where Paul seems to be preparing to end the letter but 
inexplicably launches into polemical invective. This has led some commentators to 
conclude that a fragment from another letter has been spliced in here; on this reading, at 
3.1 τὸ λοιπόν means “finally,” while χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ is a farewell formula akin to 2 
Cor 13.11. The second uneven seam concerns the location of Paul’s thanksgiving for 
their gift (4.10–20). Its placing within an ancient letter is unusually late; and again, the 
τὸ λοιπόν of 4.8 should lead to concluding remarks rather than to an expression of 
thanks.  
Though the various partition theories are not all agreed, the most common 
proposal is that Philippians comprises three letter fragments, which are (in 
chronological order): Letter A (4.10–20), a short letter of thanks sent immediately after 
the arrival of Epaphroditus; Letter B (1.1–3.1), a letter of reassurance dispatched with 
Epaphroditus upon his return to Philippi; and Letter C (3.2–4.3), a polemical letter sent 
later, perhaps after Paul’s release, or when he had become more fully apprised of the 
theological dangers facing the Philippians.391 The remaining material (4.4–9 and 4.21–
23) is variously assigned, with 4.4–7 and 4.21–23 often shoehorned into Letter B.392  
For every argument favouring composite authorship, there is a counterargument 
favouring the letter’s literary integrity. Furthermore, as Osiek notes, modern composite 
theories presume an intellectual consistency acceptable to a modern literary critic in the 
writing of an ancient author, but consistency and continuity are cultural values that 
differ widely. Abrupt transitions in other ancient letters have been identified upon closer 
look, so those of Paul would not need to be so unusual.393 In any case, the very presence 
of redactional seams has been challenged. It is unnecessary to conclude in 3.1a that Paul 
                                                
390 For a chronicle of the early debates see Veronica Koperski, “The Early History of the Dissection of 
Philippians,” JTS 44 (1993): 599–603; a useful recent discussion is in Holloway, Consolation, 7–33.  
391 Holloway, Consolation, 7–8. 
392 See the table in Lukas Bormann, Philippi: Stadt und Christengemeinde zur Zeit des Paulus, 
NovTSup 78 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 110. 
393 Carolyn Osiek, Philippians, Philemon, ANTC (Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 17. 
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is bringing the letter to a close: τὸ λοιπόν is best understood here as a transitional 
instead of concluding particle (“furthermore,” instead of “finally”),394 and χαίρετε ἐν 
κυρίῳ means “rejoice [not goodbye] in the Lord.”395 Furthermore, βλέπετε in 3:2 can 
simply mean "consider" and not "beware"—in which case the tonal shift is minimal.396 
As to the supposedly delayed “thank you” (4.10–20): it has been demonstrated that this 
section forms an inclusio with the introductory thanksgiving at the beginning (1.3–11), 
thus precluding its excision as a separate letter. The presence of numerous clear 
parallels between these two sections proves that 4.10–20 is not the only place where 
Paul thanks the Philippians for their gift.397 In the first place, in a Hellenistic letter, an 
expression of thanks for a gift need not occur near its beginning; in fact, formal 
expressions of thanks might be absent.398 
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, there has been an increase in 
numbers of scholars returning to the older assumption of the literary integrity of 
Philippians, such that one may speak now of a majority view that eschews partition 
theories.399 Several important studies, undertaken from different perspectives, uphold 
the unity of the letter. David Garland’s literary approach reveals the extensive use of 
inclusio which mark out several shorter sections as well as the overall paraenesis of 
1.27–4.3.400 Duane Watson’s seminal rhetorical-critical inquiry demonstrates that 
Philippians systematically develops the proposition found in 1.27–30 and is thus a 
cohesive whole.401 For Gordon Wiles, the introductory thanksgiving of 1.3–11 is an 
epistolary anticipation, controlled by liturgical idiom, of the major themes that run 
                                                
394 Margaret E. Thrall, Greek Particles in the New Testament: Linguistic and Exegetical Studies 
(Leiden: Brill, 1962), 25–30, esp. 28; Loveday Alexander, “Hellenistic Letter-Forms and the Structure of 
Philippians,” JSNT 37 (1989): 96–97. See also Fee, Philippians, 290–291.  
395 Alexander, “Hellenistic Letter-Forms,” 97. 
396 George D. Kilpatrick, “ΒΛΕΠΕΤΕ, Philippians 3:2,” in In Memoriam Paul Kahle, ed. Matthew 
Black and G. Fohrer (Berlin: Töpelmann, 1968). 
397 Gerald W. Peterman, Paul’s Gift from Philippi: Conventions of Gift-Exchange and Christian 
Giving, SNTSMS 92 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 90–93. Peterman notes that “the 
large-scale inclusio forces us to view the thought of the letter as more concerned with providing a 
response to the Philippians’ support than has commonly been recognized” (92–93).  
398 Alexander, “Hellenistic Letter-Forms,” 97–98. 
399 Indeed, almost all recent commentaries and monographs champion the integrity of the letter, with 
striking exceptions being Jean-Baptiste Edart, L’Épître aux Philippiens, Rhétorique et Composition 
Stylistique, EBib 45 (Paris: Gabalda, 2002); John Reumann, Philippians: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary, AB 33B (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
400 David E. Garland, “The Composition and Unity of Philippians: Some Neglected Literary Factors,” 
NovT 27 (1985): 141–173, esp. 159–161. He also highlights the numerous thematic and verbal parallels 
between chs. 2 and 3, not least between the hymn of 2.5–11 and 3.20–21 (157–159). 
401 Duane F. Watson, “A Rhetorical Analysis of Philippians and Its Implications for the Unity 
Question,” NovT 30 (1988): 57–88, esp. 66–67, 84. See also Peter Wick, Der Philipperbrief: Der formale 
Aufbau des Briefs als Schlüssel zum Verständnis seines Inhalts, BWANT 135 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 
1994), 11, 187–191.  
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through the letter.402 Loveday Alexander observes that the arguments typically adduced 
for partition are not reflected in Hellenistic epistolary conventions.403  
However, rhetorical and epistolographic arguments for unity are not without their 
problems, as Bockmuehl points out.404 As a way out of the impasse, he furnishes two 
considerations about the text and the composition of Philippians that suggest that one 
may reasonably continue to interpret the letter in its received form. First, the manuscript 
transmission of Philippians as a whole is consistent without exception—a fact which is 
significant especially given the well-documented tenacity of textual variants.405 Second, 
it is difficult to imagine how an editor clever enough to carry out such a sophisticated 
splicing operation would be so inept as to leave such obvious breaks in the redacted 
document.406  
It seems clear that partition hypotheses do not hold water, and I shall therefore 
proceed on the assumption of the literary integrity and unity of Philippians, and 
interpret the letter as an integral whole. We turn next to the question of Philippians as a 
letter: precisely what kind of letter is it? Several recent studies of Philippians draw 
attention to the importance of recognizing the literary and social conventions upon 
which it is based, in order to elucidate the precise nature of Paul’s implied relationship 
with his readers and thus understand better the purpose and cohesiveness of the letter as 
a whole. However, as we shall now see, these studies are not conclusive.  
3.1.3. Genre 
3.1.3.a. A Hortatory Letter of Friendship 
On the basis of evidence from Greco-Roman epistolography, some scholars posit 
that Philippians reflects many characteristics of both a “letter of friendship” and a “letter 
                                                
402 Gordon P. Wiles, Paul’s Intercessory Prayers: The Significance of the Intercessory Prayer 
Passages in the Letters of St Paul, SNTSMS 24 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 194–
215; see also Paul Schubert, Form and Function of the Pauline Thanksgivings, BZNW 20 (Berlin: 
Töpelmann, 1939), 71–82. 
403 Alexander, “Hellenistic Letter-Forms,” 87–101. See also Jeffrey T. Reed, “Philippians and the 
Epistolary Hesitation Formulas: The Literary Integrity of Philippians, Again,” JBL 115 (1996): 63–90, 
who demonstrates that Phil 3.1b forms what he labels the “epistolary hesitation formula”—a common 
expression used in letters of Paul’s day to effect a transition from one subject to another.  
404 See Bockmuehl, Philippians, 23–24 and 38–40.  
405 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 24–25; Silva, Philippians, 12.  
406 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 24–25. Fee, Philippians, 22, stresses that there is simply no historical 
evidence for this kind of “scissors-and-pasting” of someone’s letters. The only letter from antiquity that 
might possibly serve as an analogy is 2 Cor (1–9 and 10–13), but in this case we are dealing merely with 
stitching two letters together in their assumed chronological order, not with an intricate and non-
chronological weaving together of three letters. 
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of moral exhortation,”407 and is therefore best described as “a hortatory letter of 
friendship.”408 Certainly, the letter seems to abound with allusions to the topoi and 
language of friendship.409 Examples are the presence-absence motif (1.19–26; 2.12), 
expressions of affection and desire to be with the readers (1.7–8; 4.1), the reciprocity 
between writer and readers (1.7, 30; 2.17–18; 4.14), the pattern of giving and receiving 
(4.10–20), the importance of mutual participation (1.5; 2.1; 3.10; 4.15), the push for 
                                                
407 L. Michael White, “Morality Between Two Worlds: A Paradigm of Friendship in Philippians,” in 
Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. David J. Balch, Everett 
Ferguson, and Wayne A. Meeks (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 201–215; Stanley K. Stowers, “Friends 
and Enemies in the Politics of Heaven: Reading Theology in Philippians,” in Pauline Theology 1: 
Thessalonians, Philippians, Galatians, ed. Jouette M. Bassler (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 107–114; 
Fee, Philippians, 2–14. For a survey of the scholarship see John Reumann, “Philippians, Especially 
Chapter 4, as a ‘Letter of Friendship’: Observations on a Checkered History of Friendship,” in 
Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies in Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. 
John T. Fitzgerald, NovTSup 82 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 83–106. 
See also Alexander, “Hellenistic Letter-Forms,” 87–101, on the closely related category of the so-
called "family letter": since the content of family letters was similar to that of letters of friendship, family 
letters were grouped together with them by the ancient theorists, and not regarded as a distinct type (on 
this, see Fee, Philippians, 2 n.8). Ben Witherington, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians: A Socio-Rhetorical 
Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 17–21, has recently made a case for Philippians to be 
regarded as a family letter because key aspects of the grammar of friendship such as direct reciprocity and 
explicit references to friendship itself are absent. Witherington draws support from the work of Alexander 
and from Reidar Aasgaard’s study of the Pauline sibling metaphor, in which he argues that the familial 
metaphor is used to strengthen the ties between Paul and his readers and to support his drive for unity and 
mutual responsibility; see Reidar Aasgaard, “My Beloved Brothers and Sisters!”: Christian Siblingship in 
Paul, JSNTSup 265 (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 309, 311. However, our evidence indicates that the 
family letter was not regarded as a distinct type.  
On letter-writing in the Greco-Roman world, see Abraham J. Malherbe, Ancient Epistolary Theorists, 
SBLSBS 19 (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988), 1–14; Stowers, Letter Writing, 27–40. As Malherbe (6–7) and 
Stowers (32–35) explain, formal schooling would have included instruction in letter-writing. Two 
manuals for such instruction are extant: “Epistolary Types,” by Pseudo-Demetrius, and “Epistolary 
Styles,” by Pseudo-Libanius, both of which are reproduced and translated by Malherbe in Theorists, 30–
41 and 66–81 respectively. Pseudo-Demetrius illustrates twenty-one different types of letters, with the 
“friendly” type heading his list and the “advisory” letter listed as the eleventh type. Pseudo-Libanius 
expands the list from twenty-one to forty-one styles, with the “paraenetic” and “friendly” letter listed as 
the fifth and eleventh styles.  
408 Fee, Philippians, 12. Cf. White, “Morality,” 206 (“Philippians … is primarily a friendly hortatory 
letter”); Stowers, “Friends,” 107 (“a hortatory letter of friendship”). Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral 
Exhortation, A Greco-Roman Sourcebook (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 80, notes that the styles of a 
letter could be mixed. 
409 On friendship in classical antiquity see Aristotle, Eth. nic. Book 8; Cicero, Amic.; Seneca, Ep. 1, 9, 
35; Plutarch, Amic. mult.; for discussions in the vast secondary literature, see esp. Richard P. Saller, 
Personal Patronage under the Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 7–39; 
Peter Marshall, Enmity in Corinth: Social Conventions in Paul’s Relations with the Corinthians, WUNT 
2.23 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1987), 1–34; Stowers, “Friends,” 107–114; David Konstan, Friendship in the 
Classical World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); John T. Fitzgerald, “Paul and 
Friendship,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook, ed. J. Paul Sampley (Harrisburg: Trinity 
Press International, 2003), 319–343. 
For the language of friendship in Philippians chs. 1–3, see John T. Fitzgerald, “Philippians in the 
Light of Some Ancient Discussions of Friendship,” in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: 
Studies in Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. John T. Fitzgerald, NovTSup 82 (Leiden: Brill, 
1996), 144–147; in ch. 4, see Ken Berry, “The Function of Friendship Language in Philippians 4:10–20,” 
in Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies in Friendship in the New Testament World, ed. 
John T. Fitzgerald, NovTSup 82 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 107–124. 
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agreement and equality (1.27–2.4; 4.2), the need for a single mind (2.2, 5; 4.2) and the 
sharing of common enemies (1.27–30; 3.2, 17–19).410 That Philippians also contains 
significant elements of moral instruction is not in question: two large hortatory sections 
(1.27–2.18 and 3.1–4.3) take up a large part of the letter. Consistent with the goal of 
Greco-Roman letters of exhortation (which often took place in the context of 
friendship)411 the aim of this hortatory material is to advocate a certain kind of 
behaviour and deprecate another, and this is evident in Paul’s explicit appeal throughout 
the letter to exemplary paradigms (Christ, 2.6–11; Timothy, 2.20–22; Epaphroditus, 
2.29–30; and Paul himself, 3.4–14).412  
However, critics argue that while some of the phraseology that is characteristic of 
Greco-Roman friendship is found in Philippians, Paul does not actually make explicit 
reference, nor unambiguous allusion, to friendship; moreover, he does not use here (nor 
in any other letter) the terms φίλος/φιλία.413 In addition, the social equality that was 
thought to be ideal in friendship—between two males of equal standing—is lacking; 
Paul’s seniority in the relationship is implicit throughout the letter.414 Also, there is no 
parallel example of one person entering into a friendship with a group of people, as is 
the case here.415 Furthermore, while one might argue that a Greco-Roman paradigm of 
friendship can shed light on some aspects of the two-way relational dynamics between 
Paul and his readers, it does not account for one factor that some interpreters see as 
being central to the understanding of Paul’s relationship with the Philippians—God’s 
presence in it.416 On balance, Bockmuehl is probably correct in his assessment: 
“Philippians certainly manifests many informal aspects of a warm human friendship … 
                                                
410 As Cousar, Philippians, 12, summarizes; see also Stowers, “Friends,” 108–114; Fee, Philippians, 
5–6, 12–14; Hansen, Philippians, 8–11.  
411 On this see Stowers, Letter Writing, 91–112; Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 79–80 and passim. 
412 Fee, Philippians, 11–12. 
413 See Bockmuehl, Philippians, 34; Silva, Philippians, 19. However the absence of explicit 
friendship terms in Paul has been variously explained; for a summary see Reumann, Philippians, 684.   
414 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 34–35. However, one may argue that friendship was found also among 
social unequals; on this see David E. Briones, Paul’s Financial Policy: A Socio-Theological Approach, 
LNTS 494 (London: T&T Clark, 2013), 75–77. 
415 Osiek, Philippians, 24. 
416 However, Fee seems fully cognizant of this possible objection. On his reading, Philippians is an 
especially Pauline and therefore intensely Christian expression of a “hortatory letter of friendship,” one in 
which first-century epistolary conventions are mere scaffolding for Paul, in whose hands friendship is 
thus radically transformed from a two-way bond to a three-way bond—between him, the Philippians, and 
Christ; see Philippians, 12–14.  
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That recognition alone, however, does not suffice to confirm the requisite social and 
epistolary conventions of Greco-Roman philia.”417  
3.1.3.b. A Letter of Consolation 
An interesting proposal comes from Paul Holloway, who situates Philippians 
within the literature and practice of consolation in antiquity. He argues that Philippians 
should be seen in the light of ancient consolers, who “understood their primary task to 
be not one of sharing in the grief of others, but one of removing that grief by rational 
argument and frank exhortation.”418 For Holloway, Paul diagnoses the chief problem at 
Philippi to be discouragement; his primary purpose in writing is thus to console the 
Philippians that things were going much better than they imagined.419 To correct their 
sense of distress and restore them to responsible behaviour, Paul exploits two key 
consolatory motifs: the distinction between things that matter and things that do not (he 
introduces the “adiaphora” topos at 1.10: εἰς τὸ δοκιµάζειν ὑµᾶς τὰ διαφέροντα), and the 
disposition of “joy” (χαρά), which characterized the wise person in both good times and 
bad.420 Although Holloway identifies Philippians in formal terms as a “letter of 
consolation,” his focus is not so much on the matter of form but on broader questions of 
function and content. As such, he is open to fuller descriptions of the genre of 
Philippians, and accepts that the letter can be discussed helpfully in terms of “other 
modalities,” such as a letter of friendship (since it was certainly the duty of friends to 
console one another) or a kind of family letter; however, these descriptions identify 
what are secondary modes of discourse.421  
3.1.3.c. Other Proposals and Conclusion 
Though the above proposals are inconclusive, in my view they remain among the 
most promising. To be sure, other approaches have been championed. These include 
efforts to locate and understand Paul’s implied relationship with the Philippians within 
the milieu of societal conventions and structures, such as mutual benefaction,422 the 
                                                
417 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 35. See also the discussion and similar conclusion in Reumann, 
Philippians, 678–685.  
418 Holloway, Consolation, 1. He offers a useful survey of the genre of ancient consolation in 55–74.  
419 Holloway, Consolation, 45–48.  
420 Holloway, Consolation, 74–83, 87–145. 
421 Holloway, Consolation, 2. 
422 Marshall, Enmity, 157–164; White, “Morality.” 
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Roman societas,423 or patron-client relationships.424 Other scholars have interpreted 
Philippians against the background of ancient rhetoric,425 or even as a praemeditatio 
mortis.426 However, just as efforts to classify Philippians on the basis of literary genre 
have proven ambiguous, attempts to read it in the light of ancient social conventions or 
rhetoric have been equally inconclusive. Arguing that many of these highly precise 
models are proving less than helpful as tools for the analysis of Philippians, not least 
because few of them tend to agree, Bockmuehl wisely pleads for a cautious and light-
handed application of all these approaches427—an approach that this study will adopt.  
3.1.4. Distinctives 
3.1.4.a. Lexical Distinctives 
The profiling of a document’s character using statistics based on vocabulary can 
generate more than merely superficial results and provide useful clues about the 
author’s priorities, if one proceeds with discrimination and due regard for the 
overarching themes of the piece of writing. There are in Philippians some terms that 
occur with disproportionate frequency. Most noticeable is the remarkable frequency of 
χαρά and its verbal cognates, which are found a total of sixteen times in Philippians428 
(more than anywhere else in Paul), out of a total of some fifty occurrences in the 
undisputed Pauline letters;429 this is a clear indication of the importance of joy in Paul’s 
thinking.430 Two verbs that relate to the activity and disposition of the mind occur also 
                                                
423 J. Paul Sampley, Pauline Partnership in Christ: Christian Community and Commitment in Light of 
Roman Law (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980). See recently also Julien M. Ogereau, Paul’s Koinonia with the 
Philippians: A Socio-Historical Investigation of a Pauline Economic Partnership, WUNT 2.377 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), who affirms Sampley’s views and finds that Paul and the Philippians 
had formed a financial partnership “where they cooperated in his missionary activities by providing 
material and financial resources, while he performed the work of ministry” (15).  
424 E.g. Bormann, Philippi, 187–217. 
425 E.g. Watson, “Rhetorical Analysis”; Bloomquist, Function of Suffering. See the discussion in 
Hansen, Philippians, 12–15. 
426 Hans Dieter Betz, Studies in Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, WUNT 343 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2015), 133–154, esp. 153. 
427 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 39; see also 34–40 for a shrewd assessment of these approaches.  
428 In noun form: χαρᾶς (1.4); χαράν (1.25); χαράν (2.2); χαρᾶς (2.29); χαρά (4.1). In verbal form: 
χαίρω, χαρήσοµαι (1.18); χαίρω, συγχαίρω (2.17); χαίρετε, συγχαίρετε (2.18); χαρῆτε (2.28); χαίρετε (3.1); 
χαίρετε (twice) (4.4); ἐχάρην (4.10). 
429 Hans Conzelmann, “χαίρω, χαρά, συγχαίρω,” TDNT 9.359–372; William G. Morrice, “Joy,” DPL 
511–512. 
430 N. T. Wright rightly notes that though it is sometimes claimed that there is theological significance 
in the etymological proximity between χαρά and χάρις, the NT writers themselves do not make this link 
explicit; thus we must be wary of going beyond the usual rule of locating the meaning of a word in its 
context and not in its history or family resemblances; “Joy,” 47. 
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with unusual frequency: φρονέω (ten times;431 otherwise used only twelve times in the 
undisputed Pauline letters, nine of which are in Romans), and ἡγέοµαι (six times;432 
elsewhere only three times in the undisputed Paulines).  
3.1.4.b. Thematic Distinctives  
It has become something of a hackneyed commonplace to speak of Philippians as 
a “letter of joy,” as if it was written to an exemplary church that did not have to deal 
with any serious problems. The obvious affection that unites Paul and his readers only 
reinforces this jejune notion in the popular Christian imagination. This may have led to 
a downplaying of both the nature of the problems at Philippi and the theological content 
of the letter. A second factor pulls in a different direction, but has also led to potential 
misunderstanding about Paul’s central concerns: so much attention has been given to 
the Christ poem of Phil. 2:6–11 in contemporary NT scholarship—which tends to focus 
on the pre-Pauline origins of the passage and thus isolate it from its literary context—
that questions of christology may have obscured other important features of the letter.433  
It becomes apparent, when the Christ poem is seen in its context, that its point 
here is to showcase the pattern of selflessness and humility to which the Philippians 
must be conformed if they are to live in a manner worthy of the gospel (1.27). For this 
to happen the Philippians need to have the correct mindset; that this is a major concern 
for Paul is shown in his repeated use of φρονέω.434 He first models for his readers what 
it means to think rightly about others (1.7), and then uses the same verb at several key 
points: to encourage them towards unity in Christ (2.2), to mandate the same self-
abasing attitude that Christ displayed (2.5), and to emphasize the contrast between 
mature thought and its opposite (3.15, 19). Paul adjures Euodia and Syntyche to think 
the same things in the Lord (4.2). His final use of the verb is in connection with the 
commendable attitude of the Philippians towards him (4.10). To further impress on the 
reader the significance of all this, Paul uses comparable terms throughout: ἡγέοµαι (see 
n.432), σκοπέω (2.4; 3.17), and λογίζοµαι (3.13, 4.8). There is also an abundance of 
                                                
431 φρονεῖν (1.7); φρονῆτε, φρονοῦντες (2.2); φρονεῖτε (2.5); φρονῶµεν, φρονεῖτε (3.15); φρονοῦντες 
(3.19); φρονεῖν (4.2); φρονεῖν, ἐφρονεῖτε (4.10).  
432 ἡγούµενοι (2.3); ἡγήσατο (2.6); ἡγησάµην (2.25); ἥγηµαι (3.7); ἡγοῦµαι (twice) (3.8).  
433 Silva, Philippians, 20–21. 
434 Wayne Meeks has drawn attention to Paul’s frequent use of φρονέω in Philippians—a frequency 
comparable only with the latter part of his letter to the Romans; “The Man from Heaven in Paul’s Letter 
to the Philippians,” in In Search of the Early Christians: Selected Essays, ed. Allen R. Hilton and H. 
Gregory Snyder (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 109–110. 
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“knowledge” terminology throughout the letter: most notably in 1.9–10, where Paul 
prays that the Philippians’ love may increasingly abound ἐν ἐπιγνώσει καὶ πάσῃ 
αἰσθήσει εἰς τὸ δοκιµάζειν ὑµᾶς τὰ διαφέροντα; and in 3.8–10, where Paul speaks of the 
surpassing value of the knowledge of Christ (τὸ ὑπερέχον τῆς γνώσεως Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ) 
and expresses his desire to know Christ more fully (γνῶναι αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν δύναµιν τῆς 
ἀναστάσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ [τὴν] κοινωνίαν [τῶν] παθηµάτων αὐτοῦ). Paul also employs 
military and athletic imagery to express the notion of mental determination (1.27, 30; 
3.12–14; 4.1–3). It is clear that in Philippians there is a strong focus on the mind and on 
right thinking.435   
The reason for this emphasis is that the faith of the believers and its practical 
expression are being stymied by much adversity and disunity. Accordingly, Paul 
emphasizes the need to stand firm (1.27–28; 4.1) and persevere (3.13–15); right 
thinking about Christian truth will lead to a repristination of the ways in which suffering 
and opposition are faced. Specifically, Paul reminds the Philippians of their sure future 
with its eschatological victory—a major motif running through the letter, and one that is 
seldom noted, according to Fee.436 The end result is joy: indeed, the motif of joy in 
Philippians is pervasive, more so than in any other Pauline letter. The importance of this 
theme is not accidental: 2 Cor 8.1–2 reveals that joy in the midst of great affliction is a 
hallmark of the Macedonian churches (cf. 1 Thess 1.6, in which Paul recalls how the 
gospel was received in Thessalonica ἐν θλίψει πολλῇ µετὰ χαρᾶς πνεύµατος ἁγίου). 
Our broad analysis thus far already yields some tantalizing clues about what joy 
is, for Paul: it seems that has something to do with correct thinking, and the 
relativization of present suffering in the light of eschatological hope. Since suffering is, 
in this sense, a foil for joy, it is helpful for our purposes to specify in some detail the 
suffering that Paul refers to. The way in which various descriptions of suffering (Paul’s, 
his co-workers’, the Philippians’, and Christ’s) are woven into the letter—and also tied 
together—indicates that it is for Paul an important motif. Hence we now turn our 
attention to suffering in Philippians, before we investigate what Paul says about joy.  
 
                                                
435 I am indebted to the insights of Silva, Philippians, 21. 
436 Fee, Philippians, 30. 
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3.2. Suffering in Philippians  
3.2.1. Paul’s Suffering 
3.2.1.a. Paul in Prison (Phil 1.7, 13–14, 17) 
The notion of suffering makes its first appearance early in the letter, in the middle 
of Paul’s thanksgiving for the Philippians’ partnership in the gospel (1.3–8).437 Paul’s 
speaking of “chains” (δεσµοί, 1.7) indicates that he is under some form of custody.438 
He mentions these chains again in 1.13–14, 17; and probably refers again to his 
detention in 4.4 when he commends the Philippians for sharing in his “affliction” (πλὴν 
καλῶς ἐποιήσατε συγκοινωνήσαντές µου τῇ θλίψει; in this regard, it is instructive that 
earlier in 1.17 the notion of θλῖψις is linked with δεσµοί). Fee argues that although 
“chains” could possibly be a metonymy for imprisonment as such,439 it is most likely 
that Paul was literally chained to his guards, since imprisonment without the use of 
chains was a concession to high status.440 Some scholars have suggested, on the basis of 
the account in Acts 28.30–31 (which indicates that for a length of time Paul, in Rome, 
was undergoing a less severe form of remand), that at the time of writing to the 
Philippians, Paul was certainly chained to a guard—but under house arrest.441  
However, though we cannot be certain about the precise mode of Paul’s 
confinement at this time, on balance the language and structure of communication of the 
letter seem to indicate that he was incarcerated in prison.442 In general, the Roman penal 
system did not seek to rehabilitate people: prisons were basically holding tanks where 
people were detained awaiting trial or execution, and conditions of life in prison were 
                                                
437 For an overview of the historical interpretation of the motif of suffering in Philippians, see 
Bloomquist, Function of Suffering, 18–70.  
438 Lohmeyer, Briefe, sees here one of many indications of persecution and impending martyrdom in 
Philippians. Though Lohmeyer's perspective of Philippians as a disquisition on the experience of 
martyrdom is widely criticized for going beyond the realities depicted in the letter and overemphasizing 
suffering at the expense of other motifs, his approach highlights the pervasiveness of the language of 
suffering in the letter. See Bloomquist, Function of Suffering, 50–52, for an analysis of Lohmeyer's 
approach.  
439 BDAG 219.  
440 Fee, Philippians, 92, drawing on the work of Brian Rapske, The Book of Acts and Paul in Roman 
Custody, The Book of Acts in Its First Century Setting 3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 25–28.  
441 So most recently Witherington, Philippians, 9–10. But such a reading may owe too much to Acts 
28.30–31; see Angela Standhartinger, “Letter from Prison as Hidden Transcript: What It Tells Us about 
the People at Philippi,” in The People beside Paul: The Philippian Assembly and History from Below, ed. 
Joseph A. Marchal (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015), 111–112. For a reconstruction of Paul’s custody in Rome, 
see Rapske, Custody, 177–191, 227–242. 
442 So e.g. Standhartinger, “Letter,” 124–130, noting the presence of coded references to people and 
situations, e.g. the unnamed “loyal companion” (4.3), in order to lessen the dangers of writing in prison.  
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often gruesome.443 The support and material help of friends was crucial,444 but the 
stigma associated with imprisonment made it socially costly, if not downright 
dangerous, to identify publicly with a prisoner.445 In short, incarceration in any form 
was grim and degrading; Fee is right to say that the repetition of the phrase “my chains” 
(1.7, 13–14, 17) indicates that Paul is smarting under the imprisonment.446 
3.2.1.b. The Actions of Paul’s Rivals (Phil 1.15–17) 
Furthermore, while Paul’s confinement has catalyzed an increasingly strong sense 
of evangelistic fervour among the believers who have been inspired by his example of 
courage and conviction (1.14; see also 1.16, where Paul seems to draw a connection 
between his present sufferings and “the defence of the gospel”), it has also created an 
opportunity for his rivals to achieve their own goals by capitalizing on his misfortunes. 
They proclaim Christ, but their motives stem from envy and rivalry (διὰ φθόνον καὶ 
ἔριν, 1.15), unlike others who do so out of goodwill towards Paul (διʼ εὐδοκίαν, 1.15).447 
Driven by their own selfish ambitions and insincere in their aims, they are more than 
willing to allow further distress to fall upon Paul (οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἐριθείας τὸν Χριστὸν 
καταγγέλλουσιν, οὐχ ἁγνῶς, οἰόµενοι θλῖψιν ἐγείρειν τοῖς δεσµοῖς µου, 1.17).448 It seems 
accurate to think, therefore, that the already considerable physical suffering and mental 
distress resulting from Paul’s imprisonment are being compounded by the emotional 
pain wreaked upon him through the actions of his rivals.  
                                                
443 On the purposes and varieties of custody in the Roman world, see Rapske, Custody, 10–35; Craig 
S. Wansink, Chained in Christ: The Experience and Rhetoric of Paul’s Imprisonments, JSNTSup 130 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 28–32; Richard J. Cassidy, Paul in Chains: Roman 
Imprisonment and the Letters of St. Paul (New York: Crossroad, 2001), 37–43. On conditions in prison, 
see Rapske, Custody, 196–225; Wansink, Chained, 33–40, 44–95.  
444 Cassidy, Paul in Chains, 48–51; Rapske, Custody, 370–388. 
445 Rapske, Custody, 293–294, 388–392. 
446 Fee, Philippians, 92. 
447 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 78–79, detects in the phrase διʼ εὐδοκίαν the possibility that Paul here 
refers to the desire of the second group of evangelists to pursue the divine will, rather than their wish to 
show him some sort of goodwill. His argument, based on the contemporary usage of εὐδοκία elsewhere, 
does not lack cogency; however, it perhaps downplays too much the juxtaposition of the phrases διὰ 
φθόνον καὶ ἔριν and διʼ εὐδοκίαν, which surely has a contrastive function in terms of emphasizing two 
antithetical attitudes towards Paul and his ministry.  
448 On the precise identity of this group of evangelists who are opposed to Paul, see the proposals in 
Reumann, Philippians, 202–207. 
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3.2.1.c. Paul’s Common Suffering with the Philippians (Phil 2.17–18) 
Paul returns to a discussion of his suffering at 2.17–18. In ancient Mediterranean 
religious practice, sacrifices were often completed with a libation or drink offering.449 
Paul is thus using a familiar metaphor in describing his suffering as a libation that is 
“poured out” onto the “sacrificial service” of the Philippians’ faith (Ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ 
σπένδοµαι ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ καὶ λειτουργίᾳ τῆς πίστεως ὑµῶν, 2.17).450 Commentators are 
divided as to whether Paul is drawing on a pagan or a Jewish cultic background,451 but 
the question need not detain us. In either case, it is evident that for Paul, the Philippians’ 
faith constitutes a sacrifice to God, with his own ministry being the accompanying drink 
offering.452  
There is some debate concerning Paul’s self-description as a libation: is he 
referring generally to his ongoing missionary work, including his present suffering, or 
specifically to the eventuality of martyrdom?453 Some interpreters find it likely that 
Paul’s imagery here incorporates the supposition of a possibility of martyrdom. Hansen, 
for example, argues that the present tense σπένδοµαι (2.17) is used in a concessive 
clause (εἰ καὶ, “even if, although”) to portray a real possibility, i.e., “even if I am 
martyred.”454 Further, other uses of σπένδω (2 Tim 3.6 and Ign. Rom 2.2) demonstrate 
that the verb’s cultic associations made it suitable for use with reference to imminent 
martyrdom.455 It is also noteworthy that Paul has alluded to the possibility of martyrdom 
earlier at 1.20–21 and will do so again at 3.10.456 
                                                
449 See e.g. Num 28.7; Plutarch, Arist. 21.2–5.  
450 The verb σπένδω means “offer as a libation/drink offering” (BDAG 937) and in the NT appears 
only here and in 2 Tim 4.6, both in the passive and employed figuratively. On the use of σπένδω as a 
cultic term in the Hellenistic world, see Otto Michel, “σπένδοµαι,” TDNT 7.528–536; A. M. Denis, “La 
fonction apostolique et la liturgie en Esprit. Étude thématique des métaphores paulinieres du culte 
nouveau,” RSPT 42 (1958): 631–634. On its use in the LXX together with the cognate noun σπονδή, see 
Reumann, Philippians, 398.  
451 See Reumann, Philippians, 397–398.  
452 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 160. For a discussion of the possible meanings of the Philippians’ 
“sacrifice and service,” see esp. Reumann, Philippians, 398–401. Reumann concludes by noting that both 
terms within the hendiadys had cultic applications, Greco-Roman and Jewish, and also wider non-cultic 
applications; there is no consensus on which term dominates. Even so, along with several other 
interpreters (e.g. Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 148), he takes λειτουργίᾳ as basic and θυσίᾳ as 
adjectival; hence, “sacrificial service.”  
453 See the useful overview in Joseph H. Hellerman, Philippians, EGGNT (Nashville: Broadman and 
Holman, 2015), 140–141. 
454 Hansen, Philippians, 188.  
455 Hansen, Philippians, 188; Silva, Philippians, 128. See also J. B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to 
the Philippians, 6th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1881), 118–119, who in connection with this cites the 
examples of Seneca and Thrasea who used similar metaphors when at the point of death (Tacitus, Ann. 
15.64; 16.35).  
456 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 161. 
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However, others do not see here any allusion to Paul’s death. Hawthorne and 
Martin note that while libation accompanies most sacrifices in both the Greek world and 
Jewish cultus, “never in the Greek bible nor in the Hellenistic world is this term ever 
used to denote libations of blood.”457 Moreover, the present tense, σπένδοµαι, indicates 
that Paul sees his ministry as ongoing and not one that will terminate prematurely in 
death. The libation metaphor is to be understood in conjunction with the earlier two 
metaphors of running and labouring (2.16) as describing the rigours of his current 
apostolic activities. Hence when Paul uses the libation metaphor, he does not have death 
in mind; indeed, within a few sentences, in 2.24, he confidently assures the Philippians 
of a future visit to them.458 Rather, “he is picturesquely referring to his sufferings as an 
apostle”; these sufferings “act as a seal on whatever sacrifice the Philippians may make, 
just as a libation completes any offering made to God.”459 Fee reaches a similar 
conclusion. On the basis that 2.14–18 serves with 1.27–30 as an inclusio, he argues that 
the libation metaphor most likely refers to the present suffering mentioned in 1.30 
(which he takes to be imprisonment). As Fee puts it: “Thus he [Paul] is suggesting that 
his imprisonment, besides being a “drink offering” to the Lord, is to be understood as 
his part of their common suffering, the “drink offering” poured out in conjunction with 
their ‘sacrifice.’”460  
Clearly, there is no consensus on the matter. However, Bockmuehl offers a 
helpfully conciliatory perspective: in his opinion, Paul most likely takes a 
comprehensive view of things: his work and ministry—whether in life or in death—is 
offered to God as a complement to the sacrifice of the Philippians.461 In a similar way, 
Reumann interprets the “libation” motif as a premise about Paul’s long-time apostolic, 
missionary experience and his giving of himself, and not just possible martyrdom to 
come.462 As we shall see below, for Paul as for the Philippians, such a view is cause 
indeed for mutual joy (2.17–18). For now, however, we should note that Paul is clearly 
                                                
457 Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 149, citing Jean-François Collange, The Epistle of Saint Paul 
to the Philippians, trans. A. W. Heathcote (London: Epworth, 1979), 113 (following Denis, “La 
fonction,” 630–645). 
458 Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 149. Fee, Philippians, 253, argues that Paul nowhere in the 
larger context of the letter suggests (or even hints) that he expects his imprisonment to end in death: he 
might yearn that it did (1.23), but actually expects to be vindicated (1.19–20), and that out of divine 
necessity he will live, and revisit them (1.24–26; 2.24). 
459 Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 149. 
460 Fee, Philippians, 254. 
461 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 161–162. 
462 Reumann, Philippians, 415. 
Chapter 3. Joy in Philippians 
 94 
tying his own experience of suffering—even unto death, if need be—to that of the 
Philippians in a very specific way: as partners in the work of the gospel. 
3.2.2. The Philippians’ Suffering (Phil 1.27–30) 
From 1.27–30 it is clear that the Philippian believers are also experiencing some 
form of adversity. Here, Paul exhorts them to live worthily of the gospel of Christ and 
to stand firm together in their faith (1.27), and not to be intimidated in any way by those 
who oppose them (µὴ πτυρόµενοι ἐν µηδενὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀντικειµένων, 1.28). Some 
commentators discern here the presence of pagan opposition: the Philippians’ 
adversaries come from outside the Christian community, since they are destined for 
“destruction” (ἀπώλεια, 1.28); and they are possibly linked with the Roman civic 
authorities, since they are of the same kind as those who confronted Paul when he first 
came to Philippi (1.30; see also Acts 16.19–39).463 Others identify the ἀντικειµένοι with 
the Judaizers, since this is the group that Paul appears to be greatly concerned about 
elsewhere (3.2).464 This latter proposal is much the weaker of the two: the context 
(1.27–30) indicates actual suffering, and it is difficult to imagine the Philippians putting 
tensions caused by the presence of false teachers into this category. Furthermore, 
πτύρω465 is much too forceful a choice of term to use to describe a response to false 
teaching; that danger is surely one of being persuaded rather than being panicked.466 
However, whatever view one takes, the fact is that the Philippians are facing opposition; 
and according to Paul, the presence of this opposition is evidence (ἔνδειξις) of the 
Philippians’ salvation (1.28). Paul provides a theological précis of why this is so,467 
contextualizing their suffering firstly in terms of their relationship with Christ (1.29), 
and secondly in terms of their relationship with him (1.30).  
In 1.29, Paul explains that to suffer for the sake of Christ is as much a gift of 
divine grace as it is to believe in Christ (ὅτι ὑµῖν ἐχαρίσθη τὸ ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ, οὐ µόνον τὸ 
εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύειν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ πάσχειν, 1.29). Paul’s markedly 
                                                
463 E.g. Bockmuehl, Philippians, 100–101. 
464 E.g. Silva, Philippians, 82–83. 
465 Hapax legomenon in the NT. It occurs almost always in the passive, and means “let oneself be 
intimidated, be frightened, terrified” (BDAG 895). Thus it can denote the panicked stampede of startled 
horses; Lightfoot, Philippians, 106. 
466 See Peter Oakes, Philippians: From People to Letter, SNTSMS 110 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 81–82; also Fee, Philippians, 167 n.50. 
467 As Fee, Philippians, 170 n.59 observes, this is similar to the kind of thing Paul has done 
elsewhere, e.g. 1 Thess 3.2–3; 2 Cor 4.17–18; Rom 5.3–4; 8.17–18. 
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christological emphasis in describing their suffering468 indicates that he is not offering 
encouragement about suffering in general. Rather, he is reminding believers that it is not 
just their lot but their privilege “to suffer for the sake of Christ” (τὸ ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ 
πάσχειν)469 in a world that is hostile to God; indeed, it is precisely because their 
believing in Christ and their suffering for his sake have both been “graciously given” 
(ἐχαρίσθη)470 by God that they can be assured that whatever they are undergoing is a 
sure sign of their future salvation.471   
Paul augments these comments on suffering by calling attention to the parallels 
betweeen the Philippians’ experiences and his own (1.30). Already in 1.7 he had 
referred to them as his co-participants in the grace of God—the grace manifested in his 
imprisonment and in the defence and propogation of the gospel (ἔν τε τοῖς δεσµοῖς µου 
καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ καὶ βεβαιώσει τοῦ εὐαγγελίου συγκοινωνούς µου τῆς χάριτος πάντας 
ὑµᾶς ὄντας); that he could address them in this way demonstrates their resolute 
solidarity with him in his gospel mission and hence also in his suffering. Now he 
explicitly correlates their suffering to his: they and he are engaged in the very same 
struggle (τὸν αὐτὸν ἀγῶνα ἔχοντες, 1.30). As he suffers, so they suffer. Since Paul is 
suffering at the hands of the Roman authorities, the implication may be that the 
Philippians are being troubled likewise by them.472 Some commentators assert that the 
point of the comparison is not the similarity of the circumstances, but their shared 
theological rubric: they were all part of the one same apostolic ἀγών.473 However, even 
if the parallel is limited to this level of abstraction (a view which I am not fully 
persuaded by), Paul’s incorporation of the Philippian believers into his sphere of 
suffering demonstrates clearly that he sees them going through harsh treatment on 
behalf of the gospel, as he does. As such, a paradigmatic understanding of the narrative 
of 1.12–26 is surely in view (cf. 1.30: οἷον εἴδετε ἐν ἐµοὶ καὶ νῦν ἀκούετε ἐν ἐµοί). Also, 
their common experience for the sake of Christ represents something of the 
“participation in his sufferings” of which Paul goes on to speak in 3.10.  
                                                
468 On this see further Fee, Philippians, 171, esp. n.63. 
469 Hellerman, Philippians, 86, notes that ὑπέρ, when used with verbs of suffering, gives the reason 
for it; see also BDAG 1031.  
470 BDAG 1078: χαρίζοµαι, “to give freely as a favour, give graciously.” 
471 “God has granted you the high privilege of suffering for Christ; this is the surest sign, that He 
looks upon you with favour”; Lightfoot, Philippians, 106.  
472 Fee, Philippians, 172; similarly, Bockmuehl, Philippians, 103. 
473 Joachim Gnilka, Der Philipperbrief, HThKNT 10.3 (Freiburg: Herder, 1976), 102; Hawthorne and 
Martin, Philippians, 77.  
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3.2.3. Christ’s Suffering (Phil 2.5–11) 
We turn our attention, next, to the suffering of Christ. An extraordinary amount of 
scholarship has centred on the famous encomium to Christ of 2.5–11. Our interest, 
however, lies solely in how Paul uses this passage in its epistolary context to draw out 
the motif of suffering. As such, I am assuming that the text is a unity; moreover, 
concerns about its religious origin and authorship are of only secondary importance to 
my inquiry.474 Even if Paul merely quotes the passage, Morna Hooker argues most 
reasonably that “even if the material is non-Pauline, we may expect Paul himself to 
have interpreted and used it in a Pauline manner.”475  
Paul launches into the hymn with an opening imperative that serves a double 
purpose: it both sums up the habits of reasoning and behaviour which he has just 
outlined to the Philippians at 2.2–4 and emphasizes the paradigmatic nature of the 
φρόνησις of Christ, the contours which he is about to describe: Τοῦτο φρονεῖτε ἐν ὑµῖν ὃ 
καὶ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ  (2.5).476 In no uncertain terms Paul exhorts his readers to adopt the 
very mindset of Christ477—the possession and practical expression of which will result 
in faithful living that is “worthy of the gospel” (1.27) and the assurance of salvation in 
the face of opposition (1.28), as the Philippians apply their knowledge of the gospel to 
the specific circumstances that they find themselves in. As Fowl rightly observes: 
“Within this scheme the story of Christ narrated in 2.6–11 functions as an exemplar, a 
                                                
474 Many scholars, following the seminal work of Ernst Lohmeyer, Kyrios Jesus: Eine Untersuchung 
zu Phil 2.5–11, SHAW, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1927–1928, 4. Abhandlung, 18  
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1928), take the passage to be a pre-Pauline hymn; see esp. Ralph P. Martin, 
Carmen Christi: Philippians 2.5–11 in Recent Interpretation and in the Setting of Early Christian 
Worship, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983). The various views concerning the inter-related issues 
of background and authorship are helpfully summarized in Fee, Philippians, 43–46.   
475 Morna D. Hooker, “Philippians 2:6–11,” in Jesus und Paulus: Festschrift für Werner Georg 
Kümmel zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. E. E. Ellis and E. Grässer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), 
152. 
476 Meeks argues that “this letter’s most comprehensive purpose is the shaping of a Christian 
phronēsis, a practical moral reasoning that is ‘conformed to [Christ’s] death’ in hope of his resurrection”; 
see “Man from Heaven,” 110.  
477 That the φρόνησις of Christ is also to be that of the Philippians is made even clearer by some 
further structural parallels that Paul composes: ἡγούµενοι (2.3) / ἡγήσατο (2.6b); µηδὲν … µηδὲ … ἀλλὰ 
(2.3), µὴ … ἀλλὰ (2.4) / οὐχ … ἀλλὰ (2.6b, 7a). As Bertschmann notes, the presence of these parallels 
“makes it even clearer that the point of correspondence between the Philippians and Christ which Paul 
wants to point out is one of attitude. The unselfish behaviour of Christ is contrasted with the potentially 
selfish behaviour of the Philippians and vice versa” (Bowing Before Christ - Nodding to the State?: 
Reading Paul Politically with Oliver O’Donovan and John Howard Yoder, LNTS 502 [London: 
Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014], 96, emphasis original). 
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concrete expression of a shared norm from which Paul and the Philippians can make 
analogical judgments about how they should live.”478  
One primary way in which Christ functions as an exemplar in his φρόνησις lies in 
his willingness to embrace abasement, suffering, and even an ignominious death for the 
benefit of others (2.6–8). As a slave (δοῦλος, 2.7), Christ enters human history without 
rights or privileges; instead, he is the servant of all.479 Clearly, 2.3–4 is in view: Christ 
exhibits and indeed exemplifies, in superlative fashion, the spirit of self-abnegation and 
selflessness of mind and behaviour that the Philippian believers are urged to have. 
Amongst other things, then, the Christ poem highlights that the one who truly follows 
Christ will also willingly take on the role of a slave for the sake of others. As Fee 
concisely expresses it: “the Philippians are to pursue the mindset of the one who as God 
emptied himself and as man humbled himself, even to death on the cross.”480 The basic 
paradigmatic concern of the Christ poem, found in 2.6–8, thus has to do with “the 
pattern of service provided by Jesus in his dying.”481 
However, as Paul goes on also to emphasize, the death of Christ is not the end of 
the story. The poem concludes on a stunning note of exaltation, as Christ is bestowed 
with the title of κύριος and accorded universal worship (2.9–11).482 Paul thus affirms the 
rightness of the paradigm to which he has called the Philippians, while at the same time 
                                                
478 Stephen E. Fowl, “Christology and Ethics in Philippians 2:5–11,” in Where Christology Began: 
Essays on Philippians 2, ed. Ralph P. Martin and Brian J. Dodd (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1998), 145–146. See also his The Story of Christ in the Ethics of Paul: An Analysis of the Hymnic 
Material in the Pauline Corpus, JSNTSup 36 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990), 92–96, 198–
207, for an account of analogy as the way in which phronēsis operates. 
479 Only here in his letters does Paul use δοῦλος to specify Christ. On the basis of certain conceptual 
and linguistic affinities, scholars often posit a connection between the δοῦλος here and the Suffering 
Servant of Isaiah; see e.g. N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God (London: SPCK, 2013), 680–
684, though some would demur, e.g. Reumann, Philippians, 360–361. However, whether or not such a 
link can be established, the key point remains the same: Christ voluntarily gives up his divine privileges 
in order to serve as a slave, descending from the highest status to the lowest (Bockmuehl, Philippians, 
136).  
480 Fee, Philippians, 218 n.3.  
481 I. Howard Marshall, “The Theology of Philippians,” in The Theology of the Shorter Pauline 
Letters, by Karl P. Donfried and I. Howard Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
137. 
482 On the causal link between 2.6–8 and 9–11, see esp. Stephen E. Fowl, Philippians, THNTC 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005), 100–101. Fowl is correct to say that God’s exaltation of Christ displays 
something about God’s character: “Christ’s death on the cross is not the last word on the relationship 
between God and the Christ who both shares God’s glory and manifests the appearance of a servant in his 
incarnation and obedience. Christ’s willed obedience to God can truly display the glory of the God of 
Israel if that suffering is vindicated.” (101). As such, to read the causal link as a transaction where 
obedience is offered in exchange for exaltation is to miss the point (101).  
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highlighting the eschatological vindication that also awaits them as followers of 
Christ—a thought that runs throughout the letter.483  
3.2.4. The Examples of Paul’s Co-workers (Phil 2.19–30)  
Next, in 2.19–30, Paul turns his attention to Timothy and Epaphroditus, casting 
them as examples for the Philippians.484 Timothy is commended as one who is like-
minded (οὐδένα γὰρ ἔχω ἰσόψυχον485 (2.20a); lit. “I have no one of equal soul”) and 
who therefore, like Paul, manifests in his thinking a genuine concern for the welfare of 
the Philippians (2.20b–21); the context suggests that this concern has to do with how 
they are faring in the gospel mission in the face of growing opposition (1.27–30). 
Epaphroditus, too, is commended: though severely ill, he chose to put his life on the line 
in order to complete the task that was entrusted to him by the Philippian church, and 
thereby honour his commitment to them and to Paul (2.25–30).486 As such, Paul 
instructs the Philippians to receive him “in the Lord” with due honour and great joy 
(2.29), as one who has risked his life for “for the work of Christ” and been willing to 
give up his life on behalf of another.    
In the latter part of chapter 2, then, the Philippian church is presented with three 
examples of the self-renouncing φρόνησις that Christ has and which is enjoined (2.5). 
There is Paul, who regards his life and ministry as an offering that accompanies the 
Philippians’ sacrifice. Timothy has served faithfully in the work of the gospel and 
shown a selfless concern for them. Finally, Epaphroditus’ devotion to the service of 
Christ has led him to jeopardize his life for the good of others. In two of these examples 
(Paul’s and Epaphroditus’) suffering for the sake of the gospel is described in explicit 
                                                
483 See Fee, Philippians, 219.  
484 Peter-Ben Smit rightly argues that although Timothy and Epaphroditus are introduced in the letter 
because Paul needs to tell the Philippians about his plans concerning the two men, it is reasonable to read 
his characterizations of them as exempla, since the surrounding context in which information is given 
about them is dominated by exempla: Paul has presented Christ’s example as a model for emulation, and 
his own periautological exemplum is about to come in ch.3 (Paradigms of Being in Christ: A Study of the 
Epistle to the Philippians, LNTS 476 [London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2013], 107–109). We would add 
that Paul has already described his attitude and actions in 1.12–26 in paradigmatic terms as well, via 1.30, 
as we saw earlier (see section 3.2.2).  
485 Hapax legomenon in the NT. As Fee notes, attempts to give it a more precise nuance have not met 
with success (Philippians, 265 n.27).  
486 The grammar at 2.30 indicates that Paul is saying that Epaphroditus came close to death in his 
willingness to put his life at risk in order to fulfil his mission. The main clause (ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἔργον Χριστοῦ 
µέχρι θανάτου ἤγγισεν) is modified by a participial clause (παραβολευσάµενος τῇ ψυχῇ) that is connected 
to a purpose clause (ἵνα ἀναπληρώσῃ τὸ ὑµῶν ὑστέρηµα τῆς πρός µε λειτουργίας).   
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terms; in Timothy’s ministry, it is implicit—but is not unreasonable, on the basis of the 
evidence, to read into his example a willingness to suffer likewise for the same cause.  
3.2.5. Conclusion 
The motif of suffering is threaded right through the letter. However, this 
suffering—that which Paul is himself undergoing and gives voice to, and which he also 
describes in the lives of others—is not some generalised, catch-all notion of mental or 
physical distress. It refers instead to suffering that is borne for the sake of Christ and his 
gospel. Paul sets up this suffering as a correlative of faith in Christ: both are “graciously 
given” (1.29) by God and are therefore integral to his divine purposes in the life of the 
believer. For Paul, the presence of such suffering is evidence of the Philippians’ 
salvation, because the God who has granted to them the gift of salvation has thereby 
also graced them to be Christ’s people in the world, which entails suffering for his sake. 
As Paul goes on to demonstrate in 2.5–11, Christ’s own death and resurrection 
prefigures and provides the warrant for the experiences of those who follow him. Thus 
believers are to live (and suffer) for the sake of Christ who himself lived (and suffered) 
for the sake of this world; in this way, they—as with their Lord—move from present 
suffering to future glorification. 
Paul thus looks to Christ as the ultimate paradigm: in possessing a totally selfless 
mindset and by being willing to suffer and even die for the sake of another, Christ 
advances the gospel and receives eschatological vindication. By setting up himself, 
Timothy, and Epaphroditus as exemplars, Paul teaches the Philippians that those who 
pattern their thinking and behaviour after that of Christ will likewise advance his gospel 
and receive that same prize at the parousia. Suffering for the sake of Christ is thus the 
harbinger of resurrection glory. However, the picture of suffering as Paul paints it is not 
yet complete. For while it is the lot of the believer in this age to bear suffering for the 
sake of Christ, along with that suffering there can also be the experience of joy in 
Christ—which in a very profound way signals the believer’s entry into the 
eschatological practice of life in the age to come.487 Hence, it is not surprising that in 
the course of the letter suffering is often articulated with joy. We will now investigate in 
detail Paul’s account of joy in Philippians.  
 
                                                
487 Wright, “Joy,” 54–55. 
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3.3. Joy: Exegetical Considerations 
3.3.1. Joy in Partnership in the Gospel (Phil 1.3–5; 2.28–30; 4.10–19) 
Paul’s first mention of joy occurs within the introductory thanksgiving, where he 
tells the Philippians that he thanks God each time he remembers them (1.3), and that his 
prayers for them are always made “with joy” (µετὰ χαρᾶς, 1.4). These thankful 
remembrances and the prayers of joy that accompany them have their foundation ἐπὶ τῇ 
κοινωνίᾳ ὑµῶν εἰς488 τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡµέρας ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν (1.5); Paul’s joy 
thus reflects a profound partnership in the spread of the gospel that he has shared with 
the Philippian church since the beginning of his missionary endeavours in Macedonia. 
In the NT the phrase κοινωνίᾳ … εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον is unique to Philippians; Paul’s use 
of it here defines his relationship with them early on and removes all doubt as to the 
character of their partnership: it is a partnership in the gospel’s advancement.489 This 
partnership is certainly “spiritual” in nature (in that it has its basis in Paul’s and the 
Philippians’ shared theological understanding of God and his work),490 but it also finds 
expression in concrete, material terms, both in the task of evangelism and in the matter 
of finances.491 More than once, the Philippians have sent pecuniary aid to Paul to help 
him to meet his needs; by so doing they have demonstrated their backing of Paul’s 
ministry and their solidarity with him in his troubles (4.14–16). Most recently, their 
ongoing support has been shown again in their sending of Epaphroditus to Paul with a 
monetary gift and, presumably, also to be of general help to him (4.18; cf. 2.25–30).  
Apparently very touched by the Philippians’ gift—which he regards as a renewed 
and concrete expression of their concern for his welfare—Paul expresses great joy 
(Ἐχάρην492 δὲ ἐν κυρίῳ µεγάλως ὅτι ἤδη ποτὲ ἀνεθάλετε493 τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐµοῦ φρονεῖν, 
                                                
488 The Greek εἰς has here the sense of “unto,” i.e. “with the furtherance of the gospel in view”; Fee, 
Philippians, 81 n.46.  
489 Peterman, Gift, 100–101. 
490 See 1.7, “my partners in God’s grace”; 2.1, “fellowship in the Spirit”; 3.10, “fellowship of his 
[Christ’s] sufferings.”   
491 See Barton, “Spirituality,” 185. 
492 On whether ἐχάρην is a genuine or epistolary aorist, see esp. the discussion in Fee, Philippians, 
428 n.17. I am persuaded by Fee’s arguments for the former interpretation.  
493 Grammatically the unusual verb ἀναθάλλω (lit. “to bloom again”; hapax legomenon in the NT) can 
be either intransitive, taking τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐµοῦ φρονεῖν as an accusative of reference (hence, “you flourished 
again in your concern for me”), or transitive, taking τὸ ὑπὲρ ἐµοῦ φρονεῖν as its direct object (“you caused 
your concern for me to flourish again”); both meanings are possible here and the difference is 
insignificant. See BDAG 63; Fee, Philippians, 429.  
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4.10).494 Interestingly, this is the only place where Paul quantifies his own experience of 
joy: the adverb µεγάλως appears only here in the NT, and its very uniqueness intensifies 
what he is saying about the depth of his feelings.495 It is clear that the concern (φρονεῖν) 
of the Philippians and the way it continues to find tangible expression draw from him 
immense joy. Peterman notes that the same expression “to rejoice greatly” is found in 
various papyri (e.g. P.Oxy. 1676 and 3356), where it serves to confirm the bond 
between the parties, and is typically used in connection with the receipt of a letter. In his 
view, Paul’s expression of joy here fits well with such expressions because it is based 
on contact with, and good news from, the Philippians, even though, in more specific 
terms, his joy is linked not so much to the receipt of a letter but to their remembrance of 
him.496 However, even so—and consistent with the exhortations of 3.1 and 4.4 (which 
we shall examine below, at section 3.3.3)—Paul’s joy is first and foremost ἐν κυρίῳ. 
Although the immediate occasion for Paul’s joy has to do with the Philippian church’s 
concern for him, its ultimate basis is “in the Lord,” since, among other things, it is he 
who has begun the good work in the Philippians (1.6) that has led to their work of 
partnership with him.497 Also, we should not read any hint of reproach in Paul’s words 
here in 4.10: the adverbial expression ἤδη ποτέ points to the conclusion of the hiatus in 
the Philippians’ giving rather than to any insinuation that it was long overdue498—a 
                                                
494 Many have found it strange that Paul acknowledges in 4.10–20 gifts from Philippi without actually 
expressing thanks by using a verb like εὐχαριστέω; the various explanations offered for Paul’s “danklose 
Danke” are documented in Reumann, Philippians, 685–688. Among them is the view of Wolfgang 
Schenk, Die Philipperbriefe des Paulus (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1984), 43, that joy and thanks occupy 
the same sematic field; against this Peterman, Gift, 128–129, argues that Schenk relies too heavily on the 
etymological connection between εὐχαριστέω and χάιρω and on the fact that thanks to God in the Old 
Testament often takes the form of an expression of joy. Peterman’s own view (Gift, 74–83)—that first 
century social conventions between friends did not call for a statement of thanks—has won some 
scholarly endorsement (so e.g. Reumann, Philippians, 686–688), but is not without its detractors; see 
recently Briones, Financial Policy, 124–128, who argues that Paul’s so-called thankless thanks actually 
reflects a theological conviction that only God occupies the position of benefactor.  
495 Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 261.  
496 Peterman, Gift, 129.  
497 I. Howard Marshall, The Epistle to the Philippians, Epworth Commentaries (London: Epworth, 
1991), 12, rightly draws attention to the recurrent theme in Philippians of Christian growth being 
simultaneously ascribed to God’s activity and to enrolling the believer’s own efforts. As such, as 
Bockmuehl, Philippians, 64, expresses it (in reference to 1.6): “God’s good work in these Christians, 
then, is to make them active participants in the gospel and its benefits. This participation includes, but 
goes far beyond, their material contribution to Paul’s ministry.”  
498 Contra F. F. Bruce, “St. Paul in Macedonia. 3. The Philippian Correspondence,” BJRL 63 (1980– 
1981): 274, who claims that the modern reader “finds it difficult not to discern a nuance of ‘And high 
time too!’” in these words. 
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point of view that is surely confirmed by the clause that follows, ἐφʼ ᾧ καὶ ἐφρονεῖτε, 
ἠκαιρεῖσθε δέ.499  
This joy, then, has nothing to do with the satisfaction of his physical or financial 
needs, as 4.11a (οὐχ ὅτι καθʼ ὑστέρησιν λέγω) makes clear.500 The reason (γάρ) that he 
gives for not speaking to the Philippians of these needs is that he has learned to be 
content in whatever circumstance he might find himself in (ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔµαθον501 ἐν οἷς εἰµι 
αὐτάρκης εἶναι, 4.11b). Long exegetical tradition has interpreted this clause in the light 
of Stoicism.502 On this reading, the adjective αὐτάρκης503 is freighted with Stoic 
introspection: the truly “contented” or “satisfied” person, being sufficient unto himself 
in all things, is one whose state of inner tranquility is never disturbed by the vicissitudes 
of life and the actions of others.504 Other scholars, however, argue that since αὐτάρκεια 
was also used widely to denote contentment in a general, non-technical sense, we 
cannot be sure that Paul was consciously drawing on Stoic sources.505 Malherbe locates 
Paul’s language outside the technical Stoic idea of αὐτάρκεια altogether, placing it 
instead in the context of ancient discussions of friendship.506  
However, it seems to me that a careful consideration of the context of Paul’s 
language can help to settle the matter. When Paul later in 4.12 reveals that he has 
                                                
499 The imperfect tenses of ἐφρονεῖτε and ἠκαιρεῖσθε, together with the intensive καί (which 
emphasizes the φρονέω repeated from the previous clause; on this see Thrall, Greek Particles, 90), imply 
strongly that the Philippians had all along been concerned for Paul’s welfare but faced an ongoing lack of 
opportunity to do something about it; see Fee, Philippians, 430. For hypotheses concerning the 
circumstances surrounding this lack of opportunity, see Hellerman, Philippians, 256; however, none can 
be fully supported.  
500 ὑστέρησιν stems from ὑστέρησις, “the condition of lacking that which is essential” (BDAG 1044). 
Hence Hellerman, Philippians, 258, rightly argues that Paul’s joy is not that of a poor man whose need 
has been met, but of “a man whose Christian family has found renewed opportunity to tangibly express 
its Christlike mind-set of concern for him.”   
501 Most likely a constative aorist, used of completed experiences; see Bockmuehl, Philippians, 260.   
502 See e.g. Lightfoot, Philippians, 163–164; Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in Its 
Contemporary Setting (Cleveland: Collins, 1956), 138, 185–186; and more recently Fee, Philippians, 
431–432.  
503 αὐτάρκης appears only here in the NT; its cognate noun (αὐτάρκεια) twice, in 2 Cor 9.8 and 1 Tim 
6.6. 
504 Many commentators note the similarity of Paul’s language at 4.11 with that of Seneca’s, e.g. in Vit. 
beat. 6.2: “the happy man is content with his present lot, no matter what it is, and is reconciled to his 
circumstances”; see e.g. Fee, Philippians, 432 n.37; J. N. Sevenster, Paul and Seneca, NovTSup 4 
(Leiden: Brill, 1961), 113–114. Cf. Epictetus, Diatr. 4.7.14: “Wherever I go it will be well with me, for 
here where I am it was well with me, not because of my location, but because of my judgments, and these 
I shall carry away with me; … and with the possession of them I am content, wherever I be and whatever 
I do”; quoted by Fee, Philippians, 432 n.37.  
505 e.g. Silva, Philippians, 204. 
506 Abraham J. Malherbe, “Paul’s Self-Sufficiency (Philippians 4:11),” in Friendship, Flattery, and 
Frankness of Speech: Studies in Friendship in the New Testament World, NovTSup 82 (Leiden: Brill, 
1996), 125–139. 
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“learned the secret”507 of having plenty and being in need and so forth, he is actually 
making the claim that none of these things matter to him any more—in other words, that 
he is indifferent to matters which are outside the sphere of one’s control. That this is so 
is because his contentment now wholly derives from his relationship with Christ, who 
empowers him to face any challenge (πάντα ἰσχύω ἐν τῷ ἐνδυναµοῦντί µε, 4.13). As we 
have earlier seen, the concept of the “indifferents” (ἀδιάφορα), or external goods, is 
important in Stoic thought. Virtue alone is the only good and thus the one thing which 
fits the bill of making up the Stoic telos; as such, virtue alone is self-sufficient and all 
else is indifferent. It seems likely that Paul adopts the same ideas here; the parallels with 
Stoicism are too clear to be put aside.508 Paul is αὐτάρκης: his personal situation with 
regard to material goods is a matter of complete indifference to him. However, his is not 
the cultivated imperturbability of the Stoic sage, who, by relying on his own inner 
resources, has trained himself to face any situation with equanimity. Instead, Paul‘s self-
sufficiency has its basis in a special kind of strength and empowering that originates 
from a profound, ongoing sense of connection with Christ. As Fee deftly puts it, “he 
[Paul] turns ‘self-sufficiency’ into ‘contentment’ because of his ‘Christ-sufficiency.’”509 
Paul’s self-sufficiency is wholly constituted by his relationship to Christ.  
Only after qualifying his opening statement of joy against possible 
misunderstanding, and after elaborating why the Philippians’ ministering to his material 
lack was not the cause of his joy, does Paul proceed to explain further the question of 
what it is about in 4.14–18—thereby returning to his earlier train of thought. At 4.10, as 
we have seen, Paul had joyfully received the Philippians’ gift, seeing it as tangible proof 
of the revival of their care for him. He now hastens to reassure them that he is by no 
means ungrateful for their generosity (πλὴν510 καλῶς ἐποιήσατε511, 4.14), and that his 
                                                
507 The verb µεµύηµαι (lit. “I have been initiated”; hapax in the NT) came from the vocabulary of the 
mystery religions and was used in relation to initiatory rites, but like other mystery terminology also 
acquired more general meanings (BDAG 660). However, as Bockmuehl observes: “Initiation in a 
metaphorical sense may well still be intended, in which case Paul’s point is that Christian contentment 
remains unintelligible to those outside and can only be “learned” from the God of peace …” (Philippians, 
261).  
508 So Troels Engberg-Pedersen, “Stoicism in Philippians,” in Paul in His Hellenistic Context, ed. 
Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 270, referring to Cicero, Fin. 3.23–26, 32. See 
also his Paul and the Stoics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 101; and Bockmuehl, Philippians, 260–261.  
509 Fee, Philippians, 434.  
510 With πλήν (“nevertheless”), Paul does two things: he underscores for the Philippians that he could 
just as well have done without their contributions, and returns to the task of affirming them for their care 
and concern; see Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 267. Thrall, Greek Particles, 21, claims that in 4.14 
(in relation to 4.11) we have the clearest example in Paul of πλὴν functioning as a balancing adversative 
(used to contrast two truths of divergent tendency).  
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remarks in 4.11–13 should not be taken to imply that he regards their gift as 
unnecessary (4.15–18). However, Paul does more than just these things. He continues to 
contextualize what he says within a candid but carefully calibrated affirmation of the 
special partnership that he shares with the Philippian Christians, an affirmation in which 
he combines his appreciation for their gift with assertions about his financial 
independence.  
Since their gift was aimed at meeting his material needs while in prison—though 
he has no actual need of the gift—it stands as evidence of their being partners with him 
in his affliction (συγκοινωνήσαντές µου τῇ θλίψει, 4.14).512 At the same time, the 
Philippians are partners with him in the gospel mission through their financial 
contributions to his work (ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, ὅτε ἐξῆλθον ἀπὸ Μακεδονίας, οὐδεµία 
µοι ἐκκλησία ἐκοινώνησεν εἰς λόγον δόσεως καὶ λήµψεως εἰ µὴ ὑµεῖς µόνοι … καὶ ἅπαξ 
καὶ δὶς εἰς τὴν χρείαν µοι ἐπέµψατε, 4.15–16). Paul’s description of the κοινωνία in 
which he and the Philippians jointly participate recalls and adds to what he has earlier 
said (1.5, 7; 2.1). His language is now couched in terms of “giving and receiving” 
(δόσις καὶ λήµψις)—commercial parlance that in the first century was also regularly co-
opted to refer to the mutual obligations inherent to contexts of friendship and social 
reciprocity.513 It is almost certain that Paul is drawing on familiar notions and 
conventions of friendship to acknowledge the recent gift from the Philippians and to 
express his gratitude to them.514  
                                                                                                                                          
511 Some commentators suggest that the expression καλῶς ἐποιήσατε (lit. “you did well”) is the closest 
that Paul comes to saying “thank you”; see e.g. Bockmuehl, Philippians, 262 (citing F. F. Bruce, 
Philippians, NIBCNT (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1989), 154). Fee, Philippians, 438 n.7 offers the American 
slang “you did good” as a translation which captures better the sense of the Greek.  
512 Fee, Philippians, 438 n.8, notes that the redundant συν prefix of the modal participle 
συγκοινωνήσαντες “emphasizes their participation together with him in his affliction”; cf. Lightfoot, 
Philippians, 164 (cited by Fee): “It was not the actual pecuniary relief, so much as the sympathy and 
companionship in his sorrow, that the apostle valued.” That they were suffering as he was has already 
been intimated at 1.29–30.  
513 On δόσις καὶ λήµψις in the Greco-Roman world, see Peterman, Gift, 51–65; Marshall, Enmity, 
157–164. The term also appears in Jewish-Hellenistic writings, both in its financial sense (e.g. Sir 42.7) 
and metaphorically of a socially reciprocal relationship (e.g. Sir 41.21).  
514 So e.g. Fee, Philippians, 442–445. See also 445–446, where Fee offers two perspicacious reasons 
why Paul even sees the need to tell the Philippians what (by his own admission) they well know, and why 
he emphasizes their being the only church to have entered into this kind of partnership with him. First, as 
often happens between friends, one partner in the friendship takes delight in reminding the other how that 
one has expressed friendship in the past; Paul’s point, then, is that their gift represents yet another in their 
long and laudatory history in this regard. Second, in keeping with social convention, Paul is most likely 
expressing his thanks indirectly, but even more tellingly, by rehearsing in this manner the long history of 
his benefitting from their generosity.  
Chapter 3. Joy in Philippians 
 105 
With another οὐχ ὅτι (4.17; cf. 4.11),515 Paul immediately qualifies what he has 
just said. Aware that the Philippians might misinterpret his words as a request for more 
aid, he tells them in no uncertain terms, still using accounting terminology, that what he 
“strives for” 516 is not any gift of theirs (οὐχ ὅτι ἐπιζητῶ τὸ δόµα, 4.17a), but rather, “the 
interest that accrues to your account” (ἐπιζητῶ τὸν καρπὸν517 τὸν πλεονάζοντα εἰς λόγον 
ὑµῶν, 4.17b). Its meaning, as 4.18 goes on to show, is theological: the “fruit” is not their 
enhanced standing vis-à-vis Paul, but their practical praise offering to God.518 Using 
metaphorical language (ὀσµὴν εὐωδίας, θυσίαν δεκτήν) drawn from the LXX, Paul 
likens the Philippians’ gift to an aromatic sacrifice that is pleasing to God. 519 Paul then 
closes his thoughts in this section with an assurance that would have been very striking 
to his readers, because of the way it radicalized the social conventions that structured 
relationships. Here in 4.19, a third party, God, is explicitly introduced as an integral 
member of the partnership that Paul shares with them; it is God, not Paul, who will 
supply (πληρώσει520) all the Philippians’ needs (πᾶσαν χρείαν ὑµῶν), i.e. whether these 
needs are associated with material lack (cf. 2 Cor 8.1–2) or spiritual concerns (which 
are mentioned throughout the letter).521 This divine provision is not according to the 
balanced reciprocity of a Greco-Roman friendship, but κατὰ τὸ πλοῦτος αὐτοῦ ἐν δόξῃ 
ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Paul’s partnership with the Philippians is not predicated on the social 
expressions of mutuality that one would expect, but instead upon their common 
participation in a heavenly citizenship (3.20) in which all notions and norms of giving 
and receiving are relativized. For Paul, this partnership—specifically, what it consists in 
and how it is lived out—forms the basis for his joy here.  
 
 
                                                
515 In both 4.11 and 4.17, οὐχ ὅτι is used to introduce a correction. See further Schenk, 
Philipperbriefe, 44–46, for the linguistic and syntactical parallels in two verses. 
516 ἐπιζητῶ: in Paul, only here (twice) and at Rom 11.7; an intensified form of ζητέω, meaning here 
“to be seriously interested in or have a strong desire for” (BDAG 371). 
517 Lit. “fruit” (appearing also at 1.11, 22); used here metaphorically in a commercial sense 
(Hellerman, Philippians, 266).  
518 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 265–266. Bockmuehl also highlights the plausibility of “fruit” being read 
in eschatological terms too; i.e. relating to the future reckoning on the “day of Jesus Christ” (1.6; 2.16) 
when the Philippian gift will accrue not only to their own account, but they themselves will be Paul’s “joy 
and crown” (4.1; cf. 2.16), i.e. his eschatological reward.  
519 On this see esp. Reumann, Philippians, 667–670. 
520 I follow the majority of recent commentators in preferring the better attested future indicative 
πληρώσει rather than the aorist optative πληρώσαι. However, even if the optative is original, Paul’s note 
of assurance is not significantly diminished. For discussion see Reumann, Philippians, 670–671.  
521 See e.g. Fee, Philippians, 452–453; Hellerman, Philippians, 269–270; contra those who understand 
πᾶσαν χρείαν in eschatological terms (e.g. Ralph P. Martin, Philippians, NCB [London: Oliphants, 1976], 
169), or in present material terms (e.g. Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 273). 
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That Paul expects the Philippians also to find joy in this gospel partnership is seen 
in his instructions concerning Epaphroditus’ return. To be sure, this occasion is, 
naturally, already cause for rejoicing (2.28). However, Paul makes it clear that joy is to 
come also because Epaphroditus has exemplified selfless service both to him and them 
in relation to the work of the gospel (2.29–30). 
Summarizing our findings thus far: for Paul, joy arises because of his partnership 
with the Philippians in the advance of the gospel—a partnership that is at once both 
spiritual and material. Most recently, he has had cause to find particular joy on the 
occasion of the receipt of a financial gift from the Philippians. However, since Paul 
derives his sense of contentment solely from his relationship with Christ, the actual 
ground for his joy does not consist in any pecuniary benefit that this gift might bring; 
instead, it consists in what the gift represents—a renewal of the Philippians’ concern for 
his welfare, and an offering to God that is pleasing to him. In a sense, then, along with 
Peterman we may infer that Paul’s joy has to do with “delight in the spiritual maturity 
of the Philippians,” since their display of concern (φρονεῖν) in 4.10 is in keeping with 
the Christian mindset (φρόνησις) that he has delineated throughout the letter (esp. at 2.2, 
5; cf. 4.14 in which Paul pays tribute to their willingness to share in his afflictions).522 
Furthermore, given that such Christian maturity—and the right thinking and action that 
mark it—have their basis in God’s work, Paul sees his joy over the Philippians’ concern 
as being “in the Lord” (4.10).    
3.3.2. Joy in the Gospel’s Advancement  
3.3.2.a. Joy and the Progress of the Gospel in Rome (Phil 1.15–18) 
Paul’s joy, however, also has a dimension that is predicated on the spread of the 
gospel itself. In 1.18, the apostle rejoices because Christ is being preached through the 
evangelistic efforts of the believers in Rome; this is the “progress” (προκοπή) of the 
gospel that he has earlier referred to at 1.12. The motives of these believers, as we have 
noted, are mixed; among these fellow Christians are those who are quite willing to let 
further distress fall upon Paul (1.17; see also section 3.2.1.b). However, this is clearly a 
secondary concern for him. Even if there is duplicity rather than sincerity in the ministry 
of some of the other evangelists, what matters is that Christ is being preached; as long 
                                                
522 Peterman, Gift, 128; see esp. n.42. 
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as this happens, Paul will rejoice (Τί γάρ; πλὴν ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ, εἴτε προφάσει εἴτε 
ἀληθείᾳ, Χριστὸς καταγγέλλεται, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ χαίρω, 1.18).523 Moreover, in expressing 
this singular joy in the advancement of the gospel rather than in self-advancement, Paul 
demonstrates to the Philippians the kind of mindset and practical behaviour that he 
wants them to imitate (see 3.17 and 4.9). In Christ, Paul’s ambition and desire have now 
found a true and satisfying goal—one in which all pain and gain are reconfigured in the 
light of God’s call upon his life (3.7–14).524 The gospel of Christ is being increasingly 
heard in Rome; for Paul, this fact alone is cause for joy.  
3.3.2.b. Joy and the Progress of the Gospel in the Philippians’ Lives (Phil 1.18–26; 
2.1–4; 4.1) 
Paul’s reflection on the matter of the progress of the gospel, which began with 
evangelism, ends on a related note: the progress of the gospel in the lives of the 
Philippians themselves. Despite what he is presently undergoing, Paul is confident that 
he will remain alive and continue his ministry (1.19–26), the immediate focus of which 
concerns the Philippians’ “progress and joy in the faith” (εἰς τὴν ὑµῶν προκοπὴν καὶ 
χαρὰν τῆς πίστεως, 1.25)525—which is almost certainly the progress of the gospel (1.12) 
now applied specifically to the Philippians.526 The deliberate co-location of the themes 
of progress and joy in relation to faith is instructive: we may say that progress denotes 
the objective aspect of faith, while joy (and, we as shall later discuss, mutual joy) are its 
appropriation in the experience of the believer, because it emerges from a renewed 
outlook on the world that is made possible only through genuine progress in the faith. 
These twin themes of progress and joy, which have characterized Paul’s description of 
his own situation since 1.12, will also guide his concern for the believers throughout the 
rest of the letter. Progress in the faith and joy in the faith are to go hand in hand.527   
                                                
523 Fee, Philippians, 124, notes: “Without doubt the newly emboldened, fearless preaching of the 
gospel by his friends was cause for joy under any circumstances. What he wants the Philippians to hear is 
that the preaching which intended as one of its side effects to afflict him is also a cause for joy.” 
524 See Bockmuehl, Philippians, 81. 
525 With regard to εἰς τὴν ὑµῶν προκοπὴν καὶ χαρὰν τῆς πίστεως (1.25): most commentators see the 
single preposition and article (εἰς τὴν) as holding the two nouns together as one thought unit, while ὑµῶν 
and the genitive τῆς πίστεως qualify both nouns. On this reading, the phrase is understood as “for your 
progress and joy in the faith,” with τῆς πίστεως taken as a genitive of reference and ἡ πίστις used to 
denote the content of belief, i.e., the faith of the gospel (cf. 1.27); see Fee, Philippians, 153. For 
alternative interpretations see Reumann, Philippians, 227–229.  
526 προκοπή at 1.12 and at 1.25 from an inclusio.  
527 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 94.  
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However, Paul’s joy over the Philippians has yet to reach full flower. Despite the 
enthusiastic affirmations with which he begins the letter at 1.3–11, it is clear from 2.1–4 
that his joy over them is curtailed by what he perceives to be a lack of love and 
harmony among them. Even so, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that disunity 
was at this point in time already a dire problem in the church.528 Only at 4.2–3 is there 
an explicit mention of a division within the church. Hence Paul’s language in ch. 2 may 
merely reflect his identification of disunity as a potentially serious risk529—something 
that he hopes to nip in the bud through an impassioned yet tactful appeal that 
presupposes the secure bonds of friendship and mutuality that exist between him and 
the Philippians. This strongly personal appeal—πληρώσατέ530 µου τὴν χαρὰν (2.2)—is 
far from being egotistical and self-serving;531 instead, it reveals much about the nature 
of the relationship between Paul and his church. His heart and apostleship are deeply 
bound up with the well-being of his converts. The Philippians’ progress in the faith, 
expressed in unity for the sake of the gospel (see 1.25, 27) and in like-minded, 
harmonious relationships in which the interests of others have priority (2.1–4), will fill 
up his own measure of joy (2.2)—and given their bonds of friendship, that in itself 
should be incentive for them to pursue it.532 
To be sure, as we have noted earlier, Paul already experiences joy because of the 
Philippians (1.4; 4.10); indeed, he expresses delight in, and further desire for, their 
progress in the faith (1.3–11; 25). Now, through the like-mindedness and unity of soul 
of the Philippians, (2.2–4), Paul’s joy will be enlarged—even though his joy will reach 
its final goal only on the “day of Christ,” as he has first intimated at 1.6. At the 
parousia, it will be evident that Paul has not laboured in vain (2.16), and the Philippians 
                                                
528 Pace Peterlin, Paul’s Letter, 59–65 and passim. 
529 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 108 (following G. B. Caird, Paul’s Letters from Prison, New Clarendon 
Bible [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976], 129) argues that such a risk is heightened in Paul’s mind 
because tensions in the church in Rome have become evident (1.15, 17; 2.20–21).   
530 This is best understood in the sense of “to bring to completion that which was already begun” 
(Reumann, Philippians, 304).  
531 Therefore pace Robert T. Fortna, “Philippians: Paul’s Most Egocentric Letter,” in The 
Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul and John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn, ed. Robert T. Fortna and 
Beverly R. Gaventa (Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 220–234, who produces a caricatured reading of Paul 
that is based more on modern psychologizing than on the realities of the text. 
532 Fee, Philippians, 183–184; Bockmuehl, Philippians, 108; see also Lynn H. Cohick, Philippians, 
SGBC (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2013), 87–88. 
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will be his cause for joy; hence, by metonymy, they are already now his “joy and 
crown” (χαρὰ καὶ στέφανός µου, 4.1).533 
3.3.2.c. Mutual Joy in the Face of Suffering (Phil 2.17–18) 
The subject of joy appears again at 2.17–18. Here, while at the same time 
referring to his suffering, Paul enjoins the Philippians to rejoice with him—a thought 
that has been anticipated at 1.18. As we have earlier seen, Paul regards his present 
circumstances as a form of libation—the giving of himself and his apostolic experiences 
as a sacrifice to God to complement the sacrificial service of the Philippians: Ἀλλὰ εἰ 
καὶ σπένδοµαι ἐπὶ τῇ θυσίᾳ καὶ λειτουργίᾳ534 τῆς πίστεως ὑµῶν,535 χαίρω καὶ συγχαίρω 
πᾶσιν ὑµῖν· (2.17). The imagery makes it clear that Paul’s focus of attention is not on 
himself, however, but on the Philippians: theirs is the main offering that is offered to 
God, and Paul is more than willing to expend his ministry—and indeed, his very life—
on their behalf if one thing remains to make that sacrificial service acceptable.  
Paul’s joy therefore consists in the fact that he continues to make a contribution to 
the sacrificial service that his Philippian converts offer, just as he has previously 
identified their faith (1.4–5) and progress in the gospel (1.25) as a cause for joy.536 
Specifically, he takes joy in the fact that his own sacrifice will complete their act of 
offering and make it perfectly acceptable to God.537 Interestingly, Paul also rejoices 
with the Philippians: συγχαίρω πᾶσιν ὑµῖν (2.17); this strongly suggests that they were 
themselves already rejoicing in their own participation and sacrificial service in the 
gospel mission. Indeed, evidence of their joy comes from several ingredients in that 
sacrificial service: their prayers, their pecuniary support, and the sending of 
Epaphroditus to him. Paul rejoices in the Philippians’ joyful sacrificial service for the 
sake of the gospel. The social dimension of joy is clearly apparent.  
                                                
533 Since στέφανος in the NT often has eschatological connotations, and since the parallel passage (1 
Thess 2.19) is used of the parousia, many commentators take both χαρά and στέφανος to refer to the 
future; see Hellerman, Philippians, 226–227.  
534 On τῇ θυσίᾳ καὶ λειτουργίᾳ (“sacrificial service”) see also section 3.2.1.c. It seems likely that Paul 
sees this sacrificial service in comprehensive terms, i.e. to refer to all that the Philippians have done as an 
expression of their faith; contra e.g. Hansen, Philippians, 188–190, who limits the notion to just 
“sacrificial financial support.”  
535 τῆς πίστεως ὑµῶν qualifies the Philippians’ sacrificial service. I follow most commentators in 
taking the genitive τῆς πίστεως as subjective (i.e., “your sacrificial service, prompted by your faith”); for 
discussion see Reumann, Philippians, 148.   
536 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 162. 
537 Fee captures Paul’s thought well: “But if indeed my present struggle represents a kind of drink 
offering to go along with your own suffering on behalf of the gospel, then I rejoice over that”; 
Philippians, 255.  
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The emphasis on mutual joy continues in 2.18 where Paul instructs them: τὸ δὲ 
αὐτὸ καὶ ὑµεῖς χαίρετε καὶ συγχαίρετέ µοι. The resultant fourfold (συγ)χαίρειν produces 
an awkward redundancy for some, but I suggest that the most natural way to understand 
Paul’s thrust, factoring in the τὸ δὲ αὐτό, is to see it as some kind of pleonastic 
parallelism: “Just as I take joy in my service, and I rejoice with you in yours, so you 
must take joy in your service, and rejoice with me in mine.” Fee is correct to say that 
Paul’s emphasis is that “first, he and they rejoice on their own accounts for the privilege 
of serving the gospel, even in the midst of great adversity, and second that they do so 
mutually, as they have done so much else mutually.”538  
It is on this highly striking note of shared joy—with the emphatic repetition of 
verbs to do with joy (χαίρω, χαίρετε) and mutuality in joy (συγχαίρω, συγχαίρετε)—that 
Paul brings his thoughts here to a close. The Philippians are beginning to make 
“progress and joy in the faith” (1.25), and there is no doubt at all that these inter-related 
ideals are crucial things which Paul wishes to nurture in their lives. In particular, here at 
least, the aspect of joy is accentuated: it is the “experienced” concomitant of genuine 
progress in the Christian life, and thus capable of flourishing even in times of 
deprivation and suffering. Moreover, joy for Paul is not just an emotion belonging to the 
individual; it is equally a “social” emotion—the Philippians are to express their joy 
corporately, and they are also to share in Paul’s joy, just as he shares in theirs. These 
emphases are reflected in Paul’s handling of the theme of joy. As Fee notes: up to 2.17–
18 every mention of joy, except in 1.25, has had to do with Paul himself; but a subtle 
but noticeable shift towards the Philippians now takes place (Paul’s own “rejoicing” 
occurs only once more in the letter, at 4.10). What began in 1.25 as concern for the 
Philippians’ “progress and joy in the faith” is now expressed with imperatival force in 
2.18 (an emphasis that will appear again later at 3.1 and 4.4). Significantly, the first 
appearance of joy as an imperative is intertwined with Paul’s joy, and also found in the 
context of affliction and opposition.539 Our conclusion must be that joy—and mutual 
joy—even in the face of suffering is surely the goal of Paul’s preceding instructions and 
exhortations. As Paul goes on to highlight, that such joy is possible in the first place is 
because it is predicated on the work of Christ, both past and future.  
                                                
538 Fee, Philippians, 256.  
539 Fee, Philippians, 256.  
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3.3.3. Joy “in the Lord”: the Eschatological Horizon (Phil 3.1; 4.4–9) 
In the final analysis, for Paul, joy is to be found “in the Lord.” At 3.1, Paul picks 
up the earlier χαίρετε from 2.18 and adds ἐν κυρίῳ to it. The imperative therefore 
explicitly recalls his earlier mentions of joy but is now couched in explicitly theological 
terms. As with the Psalmists whose language Paul is borrowing (there are numerous 
references, e.g. Ps 32.11; 33.21; 35.9), the Lord is both the ground and object of joy.540 
This perspective on joy is to form the framework, both theological and experiential, in 
which the Philippians are to understand Paul’s injunctions in this section,541 and indeed 
in the entire epistle. This joy is neither a psyched-up satisfaction in feeling miserable 
nor a superficial triumphalism that blithely disregards the realities of one’s 
circumstances. What Paul is describing is a joy that emerges in spite of the presence of 
suffering, not because of it; he is inculcating in the Philippians a perspective on joy in 
which suffering can be seen in the light of the bigger picture of God’s working in and 
through adversity to achieve his purposes in Christ. Indeed, it is Christ who in his 
service, suffering, and exaltation provides the example and assurance of future victory 
and glory for the believer (2.5–11; 3.20–21). Christ, then, is the source and occasion of 
the Philippians’ joy—a joy that begins here on earth and reaches its final fulfilment in 
the eschaton.  
These theologically-charged ideas are reinforced at 4.4 where Paul begins a set of 
final imperatives (4.4–9)542; here, he repeats the interim conclusion at 3.1 not once, but 
twice, and adds the important qualifier “always”: Χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ πάντοτε· πάλιν ἐρῶ, 
χαίρετε (4.4). Just as Paul has in 3.1 reinforced his prior exhortations to joy in the letter, 
                                                
540 Fee, Philippians, 291 n.27, observes that the LXX translators consistently avoided χαίρω for this 
idiom in the Psalms, using instead either ἀγαλλιάω or εὐφραίνω. Paul, on the other hand uses the latter 
terms only once (2 Cor 2.2), not counting the LXX citiations, preferring χαίρω and its cognates. Fee 
concludes that given the flexible way this idiom is handled in the LXX and given Paul’s linguistic 
preferences, χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ is best understood as Paul’s own rendering of this OT idiom.  
I follow Fee in taking ἐν κυρίῳ to denote that the Lord is both the object and ground of joy 
(Philippians, 291); similarly, Bockmuehl, Philippians, 60, thinks that the fact that joy is “in the Lord” 
indicates that it arises “from belonging to him who is both its source and its object.” Some scholars, 
however, here distinguish—unnecessarily, in my opinion—betweeen the two senses: e.g. Bruce, 
Philippians, 76, who takes it (and the Psalms) to indicate that the Lord is the object of the believer’s 
rejoicing, and Fritz Neugebauer, In Christus: Eine Untersuchung Zum Paulinischen Glaubensverständnis 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 144 n.17 (against any OT derivation) who emphasizes the 
incorporative sense of being “in the Lord,” i.e. that it is union with the Lord that provides the ground for 
rejoicing. 
541 Fee, Philippians, 291, is correct in saying that this framework serves as Paul’s first antidote to the 
Philippians’ being taken in by the possible attractiveness of the Judaizing option (on which see Fee, 
Philippians, 293–303).  
542 On how the concluding paraenesis in Philippians compares to the other Pauline letters, see Fee, 
Philippians, 400–402.  
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so here at 4.4 he underlines—doubly—that previous encouragement as standing at the 
very heart of his message to the Philippians.543 Once again, some sort of cosmetic 
happiness that appears when things go well is not in view here. The joy that Paul speaks 
of can be had πάντοτε, “because it depends not on changing circumstances but on the 
one who does not change.”544 The imperative to rejoice is followed by two further 
exhortations which are related to this joy.545   
The first of the two is to have an attitude of forbearance towards others: τὸ 
ἐπιεικὲς546 ὑµῶν γνωσθήτω πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις (4.5a). In the midst of their present 
adversity, the Philippians’ unbridled joy in the Lord is to be accompanied by a 
noticeable quality of gentle forbearance towards one another and towards all; this seems 
to include the patient bearing of abuse from those who are making life difficult for 
them.547 More precisely, the context suggests that ἐπιείκεια here denotes “a humble, 
patient steadfastness, which is able to submit to injustice, disgrace and maltreatment 
without hatred or malice, trusting God in spite of it all.”548 The second exhortation 
relates to the believer’s prayer life: µηδὲν µεριµνᾶτε, ἀλλʼ ἐν παντὶ τῇ προσευχῇ καὶ τῇ 
δεήσει µετὰ εὐχαριστίας τὰ αἰτήµατα ὑµῶν γνωριζέσθω πρὸς τὸν θεόν (4.6). Only in 
prayer about “everything” can they be anxious about “nothing”: the comprehensive 
                                                
543 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 243–244. 
544 Silva, Philippians, 194.  
545 Hansen, Philippians, 287. The asyndetic injunctions in 4.4–6 (χαίρετε … γνωσθήτω … µεριµνᾶτε) 
have led some scholars to look beyond syntax to semantics to connect the imperatives, with differing 
conclusions (see Reumann, Philippians, 634, for whom they are “aphoristic dicta but linked at points”). I 
agree with Fee, who reads them as sharing ground with the “threefold expression of Jewish piety—
rejoicing in the Lord, prayer, and thanksgiving—which are basic to the Psalter” (Philippians, 402–403). It 
is noteworthy that these three things form also that familiar Pauline triad of practices that mark the mature 
believer (see 1.3–4; 1 Thess 3.9–10; 5.16–18; also Col 1.9–12).   
546 ἐπιεικές is from the adjective ἐπιεικής (“not insisting on every right of letter of law or custom, 
yielding, gentle, kind, courteous, tolerant,” BDAG 371); this range of meanings is reflected in the varied 
English translations of the word. It appears elsewhere in the Paulines only in 1 Tim 3.3 and Titus 3.2; 
Paul uses the noun ἐπιείκεια alongside πραΰτης at 2 Cor 10.1 to denote Christ’s attitude of humility and 
gentleness.  
547 As Hellerman, Philippians, 237, observes: the word group is often used to describe the superior 
party, e.g. Felix (Acts 24.4), Christ (2 Cor 10.1), and slave owners (1 Pet 2.1); so some see Paul here 
enjoining the Philippians to exhibit ἐπιείκεια in the sense of “magnanimity,” since the Lord is at hand (so 
e.g. Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 244). However, other uses of the word group describe the 
weaker party (e.g. Wis 2.19; Titus 3.2). Hellerman is correct to argue that the context indicates that the 
latter situation is the better description of the Philippians’ circumstances, as those who face serious 
opposition.  
Silva makes the interesting suggestion that Paul is here in 4.5a most likely recalling 2.3–4 (where he 
had instructed the Philippians to place the interests of others above their own). Christian joy is not 
inward-looking, and the believer is to find godly satisfaction in focusing on others and their needs; in this 
way joy can be learnt, and the call to show forbearance towards others can be seen as a way of reinforcing 
Christian joy (Philippians, 194). However, a proactive consideration of the interests of others does not 
seem to be a basic sematic component of ἐπιείκεια. 
548 R. Lievestad, “‘The Meekness and Gentleness of Christ’ II Cor. X.1,” NTS 13 (1965–1966): 158. 
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positive πᾶς sets up a contrast with the comprehensive negative µηδείς.549 The result of 
heeding this exhortation is the promise550 of God’s peace,551 bestowed on his people and 
standing guard over their hearts and minds (4.7).552  
Lying in the middle of the exhortations of 4.4–6 is a terse, important formulation 
about the “nearness” of Christ: ὁ κύριος ἐγγύς (5b). Its meaning is slightly ambiguous, 
as ἐγγύς can be understood either temporally or spatially;553 furthermore, its function in 
relation to the surrounding instructions is in dispute because there is no grammatical 
connection to them.554 I follow many modern exegetes in taking the nearness of the 
Lord in a temporal sense, and therefore understand ὁ κύριος ἐγγύς to mean the imminent 
parousia of Christ.555 On this interpretation, the return of the Lord provides 
eschatological motivation to respond confidently to all the apostolic injunctions of 4.4–
6.556 It is this sure hope that provides the essential underpinning of Paul’s exhortations 
here and hence also of Paul’s approach to joy. Earlier in the letter, Paul had spoken of 
his joyful confidence in the fact of his own final vindication before God: Ἀλλὰ καὶ 
χαρήσοµαι, οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτό µοι ἀποβήσεται εἰς σωτηρίαν557 (1.18–19). He now 
enjoins the Philippians, who are suffering as he is, to keep their sight on that same 
eschatological horizon, and thereby find their joy “in the Lord” (3.1; 4.4).   
                                                
549 See Ulrich B. Müller, Der Brief des Paulus an die Philipper, THKNT 11.1 (Leipzig: Evangelische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1993), 198. 
550 As Müller, Brief, rightly emphasizes, this is a promise, not a wish. 
551 ἡ εἰρήνη τοῦ θεοῦ appears only here in the NT, though a similar expression, ἡ εἰρήνη τοῦ Χριστοῦ, 
is found in Col 3.15. The genitive is subjective, and the phrase is therefore best understood as “the peace 
that God himself has and guarantees” (Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Philippians, trans. James W. Leitch 
[Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002], 123), rather than signifying an inward peace of the soul that 
comes from God (as many older commentators think, e.g. M. R. Vincent, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on the Epistles to the Philippians and to Philemon, ICC [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897], 
135).  
552 Recent commentators rightly draw attention to the fact that 4.4–7 “reflects the conjunction 
between individual and corporate piety” (Fee, Philippians, 403). See also Hansen, Philippians, 294–295, 
Cohick, Philippians, 222–223.  
553 See further Hellerman, Philippians, 237–238.  
554 I take ὁ κύριος ἐγγύς to ground both v.5a and v.6; so e.g. Fee, Philippians, 407–408; Silva, 
Philippians, 194–195.  
555 See Reumann, Philippians, 613. Fee however thinks both meanings are probably in view 
(Philippians, 407–408). Bockmuehl opines that it is theologically pointless to choose between the two 
interpretations, because the evidence in the NT is that each one in any case implies the other (Philippians, 
246).  
556 So correctly J. Ernst, who argues that for Paul, awaiting the parousia is a key paraenetic motif; Die 
Briefe an die Philipper, an Philemon, an die Kolossser, an die Epheser, RNT (Regensburg: Pustet, 1974), 
115. See 1.6, 10; 2.16; 3.20–21. 
557 τοῦτό µοι ἀποβήσεται εἰς σωτηρίαν is Job 13.16a (LXX) verbatim. The majority of scholars argue 
that σωτηρία in Paul always refers, directly or indirectly, to eschatological salvation and vindication, and 
never to physical deliverance; that eschatological salvation and vindication are in view here seems highly 
likely in light of the Job citation, so e.g. Fee, Philippians, 128 n.7; Bockmuehl, Philippians, 83. 
Hawthorne and Martin’s advocacy of the latter view is a minority position (Philippians, 49–50).  
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3.4. The Basis and Function of Joy 
Our exegetical spadework has revealed that the theme of joy runs right through 
Philippians. Far from being merely incidental, joy often occupies a central place in 
Paul’s thinking and certainly integral to much of the hortatory material in the letter. 
Noteworthy is the fact that Paul’s call to joyful living emerges from the privations of 
imprisonment; this in itself is significant because it emphasizes to the believers his 
ability to rise above the thoroughly adverse circumstances in which he finds himself and 
to experience joy in spite of the hardships and opprobrium that he has had to bear. 
However, in the letter, joy is inflected in other important ways as well—so much so that 
it may be said that what Paul offers to the Philippians is careful, deliberate instruction 
on how to live the Christian life victoriously while in the very midst of suffering and 
affliction: it is a “pedagogy in joy.”558 Indeed, Paul’s indefatigable efforts both to 
exemplify this joy himself and to inculcate, guide—and even regulate—its expression 
within the Philippian church seem to suggest that he views joy as being crucial to the 
establishment of early Christian culture. The question is: why is so much weight put on 
joy as the goal of Paul’s instructions?  
3.4.1. The Theological Basis of Joy  
That Paul’s promoting of joy in the Philippian Christians is practicable and, 
indeed, makes good sense in the first place is because God’s work of redemption—the 
death and resurrection of God’s Christ, the coming of the Spirit, and the certainty of the 
parousia—has meant that new terms of engagement with the world are now available. 
For the believer, it is no longer only visible, corporeal manifestations of reality that feed 
his consciousness and govern his sense of existence; instead, his metaphysical horizon 
is to be definitively reshaped by eschatological reality. This has, as its corollary, a 
profound effect on his mental and emotional engagement with the world around him. A 
radical reconfiguration of his sense and conception of identity, value, meaning, and 
purpose has taken place.  
As such, to rejoice in the face of suffering is to reject any notion that one’s sense 
of well-being depends on one’s circumstances, for the present age no longer has the last 
word. Paul regards joy as being for the believer’s taking, because it is grounded in the 
                                                
558 Being the expression used by Barton, “Spirituality,” 185. 
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confident assurance that in the end all will be made right through God’s work in Christ 
(Phil 3.20–21; cf. 1 Cor 15.24–28). Putting it a different way: this revised hermeneutic 
for all of life that reads in it the possibility of joy at all times is rooted in the 
transfiguration of meaning that emerges from the believer’s participation in the 
christological pattern of dying and rising (Phil 3.10–11).559 The basis of Christian joy is 
therefore intrinsically theological; this joy simultaneously signals and celebrates the 
profound connection between the believer and God and his work in the world, past, 
present and future. For the believer, then, the experience of suffering for the sake of the 
gospel throws into sharp relief the painful tensions that result from a life lived both in 
this world and the one to come. However, joy is attainable in spite of these tensions, 
because the presence of such suffering is proof of—and a precursor to—eschatological 
salvation (Phil 1.27–30).  
In the letter to the Philippians, the theological basis of the believer’s joy is made 
most explicit in 3.1 and 4.4, where the summons to rejoice is articulated to the fact that 
this joy is “in the Lord,” and similarly in 4.10, where Paul expresses much joy “in the 
Lord” over the Philippians’ renewed concern for him (though ἐν κυρίῳ is absent at 1.18 
and 2.17–18, the verbs for “rejoicing” in these verses surely stand in this same 
theological correlation). It is precisely because Christian joy has a firm theological basis 
that it can be called forth with imperatival force. 
Closely related to the theological underpinning of joy is the emphasis on thinking 
and on the mind that runs through Paul’s letter. We have noted earlier the significance 
of the numerous appearances of verbs that relate to the disposition or activity of the 
mind (φρονέω, ἡγέοµαι, σκοπέω, and λογίζοµαι), the abundance of “knowledge” 
vocabulary, and the use of military and athletic imagery to flesh out the notion of 
mental tenacity. It is right thinking about Christian truth, and the possession of a 
mindset that reflects the character and disposition of Christ, that will help the 
Philippians to overcome the suffering and trials that they are going through—and to do 
so with joy. Quite clearly, for Paul, there is a significant cognitive dimension to living 
the Christian life well.     
Interestingly, the cognitive aspect of the Pauline reality-framework that makes 
joy possible is in some respects parallel to that of the Stoic account of affective 
response, but, as we shall see, at a fundamental level the two schemes are completely 
                                                
559 See Shantz, “Happiness,” 198–199.  
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different. A recapitulation of the Stoic theory is helpful at this juncture. For the Stoics, 
joy belongs to a select group of emotions called the eupatheiai, which are acceptable, 
non-culpable ways of experiencing affect. The wise person—whose perfected 
rationality mirrors the universal reason that governs the cosmos, and who therefore 
always acts in conformity with nature and its ends—would regularly be subject to the 
eupatheiai. Such a person would not be overwhelmed emotionally by any circumstance, 
whether (in the eyes of the ordinary person) beneficial or baneful. This is because the 
wise person has redirected his capacity to perceive and ascribe value correctly through 
his judgements and affective responses, so that they are appropriate for a rational human 
being. At the heart of Stoic ethics is the doctrine that virtue alone is good, vice alone 
bad; everything else is an indifferent. The wise person is incapable of being emotionally 
impacted by anything that others would regard as a present evil. To be sure, like any 
other person, in life he encounters suffering (and other circumstances that an ordinary 
person would consider as bad)—but he would not count them as bad. Suffering is not 
for him a present evil, because vice is the only evil there is; the Stoic sage is, by 
definition, free of vice and its effects. He would not mistake an indifferent for genuine 
goods and evils, which is to say, virtue and vice.  
Instead, the wise person would experience the eupatheiai on a regular basis. He 
would be able to experience joy often, because the perfection of reason produces virtue 
and the actions that are the immediate practical expression of such a state of mind—
virtue and virtuous acts being the genuine goods towards which the wise person’s 
rational impulses are directed and in relation to which he consistently forms fully 
accurate, veridical judgements. So Seneca, as we have seen, speaks of a “boundless joy” 
that emanates from deep within the wise man because he delights in his own inner 
resources (Vit. beat. 3.4, 4.4), a joy that causes one’s soul to be “happy and confident, 
lifted above every circumstance” (Ep. 23.3). The wise maintain a steady joy both at 
their virtuous condition and its practical expression, and remain unaffected by 
externals—the things that lie beyond their sphere of control. Stoic joy is therefore 
premised on a belief about the rational ordering of the world and its inhabitants.  
Like the Stoics, Paul has a cognitive interest in what makes joy reasonable. In his 
scheme, right thinking can also produce a profound sense of joy that is able to transcend 
all adversity. However, Paul’s ideological framework has a totally different basis; for 
him, joy in grounded in a proper understanding of—and, one might add, a participation 
in—God’s continuing action in the world. Paul’s inaugurated eschatology speaks of a 
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world in which God’s perfect order is yet to be fully established: the πολίτευµα of 
believers is in heaven, from which they expect the arrival of Christ, who will transfigure 
and glorify their bodies through the same power that will subject all things to his rule 
(Phil 3.20–21; cf. 2.11). Therefore, though there is an already present reality that 
governs the lives of Christians, their orientation is one of forward anticipation, as 3.12–
14 has already made very clear,560 because the “day” is not yet here (1.6, 10; 2.16).  
However, this forward-looking thrust makes present joy possible, but also 
precarious: there is a danger that a severe or prolonged ordeal of some sort might 
severely weaken, or even totally extinguish, the believer’s joy. Paul’s solution seems to 
be threefold. First, throughout the letter, and in different ways, he stresses the 
importance of developing and maintaining a Christian mindset—one that demonstrates 
right thinking, maturity, and perseverance and, above all, is patterned after Christ’s. 
This mindset is thus to be a common mindset: one that consists in the Philippians 
having the same outlook on the world, on the work of God in the world, and on one’s 
responsibilities in light of these truths.561 Second, he himself models such a mindset for 
the Philippians, and shows them what Christian joy looks like, even in the presence of 
great adversity. Third, he calls for the corporate reinforcement of this joy, knowing that 
the Philippians’ faith would be buttressed by the mutual encouragement that shared joy 
can bring. For Paul, joy very clearly also has a social dimension—and as we shall see, 
this distinctive Christian sociality not only protects and promotes joy, but helps to 
complete it.  
3.4.2. The Social Character and Function of Joy 
 While the ground of joy in Philippians is theological, its expression is manifestly 
social. Joy here is not simply a matter of the emotions construed as private experiences 
and expressions that occur within the individual’s thought-world and remain embedded 
within its confines, important though this aspect is. The way in which Paul describes his 
own joy and how it comes about shows beyond any doubt that it is dependent—and to 
no small degree—on the attitudes and actions of the Philippians. Furthermore, this joy 
is not to be contained within the individual, but is to be enacted and shared. In other 
                                                
560 See Bockmuehl, Philippians, 235.  
561 Cohick, Philippians, 89. 
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words, for Paul, joy is very much a matter of sociality and public performance; it is both 
socially generated and socially expressed. 
The sociality of joy in Philippians is made evident several times during the course 
of the letter. We note, firstly, that the ongoing, flourishing mission partnership between 
Paul and the Philippian church is a key ingredient in the production of joy. In ch. 1, Paul 
speaks of the joy that accompanies his prayers of thanksgiving for his Philippian 
brethren—a joy that arises from their faithful partnership with him in the work of 
evangelism. In ch. 4, we learn that this partnership includes also an important financial 
dimension: the Philippian believers have, on a number of separate occasions, sent 
money to Paul to help him to meet his needs. They have recently despatched 
Epaphroditus to Paul with another monetary gift, which he receives with much joy, 
though (as we have discussed earlier) he hastens to inform them that his joy comes not 
so much from the economic value of the gift but from the fact that it is a concrete 
expression of their ongoing concern for his welfare and interest in his ministry.  
Secondly, and related to the above, Paul speaks of a joy that he and the Philippian 
believers are to have because of their common commitment to the gospel mission. 
Paul’s and the Philippians’ evangelistic efforts take place against a backdrop of 
suffering. Yet, even in the midst of great adversity, it is apparent that both Paul and the 
Philippians have been able to take joy in the privilege of serving the gospel. What is 
even more striking is that this joy is also a shared joy: Paul rejoices in his own service 
to God and also in that of the Philippians, and he expects them likewise to rejoice in his 
service even as they rejoice together in their own (2.17–18). Quite clearly, the joy that 
Paul refers to here does not belong only to the realm of personal experience. It is also 
very much a mutual, social joy that stems from the fact that in the very face of suffering 
both Paul and the Philippians believers are giving themselves wholeheartedly to God in 
sacrificial service, and gladdened by the salutary example of the other. It is, I think, not 
unreasonable to suggest that such a joy would have a strongly mutually-reinforcing 
quality.  
Another depiction of a social basis for joy in the letter occurs at 2.1–4. Here, Paul 
attempts to galvanize his readers towards a vision of solidarity and like-minded 
relationships within the church. The achieving of this ideal state of affairs would induce 
an even fuller flowering of the joy that he already experiences from his evangelistic 
partnership with them and investment in their lives. To be sure, the Philippians are 
already his “joy and crown” (4.1)—but growth in unity of mind and spirit among the 
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believers would intensify Paul’s sense of joy and indeed “complete” it (2.2). Once 
again, the sociality of joy comes to the fore: joy is now directly correlated to the quality 
of the relationships within the church, or, to be more specific, to the extent to which the 
Philippians display to each other Christ’s attitudes of humility and self-abnegation (2.2–
5), and thereby “‘think’ in a manner appropriate to where they are, which is ‘in Christ 
Jesus.’”562 For Paul, a unified church brings deep joy, because unity is a clear indicator 
of the presence in the believers of a Christ-like φρόνησις, and thus also a marker of their 
maturity in the faith.  
Finally, we note that joy is a matter also of public performance: it is to be socially 
expressed. This is already evident in Paul’s exhortation to mutual joy in the face of 
suffering at 2.17–18 (discussed earlier); and certainly, Paul himself models it through 
the ways in which he describes and communicates his own joy throughout the letter. 
Paul also expects the Philippians to welcome with joy the returning Epaphroditus, who 
has faithfully served both him and them (2.28–29). We meet this notion again at 3.1 and 
4.4, where he summons again the believers at Philippi to joy “in the Lord” in spite of 
the trials and pressures through which they are called to pass. Their joy is to be visible; 
and not only that, but visibly celebrated.563 This is, again, a shared joy—certainly, 
premised on a particular view of salvation history, but also at once a joy that is 
indispensably social in its orientation and manifestation. 
Indeed, to a degree that would have made his Stoic contemporaries rather 
nervous, the way Paul describes his joy shows that it is intentionally bound up with the 
outlook and behaviour of others. Specifically, Paul’s joy is generated in relationship 
with the Philippian believers, for the expression of warm concern and friendship that 
their gift to him represents brings him immense delight and comfort; indeed, it is 
obvious that he desires their φρονεῖν more than the material expression of it.564 Also, the 
Philippians’ unity and like-mindedness, and their continuing progress in the faith, are 
for Paul rich sources of joy, as is their committed and faithful partnership with him in 
the work of the gospel. This joy, however, is not to be his alone; Paul expects the 
Philippians to exhibit in their demeanour a lively, mutual joy.  
                                                
562 Francis B. Watson, “Barth’s Philippians as Theological Exegesis,” in Barth, Philippians, xlix. 
563 As Barth (commenting on Phil 4.4–5) puts it: “And perhaps we are to think at the same time of the 
fact that the Lord is near: the time of rejoicing is at the door—see that all men notice it!” (Philippians, 
121).  
564 Cf. 2 Cor 12.14, where Paul tells the Corinthians: οὐ γὰρ ζητῶ τὰ ὑµῶν ἀλλὰ ὑµᾶς. 
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All this indicates that Paul’s thinking—and that which he also wants to see 
among his Christian brethren—is far removed from the relational self-sufficiency that 
marks the Stoic sage. Paul’s attitude, as a Stoic would understand and interpret it, 
involves the evaluative construal of an external object (the actions of fellow Christians) 
as being beneficial in some way for oneself, such that one should reach out for it. 
However, the Stoic wise person, whose rationality has been perfected, would not allow 
an external object to affect in any way his state of complete inner equanimity. 
Furthermore, Paul’s joy is not eupathic joy, which derives from one’s virtuous condition 
and its practical expression, and is untouched by the presence of externals. The 
implication is that in the Stoic schema, Paul’s joy would most likely be classified 
instead as one of the four generic passions—ἡδονή (delight), the opinion that some 
present thing is a good of such a sort that one should be elated about it—and, as such, to 
be extirpated, since the passions followed directly upon faulty judgements of one’s 
impressions.  
The comparison of Pauline joy with Stoic thinking about emotion throws the 
sociality of Christian joy into sharp relief, and leads to some rather intriguing questions. 
First, Paul is obviously not self-sufficient at a relational level (in the sense of not 
needing any encouragement and care); he certainly values—and indeed, deeply so—the 
ongoing, thoughtful concern of his friends at Philippi. Would he still rejoice if they had 
forgotten about him and his needs, if they had not responded at this time and in such a 
manner? Second, all these human relationships are, in a sense, embedded in the 
common relationship with Christ that believers share. For Paul, to what extent could 
this relationship with Christ substitute for his relationship with the Philippians when it 
came to the engendering of joy? Third, the presence of Christ serves to embolden and 
empower Paul’s ministry, even without material supply. Could Paul’s work still be 
carried out effectively and his mission be accomplished, without interaction and 
fellowship with other believers? And finally, what about the Philippian church—would 
it continue to grow without the vivifying presence of joy, expressed at both the 
individual and corporate level?  
Our answers to these questions can be at best only speculative. However, from 
what we have elucidated, Paul’s attitude towards joy seems to show that in certain very 
important ways its promotion and social flourishing are seen to be integral to the health 
of the fledgling Christian community at Philippi and to the success of the gospel 
mission, and also to his personal well-being.  
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3.5. Conclusion 
The evidence before us indicates that joy, for Paul, is a crucially important 
emotional corollary of certain key theological values in the Christian life. More 
specifically, we may say that Paul sees joy as the believer’s deep-seated, embodied, and 
enacted pleasure that emerges through his or her discernment of, and active 
participation in, God’s eschatological renewal of creation and creature in the light of the 
work of Christ and the coming of the Spirit.565 The good news is that Christ has come, 
and that he is coming again; Christian joy is grounded in these realities and therefore 
profoundly connected to the advancement of this good news and to the growth in faith 
of those who accept it. To be joyful is thus to believe rightly in the truths that the gospel 
of Christ proclaims; and the implication is that the quality of a person’s joy is in some 
sense an indication of the extent to which these truths have actually taken hold of the 
person’s thinking566—and thereby shaped his or her Christian identity, outlook in life, 
and sense of mission.  
Moreover, since the basis of joy consists in God’s eschatological act of renewing 
the world, the presence of suffering in the here and now does not need to cripple the 
believer’s joy. Paul does not shy away from telling the Philippians that suffering for the 
sake of the gospel is part of what it means to follow Christ. For just as it was for Christ, 
lying behind such suffering is the promise of ultimate vindication. Therefore suffering 
becomes, in a way, a theological crucible in which the melding together of pain and a 
renewed, Christ-focused perspective on such pain produces the possibility of a deeper 
and richer understanding of the Christian life, as the believer learns to fix his gaze on 
the eschatological horizon, thereby becoming increasingly cognizant of the hope—and 
accompanying joy—that are also present realities.567 Joy is thus an experience of 
revitalization—one that is “so profound, so touched by transcendence, that it makes 
possible the transcendence of suffering, grief, shame, and all that is death-dealing, even 
and especially death itself.”568 Putting these things together, it seems entirely reasonable 
                                                
565 See also Barton, “Spirituality,” 183. 
566 As Wright, “Joy,” 61, observes: “Not to celebrate, not to express joy in the lordship of the 
crucified and risen Jesus, would be tacitly to acknowledge that one did not really believe.” 
567 To use Nicholas Lash’s apt expression: joy is “the felt form of Christian hope.” See his Seeing in 
the Dark (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2005), 201; quoted in Barton, “Spirituality,” 190 n.40.  
568 Barton, “Spirituality,” 191.  
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to conclude that for Paul joy is to be regarded as a primary, and perpetual, orientation 
within the life of the believer (cf. Rom 14.17).569  
In addition, Paul clearly regards joy as being also a social phenomenon: socially 
generated in relationship with fellow believers, and socially displayed through 
expressions of mutual joy that reflect and reinforce the fact that each believer’s story is 
part of a larger narrative, one in which God has the final word. We may therefore say 
that joy is the collective manifestation of salvation and spiritual transformation in the 
lives of individual believers. Throughout the letter, Paul places joy within the context of 
his special relationship with the Philippians: he repeatedly makes clear his desire that 
they know and share his joy, and so attain a greater fullness of joy in their own lives. 
The mutuality and sociality of joy are thus foregrounded; it would certainly seem that 
Paul sees joy as being a critical ingredient in the establishment of a distinctively 
Christian culture, in view of its powerful potential to structure both personal sensibility 
and public behaviour. One might even say that here in Philippians Paul regards joy as a 
responsibility of the believer, because of the far-reaching ways in which joy expresses 
key aspects of Christian belief and is thus constitutive of the emotional ethos of a 
community that is truly Christian.  
All this helps to explain why Paul takes such great pains to call forth joy from the 
Philippians by making it the subject of repeated pedagogy, as well as to exemplify it in 
his own life and ministry. It is interesting to note that like the Stoics, Paul develops a 
process to inculcate Christian joy: Paul knows that it can be taught (and conversely, also 
learned), modelled, requested, and also reinforced through the solidarity of shared 
feelings. And like the Stoics, in his understanding of joy Paul assumes that some kind of 
grand ordering of the cosmos is at work. But here any superficial similarities end, not 
least because Pauline joy and Stoic joy are premised on entirely different ideological 
realities. For in the final analysis Paul derives his joy from his relationship with his 
Lord, and from his relationship with others who also call Christ Lord. True Christian 
joy will emerge when these relationships are what they should be. 
                                                
569 Paul writes elsewhere that joy is a fruit of the Spirit and thus serves as evidence of the Spirit’s 
presence and ministry in the life of the believer (Gal 5.22).  
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Chapter 4. Grief in 1 Thessalonians 
4.1. The Background to 1 Thessalonians 
4.1.1. Overview 
Paul’s first letter to the church at Thessalonica—his earliest extant letter—was 
most likely written from Corinth in 50/51 CE,570 several months after his abrupt flight 
from Thessalonica, where his evangelistic mission had fomented much hostility (Acts 
17.1–10; 1 Thess 1.6). Following Paul’s departure, the opposition against the fledgling 
church that he had planted intensified. Deeply concerned about the well-being of his 
new converts (1 Thess 3.5)—not only because they were suffering (2.14–16; 3.3-4), but 
also because he had been forced to leave them before he had finished instructing them 
in their newfound faith (2.17; 3.10)—and repeatedly frustrated in his efforts to return to 
Thessalonica to see them again (2.18), Paul sent Timothy to them to strengthen them 
(3.1–5). Timothy has since returned with a favourable report of the believers’ faith and 
love, and of their good memories of Paul and desire to see him again (3.6).   
In response, Paul writes this warm pastoral letter to the Thessalonians to 
encourage them to continue to stand firm in the Lord (3.8) in the midst of the severe 
adversity they are experiencing. The missive creates the impression that Paul is 
generally pleased with the progress of his converts; there are no major issues identified 
for censure, nor doctrinal aberrations for correction. Paul does provide teaching and 
advice on certain aspects of their corporate ethics (in various parts of chs. 4–5), but the 
main problem that he concerns himself with has to do with the Thessalonians’ 
eschatological outlook (4.13–5.11): the recent deaths of some of their number have 
brought on immense grief—which, for Paul, indicates that their understanding of the 
resurrection of believers at the return of Christ is incomplete. Hence Paul takes time to 
help the Thessalonians deal with their grief; and as we shall see, the consolation he 
offers is firmly rooted in his theology, and has profound personal and social 
implications for his addressees. 
                                                
570 I follow the traditional view of the dating and provenance of the letter; so also e.g. Malherbe, 
Thessalonians, 72–73; Jeffrey A. D. Weima, 1–2 Thessalonians, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2014), 
38–39. For objections to this view and an evaluation of them, see Malherbe, Thessalonians, 71–74; I. 
Howard Marshall, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, NCB (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), 20–23; Robert Jewett, 
The Thessalonian Correspondence: Pauline Rhetoric and Millenarian Piety (Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1986), 49–60. 
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4.1.2. Literary Integrity 
There is an overwhelming scholarly consensus concerning Paul’s authorship of 1 
Thessalonians as a whole.571 However, the literary integrity of the letter has on occasion 
been challenged by arguments that it is interpolated, or a compilation of a number of 
Pauline letters. The various compilation theories do not have a following and may be set 
aside.572 In relation to the matter of interpolation: only 1 Thess 2.13–16 (or a portion of 
it) has garnered a certain degree of support that it did not emerge from Paul’s hand and 
thus deserves our consideration.573 In the nineteenth century, Baur and others had 
already challenged the authenticity of 1 Thess 2.13–16,574 but the contemporary debate 
was given its impetus during the second half of the twentieth century, primarily through 
the work of Birger Pearson.575   
In sum, Pearson marshals three types of arguments—historical, theological, and 
form-critical—to make the case that 1 Thess 2.13–16 is a post-Pauline interpolation. In 
regard to matters of history: Pearson contends that 2.16c is about the destruction of 
Jerusalem in 70 CE, as the aorist ἔφθασεν refers to a past event of wrath, with εἰς τέλος 
underscoring its catastrophic finality.576 He also finds it problematic that in 2.14 the 
                                                
571 There has been no scholarly challenge to Paul’s authorship of 1 Thess since the nineteenth century, 
except for Marlene Crüsemann’s recent monograph, Die pseudepigraphen Briefe an die Gemeinde in 
Thessaloniki: Studien zu ihrer Abfassung und zur jüdisch-christlichen Sozialgeschichte, BWANT 191 
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2010). 
572 See esp. Karl-Gottfried Eckhart, “Der zweite echte Brief des Apostels Paulus an die 
Thessalonicher,” ZTK 58 (1961): 30–44, who regards the letter as an aggregation of numerous fragments 
of authentic and inauthentic material; Walter Schmithals, Paul and the Gnostics, trans. John E. Steely 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1972), 123–218, who partitions 1 and 2 Thessalonians into four distinct letters 
made up of material from 1 and 2 Thessalonians; and Earl J. Richard, First and Second Thessalonians, SP 
11 (Collegeville: Liturgical, 1995), 11–19, who proposes that 1 Thessalonians was formed by combining 
two separate letters and interpolating 2.14–16 into the combination. For an evaluation of Eckhart’s and 
Schmithals’ proposals, see esp. Charles A. Wanamaker, The Epistles to the Thessalonians, NIGTC 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 34–35.  
573 Scholars who reject the authenticity of 2.13–16 include, more recently, John G. Gager, The Origins 
of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes towards Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 255–256; Richard, Thessalonians, 17–18, 119–127; for further examples see 
Todd D. Still, Conflict at Thessalonica: A Pauline Church and Its Neighbours, JSNTSup 183 (Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 24 n.2. 
 The only other passage in 1 Thessalonians which has received serious consideration as a post-Pauline 
interpolation is 5.1–11. Gerhard Friedrich, “1. Thessalonicher 5,1–11, der apologetische Einschub eines 
Späteren,” ZTK 70 (1973): 288–315, has argued that the thought and language of 5.1–11 is not consistent 
with other parts of the letter. However, his arguments have not convinced other scholars; see Wanamaker, 
Thessalonians, 33. 
574 See the survey in Jewett, Thessalonian Correspondence, 37. 
575 Birger A. Pearson, “1 Thessalonians 2:13–16: A Deutero-Pauline Interpolation,” HTR 64 (1971): 
79–94. 
576 Pearson, “Interpolation,” 82–83; here he also implies that the whole of 2.14–16 is suspect, as 2.16c 
formally constitutes the conclusion to the participial clauses of 2.15 and 2.16a–b, which in turn modifies 
the τῶν Ἰουδαίων of 2.14.  
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Thessalonians’ sufferings are compared with those of the churches in Judea at the hands 
of the Jews, because there is no evidence of any significant persecution of the Judean 
Christians before the first Jewish-Roman War.577 Pearson reinforces these arguments 
with the claim that there are theological incompatibilities between 2.15–16 and Paul’s 
thoughts elsewhere. Pearson insists that Paul nowhere attributes Jesus’ death to the 
Jews—which means that he did not write 2.15.578 Furthermore, Pearson finds it 
impossible to ascribe to Paul the anti-Semitic invective of 2.15–16 when in Rom 9–11 
he speaks far more positively of the Jews.579 Finally, Pearson argues that a form-critical 
investigation substantiates the fact that 2.13–16 is a later interpolation. Structurally, 
2.11–12 introduces the apostolic parousia, but this actually begins only at 2.17. The 
appearance at 2.13 of a second thanksgiving (indicated by εὐχαριστοῦµεν) is not only an 
anomaly in Paul’s letters, but also interrupts his flow of thought.580  
 However, Pearson’s arguments have been refuted. It has been shown that the past 
event that the ἔφθασεν of 2.16c refers to could be any of several calamitous situations 
that the Jewish people had undergone in the period preceding Paul’s writing of the 
letter;581 while, in relation to 2.14, several scholars have demonstrated that the Judean 
Christians did suffer at the hands of their fellow Jews before the outbreak of the Jewish-
Roman War.582 Pearson’s more theologically-grounded assertions have also been called 
into question. Karl Donfried argues that Rom 9–11 adds new information to what Paul 
has previously said in 1 Thess 2.13–16. Also, the εἰς τέλος of 1 Thess 2.16c is referring 
to the future, with the sense of “until the end.” Thus, for Donfried: “1 Thessalonians 
reports God’s attitude of wrath towards the Jews from the death of Jesus until the last 
day; Romans adds that at the last day God’s mercy will be revealed towards them in a 
mysterious and radically new way.”583 Furthermore, there is good reason to think that 
Paul’s polemic of 1 Thess 2.15–16 is directed not at all Jews generally, but specifically 
                                                
577 Pearson, “Interpolation,” 86–87.  
578 Pearson, “Interpolation,” 85. 
579 Pearson, “Interpolation,” 85–86.  
580 Pearson, “Interpolation,” 88–91. 
581 See Weima, Thessalonians, 43. 
582 See esp. Robert Jewett, “The Agitators and the Galatian Congregation,” NTS 17 (1970–1971): 
204–208; Bo Reicke, “Judaeo-Christianity and the Jewish Establishment, A.D. 33–66,” in Jesus and the 
Politics of his Day, ed. Ernst Bammel and C. F. D. Moule (London: SCM Press, 1984), 145–152; Markus 
Bockmuehl, “1 Thessalonians 2:14–16 and the Church in Jerusalem,” TynBul 52 (2001): 20–27. 
583 Karl P. Donfried, “Paul and Judaism: 1 Thessalonians 2.13–16 as a Test Case,” Int 38 (1984): 
251–253, quote from 253. 
Chapter 4. Grief in 1 Thessalonians 
 126 
at those who have opposed God’s messengers.584 The form-critical basis for regarding 1 
Thess 2.13–16 as an interpolation has also been undermined. Several scholars have 
shown that the passage is integral to the letter.585 Furthermore, even if 2.13 can be 
properly classified as a thanksgiving, Paul consistently demonstrates in his letters that 
he is never straitjacketed by epistolary conventions; he is certainly capable of adding a 
second thanksgiving if it suits his purposes for writing.586  
Pearson’s objections to the authenticity of 1 Thess 2.13–16 are supplemented by 
an argument by Daryl Schmidt that is based on a number of claimed linguistic 
inconsistencies.587 However, scholars who have evaluated Schmidt’s proposal are not 
convinced by his findings: the general view is that the claimed linguistic anomalies in 
the text are not so unique in Paul’s letters that a case for inauthenticity can be made.588 
In addition, there is a distinct possibility that Paul is borrowing from traditional 
material, which would explain some of the text’s unusual linguistic features.589  
In conclusion: the arguments put forward for the inauthenticity of 2.13–16 are not 
persuasive. There are compelling reasons to regard the text as being part of the letter—a 
conclusion that is only strengthened by the fact that it is found within every extant 
manuscript of 1 Thessalonians. My study will therefore proceed on the assumption of 
the literary integrity of the letter.  
4.1.3. Genre 
4.1.3.a. A Paraenetic Letter 
Malherbe has built a forceful case for understanding 1 Thessalonians as a 
paraenetic letter590—a type of letter that, at the time of Paul’s writing, had already 
                                                
584 See the discussion in Still, Conflict, 41–42; so rightly W. D. Davies, “Paul and the People of 
Israel,” NTS 24 (1977–1978): 8; and Frank D. Gilliard, “The Problem of the Antisemitic Comma between 
1 Thessalonians 2.14 and 15,” NTS 35 (1989): 498–501.  
585 See e.g. Jewett, Thessalonian Correspondence, 38; Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 32; Weima, 
Thessalonians, 45. 
586 See Still, Conflict, 29–30. 
587 Daryl Schmidt, “1 Thess 2:13–16: Linguistic Evidence for an Interpolation,” JBL 102 (1983): 269–
279. 
588 See esp. Jon A. Weatherly, “The Authenticity of 1 Thessalonians 2.13–16: Additional Evidence,” 
JSNT 42 (1991): 91–98; Carol J. Schlueter, Filling up the Measure: Polemical Hyperbole in 1 
Thessalonians 2.14–16, JSNTSup 98 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 34–36; Still, Conflict, 
32–35.  
589 See e.g. Donfried, “Paul and Judaism,” 247–250; Malherbe, Thessalonians, 169, 174–175. 
590 See esp. Malherbe, “Exhortation”; Malherbe, Pastoral Care, 68–78; Malherbe, Thessalonians, 81–
86 (85: “1 Thessalonians is clearly a paraenetic letter; indeed, it is one of the best examples of such a 
letter.”). For an overview of the development of Malherbe’s thesis in his writings, see David 
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become one of the recognized forms of epistolography in the Greco-Roman world.591 
For Malherbe, the paraenetic intention of 1 Thessalonians is highly pronounced: 
chapters 4 and 5 are clearly paraenetic, while chapters 1 to 3, which are 
autobiographical, function paraenetically by laying the foundation for the specific 
advice that would follow in the second half of the letter.592 He opines that the heavy use 
of paraenesis may lie in the fact that Paul is writing to recent converts to Christianity 
sooner than he writes to his other converts; these new believers need to be nurtured in 
their faith and given more basic instruction in Christian behaviour. Hence, “its 
paraenetic features perform what we would call pastoral care.”593 
Malherbe identifies in Paul’s letter many key features of contemporary 
paraenesis. These include (1) the frequent, conscious use of material that is already 
known to one’s readers;594 (2) complimenting the readers for living as they should, 
along with the encouragement to do so more and more (4.1, 10; 5.11);595 (3) the offering 
of models for imitation (1.6; 2.14);596 and related to this, (4) the delineation of such a 
model in antithetical terms, for the sake of emphasis (“not … but,” 2.1–8);597 (5) 
employing a wide range of hortatory terms throughout the letter;598 and (6) the use of 
philophronetic, even familial, language and imagery that are redolent with positive 
feeling designed to strengthen one’s readers.599 Attention is drawn also to the unique 
character of 4.13–18, where Paul consoles those who are grieving: for Malherbe, the 
pericope exhibits similarities to the genre of the letter of consolation, which was 
discussed in the epistolographic handbooks of the era in terms that reflected its 
                                                                                                                                          
Luckensmeyer, The Eschatology of First Thessalonians, NTOA/SUNT 71 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2009), 26–28. 
591 Pseudo-Libanius lists the “paraenetic” style as the fifth style in his instruction manual for letter-
writing; this broadly corresponds to Pseudo-Demetrius’ “advisory” type, which is the eleventh type of 
letter in his manual (see further n.407 of my study).  
592 Malherbe, “Exhortation,” 49–51; at 49 he cites Schubert, Thanksgivings, 16–20, 88–89, in arguing 
that all Pauline thanksgivings (in this case 1.2–3.13) have either explicitly or implicitly a paraenetic 
function.        
593 Malherbe, Thessalonians, 85. We should note, however, that it is difficult to use the adjective 
“pastoral” unambiguously because of possible connotations that may be anachronistic.  
594 See Malberbe, “Exhortation,” 51, for further details and references to 1 Thessalonians. As 
Malherbe notes in Pastoral Care, 76, the frequent use of language such as the paraenetic “as you know” 
subtly makes the point to the Thessalonians that despite their novice status in their new faith, they already 
share a history in the faith that is documented by their own experience.   
595 Malherbe, “Exhortation,” 51; Malherbe, Pastoral Care, 76. 
596 Malherbe, “Exhortation,” 51. 
597 Malherbe, Pastoral Care, 71.  
598 See Malberbe, “Exhortation,” 51–52, for details.  
599 See Malherbe, “Exhortation,” 52–55; Malherbe, Pastoral Care, 72–75; Malherbe, Thessalonians, 
85–86.  
Chapter 4. Grief in 1 Thessalonians 
 128 
paraenetic character.600 Paul’s use of these hortatory terms and motifs thus demonstrates 
his continuity with the hortatory tradition and reflects his pastoral method; however, he 
often radically reshapes the material so that it squares with his understanding of 
theology.601 At the same time, Paul freely modifies conventional epistolary form so that 
his letter can take on certain functions.602 
To be sure, and as Malherbe acknowledges, his identification of 1 Thessalonians 
as pastoral paraenesis is not new. He notes that Patristic commentators, especially John 
Chrysostom and Theodoret, have frequently commented on Paul’s pastoral sensibilities 
by using the language of paraenesis and psychagogy.603 Even so, it is Malherbe’s 
comprehensive (and vigorous) articulation of this view that raised its profile;604 and 
indeed, his prolific scholarly contributions in this area continue to be cited regularly—
though not without some reservations, particularly concerning how his analyses of the 
letter’s eschatological sections often disregard the Jewish and apocalyptic dimensions of 
Paul’s theology.605  
4.1.3.b. A Letter of Consolation 
Based on his investigation of the Greco-Roman consolatory tradition, where 
consolatory visits and letters played central roles, Abraham Smith proposes that the 
letter of consolation, which was a notable form of psychagogy in antiquity, “can 
account for virtually every aspect of 1 Thessalonians.”606 In his argument that the 
consolatory letter is a generic model for 1 Thessalonians, Smith looks beyond epistolary 
structural parallels and focuses on how Paul co-opts the topoi of the consolatory 
tradition in the Hellenistic world as literary expressions of the typical pattern of social 
interaction associated with consolation.607 Smith’s conclusion is that Paul’s consolatory 
goal is not limited to 4.13–18; instead, the entire letter reflects its shared origin with 
                                                
600 Malherbe, “Exhortation,” 64–65, citing the fifth type in Pseudo-Demetrius’ “Epistolary Types” 
(see further n.407 of my study).   
601 Malherbe, “Exhortation,” 56–66. 
602 Malherbe, Thessalonians, 90–91.  
603 See Malherbe, Thessalonians, 86; Malherbe, “Exhortation,” 58.  
604 For an early endorsement see Stowers, Letter Writing, 25–26; and 96: “First Thessalonians is an 
excellent example of a paraenetic letter.”  
605 On this see the discussion in Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 28–29. 
606 Abraham Smith, Comfort One Another: Reconstructing the Rhetoric and Audience of 1 
Thessalonians (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1995), 47–60 (quote from 48). 
607 Smith, Comfort, 45–46, 52–57; here Smith builds on the work of Stowers (Letter Writing, 144) 
who notes three fundamental elements of the typical social interaction reflected in ancient consolatory 
letters: (1) The writer may have a wide range of positive relationships with the recipient. (2) The recipient 
has experienced some major misfortune that is apt to produce grief. (3) The writer expresses his grief and 
provides reasons why the recipient should bear up under this grief.  
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contemporaneous consolatory writing, through how its readers are furnished throughout 
with consolatory examples and commonplaces to help them overcome their experiences 
of grief.608  
Donfried reaches a similar conclusion in an essay that seeks to uncover the 
purpose for which 1 Thessalonians is written.609 He argues that Paul writes to the 
Thessalonians primarily to console them and encourage them in the face of persecution; 
in order to carry out this purpose effectively he must also emphasize the divine origin of 
the message he had proclaimed while he was in their company, and defend himself 
against charges made against his motivation and behaviour.610 At the heart of Paul’s 
purpose, however, lies the desire to bring consolation and encouragement to the 
discouraged; thus, as Donfried explains, “we understand 1 Thessalonians not primarily 
as a ‘paraenetic’ letter but as a ‘paracletic’ letter, as a consolatio.”611 
4.1.3.c. Other Proposals and Conclusion 
With the rise of rhetorical criticism in the latter decades of the twentieth century, 
a number of studies of 1 Thessalonians have been carried out on the assumption that its 
interpretation as a letter is better served by prioritizing a concern for its rhetorical genre 
                                                
608 Smith, Comfort, 59.  
609 Karl P. Donfried, “The Theology of 1 Thessalonians as a Reflection of Its Purpose,” in Paul, 
Thessalonica, and Early Christianity (London: T&T Clark, 2002), 119–138. 
610 Donfried, “Purpose,” 119–120. 
611 Donfried, “Purpose,” 119–120. Donfried does not deny Malherbe’s claim that there are paraenetic 
elements in 1 Thessalonians, but he rejects the idea that it is the overriding genre: “Much closer to Paul’s 
intention is the genre consolatio, a genre which, like many other subcategories, includes paraenesis. 1 
Thessalonians is a λόγος παραµυθητικός to a Christian church suffering the effects of persecution.” 
(“Purpose,” 137–138). See also his “The Theology of 1 Thessalonians,” in The Theology of the Shorter 
Pauline Letters, by Karl P. Donfried and I. Howard Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 5, where he contends that 1 Thessalonians “approximates, but is not identical with, ancient letters 
of consolation.”  
See also e.g. Craig Steven de Vos, Church and Community Conflicts: The Relationship of the 
Thessalonian, Corinthian, and Philippian Churches with Their Wider Civic Communities, SBLDS 168 
(Atlanta: Scholars, 1999), 171–175, who agrees that 1 Thessalonians shares many characteristics of the 
letter of consolation, and accordingly frames Paul’s response to the Thessalonians in terms of consolation 
and exhortation. In a similar vein Juan Chapa, “Is First Thessalonians a Letter of Consolation?,” NTS 40 
(1994): 150–60 (esp. 156–160), identifies several features that 1 Thessalonians shares with Greco-Roman 
consolatory letters, but stops short of formally classifying it as such, because it does not adhere to the 
structural guidelines of the consolatory letter-type as outlined in the standard handbooks. However, David 
Luckensmeyer and Bronwen Neil, “Reading First Thessalonians as a Consolatory Letter in Light of 
Seneca and Ancient Handbooks on Letter-Writing,” NTS 62 (2016): 31–48, have recently suggested that 
since the Senecan consolatory epistles do not rigidly follow such guidelines, there is some justification in 
locating 1 Thessalonians within a reinterpreted understanding of the consolation genre and reading it as a 
letter of consolation.   
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over its epistolary features. The earliest explicit attempt at the rhetorical analysis of 1 
Thessalonians as a letter seems to have been the short discussion by Kennedy, who 
regards it as deliberative rhetoric.612 Subsequent studies have led several scholars to 
conclude instead that it is an example of epideictic rhetoric,613 with at least one of them 
assigning it to a specific sub-genre of epideictic rhetoric.614 Even so, we cannot speak of 
a consensus view: there are a number of scholars who see 1 Thessalonians as 
deliberative rhetoric,615 or find it unhelpful to have to choose between epideictic and 
deliberative rhetoric,616 or even delineate a new rhetorical genre for it because it does 
not square with the traditional ones.617  
The nature of the relationship between rhetorical criticism and epistolary 
approaches continues to be debated. To be sure, the advocates of rhetorical analysis 
recognize that its effectiveness is heightened when it is carried out alongside a 
corresponding epistolary analysis—but its most fervent proponents stress that it is 
rhetorical analysis that brings the interpreter closer to the meaning and intention 
embedded within a text.618 However, on the other side of the hermeneutical fence are 
those who question the value of applying the rules of Greco-Roman rhetoric to 1 
Thessalonians, not least because the various studies of the letter have elicited much 
                                                
612 George A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 142. 
613 So e.g. George Lyons, Pauline Autobiography: Towards a New Understanding, SBLDS 73 
(Atlanta: Scholars, 1985), 219–221; Jewett, Thessalonian Correspondence, 71–76; Frank W. Hughes, 
“The Rhetoric of 1 Thessalonians,” in The Thessalonian Correspondence, ed. Raymond F. Collins, BETL 
87 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 94–116, esp. 97; Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 46–50; Steve 
Walton, “What Has Aristotle to Do with Paul? Rhetorical Criticism and 1 Thessalonians,” TynBul 46 
(1995): 249–250; Johannes Schoon-Janssen, “On the Use of Elements of Ancient Epistolography in 1 
Thessalonians,” in The Thessalonians Debate: Methodological Discord or Methodological Synthesis?, 
ed. Karl P. Donfried and Johannes Beutler (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 192–193; Ben Witherington, 
1 and 2 Thessalonians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 21–27. 
614 So Wilhelm Wuellner, “The Argumentative Structure of 1 Thessalonians as Paradoxical 
Encomium,” in The Thessalonian Correspondence, ed. Raymond F. Collins, BETL 87 (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 1990), 126–128.  
615 E.g. Bruce C. Johanson, To All the Brethren: A Text-Linguistic and Rhetorical Approach to 1 
Thessalonians, ConBNT 16 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1987), 189; Krentz, “Rhetorical 
Flourishes,” 304. 
616 E.g. Jan Lambrecht, “A Structural Analysis of 1 Thessalonians 4–5,” in The Thessalonians 
Debate: Methodological Discord or Methodological Synthesis?, ed. Karl P. Donfried and Johannes 
Beutler (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 177. 
617 So Thomas H. Olbricht, “An Aristotelian Rhetorical Analysis of 1 Thessalonians,” in Greeks, 
Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, ed. David J. Balch, Everett Ferguson, 
and Wayne A. Meeks (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 216–236, esp. 225–226.  However, Olbricht’s 
proposal of 1 Thessalonians as “church rhetoric” does not have much of a following, perhaps because of 
his failure to offer any other examples of it.  
618 See e.g. Charles A. Wanamaker, “Epistolary vs. Rhetorical Analysis: Is a Synthesis Possible?,” in 
The Thessalonians Debate: Methodological Discord or Methodological Synthesis?, ed. Karl P. Donfried 
and Johannes Beutler (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 283–286. 
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disparity in its rhetorical disposition,619 but more fundamentally, because of concerns 
about the very legitimacy of using the categories of rhetorical theory to analyze the 
Pauline letters.620  
4.1.4. Distinctives 
Whatever one’s views might be as to the overall character of Paul’s letter in 
relation to some sort of genre, it seems clear that he aims through his writing to nurture 
and establish the Thessalonians in their new-found faith, since he is unable to be 
physically present with them (3.10–11). Evidently, these recent converts still lack a 
basic grounding in all the proprieties of Christian living, because running through the 
letter is a distinct interest in matters of behaviour (e.g. 2.1–12; 4.1–18; 5.1–22). It is 
thus not surprising to find a preponderance of discourse and terminology of the type that 
Malherbe has termed as paraenetic in nature,621 since such a mode of writing is arguably 
the most effective communicative vehicle for Paul’s thinking.  
Indeed, Paul’s deep love and concern for the spiritual well-being of the 
Thessalonian believers is woven into the fabric of the letter. He constantly refers to 
them as “brothers,”622 and speaks passionately of his intense affection and longing for 
them (e.g. 2.8, 17–20; 3.6–11). Forced to leave them against his will, he emphasizes his 
sense of loss by describing himself as a bereft orphan (ἀπορφανίζω,623 2.17). Recalling 
his past conduct and that of his colleagues in ministry, he recounts how they had treated 
the Thessalonians as a nursing mother (τροφός, 2.7) would cherish and care for her own 
infants; because of their love for the Thessalonians, Paul and his colleagues had shared 
with them not only the gospel but their “own selves” (ἡ ἑαυτῶν ψυχή, 2.8). As a father 
                                                
619 On this see esp. Krentz, “Rhetorical Flourishes,” 295–304. 
620 See Weima, Thessalonians, 55–56, and further references therein. 
621 See section 4.1.3.a above.  
622 The fictive-kinship term ἀδελφός occurs proportionately more often in 1 Thessalonians than in any 
of Paul’s other letters (1.4; 2.1, 9, 14, 17; 3.2, 7; 4.1, 6, 10 (x2), 13; 5.1, 4, 12, 14, 25, 26, 27): a total of 
19 times, compared to 13 times in Romans, 33 times in 1 Corinthians, and 9 times in 2 Corinthians—all 
three of which are considerably longer letters. For further details and for the function of the term in 1 
Thessalonians see esp. Trevor J. Burke, Family Matters: A Socio-Historical Study of Kinship Metaphors 
in 1 Thessalonians, JSNTSup 247 (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 165–175. See also Aasgaard, Christian 
Siblingship, 151–166. 
623 The verb is hapax in the NT, and occurs only infrequently in the extant Greek literature where it 
consistently refers to children who are orphaned from their parents and not the reverse; see further John 
B. Faulkenberry Miller, “Infants and Orphans in 1 Thessalonians: A Discussion of Ἀπορφανίζω and the 
Text-Critical Problem in 1 Thess. 2:7” (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical 
Literature, Boston, 20 March 1999). Paul’s placement of the orphan metaphor within a passive participle, 
coupled with his earlier mention of being driven out (2.15), strongly indicate that he was forcibly 
separated from his new converts (which squares with the account in Acts 17.10).  
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with his own children (2.11), he and his colleagues had exhorted (παρακαλέω, 2.12; cf. 
3.2, 7; 4.1, 10, 18; 5.11, 14), encouraged (παραµυθέοµαι, 2.12; cf. 5.14) and urged 
(µαρτύροµαι,624 2.12) the Thessalonian believers to live a life that was worthy of God 
(2.12), which would please (ἀρέσκω, 4.1; cf. 2.4, 15) him. 
I think that one may conjecture with some justification that Paul’s heartfelt 
concern for the believers at Thessalonica is precipitated by two related exigencies: first, 
the fact that he and his co-workers had to leave Thessalonica so abruptly, very likely 
without having completed the task of instructing the new Thessalonian believers in the 
basics of Christian belief and praxis (as 3.10 seems to indicate); and second, because 
they, like him, are presently undergoing much suffering for their faith.  
Indeed, the motif of suffering and conflict is highly significant in the letter. The 
Thessalonians had received the gospel “in much affliction” (ἐν θλίψει πολλῇ, 1.6), and 
they were suffering the same things as did the churches in Judea (2.14). Suffering and 
affliction for the sake of the faith would continue to mark the lives of the believers at 
Thessalonica (3.3), as it did Paul’s own life and ministry (3.7). Several times in the 
letter, Paul speaks of his own sufferings. He had previously suffered (προπάσχω, 2.2) at 
Philippi and been shamefully mistreated (ὑβρίζω, 2.2) there; however, taking courage in 
God, he had brought the good news to Thessalonica in spite of the continuing presence 
of what seems to have been a considerable degree of opposition (ἐν πολλῷ ἀγῶνι, 
2.2).625 Paul describes some of this opposition: there are those who have been 
persecuting him and his team of co-workers, and thus hindering their task of evangelism 
(καὶ ἡµᾶς ἐκδιωξάντων … κωλυόντων ἡµᾶς τοῖς ἔθνεσιν λαλῆσαι ἵνα σωθῶσιν, 2.15–
16). Also lined up against them is Satan, whose actions have “prevented” (ἐγκόπτω, 
2.18) Paul from returning to Thessalonica to see his friends there.  
Yet in spite of suffering and persecution, the Thessalonians had accepted the 
gospel with joy that was inspired by the Holy Spirit, and in this way they had become 
imitators of both Paul and the Lord (1.6). Paul links joy with a “crown of boasting” 
(2.19) in which he will glory at the coming of Christ; and indeed, as he tells them: ὑµεῖς 
γάρ ἐστε ἡ δόξα ἡµῶν καὶ ἡ χαρά (2.20). Joy cannot be said to be a major motif in 1 
Thessalonians, but it serves to bridge two themes that are key to the letter: suffering, 
                                                
624 BDAG 619: “to urge something as a matter of great importance.” 
625 If credence is given to the parallel account in Acts 17.1–10, there is here a depiction of aggressive, 
possibly also physical, opposition.  
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and eschatology—which we shall now briefly outline, before we return to a discussion 
of the theme of suffering and conflict.  
Paul makes explicit mention of the parousia several times in the letter. At the end 
of ch. 1, he reminds the Thessalonians that they are waiting for God’s son to come from 
heaven—Jesus, who would deliver believers from the coming wrath (1.10; cf. 1.3). At 
2.19–20, as we have already seen, the parousia forms the context in which the 
Thessalonians are to be celebrated as Paul’s hope or joy or crown of boasting; at that 
eschatological event the Thessalonians are pictured as being blameless in holiness 
before God (3.13). The parousia takes centre stage in the pericopes of 4.13–18 and 5.1–
11, where Paul explains how the return of Christ relates to the status of believers, 
whether deceased (4.13–18) or living (5.1–11). Indeed, since the “day of the Lord” is 
imminent (5.2), the believers are to wait for Christ’s coming from heaven (1.10), in full 
assurance that they are called into God’s own kingdom and glory (2.12). Then, as he 
brings the letter to a close, Paul makes a final reference to the parousia (5.23). The letter 
is shot through with the imagery and language of apocalyptic.  
 
4.2. Conflict and Suffering in 1 Thessalonians 
4.2.1. Introduction 
We now take a closer look at the notion of conflict and suffering in 1 
Thessalonians. Such a notion is readily apparent in the letter at a number of levels: thus 
we find a reference to violent conflict culminating in the death of Jesus and his prophets 
(2.15); conflict arising from the Gentile mission (2.2, 15–16); conflict between spiritual 
powers (1.9; 2.18; 3.5); Paul’s anxiety associated with the possibility that his work 
would be in vain (3.1–5); ideological conflict between the Christian message and that of 
ancient Rome (5.3); and conflict among members of the community (5.12–15).626 
However, for the purposes of this study what I wish to discuss is the social aspect of 
such conflict from the perspective of the Thessalonians themselves, or, in other words, I 
wish to be able to offer some answers to the two questions that follow. What precisely 
is the nature of the conflict that the Thessalonian Christians are facing? How might this 
conflict have affected them as a community of believers? The answers to these 
                                                
626 As Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 22, helpfully summarizes.  
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questions may help us to understand further the background to Paul’s paraenesis in the 
letter, especially as it pertains to the quelling of the grief that the Thessalonians are 
experiencing (4.13–18).  
4.2.2. The Nature of the Thessalonians’ Suffering (1 Thess 1.6) 
As we have already noted, it is evident that the Thessalonian believers had 
encountered a considerable degree of hostility when they first heard and accepted the 
gospel that Paul had proclaimed to them (1.6). That this θλῖψις had continued may be 
inferred from Paul’s reference to the fact that the Thessalonians had suffered (πάσχω, 
2.14) at the hands of their compatriots (συµφυλέται, 2.14), and is confirmed when he 
reveals that Timothy was sent to them to strengthen and encourage them (3.2) because 
of his concern that they would be shaken by these afflictions627 (τὸ µηδένα σαίνεσθαι ἐν 
ταῖς θλίψεσιν ταύταις,628 3.3a). Yet Paul takes the view that such suffering is part and 
parcel of the Christian life (αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἴδατε ὅτι εἰς τοῦτο κείµεθα, 3.3b), and highlights 
that he had in fact already warned the Thessalonians that they would have to endure 
these afflictions—which was apparently what did happen (3.4).   
What can be gleaned from the letter about the precise nature of the conflict that 
the Thessalonian believers found themselves embroiled in? The mimetic parallel that 
Paul draws at 1.6 between the experiences of the Thessalonians and those of himself 
and Jesus clearly suggests that Paul, in referring to the Thessalonians’ θλῖψις, has in 
view at least some form of social oppression connected with the proclamation or 
reception of the gospel;629 it is not entirely improbable that this may have also been 
manifested in terms of physical opposition, especially if credence is given to the 
account in Acts 17.1–10. Malherbe holds a decidedly minority position in arguing that 
                                                
627 Contra a minority of interpreters (e.g. Richard, Thessalonians, 141–142) who take the verb 
σαίνοµαι (hapax legomenon in the NT) to mean “to flatter” and argue that Paul is therefore saying that 
Timothy was sent to the Thessalonians to prevent them from being talked out of their new faith. For 
further discussion see esp. Weima, Thessalonians, 211–212; Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 131.    
628 The antecedent of ταύταις is not entirely certain, and this has led a few commentators (e.g. more 
recently Traugott Holtz, Der erste Brief an die Thessalonicher, EKKNT 13 [Zürich: Benziger, 1986], 
127; Malherbe, Thessalonians, 193) to suggest that Paul is referring to his own suffering. On this reading, 
Paul is worried that the faith of his converts will be shaken once they discover that he is undergoing 
persecution. However, this seems rather unlikely: first, the Thessalonians surely already knew this fact 
(2.2), and second, the second-person pronouns that Paul employs in the preceding verse (εἰς τὸ στηρίξαι 
ὑµᾶς καὶ παρακαλέσαι ὑπὲρ τῆς πίστεως ὑµῶν, 3.2c; cf. 3.5) surely indicate that the Thessalonians are in 
view (so rightly Weima, Thessalonians, 212–213).   
629 So the majority of commentators, e.g. Ernest Best, A Commentary on the First and Second Epistles 
to the Thessalonians, BNTC (London: A & C Black, 1972), 79, who thinks Paul is referring to 
persecution; and Holtz, Thessalonicher, 49 (followed by Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 80–82) who speaks 
of the presence of social oppression at the time of the Thessalonians' conversion.  
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θλῖψις refers instead to the “distress and anguish of heart experienced by persons who 
broke with their past as they received the gospel.”630 We may certainly grant that the 
Thessalonian believers have experienced significant social dislocation, but it seems 
most unlikely that Paul has only some kind of inner psychological turmoil in view in 
speaking of his converts’ θλῖψις.631  
On the other hand, is it possible that this conflict had led to the death, or even 
martyrdom, of a number of the Christians at Thessalonica? As we shall see later in 
greater detail in section 4.3.3.a, such a conclusion is generally arrived at by correlating 
what Paul says about the Thessalonians’ θλῖψις with his discussion in 4.13–18 of the 
death of certain believers. However, the presence of martyrdom seems unlikely, given 
the fact that Paul nowhere in his letter mentions nor celebrates the fact that any of the 
believers had died for their faith.632 Barclay therefore rightly concludes that the 
Thessalonians’ θλῖψις is best understood as social harassment of the kind that became 
common for Christians in the Greco-Roman world.633  
4.2.3. The Cause of the Thessalonians’ Suffering (1 Thess 2.14) 
Next, what can be said concerning the source of the Thessalonian Christians’ 
suffering? Our evidence comes from 2.14, where one may logically deduce that Paul in 
referring to the συµφυλέται634 of the Thessalonians must be using the term in its ethnic 
sense to indicate a Gentile source for their afflictions, since the Thessalonians are 
themselves Gentile converts to Christianity (1.9). This conclusion is supported by the 
fact that Paul is always mindful of the matter of race and careful to distinguish between 
Jews and Gentiles in his writings635—it would therefore be completely inconsistent of 
him to employ the term in its geographic sense to designate all the denizens of 
                                                
630 Malherbe, Pastoral Care, 48 (see also the wider discussion in 46–52); also Malherbe, 
Thessalonians, 127–129. 
631 See the discussion in Still, Conflict, 208–217. See further Weima, Thessalonians, 100–101.  
632 John M. G. Barclay, “Conflict in Thessalonica,” CBQ 55 (1993): 514, argues that Paul would 
surely have celebrated them as martyrs if so. In support Barclay cites (n.6) Phil 2.25–30 and Rom 16.4, 
where Paul lauds those who have risked their lives for the gospel; no such eulogy is present here in 1 
Thess.  
633 Barclay, “Conflict,” 513–516.  
634 BDAG 960: “one’s people”; hapax legomenon in Paul and in the rest of the NT. However, its 
cognate φυλή occurs twice in Paul (Rom 11.1; Phil 3.5); on both these occasions it is in relation to Paul’s 
belonging to the tribe of Benjamin.  
635 E.g. in Gal 2.  
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Thessalonica irrespective of their ethnicity.636 Hence (and notwithstanding the mention 
of Jewish troublemakers in Acts 17.5–6) Paul is in his letter saying that the source of 
the church’s afflictions were unconverted Gentiles.637 
It seems most likely then that the chief cause of the harassment is the fact that the 
Thessalonian believers have turned their backs on common Greco-Roman religion as a 
result of their conversion (1.9). De Vos outlines a situation of social conflict that 
“centered on the rejection of traditional religious practices and a withdrawal from 
social/religious activities.”638 Still makes a similar observation: “the conflict occurred 
because unbelievers wanted to control and to censure a novel religious movement which 
they viewed as ideologically and socially deviant.”639 The discrimination and pressure 
that was effected against the Thessalonian Christians was therefore presumably aimed at 
reversing their beliefs and practices.640  
From the viewpoint of the wider community, the behaviour of the converts was 
utterly reprehensible. First, their religious mores and social exclusiveness disrupted 
normal familial and cultic activity and thereby both offended and injured public 
sensibility.641 Second, given the way that politics and religion were so closely integrated 
in Greco-Roman society, it was highly probable that the religious ideals of the 
Christians—with their claim to be subjects of another king—became overlaid with 
political overtones that were thought to be subversive; all this would have loudly 
sounded alarm bells in a city like Thessalonica, which was acutely aware of its 
continuing dependence on Imperial benefaction.642 Third, it was very likely that the 
Christians’ rejection of traditional religion not only branded them as ἄθεοι, but was also 
seen to compromise the city’s overall well-being as far as its dealings with the gods was 
concerned; if even one segment of the community raised the ire of the gods, the entire 
city was put at risk because their wrath could lead to the meting out of severe 
                                                
636 As Barclay, “Conflict,” 514, stresses: “With his acute consciousness of the racial distinction 
between Jews and non-Jews, Paul could hardly refer to Jews as symphyletai (2.14) of his non-Jewish 
converts (1.9).” 
637 See esp. Still, Conflict, 218–227, for a persuasive articulation of this view.  
638 de Vos, Conflicts, 176; see also the wider discussion at 155–160.  
639 Still, Conflict, 267.  
640 de Vos, Conflicts, 157; Still, Conflict, 267.  
641 Barclay, “Conflict,” 515; see also his “Thessalonica and Corinth: Social Contrasts in Pauline 
Christianity,” in Pauline Churches and Diaspora Jews, WUNT 275 (Tübingen: Mohr, 2011), 53. For an 
extensive discussion see Still, Conflict, 232–255. 
642 See de Vos, Conflicts, 156–157; Barclay, “Conflict,” 514; and especially Still, Conflict, 260–266. 
On the relationship between Rome and Thessalonica, and the favoured political status that Thessalonica 
enjoyed, see the useful summary and references in Weima, Thessalonians, 3–7.  
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punishments such as famine, flooding, or other natural calamities.643 As Still 
summarizes succinctly, the conflict between the Christians and non-Christians in 
Thessalonica arose because the latter “viewed the church to be subversive to the 
foundational institutions of Greco-Roman society, namely family, religion, and 
government.”644  
 
4.3. Grief in 1 Thessalonians 4.13–18 
4.3.1. Extent of the Passage 
We turn our attention now to the specific issue of grief in 1 Thessalonians. At 
4.13, Paul marks the start of a fresh topic in his letter—the fate of deceased believers at 
the return of Christ—with his mention of “those who have died” (περὶ τῶν 
κοιµωµένων); despite the repeated appearance up to this point of motifs related to the 
parousia, this is the first discussion of the implications of that event for those who have 
died.645 The shift in topic at 4.13 is confirmed by the combined use of three distinct 
transitional devices: the disclosure formula at 4.13 (“I do not want you not to know,” οὐ 
θέλοµεν δὲ ὑµᾶς ἀγνοεῖν)—the double negative form of which contrasts with, and also 
functions as an emphatic equivalent to, the positive form found elsewhere in the letter 
(“you know that,” see 2.1; 4.2; 5.2),646 the vocative ἀδελφοί, 647 and the περὶ δέ 
formula;648 together with the presence of several literary and thematic features that 
signal the end of the previous section at 4.12.649  
Despite some similarities in content and structure between 4.13–18 and 5.1–11,650 
it is clear that the present section ends at 4.18 and not at 5.11. At 4.18, the particle ὥστε 
                                                
643 Still, Conflict, 255–260. See also Barclay, “Conflict,” 515; Barclay also notes here (citing 
Christian and non-Christian sources) that if anything went wrong the Christians could get the blame.  
644 Still, Conflict, 267.  
645 Beverly R. Gaventa, First and Second Thessalonians, Interpretation (Louisville: John Knox Press, 
1998), 62.  
646 For further details and for examples of both forms within the Pauline corpus, see Weima, 
Thessalonians, 307.  
647 See note 622 above.  
648 Occurring in the letter also at 4.9 and 5.1; and elsewhere in the undisputed Paulines at 1 Cor 7.1, 
25; 8.1, 4; 12.1; 16.1, 12. Here in 1 Thess 4.13 the disclosure formula nudges the preposition περί further 
along the sentence, while the particle δέ retains its position.  
649 For further discussion see Weima, Thessalonians, 249–251.  
650 See esp. Raymond F. Collins, Studies on the First Letter to the Thessalonians, BETL 66 (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 1984), 154–172; Tracy L. Howard, “The Literary Unity of 1 Thessalonians 
4:13–5:11,” Grace Theological Journal 9 (1988): 163–190; Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 181. 
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introduces a concluding clause651— παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις—
which looks back on the preceding material in 4.13–17 and draws it to a close, while 
simultaneously forming a thematic inclusio with the passage’s opening injunction to 
“not grieve” (4.13). The coherence of 4.13–18 is further supported by a number of 
lexical and conceptual recurrences: κοιµωµένων / κοιµηθέντας (4.13, 14, 15) and its 
semantic equivalent οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ (4.16); the double occurrence of the phrase 
ἡµεῖς οἱ ζῶντες οἱ περιλειπόµενοι (4.15, 17); and the conceptual parallels between ἄξει 
σὺν αὐτῷ (4.14) and σὺν κυρίῳ ἐσόµεθα (4.17), and also between Ἰησοῦς … ἀνέστη 
(4.14) and οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστήσονται (4.16).652 Moreover, it is also clearly 
apparent that at 5.1 a new section has begun: Paul uses two familiar transitional devices 
(the περὶ δέ formula and the vocative ἀδελφοί) and a paralipsis (οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε ὑµῖν 
γράφεσθαι) to flag the beginning of a new topic of discussion.  
4.3.2. The Disclosure Formula  
In his opening assertion of 4.13, does Paul with his use of the disclosure formula 
οὐ θέλοµεν δὲ ὑµᾶς ἀγνοεῖν introduce not only a change of topic, but one that is 
completely new to the Thessalonians? While there are some scholars who caution 
against reaching such a conclusion,653 there are others who maintain that Paul is indeed 
presenting something that was previously unknown to his converts.654 It seems to me 
that the matter is far from clear; from Paul’s phraseology we cannot be sure whether he 
is providing totally new information to the Thessalonian believers or merely 
                                                
651 ὥστε is used similarly to conclude a discussion in 1 Cor 7.38; 11.27, 33; 14.39; 15.58.    
652 Weima, Thessalonians, 305–306, citing Johanson, Brethren, 119; Hubert Jurgensen, “Awaiting the 
Return of Christ: A Re-Examination of 1 Thessalonians 4.13–5.11 from a Pentecostal Perspective,” 
Journal of Pentecostal Theology 4 (1994): 86. 
653 Perhaps most notably Malherbe, Thessalonians, 262, who opines that Paul’s varied use of both the 
positive and negative forms of the disclosure formula “makes it impossible to draw rigid conclusions 
about their significance” (see also the broader discussion on 262–263); cf. Barclay, “Death,” 218. See 
also Béda Rigaux, Saint Paul: Les Epîtres aux Thessaloniciens, EBib (Paris: Gabalda, 1956), 239, 526–
527; Marshall, Thessalonians, 118; Richard, Thessalonians, 233; Gaventa, Thessalonians, 62; and 
Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 212–213, who makes the persuasive suggestion that “Paul’s repeated 
references to eschatological motifs increase the probability that he spoke at length on such subjects during 
his founding visit.” 
654 So e.g. Best, Thessalonians, 184; Leon Morris, The First and Second Epistles to the 
Thessalonians, Rev. ed., NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 135; Joseph Plevnik, Paul and the 
Parousia: An Exegetical and Theological Investigation (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1997), 71; Karl P. 
Donfried, “The Cults of Thessalonica and the Thessalonian Correspondence,” in Paul, Thessalonica, and 
Early Christianity (London: T&T Clark, 2002), 40; Colin R. Nicholl, From Hope to Despair in 
Thessalonica: Situating 1 and 2 Thessalonians, SNTSMS 126 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 20–22; Gordon D. Fee, The First and Second Letters to the Thessalonians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2009), 164; Weima, Thessalonians, 307–308. 
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supplementing or perhaps clarifying certain points in his earlier apocalyptic teaching; on 
this matter there is no scholarly consensus. However, what seems certain is that Paul 
wants to give the Thessalonians instruction by emphasizing the material that 
immediately follows: he wants them to know περὶ τῶν κοιµωµένων.655  
4.3.3. The Circumstances of the Thessalonians’ Grief 
From the evidence, we may reasonably surmise—based on the plural construction 
περὶ τῶν κοιµωµένων—that a number of the Thessalonian believers had died in the 
period between Paul’s hurried escape from Thessalonica and the penning of this letter to 
them. Paul (understandably) in his response does not see any need to indicate who these 
individuals are nor how they have died, since the Thessalonians must already be in full 
possession of the facts. The second half of 4.13 contains a purpose clause that sets out 
the thesis that Paul will establish in the verses that follow: ἵνα µὴ λυπῆσθε καθὼς καὶ οἱ 
λοιποὶ οἱ µὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα. Quite clearly, the Thessalonians were grieving—and with 
some degree of intensity—over the deaths of the fellow believers among them.656 What 
is not made clear is why they should be grieving in such a manner. But before we try to 
ascertain in more precise terms the reason why the Thessalonian believers were in such 
grief, it is pertinent to consider if martyrdom might lie behind the deaths that are alluded 
to here.  
4.3.3.a. The Martyrdom of Fellow Believers? 
A number of exegetes have put forward the argument that some in the 
Thessalonian church were martyred for their faith.657 This view is generally arrived at 
                                                
655 Terms relating to sleep were commonly employed as euphemisms for death in antiquity: see 
Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 167, and Weima, Thessalonians, 309, for examples from Greek, Jewish and 
Christian writings. Indeed, the conceptual link between sleep and death was by no means distinctively 
Jewish or Christian, probably because their association was so intuitive (so Gene L. Green, The Letters to 
the Thessalonians, PiNTC [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002], 217). The figurative extension of the 
meaning of “sleep” as “death” is the only way in which Paul uses κοιµάω (BDAG 551). A number of 
scholars suggest that Paul’s metaphorical use of sleep for death may connote something about the 
individual’s post-mortem state, e.g. a waiting for a future resurrection, or an interim, so-called 
intermediate state of existence; however, such arguments are overly speculative, especially in the absence 
of any clear semantic implications associated with the term that might support either conclusion (see the 
helpful discussion in Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 214).  
656 The present passive of λυπέω means “be sad, distressed, grieve” (BDAG 604); and as Weima, 
Thessalonians, 310, notes: “the use of the present tense highlights the ongoing nature of the action and so 
hints at the great depth of the Thessalonians’ grief.”  
657 See e.g. John S. Pobee, Persecution and Martyrdom in the Theology of Paul, JSNTSup 6 
(Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1985), 113–114; Chapa, “Letter of Consolation?,” 156; Donfried, “Theology,” 
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through an attempt to read Paul’s instructions here in 4.13–18 against his earlier 
statements concerning the Thessalonians’ θλῖψις in 1.6, 3.3–4, and especially 2.14 
(where Paul sets up a parallel between the sufferings faced by the Thessalonians with 
those experienced by the churches in Judea), and by taking support from references to 
the afflictions that they had endured in 2 Thess 1.4–7, 2 Cor 8.2, and Acts 17.5–9.658  
However, these scattered references to affliction more likely have in view severe 
social harrassment and ostracism rather than physical death and martyrdom.659 Indeed, 
as Bruce rightly notes: “The references in both 1 and 2 Thessalonians to the ‘afflictions’ 
endured by the Christians of Thessalonica scarcely give the impression that positive 
martyrdom was involved.”660 Further, the parallel that Paul describes in 2.14 rests not so 
much on any similarity in the specifics of the suffering that the two groups have 
endured as on the presence of a similar type of opponent: both the Thessalonian and 
Judean churches have suffered at the hands of their “own fellow countrymen” (τῶν 
ἰδίων συµφυλετῶν).661 Finally, as we have already noted, based on his actions elsewhere 
we may well argue that Paul would have paid tribute to any Thessalonians who had 
actually died for their faith.662 Overall, the evidence seems to suggest quite clearly that 
martyrdom is not in view here.663  
                                                                                                                                          
21–23; Donfried, “Cults,” 41–43; and more recently Witherington, Thessalonians, 139. For additional 
discussions see the references in Weima, Thessalonians, 309.  
658 Donfried, “Cults,” 41–42 also makes much of a supposed parallel between the use of κοιµάω in 
4.13 and the account of the martyrdom of Stephen in Acts 7.60. However this conceptual link is tenuous 
at best; as de Vos, Conflicts, 159–160 points out, both Paul and Luke use κοιµάω elsewhere to refer to 
death without any sense of martyrdom (Acts 13.36; 1 Cor 7.39, 11.30, 15.51).  
659 See Weima, Thessalonians, 311–312, and as already noted, Barclay, “Conflict,” 514.  
660 F. F. Bruce, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, WBC 45 (Waco: Word, 1982), 98; cited in Weima, 
Thessalonians, 309–310.  
661 As Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 113, rightly argues: “Obviously, the persecution undergone by the 
Thessalonian Christians cannot be lined directly to the crisis in Judea. Rather the point of comparison, as 
the καθὼς shows, was that both groups had suffered harassment at the hands of their own compatriots.” 
See similarly Weima, 310; also 166–167.  
662 See n.632.  
663 Note however Still, Conflict, 216–217, who broadly demurs at the identification of the Christian 
dead of whom Paul speaks here as martyrs while not completely rejecting “the possibility that some of 
Paul’s converts were victims of physical violence and that perhaps on the rarest of occasions such 
opposition might have culminated in death” (216). Still’s concession is based on an interpretation of 2.14 
in which τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπάθετε is taken literally, i.e., that the Thessalonians suffered the same things as the 
Judean churches did; however, as we have noted above, this reading does not adequately elucidate the 
meaning of the parallel that Paul is setting up here. In a not dissimilar way, de Vos, Conflicts, 160, while 
concluding that “there is no textual basis for the idea that some were executed,” opines also that if the 
repressive measures against the Thessalonians were in response to charges of atheism or breaches against 
the oath of loyalty to the Emperor, “physical violence, and even death cannot be ruled out.” However, 
against both Still and de Vos it must be pointed out that Paul nowhere links the deaths that are implied in 
4.13–18 with the afflictions that the Thessalonian believers are undergoing (Barclay, “Conflict,” 514; 
“Thessalonica,” 53).   
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4.3.3.b. Major Hypotheses Concerning the Thessalonians’ Grief 
We return now to the larger question of the circumstances surrounding the 
Thessalonians’ emotional state here at 4.13: what can be said about the main cause of 
the apparently intense grief that they are experiencing? A number of proposals have 
been offered, and here I discuss those that are more significant.664 
An older, minority line of interpretation is that Gnostic missionaries in 
Thessalonica had subverted Paul’s kerygma by insisting that the resurrection of the dead 
was a present reality. The unexpected deaths of some of the believers therefore 
triggered shock and grief within the Thessalonian church.665 However, there is no 
evidence for the presence of Gnostic influences in Thessalonica; and in any case it may 
be questioned whether Gnosticism existed as a developed movement (or group of 
movements) at this early date. Furthermore, Paul’s response in his letter does not 
indicate that a denial of the resurrection was the problem.666  
The mainstream interpretations of the reason for the Thessalonians’ grief may be 
placed into one of two groups. One group comprises those views that are based broadly 
on the premise that the Thessalonians were confused and unable to synthesize the dual 
sets of eschatological expectations concerning the resurrection of dead believers and the 
parousia into a coherent whole. Their grief therefore stemmed from uncertainty 
concerning the relationship between the living and the dead at Christ’s coming, and was 
further fuelled by Jewish apocalyptic speculation that those deceased would be at some 
sort of relative disadvantage compared to people who were alive (see e.g. 4 Ezra 13.24; 
cf. 6.25; 7.26–44; 13.16–18; Pss. Sol. 17.44; 18.6).667 However, these views fail to 
account for the severity of the Thessalonians’ reactions: it is hard to understand why 
they would grieve with such hopelessness since they believed that their brethren would 
eventually be resurrected (albeit some time after the parousia).668 
                                                
664 For further details see especially the useful table in Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 192–211.  
665 Wilhelm Lütgert, Die Volkommenen im Philipperbrief und die Enthusiasten in Thessalonich, 
BFCT 13 (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1909), 55–81; Schmithals, Gnostics, 160–164; Wolfgang Harnisch, 
Eschatologische Existenz: Ein exegetischer Beitrag zum Sachanliegen von 1. Thessalonicher 4,13–5,11, 
FRLANT 110 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973), 16–51. 
666 Weima, Thessalonians, 310; Malherbe, Thessalonians, 283.  
667 So Malherbe, Thessalonians, 284; see also Ulrich Luz, Das Geschichtsverständnis des Paulus, 
BEvT 49 (Munich: Kaiser, 1968), 318–331; Helmut Merklein, “Der Theologe als Prophet: Zur Funktion 
prophetischen Redens im Theologischen Diskurs des Paulus,” NTS 38 (1992): 407–408; Weima, 
Thessalonians, 312–313; cf. James Everett Frame, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles 
of St. Paul to the Thessalonians, ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1912), 163–164.  
668 Weima, Thessalonians, 313, tries to counter this objection by contending that it “underestimates 
the great anticipation and hope that the Thessalonians have about participating in the glory of the parousia 
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In contrast, in the second group are those views which take the Thessalonians as 
being overwhelmed by grief because they regarded their dead as being at an absolute 
disadvantage at the parousia compared to themselves; in other words, the deceased were 
thought to have lost their salvation. We may distinguish between several views that fall 
within this group: 
(1) One proposal rests on the hypothesis that Paul had previously described the 
participation of the Thessalonian church in the parousia in terms of an assumption—
which, according to OT and Jewish apocalyptic teachings, could occur only in 
connection with living persons. With the death of some of their members, the 
Thessalonian believers were plunged into grief, since they took it as axiomatic that the 
dead were not in a condition to be taken up at the parousia.669 However, there is no 
evidence that Paul’s kerygma included teaching about such a motif.670 Furthermore, 
Paul depicts Christ’s return with the metaphor of the Einholung or Hellenistic formal 
reception (ἀπάντησις, 4.17)671—an image which does not portray an upward movement 
from earth to heaven (which an assumption would involve) but its very opposite, i.e. the 
believers meet Christ in the air and usher him down to earth.672  
(2) Another theory is that Paul did not teach the Thessalonians about the 
resurrection of dead believers because he was convinced that the return of Christ was 
highly imminent. Indeed, Paul’s thinking about the resurrection had not yet been fully 
formulated, and it would take time for him to develop his early position here to the 
more developed understanding of 1 Cor 15. Consequently, when some among the 
Thessalonian believers died, great sorrow ensued; and, with Christ’s return still only in 
prospect, Paul was now obliged to provide instruction concerning the resurrection of 
                                                                                                                                          
event (1.3, 10; 2.19)—a time when their faith would be vindicated and they would enjoy eternal life with 
Christ (4.17; 5.10), while their fellow citizens who caused them so much affliction would be justly 
punished in the ‘coming wrath’ (1.10; 5.9)”; but the argument is not sufficiently convincing.   
669 Joseph Plevnik, “The Parousia as Implication of Christ’s Resurrection: An Exegesis of 1 Thes 
4,13–18,” in Word and Spirit: Essays in Honor of David Michael Stanley on His 60th Birthday, ed. 
Joseph Plevnik (Toronto: Regis College, 1975), 199–277; see also his other work e.g. “The Taking Up of 
the Faithful and the Resurrection of the Dead in 1 Thessalonians 4:13–18,” CBQ 46 (1984): 274–283; 
“The Destination of the Apostle and of the Faithful: Second Corinthians 4:13b–14 and First 
Thessalonians 4:14,” CBQ 62 (2000): 83–95. Plevnik applies the work of Gerhard Lohfink, Die 
Himmelfahrt Jesu: Untersuchungen zu den Himmelfahrts- und Erhöhungstexten bei Lukas, SANT 26 
(Munich: Kösel, 1971), to 1 Thess 4.13–18; and he is followed by Richard, Thessalonians, 237; 
Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 166, among others. 
670 So Malherbe, Thessalonians, 276; Nicholl, Thessalonica, 46–47. 
671 Erik Peterson, “Die Einholung des Kyrios,” ZST 7 (1930): 682–702, esp. 693–697.  
672 For an instructive discussion of the debates surrounding how Paul uses ἐις ἀπάντησιν in 4.17 see 
Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 260–266; he concludes that “an association of Paul’s reference with 
Hellenistic formal receptions cannot be rejected” (265). 
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dead believers.673 However, against this view, it seems rather improbable that in the 
decade674 prior to his arrival in Thessalonica Paul had not encountered and dealt with 
the death of any believers—which means that by the time of the Thessalonian mission, 
teaching concerning such matters would have become integral to his regular programme 
of instruction. In addition, as we have noted earlier (see section 4.1.4), the contents of 
the letter reveal that the Thessalonians had received extensive eschatological 
instruction, at which time the question would surely have come up. 
(3) A third solution, which has certain points of affinity with the foregoing view, 
but involves less speculation, is that Paul may have “emphasized the possibility of 
Jesus' imminent return so much that the expectation of being alive at its occurrence had 
swallowed up what little Paul had taught them about a future resurrection.”675 
Notwithstanding the fact that some of the objections to the foregoing theory may also be 
raised here, on balance this is likely to be the best of the possible explanations for 
Thessalonians’ grief. 
 (4) A fourth proposal grants that the Thessalonians did learn about the 
resurrection of believers from Paul; however, the actual occurrence of the death of their 
brethren provoked an outpouring of grief that blunted their apprehension of the doctrine. 
As Marshall thus suggests: “It is, after all, one thing to have a theoretical belief in 
resurrection and quite another to maintain that belief in the actual presence of death and 
physical decay.”676 The ways in which this proposal captures some of the existential 
realities of lived human experience is not without its merits; but it does not account for 
                                                
673 So Willi Marxsen, “Auslegung von 1 Thess 4,13–18,” ZTK 66 (1969): 22–37; Jürgen Becker, 
Auferstehung der Toten im Urchristentum (Stuttgart: KBW Verlag, 1976), 46–54; Nicholl, Thessalonica, 
35–38. See also Gerd Lüdemann, Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology, trans. F. Stanley 
Jones (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 212–238, who argues that the undeveloped character of Paul's 
teaching about these matters is a reflection of the fact that the letter was penned in the early 40s CE, i.e. 
up to ten years before its generally accepted date of 50/51 CE, which seems rather unlikely.  
674 If we follow Michael Gorman’s general chronology of Paul’s life (which is broad enough to be 
acceptable to many scholars) Paul’s conversion dates to ca. 32–36 CE, and the period of major missionary 
activity begins ca. 46 CE with the first missionary journey; see Michael J. Gorman, Apostle of the 
Crucified Lord: A Theological Introduction to Paul and His Letters, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2017), 56–60. The Macedonian mission was part of Paul’s second missionary journey, i.e. some time 
after 46 CE, which means that by the time he reached Thessalonica, Paul would have been preaching and 
teaching for some ten years at least.  
675 Robert H. Gundry, “The Hellenization of Dominical Tradition and the Christianization of Jewish 
Tradition in the Eschatology of 1–2 Thessalonians,” NTS 33 (1987): 167; see also Todd D. Still, 
“Eschatology in the Thessalonian Letters,” RevExp 96 (1999): 196–197.  
676 Marshall, Thessalonians, 120–121, following Peter Siber, Mit Christus Leben: Eine Studie zur 
paulinischen Auferstehungshoffnung, ATANT 61 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 1971), 13–22. See also 
Green, Thessalonians, 215; Gary Shogren, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, ZECNT (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 
2012), 188. 
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why Paul takes such pains not only to reaffirm the doctrine of the resurrection of 
believers but also to explain its connection with the parousia.677 
To conclude at this stage: what Paul has mentioned so far in the passage points to 
the fact that a number of the Thessalonian Christians have died, for reasons that are not 
known to us (however, the wider evidence suggests that martyrdom is very likely not in 
view here). The grief that overwhelms the Thessalonians is probably caused by a lack of 
knowledge concerning the eschatological destiny of the deceased; it was thought that 
they had “slipped, through death, out of the current which was heading for salvation: 
they would not, and could not, be present when the much-anticipated parousia took 
place.”678 Such an interpretation allows for aspects of the fourth causal hypothesis (as 
outlined above) to have a place at the table also: thus, it seems not unreasonable to grant 
that the Thessalonians, who did not have an adequate understanding of life after death, 
were simply unable to manage their grief when they were suddenly confronted by the 
deaths of people who mattered to them. Furthermore, as Barclay points out, the precise 
circumstances of these deaths—i.e. perhaps whether they had led to increased derision 
from the Thessalonians’ opponents, who attributed these deaths to the wrath of the 
gods—could have affected the degree of distress and grief which they occasioned.679   
We now turn our attention to Paul’s consolatory strategy, beginning with a 
consideration of whether or not 4.13b is in effect an absolute prohibition against grief.  
4.3.4. A Prohibition against Grief?  
The question of how Paul intends the Thessalonians to grieve— ἵνα µὴ λυπῆσθε 
καθὼς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ οἱ µὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα (4.13b)—has attracted not a little debate. Here, 
ἵνα µή expresses a negatived purpose clause that presents the problem that is to be 
overcome, ἵνα µὴ λυπῆσθε. The adverb καθώς introduces the comparative subclause 
καθὼς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ οἱ µὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα: καθώς thus indicates that Paul’s readers are 
being compared to “the rest” (οἱ λοιποὶ), i.e., those outside the Christian community, 
who are “those who do not have hope” (οἱ µὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα).680 In broad terms, the 
scholarly opinions that have been offered may be located in one of two camps.  
                                                
677 Weima, Thessalonians, 311.  
678 Barclay, “Death,” 221. Similarly Marshall, Thessalonians, 122.  
679 See Barclay, “Conflict,” 516; and also his “Death,” 219. 
680 Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 167.  
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Several exegetes argue that what Paul is calling for is an absolute prohibition: the 
Thessalonians are not to grieve at all for their deceased brethren.681 To a significant 
degree, this argument rests on the interpretation of καθὼς καί:682 those who champion 
this line of thought typically take it to be setting up an absolute contrast, based on its 
similarity with the καθάπερ καί in 4.5 (which introduces a negative comparison that 
functions as an antithesis). So Frame, for example, insists that  
καθὼς καί here does not mean that the Christians are indeed to grieve, but not in 
the same manner or degree as the unbelievers … Paul speaks absolutely, for death 
has a religious value to him, in that after a short interval the dead are brought to the 
goal of Christian hope, σὺν αὐτῷ. In view of this glorious consummation, present 
grief, however natural, is excluded.683 
However, this view remains rather controversial, not least because it glosses over the 
anguish of bereavement and denigrates the natural psychological responses that come in 
its wake.684 
The majority of commentators from Theodoret and the Antiochenes onwards 
have supported more moderate interpretations, wherein καθὼς καί is thought to specify 
a difference between Christian and pagan attitudes to grieving.685 Thus Paul is by no 
means saying that Christians are not to grieve; but that they must not do so to the same 
degree and with the same types of motives as do those who are without hope. Scholars 
advocating this position often cite certain verses from Paul’s letters elsewhere and from 
the NT in general to demonstrate that there is no support for the view that he is balking 
at the legitimacy of grief for believers. These include, in particular: Phil 2.27, where 
Paul refers to the mercy that God had showed both Epaphroditus and him, lest he should 
have “grief upon grief” (ἵνα µὴ λύπην ἐπὶ λύπην σχῶ); Paul’s general exhortation in 
Rom 12.15 to “mourn with those who mourn” (κλαίειν µετὰ κλαιόντων); his description 
                                                
681 See e.g. J. B. Lightfoot, Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul from Unpublished Commentaries, 2nd ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1904), 63; Frame, Thessalonians, 167; Best, Thessalonians, 186; Malherbe, 
Thessalonians, 264; Barclay, “Death,” 223–224. Thus Malherbe, for example, argues that since the cause 
of the Thessalonians’ grief is an incomplete understanding of matters pertaining to Christians who had 
died, “Paul’s attitude towards this grief is equally straightforward: it is prohibited.” (264). 
682 καθώς can be an adverb of comparison or of degree; see BDAG 493–494. 
683 Frame, Thessalonians, 167, cited with approval by Barclay, “Death,” 224, who argues (225 n.22) 
that linguistic parallels involving the use of καθὼς καί and equivalents, such as 1 Thess 4.5, strongly 
suggest an absolute contrast.  
684 This problem has not been ignored by those within the “prohibition” camp: thus Lightfoot, for 
example, concedes that “here, as elsewhere, he [Paul] states his precept broadly, without caring to enter 
into the qualifications which will suggest themselves at once to thinking men” (Notes, 63); while 
Malherbe suggests that Paul’s absolute prohibition must be understood in its context and thus does not 
forbid “any grief at all in any circumstance surrounding the death of Christians,” but only “in reply to the 
specific question the Thessalonians had addressed to him” (Thessalonians, 264).  
685 See the discussion in Paul Hoffman, Die Toten in Christus: Eine religionsgeschichtliche und 
exegetische Untersuchung zur paulinischen Eschatologie, NTAbh 2 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1966), 210–
211. 
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of the Corinthians’ grief unto repentance (ἐλυπήθητε εἰς µετάνοιαν, 2 Cor 7.9) as a godly 
grief leading to salvation (ἡ γὰρ κατὰ θεὸν λύπη µετάνοιαν εἰς σωτηρίαν, 2 Cor 7.10a) 
and not a worldly grief that brings death (ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσµου λύπη θάνατον κατεργάζεται, 2 
Cor 7.10b); and the example of Jesus weeping at the tomb of Lazarus in John 11.35.686  
Yet the use of texts like these and others to substantiate the view that Paul in 1 
Thess 4.13 is not issuing an absolute prohibition of grief has not gone unchallenged. 
Barclay, for example, notes that while several Pauline passages show that a kind of λύπη 
is necessary and even beneficial (Rom 9.2; 2 Cor 2.2–5; 6.10; 7.8–11), or give examples 
of permissible weeping (Rom 12.15; 1 Cor 7.30), none of these passages concern death. 
In Paul’s letters, only in Phil 2.27 is death possibly at issue; and even so, here Barclay 
reads Paul as saying that he is relieved that he was altogether spared the experience of 
grief. Further, Barclay suggests that in the gospels it is Mark 5.39 rather than John 
11.35 that is the closest rhetorical and theological parallel to the situation in 
Thessalonica.687 On balance, however, it seems preferable to follow the majority view 
that Paul is in 1 Thess 4.13 not telling the Thessalonians that they are to stop grieving 
per se, but rather that they are to stop grieving as unbelievers do;688 “their grief, no 
matter how deep, should be of the hopeful variety.”689 Such a reading preserves the 
broad sense in which grief in its various forms seems to be understood by Paul as a 
natural, legitimate expression of the human experience. Furthermore, as Still suggests, if 
full weight is given to the fact that Paul here uses the passive (λυπῆσθε), then it seems 
improbable that he has in mind an absolute prohibition on an emotional reaction that he 
himself understands as being more or less beyond the Thessalonians’ control.690  
Whether one takes Paul to be reframing grief or prohibiting it altogether, it is 
apparent that he wants the Thessalonians believers to understand and handle their grief 
in a way that distinguishes them from the people around them. Paul has already outlined 
the distinction between Christians and non-Christians by using expressions such as “the 
Gentiles who do not know God” (τὰ ἔθνη τὰ µὴ εἰδότα τὸν θεόν, 4.5) and “the outsiders” 
(οἱ ἔξω, 4.12) to describe the latter group. In 4.13, he continues to use such in-group 
                                                
686 See e.g. Weima, Thessalonians, 314; Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 215.  
687 Barclay, “Death,” 225 n.22. 
688 So e.g., Nicholl, Thessalonica, 25, and most commentators. As John R. W. Stott rightly observes: 
“What Paul prohibits is not grief but hopeless grief”; The Message of 1 & 2 Thessalonians, The Bible 
Speaks Today (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1991), 94. 
689 N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 229. 
690 Todd D. Still, “Interpretive Ambiguities and Scholarly Proclivities in Pauline Studies: A Treatment 
of Three Texts from 1 Thessalonians 4 as a Test Case,” CBR 5 (2007): 207–219. 
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language to cement this distinction: the Thessalonians are instructed not to grieve like 
“the rest who have no hope” (οἱ λοιποὶ οἱ µὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα).  
That οἱ λοιποί refers to unbelievers can be readily inferred from Paul’s contextual 
use of the phrase here in 4.13 and again in 5.6;691 this is confirmed by how Paul here 
juxtaposes it with an adjectival phrase, οἱ µὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα, that qualifies οἱ λοιποί in 
the same way that τὰ µὴ εἰδότα τὸν θεόν qualifies τὰ ἔθνη in 4.5.692 Thus “the rest” are 
characterized as having “no hope”—which is not at all surprising given that Paul’s 
understanding of ἐλπίς is so thoroughly shaped by his kerygma. This hope is a 
distinctively Christian hope that is focused on the eschaton, as Pauline usage generally, 
and in 1 Thessalonians specifically (1.3; 2.19; 5.8), demonstrates.693 The circle is thus 
clearly drawn: outside its boundary are found all who do not accept the gospel and who 
therefore do not share in the Christian hope of salvation, while inside are the 
Thessalonian (and other) believers, who know this eschatological hope and are exhorted 
to hold on to it in the very face of grief and death.  
At this point, however, as Barclay cautions, commentators are apt to stumble as 
they wrestle with the ramifications of what Paul seems to be saying.694 Those who think 
(perhaps on the basis that he is addressing a predominantly Gentile congregation) that 
Paul excludes the Jews from οἱ λοιποί,695 are missing the thrust of his deliberately blunt 
rhetoric: all of humanity is theologically bifurcated into two streams—those with, and 
those without, the Christian hope. Other exegetes, mindful of the evidence that there 
were some people in antiquity who held hopes for an afterlife, try to defend Paul against 
the charge of over-generalization when he seems to speak of the hopelessness of the 
pagan world in the face of death, by claiming that there is at least a general sense in 
which this was actually true.696 Admittedly, Paul does overstate the case to some 
extent;697 but again, the point of his rhetoric is to establish a distinction between 
believers and non-believers, based on a distinctively Christian conception of hope. 
                                                
691 Contra Edwin D. Freed, The Morality of Paul’s Converts (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 91, whose 
view that οἱ λοιποί refers “to other members of the brotherhood who have not yet reached the status of ‘in 
Christ’ (4.16)” fails to account for Paul’s use of the phrase here and its parallels in 4.5, 12. 
692 See Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 216.  
693 See Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 215–216 for a helpful précis of Paul’s use of the word group 
ἐλπίς/ἐλπίζειν; Nicholl, Thessalonica, 25–26.  
694 Here I largely follow Barclay’s incisive argumentation in his “Death,” 223–224. 
695 E.g. Lightfoot, Notes, 64; Nicholl, Thessalonica, 23; Ernst von Dobschütz, Die Thessalonicher-
Briefe, 7th ed., KEK 10 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1909), 188. 
696 Barclay, “Death,” 224, citing Bruce, Thessalonians, 104; Marshall, Thessalonians, 119. 
697 So Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 167 (cited by Barclay, “Death,” 224); cf. Best, Thessalonians, 
185–186.  
Chapter 4. Grief in 1 Thessalonians 
 148 
Luckensmeyer is right to say that Paul’s use of the phrase οἱ µὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα must be 
understood against the background of “the polarising effect of ἐλπίς/ἐλπίζειν on 
humanity.”698 For Paul, the Christian hope of salvation, as it is understood and 
appropriated in relation to the deep human pain of bereavement, must not only inform 
but also condition, and in that way also demarcate, the very expression of sorrow. Thus, 
believers do not need to grieve as others do who are without this hope. As we shall see 
next, as part of his consolatory strategy Paul goes on to explain how and why this 
should be so. And as we shall discover, this strategy—rooted as always in his 
understanding of theology—is at once personal in its application and social in its 
function.  
 
4.4. Consolation in 1 Thessalonians 
4.4.1. The Theological Basis of Consolation 
From the evidence so far, it would seem that the believers at Thessalonica are 
deeply anguished by the sudden demise of some within their midst, because they fear 
that their deceased brethren would miss out on the great eschatological blessings that 
were associated with the imminent return of Christ. In response, Paul tells his readers 
not to grieve like the unbelievers around them who do not have the hope that they have 
(4.13). In the verses that follow, he spells out the two fundamental reasons for this 
hope.699  
4.4.1.a. The Confession of the Church (1 Thess 4.14) 
First, Paul writes: εἰ γὰρ πιστεύοµεν ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἀνέστη (4.14a)—
which most likely encapsulates an early Christian, i.e. pre-Pauline, credal formula 
concerning the death and resurrection of Christ.700 By doing so, Paul reminds the 
Thessalonians about what he had previously taught them about Christ’s death and 
                                                
698 Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 217–218. 
699 The γάρ of 4.14 functions as a marker of cause or reason.  
700 So many commentators, typically on the basis of (1) the confession-like introduction; (2) the 
presence of the rare Pauline designation Ἰησοῦς without qualification; (3) the use of the verb ἀνἰστηµι 
instead of Paul’s favoured verb ἐγείρω (all the more striking because the other NT writers employ 
ἀνἰστηµι to speak of the resurrection); (4) the reference to Jesus rising instead of God’s activity in raising 
Jesus (which Paul always refers to); and (5) the sheer economy of words. See e.g. Weima, Thessalonians, 
316–317; Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 220–221; for a contrary view see Malherbe, Thessalonians, 265.  
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resurrection, which he assumes that they have accepted and embraced; this is indicated 
by the grammatical construction εἰ γὰρ πιστεύοµεν and by his earlier thanksgiving that 
they were waiting for the return of God’s son, “ὃν ἤγειρεν ἐκ [τῶν] νεκρῶν” (1.10). 
Moreover, Paul’s citing of the credal formula rhetorically reinforces the authority of 
what he is saying: the death and resurrection of Christ are not merely a matter of his 
own privately-held beliefs, nor even those held by the Thessalonian congregation, but 
something continually affirmed by the wider church to which they all belong.701  
In the second half of the verse, Paul draws out the implications of this belief as it 
relates to the deceased believers over whom the Thessalonians grieve: οὕτως καὶ ὁ θεὸς 
τοὺς κοιµηθέντας διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἄξει σὺν αὐτῷ (4.14b). The authoritative confession of 
the church concerning the resurrection of Jesus effectively guarantees the resurrection 
of believers who have died, such that they will be alive and with him at the parousia.702 
Putting it another way, Paul anchors the assurance that he gives to the Thessalonians 
concerning the fate of dead believers to their shared belief in the resurrection of Christ.   
However, even though the broad thought-flow of the verse is indisputably logical, 
Paul’s words are elliptical, largely because the protasis and apodosis do not correspond 
as one might expect: (1) the protasis introduced by the formally conditional εἰ (4.14a) is 
completed clumsily with the formally comparative οὕτως καὶ (4.14b); (2) the verb 
πιστεύοµεν disappears; (3) the expected subject, Ἰησοῦς or οἱ κοιµηθέντες, is replaced 
with ὁ θεός; and (4) instead of the anticipated ἀνίστηµι there is ἄγω; closely related to 
this is the question of whether the prepositional phrase διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ modifies the 
preceding substantival participle (τοὺς κοιµηθέντας) or the main verb (ἄξει).703  
With regard to (1) and (2): Nicholl’s suggestion that Paul’s assertive apodosis 
might be a concerted attempt on his part to avoid any uncertainty that might be inferred 
from εἰ seems quite plausible;704 certainly, its grammatical awkwardness heightens its 
effect, and the καί strengthens what is being stated.705 Change (4) is the most 
significant, and much hinges on the interpretation of διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, the result of which 
has a bearing on change (3). The more common of the two views is to take διὰ τοῦ 
Ἰησοῦ with τοὺς κοιµηθέντας, in which case it qualifies the object of the clause and is 
                                                
701 Weima, Thessalonians, 317.  
702 See Weima, Thessalonians, 317. Paul also draws a paradigmatic connection between Christ’s 
resurrection and that of believers in Rom 8.11–12; 1 Cor 6.14; 15.20–23; 2 Cor 4.14.  
703 See esp. the detailed discussion in Nicholl, Thessalonica, 26–32.  
704 Nicholl, Thessalonica, 26 (appealing to Lightfoot, Notes, 64; Dobschütz, Thessalonicher-Briefe, 
190). 
705 Malherbe, Thessalonians, 264. 
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virtually equivalent in meaning to ἐν Χριστῷ.706 Yet the decision to do so rests mainly 
on arguments of word order and parallelism in the pericope, but these are not so 
compelling as to rule out any other option.707 I follow instead the majority of German 
and an increasing minority of Anglo-American scholars who opt for taking διὰ τοῦ 
Ἰησοῦ with ἄξει.708 On this view, God acts through Jesus, his intermediary agent of 
salvation—a reading which makes good sense of Paul’s thought here, and is also in 
keeping with his use of διά elsewhere to express Christ’s agency.709 In addition, this 
reading smooths the link between the two halves of the verse, by making God-through-
Jesus the subject of the apodosis, i.e., change (3).710 Thus 4.14 would run: “For since we 
believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so, God, through Jesus, will gather with him 
those who have died.” 
The first option (διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ with τοὺς κοιµηθέντας) has the advantage of 
making explicit an implicit fact—that those believers who have died are “in Christ.” But 
the second option (διὰ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ with ἄξει) affords a different and perhaps more helpful 
nuance: the risen Jesus is the one through whom God will act to effect the resurrection 
likewise of those believers who have died, and so bring them to himself. Ultimately, 
however, both options do not affect the overall thrust of the verse, which is to 
emphasize the presence of deceased believers with Christ at his return (ὁ θεὸς … ἄξει 
σὺν αὐτῷ, 4.14b). 
4.4.1.b. The “Word of the Lord” (1 Thess 4.15–17)  
The second reason Paul furnishes to explain why the Thessalonians have hope as 
they grieve involves a striking appeal to a “word of the Lord,” i.e., to some kind of 
authoritative saying or teaching of Jesus: Τοῦτο γὰρ ὑµῖν λέγοµεν ἐν λόγῳ κυρίου 
(4.15a).711 Scholars are divided over all three major issues that emerge from the 
                                                
706 So e.g. Frame, Thessalonians, 170; Rigaux, Thessaloniciens, 535–537; Plevnik, “Parousia,” 211; 
Marshall, Thessalonians, 124; Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 168–169; Richard, Thessalonians, 226; 
Green, Thessalonians, 221; Witherington, Thessalonians, 133. 
707 Nicholl, Thessalonica, 28, Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 222 (see also 181–182).  
708 So e.g. among German scholars, Hoffman, Die Toten, 213–216; others taking this view include 
Best, Thessalonians, 189; Collins, Studies, 159; D. Michael Martin, 1, 2 Thessalonians, NAC 33 
(Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 1995), 146; Malherbe, Thessalonians, 266; Nicholl, Thessalonica, 
28; Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 223; Fee, Thessalonians, 170. 
709 See e.g. Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 223, for references. 
710 Nicholl, Thessalonica, 28.   
711 The conjunction γὰρ parallels its use in the previous verse (so most commentators); however, 
recently a number of scholars have countered that it is explanatory, i.e. that it identifies 4.15 as an 
explication of 4.14 instead of providing a second ground for Paul’s instructions in 4.13 (so e.g. Malherbe, 
Thessalonians, 267; Nicholl, Thessalonica, 35; Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 177; Shogren, 
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interpretation of these verses: where the precise placement of this “word” is, its source, 
and Paul’s aim in citing it. However, it is unnecessary for the purposes of my study to 
examine the first two issues in any detail.  
Following an increasing number of scholars,712 I take the logion to be located at 
4.16–17a.713 On this reading, it is preceded by an anticipatory statement that relates the 
logion to the Thessalonians’ specific concern, ὅτι ἡµεῖς οἱ ζῶντες οἱ περιλειπόµενοι εἰς 
τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ κυρίου οὐ µὴ φθάσωµεν τοὺς κοιµηθέντας (4.15b), and followed by a 
comment that reinforces its importance to their situation, καὶ οὕτως πάντοτε σὺν κυρίῳ 
ἐσόµεθα (4.17b).714 As to the source of the “word”: it seems likely that Paul is citing a 
dominical saying within the Jesus tradition represented in the canonical gospels, but 
does not do so exactly, in keeping with his practice elsewhere (1 Cor 7.10, 25; 9.14; 
11.23–25).715 
The third question, concerning why Paul quotes this logion, is far more important 
for our understanding of the pericope. Earlier, in 4.14, Paul had looked to a credal 
formulation about the death and resurrection of Jesus to lend authority to his argument 
that Christians, like their Lord, would rise from the dead. Now in 4.15–17 Paul 
                                                                                                                                          
Thessalonians, 183). The demonstrative pronoun τοῦτο looks ahead to the material that follows as the site 
of this logion (so virtually all commentators; pace Richard, Thessalonians, 226, 240, who takes it to refer 
to the preceding argument). 
712 E.g. Hoffman, Die Toten, 219–220; Harnisch, Eschatologische, 40–42; Plevnik, “Parousia,” 230–
231; and more recently, Nicholl, Thessalonica, 32–33; Weima, Thessalonians, 320–321.  
713 4.16: ὅτι αὐτὸς ὁ κύριος ἐν κελεύσµατι, ἐν φωνῇ ἀρχαγγέλου καὶ ἐν σάλπιγγι θεοῦ, καταβήσεται ἀπʼ 
οὐρανοῦ καὶ οἱ νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ ἀναστήσονται πρῶτον, 4.17a: ἔπειτα ἡµεῖς οἱ ζῶντες οἱ περιλειπόµενοι 
ἅµα σὺν αὐτοῖς ἁρπαγησόµεθα ἐν νεφέλαις εἰς ἀπάντησιν τοῦ κυρίου εἰς ἀέρα·  
714 Some scholars argue that the converse is true, i.e. that 4.15b is the “word” and 4.16–17 an 
explication of it; see e.g. Dobschütz, Thessalonicher-Briefe, 193–194; Holtz, Thessalonicher, 184–185; 
Merklein, “Der Theologe,” 410–411; Donfried, “Theology,” 39–41. Thus Merklein for example 
(followed by Donfried) finds several parallels between 1 Thess 4.13–18 and 1 Cor 15.50–58 that, for him, 
limit the logion to 1 Thess 4.15b. However, apart from the fact that there are also other NT passages that 
are cited as parallels by various scholars, Merklein’s solution discounts the important matter of stylistic 
features and vocabulary: as Nicholl, Thessalonica, 32–33, persuasively argues, 4.15b is mostly consistent 
with Paul, while parts of 4.16–17a are not; the few particularly Pauline elements in 4.16–17a may be 
readily explained by Paul’s redaction to suit the epistolary context. All this strongly suggests that the 
λόγος κυρίου is located at 4.16–17a (introduced by a recitative ὅτι), with 4.15b functioning as an 
anticipatory summary (introduced by an epexegetical ὅτι).  
That 4.17b does not lie within the logion is clearly indicated by its thoroughly Pauline vocabulary; 
furthermore, the adverb οὕτως is “summarizing a thought expressed in what precedes” (BDAG 742).   
715 So Weima, Thessalonians, 321; see also e.g. Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 171. This is one of five 
major possibilities that commentators have identified as the possible source of the logion; there is no 
consensus: (1) a Pauline revelation; (2) a non-Pauline prophecy which Paul has accepted as originating 
from Jesus; (3) an agraphon; (4) a general reference to Jesus’ eschatological teachings; (5) a saying of 
Jesus as found in the gospels (i.e. my preference). Combinations of the above solutions are possible; e.g. 
Witherington, Thessalonians, 135–136, who thinks it plausible that Paul saw himself both as an 
interpreter of the sayings of the historical Jesus and as a prophet who received direct messages from the 
risen Lord. The precise provenance of the logion is not important for my study; for a concise summary of 
the scholarly debates see esp. Malherbe, Thessalonians, 267–270; Nicholl, Thessalonica, 38–41.  
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solidifies this argument by not only providing further information concerning the fate of 
dead believers at the parousia, but locating these details in nothing less than a dominical 
warrant—in something that Jesus had actually taught or said. As Wanamaker notes: “By 
placing his assurance that the living would not have precedence over the dead at the 
coming under the rubric ‘a word of the Lord,’ Paul attributed the highest possible 
authority to his assertion in v.15b.”716 The fact that Paul finds it necessary to appeal to 
such weighty sources of Christian authority in relation to both his arguments certainly 
suggests that he sees the Thessalonians’ grieving as no small matter.717  
In his argument Paul emphasizes in the strongest terms that at the parousia, 
believers who are alive “will by no means precede” (οὐ µὴ φθάσωµεν, 4.15b)718 those 
who are dead. The temporal character of the verb φθάνω is reinforced by the use of the 
adverbs πρῶτον and ἔπειτα in the following verses (4.16–17) to underscore the notion 
that deceased believers would rise “first,” and “then” they, together with living 
believers, would be taken up to meet the Lord. Paul’s obvious concern throughout is 
with the faithful who have died before the parousia; and clearly his point is that they 
will not suffer any disadvantage whatsoever. In fact, as the first order of things at 
Christ’s return, they will be raised from the dead.  
In 4.16–17 Paul rehearses, using the most explicit descriptions anywhere in his 
writings, the events surrounding the return of Christ. These verses have received a great 
deal of scholarly attention, but we do not need to be bogged down by the debates;719 it is 
sufficient for our purposes to remember that Paul is redacting, from diverse sources, 
traditional material rich in symbol and metaphor to paint a complex apocalyptic 
scenario—but always with his stated consolatory intention in mind (4.18). He paints a 
picture of the three events that would occur in sequence at the parousia: the Lord would 
descend from heaven; dead Christians would be resurrected; and these resurrected 
Christians, together with those still living, would be joined with the Lord (4.16–17a). 
Thus the result, as Paul makes crystal clear, is that all believers—whether presently 
                                                
716 Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 171.  
717 Weima, Thessalonians, 322.  
718 The construction οὐ µή with aorist subjunctive expresses the strongest form of negation possible 
(BDF §365). Excluding his quotations from the LXX, Paul employs this construction only 3 times 
elsewhere: 1 Cor 8.13; Gal 5.16; 1 Thess 5.3. His highly emphatic response lends further credence to the 
view that the concerns being addressed are of actual and not merely theoretical import; so e.g. Malherbe, 
Thessalonians, 272, who thinks that the use of the construction here “is so strong that it sounds like a 
denial of an opinion actually held by some people in Thessalonica,” especially in view of the parallel in 
5.3, οὐ µὴ ἐκφύγωσιν (“they will by no means escape”), which is directed at those who propound 
erroneous teachings because of a misplaced confidence in Roman “peace and security.”  
719 For a recent and admirably instructive discussion, see Luckensmeyer, Eschatology, 237–268. 
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alive or dead—would be in the Lord’s presence for eternity: καὶ οὕτως πάντοτε σὺν 
κυρίῳ ἐσόµεθα (4.17b).720 This brief, climaxing summary seems to reinforce the 
likelihood that Paul’s intention lies neither in documenting in precise terms the events 
surrounding the return of Christ nor in elaborating in any detail the nature of the eternal 
life that believers would enjoy with the Lord. Rather, his concern is to provide pastoral 
comfort to the Thessalonian Christians who are grieving over their deceased brethren.   
4.4.1.c. Comfort One Another with These Words (1 Thess 4.18) 
This aim is made explicit in the exhortation with which Paul brings this pericope 
to a close: Ὥστε παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις (4.18). The particle ὥστε, 
when introducing an independent clause, means “for this reason, therefore, so”;721 
accordingly, here it serves to draw out Paul’s conclusion from what he has written 
earlier in 4.13–17.722 The verb παρακαλέω—a favourite of his723—carries a range of 
meanings724 which can be grouped into two main nuances: either command (“appeal, 
exhort, request, implore”), as in 2.12; 4.1, 10; 5.14; or comfort (“encourage, comfort, 
cheer up, console”), as in 3.2, 7; 4.18; 5.11.725 From the context, here in 4.18 the latter 
nuance is undoubtedly in view: Paul writes to console his readers; moreover, they are to 
share this comfort with others within the Thessalonians church.  
Stowers notes that ancient letter writers who wrote on the theme of grief often 
urged their bereaved readers to use their words of consolation to exhort both themselves 
and others. He cites the example of a second century papyrus letter, P.Oxy. 115, where 
a woman named Irene writes to a couple who have lost a son. After expressing her own 
grief and reasoning that “nothing can be done in the face of such things [i.e., death],” 
Irene concludes: “Therefore comfort one another.”726 Stylistically, Paul’s closing 
exhortation in this pericope seems to parallel this. However, his ground of consolation 
is ideologically completely different. 
The consolation that Paul speaks of has its basis in τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις (4.18); it is 
immediately apparent from the context that he is referring back to the two arguments 
                                                
720 As we have already noted, this is almost certainly not part of the logion.  
721 BDAG 1107. 
722 Paul uses the particle in a similar manner in e.g. 1 Cor 7.38; 14.39; 15.58 (see n.651). 
723 The verb appears 40 times in the undisputed Paulines: most frequently in 2 Cor (18 times) and in 1 
Thess (8 times: 2.12; 3.2, 7; 4.1, 10, 18; 5.11, 14).  
724 See e.g. BDAG 764–765, which lists 5 meanings.  
725 Weima, Thessalonians, 336. 
726 Stowers, Letter Writing, 145–146 (translations his). See similarly Malherbe, Thessalonians, 280; 
Weima, Thessalonians, 335–336.  
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that he has just outlined: first, the ecclesiastical confession that Christ has risen from the 
dead, which serves to guarantee the resurrection of Christians and their presence at the 
parousia (4.14); and second, the authoritative “word of the Lord” which specifies that 
the faithful dead would suffer no disadvantage compared to those who remain alive but 
would participate with them on equal terms at that great eschatological event (4.15–17). 
It is these two factors that enable Paul to tell the Thessalonians with confidence that 
they need not grieve like others who do not share in the Christian hope.   
The ground of Paul’s consolatory instruction is therefore resolutely theological: it 
rests squarely on the Christian belief in the resurrection of Jesus, which in turn renders 
certain the future resurrection of dead believers upon his return. As with Paul’s strategy 
for the inculcation of joy in the Philippian church, here in his letter to the Thessalonians 
he attempts to draw the attention of the believers to the eschatological realities on which 
Christian life (and life after death) are premised—dimensions of thinking and belief that 
the Thessalonians may perhaps have either not fully understood, or forgotten as a result 
of the emotional trauma that they are undergoing. Again, as with joy, a comprehensive 
re-evaluation and transfiguration of the believer’s mental and emotional engagement 
with the world around him or her lie at the heart of Paul’s teachings. He wants the 
Thessalonians to know that a hopeless and uncontrolled sorrow because of the death of 
their believing brethren is both baseless and unnecessary. Paul does not completely 
prohibit the expression of grief when it comes to the death of believers. Rather, he 
contrasts Christian grief with the grief of those outside the faith, and emphasizes that 
the expression of the former must be different from that of the latter, because death does 
not have the last word in the kingdom of God. For Paul, this is comfort indeed—and 
comfort that is to be spoken of and shared within the church. 
4.4.2. The Social Character and Function of Consolation 
As we have seen earlier, Paul’s adjuration to the Thessalonians to bring comfort 
to one another in their grief—παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους (4.18)—is not something new, at 
least not from the standpoint of literary style. Paul is apparently following the letter 
writing conventions of the day, which in turn reflected social norms and practices. 
Consolation in antiquity was a matter of sociality and social performance: one was 
expected to give sympathy, support, and comfort to one’s bereaved friends and 
relatives. However, the eschatological ideas that Paul injects into the consolatory 
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tradition make it his own. And as I hope also to demonstrate, the Thessalonians’ 
consolatory praxis now becomes imbued with new sociological significance, because it 
carries with it the powerful potential to enhance and structure corporate sensibility and 
self-definition, as the believers begin to reckon fully with the profound implications of 
Paul’s teachings.  
4.4.2.a. The Social Regulation of Grief 
Both private grief and its public expression in mourning were matters that were of 
much concern to the peoples of the Roman empire.727 This concern manifested itself in 
feeling rules that regulated the social display of grief and mourning.728 Stephen Barton 
helpfully highlights several noteworthy aspects of these feeling rules as they operated 
within the emotional regimes of Greco-Roman society in general.729 First, grief and 
mourning were subject to sanction and control in such things as the manner and 
intensity of mourning, and its duration. Second, it is evident from the rich textual-
rhetorical tradition of consolatory discourses, laments, treatises, and the like, and also 
non-literary material in the form of funerary inscriptions, that attitudes to grief and 
mourning generated widespread public comment and philosophical scrutiny. Third, 
underlying these feeling rules was a gendered ordering of behaviour in both the private 
and public spheres of daily life; this was seen particularly vividly in how inordinate 
grief was disapproved of and thought to be something to which women were especially 
prone.  
Fourth, and perhaps most important for our purposes, since mourning customs 
were governed by considerations that related emotions to larger questions of ontology 
and worldview, the differences in these behavioural conventions served to distinguish 
one group from another and thereby contributed to corporate self-definition. As Barton 
rightly concludes: “Given the plurality of philosophical and societal views, a distinctive 
stance on grief and mourning was a likely indication of group identity and moral 
ethos.”730 All this is most helpful, because it gives us a firm basis on which we may 
                                                
727 For a sociological analysis of grief and mourning in relation to the political and social order of the 
time, see Keith Hopkins, Death and Renewal, Sociological Studies in Roman History 2 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), esp. 201–255. 
728 See generally Valerie M. Hope, Roman Death: The Dying and the Dead in Ancient Rome (London: 
Continuum, 2009), esp. 121–149. 
729 Barton, “Eschatology,” 582–586; here I summarize his main points, modifying slightly their 
sequence. 
730 Barton, “Eschatology,” 586. 
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build an account of consolation in 1 Thessalonians that is at once sympathetic to the 
historical context of contemporaneous attitudes to grief and mindful of the ways in 
which grief and its therapy can express belief and identity.731  
4.4.2.b. The Thessalonians’ Grief  
Earlier, on the basis of on the evidence in 1 Thessalonians, we had surmised that 
the Thessalonian believers’ grief was most likely brought on by their underdeveloped 
understanding of the fate of the faithful dead at the return of Christ. Up to now, we have 
not said very much about the effect of these apparently unexpected deaths on the 
Christian community at Thessalonica. This aspect is important because it forms part of 
the background against which we seek to interpret why Paul says what he does to the 
Thessalonians by way of consolation.  
Again, our evidence shows that the nascent church in Thessalonica had found 
itself mired in an ongoing situation of social conflict; indeed, such was its severity that 
Paul, apparently worried that the believers’ Christian confidence was under threat, had 
despatched Timothy to Thessalonica to strengthen and encourage them (1 Thess 3.2–5). 
In all probability, the Thessalonians’ deliberate repudiation of traditional religious 
Greco-Roman beliefs and practices (1.9) had sparked a virulent backlash against them 
in the form of opprobrium, discrimination, ostracism, and perhaps even physical 
harassment and abuse; their behaviour was denounced as being not just socially 
offensive but also religiously and politically subversive.  
It is in this situation of considerable suffering (e.g. 1.6; 2.14) that the already 
vulnerable Thessalonians now find themselves having to cope also with the shock 
caused by the sudden demise of some of their members. The community was very likely 
a small one, and certainly tight-knit and characterized by deep bonds of mutual 
affection and support; after all, their exemplary φιλαδελφία was highlighted and 
commended by Paul (4.9–10). It is not unreasonable therefore to suppose that the 
feelings of grief and loss that the Thessalonians were registering emotionally were 
particularly acute. They had probably already been dispossessed of many of their 
kinship and friendship ties through rejection and ostracism; that sense of loss was now 
                                                
731 In what follows I am indebted to Stephen Barton’s insightful proposals in his “Eschatology,” 586–
591, and also to John Barclay’s succinct reading of the social factors behind the Thessalonians’ grief in 
his “Death,” 221–223. 
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compounded by further separation and emotional pain, this time due to bereavement.732 
It therefore seems fair to make the observation that at both personal and group levels, 
the deaths of their much-loved brethren represented a severe crisis of loss for the 
Thessalonian Christians.733  
There is also another sense in which these deaths very likely occasioned a severe 
crisis for the believers. It seems that they did not understand what was happening: what 
was the fate of those who had died? Had they missed out on the future blessings that 
were supposed to accrue to Christ’s followers? Were they really God’s beloved (1.4)? It 
is wholly plausible that the Thessalonians were wrestling with difficult existential and 
teleological questions concerning their Christian identity. Barton is therefore right to 
say that for the believers the deaths of their brethren represented also “a tear in the 
delicate fabric of their intensely eschatological faith … and, if of their faith, then of 
their self-understanding, sense of identity, and sense of future destiny.”734 In other 
words, the crisis that the Thessalonians were facing had as much to do with their faith as 
it had to do with the loss of people who mattered to them.735  
This is, I think, confirmed by the way in which Paul deals with these matters. His 
consolatory strategy has a firmly theological basis, as has been earlier discussed in some 
detail—but its character and function are in many ways social. It is to the sociological 
dimensions of consolation that we now turn.  
4.4.2.c. The Social Character of Consolation  
We note, first of all, that the dominant social metaphor that Paul employs to 
address his recipients is thoroughly familial,736 here in 4.13–18 but also in the rest of the 
letter: in the Lord, the Thessalonian believers are ἀδελφοί to one another and to him 
                                                
732 Barclay, “Death,” 221–222, referring to the classic study of Arnold van Gennep, The Rites of 
Passage, trans. Monika Vizedom and Gabrielle L. Caffee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 
notes that all mourners are in a “liminal state,” but the Thessalonian Christians now suffered a “double 
liminality.” 
733 Barclay, “Death,” 222, offers the intriguing suggestion that it may be that for the Thessalonians the 
normal mourning processes were disrupted by the social tensions that their faith had engendered. He does 
not elaborate further at this juncture; but one can well imagine a situation where the embattled believers 
find it difficult to grieve for their brethren as they might wish to (perhaps because they face continued 
mockery from others who attribute these deaths to the anger of the gods against the impiety of the 
Christians; on this see Barclay, “Conflict,” 516; “Death,” 219; and earlier in this chapter of my study at 
the end of section 4.3.3.b), or where any distinctively Christian funerary proceedings become the target of 
additional derision or vitriol.   
734 Barton, “Eschatology,” 587. 
735 This is however not to say that the Thessalonians were discouraged to the point that their sense of 
hope had become “disengaged from their faith,” pace Donfried, “Theology,” 27. 
736 Barton, “Eschatology,” 590. 
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(4.13; for other occurences see n.622 earlier in this study). Paul uses also the imagery of 
loving parental nurture to describe the nature of his relationship with the Thessalonians 
(2.7, 11). In the consolatory material here, as in his letter generally, a distinctive form of 
sociality is clearly presupposed: one that is characterized by the mutual affection, 
devotion, and care that characterize, and indeed enhance, the best familial relationships.  
That this type of sociality is important, even crucial, for the proper ordering and 
functioning of the Thessalonian church is seen in how Paul repeatedly draws the 
believers’ attention to the life in common which they inhabit and of which they are to be 
fully engaged stakeholders. This common life includes such aspects as the 
Thessalonians’ shared experiences of suffering (2.14; 3.7–8) as well as of hope (5.8); a 
decided emphasis on corporate holiness, which includes being careful not to wrong each 
other (4.1–8); a proactive and vigorous φιλαδελφία (4.9–10); and the keeping of ethical 
instructions that foster social cohesiveness (5.12–15) and strengthen their corporate 
witness to outsiders (4.11–12). Even everyday rituals could acquire new layers of 
meaning in Paul’s conception of an ideal Christian community. The giving of a kiss as 
part of a greeting was widespread practice in the ancient Near East, but the behest Paul 
issues at 5.26 regarding the exchanging of a kiss greeting is far from being a merely 
perfunctory concluding exhortation, because this kiss is to be a “holy kiss” (φίληµα 
ἅγιον).737 It is perhaps no coincidence that Paul draws his letter to the Thessalonians to 
a close with a call to what is in effect a powerful somatic-symbolic enactment of the 
unique spiritual oneness and social solidarity to which they are to aspire.  
However, for our purposes, the aspect of the Thessalonians’ sociality that 
concerns us most has to do with their practice of consolation. Paul’s exhortation to 
“comfort one another” (4.18) on this occasion of immense grief places the responsibility 
for a ministry of consolation not on any single individual or group of people, but 
squarely within the believing community as a whole.738 He reinforces this in no 
uncertain terms by repeating and further fleshing out the exhortation at 5.11 (“comfort 
one another and build up each other”) and commends the Thessalonians for already 
doing this; thus it is clear that in the church at Thessalonica, consolation—and 
                                                
737 For a useful study of the Pauline “holy kiss,” and also the ancient kiss greeting generally, see the 
discussion and further references in Jeffrey A. D. Weima, Neglected Endings: The Significance of the 
Pauline Letter Closings, JSNTSup 101 (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994), 112–114; Jeffrey A. D. Weima, 
“Sincerely, Paul: The Significance of the Pauline Letter Closings,” in Paul and the Ancient Letter Form, 
ed. Stanley E. Porter and Sean A. Adams (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 330–332. 
738 Gaventa, Thessalonians, 68.  
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specifically, consolation that is grounded in Christian teachings about life beyond 
death—is to be a shared responsibility.  
I venture to suggest three possible reasons as to why this is so. First, since the 
believers’ grief is due to ignorance on their part concerning the fate of the faithful dead 
(4.13), it is precisely the studied, corporately reinforced articulation and re-articulation 
of the theological realities underlying Christian consolation—for as we have seen 
earlier, the phrase ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις within Paul’s consolatory instructions (4.18) 
relates to his antecendent arguments (4.14–17)—which provide the best corrective to 
the problem of inordinate grief.  
Second, given Paul’s painstaking efforts to highlight to the Thessalonians the 
exceptional sociality that is to mark and shape their common life, it stands to reason that 
he should locate the responsibility of consolation within the ambit of this sociality, 
providing as it does further concrete opportunities to demonstrate brotherly love and 
upbuild social solidarity. The type of community that Paul seems to want to develop 
within the Thessalonian church is one that is characterized by unity, mutuality, 
interdependence, and a loving concern for one another—and all this to a superlative 
degree. Indeed, the bonds of relationship among the believers are to be so close that 
they approximate those that one might find in ideal family relationships; thus, for 
example, Paul applauds their exemplary φιλαδελφία, yet expresses a desire to see this 
love for the brethren intensify further (4.10; cf. 3.12). It seems reasonable to imagine 
that in Paul’s mind one way this would happen is if they were more intentional about 
their responsibility to bring encouragement and consolation to one another especially in 
difficult times, like grief; indeed, as we shall later see, such an attitude builds each other 
up (5.11). 
There is a third possible reason why Paul sees consolation as a shared 
responsibilty within the church. It is intriguing that for him consolation has its basis in a 
specific theological construal of a future, glorious sociality in which living believers are 
united with (σύν) deceased believers and both groups united with (σύν) their Lord for 
eternity (4.17; cf. 4.14; 5.10). It seems most fitting that the ministry of consolation—
which, after all, announces and celebrates the eschatological warrant for such a 
perfected sociality—should be embedded within an earthly sociality that serves as a 
harbinger of that heavenly one.  
We turn now to the closely related question of the relationship between 
consolation and mutual upbuilding. At 5.1–11, Paul concerns himself with the matter of 
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the fate of living believers at the return of Christ, rather than the fate of deceased 
believers (4.13–18). That the Thessalonian believers are anxious about the timing of this 
event and its consequences is indicated by the way Paul treats the subject and carefully 
reassures them of their eschatological destiny. It is particularly noteworthy that he 
brings his argument to a close by returning to the theme of being with the Lord, which 
was already so prominent (see 4.13, 17): ἵνα εἴτε γρηγορῶµεν εἴτε καθεύδωµεν ἅµα σὺν 
αὐτῷ ζήσωµεν (5.10). Not only will all believers, deceased or living, be found in the 
company of Christ at his parousia, but they “will live” with him—the ἐσόµεθα of 4.17 
being modified to ζήσωµεν to underscore the certainty of eternal life as the existential 
reality in which eschatological salvation consists.  
Paul concludes the section with the injunction Διὸ παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους καὶ 
οἰκοδοµεῖτε εἷς τὸν ἕνα, καθὼς καὶ ποιεῖτε (5.11), in which the παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους of 
4.18 is repeated verbatim. Appended to it is a second command, οἰκοδοµεῖτε εἷς τὸν ἕνα, 
which speaks unequivocally of the believers’ obligation to build each other up: the verb 
οἰκοδοµέω is always figuratively in Paul’s letters to connote some aspect of spiritual 
edification,739 while the elliptical phrase εἷς τὸν ἕνα (literally, “one on one”) seems to 
stress here the personal and intimate nature of such a mutual ministry.740 He does not 
specify the precise teachings that form the basis for this individual, reciprocal 
upbuilding, but the flow of his argument shows that at the very least he has in view both 
the immediately preceding discussion (5.1–10) and the subsequent exhortations that 
conclude the letter (5.12–22). The inferential conjuction διό with which he introduces 
the double commands of 5.10 links them to the preceding material in 5.1–10 (the διό 
thus functions similarly to the particle ὥστε in 4.18, in relation to 4.13–17), while the 
call to mutual edification has also a transitional function in the way it sets the stage for 
the explicit exhortations that follow, especially regarding attitudes and behaviour 
towards church leaders and fellow members of the Christian community (5.12–15).741  
Yet one may with some justification argue that Paul in 5.11 has in mind a more 
expansive picture of mutual encouragement than he has earlier at 4.18. Certainly, as we 
                                                
739 BDAG 696: “strengthen, build up, make more able”; likewise, its cognate noun is almost always 
used figuratively of “spiritual strengthening” and thus connotes “edifying, edification, building up” 
(BDAG 696–697). Paul uses the verb especially in 1 Corinthians (8.1, 10; 10.23; 14.4 [2x], 17).  
740 So Weima, Thessalonians, 372–373; Malherbe, Thessalonians, 300–301, 307–308; Witherington, 
Thessalonians, 153–154; Richard, Thessalonians, 257; who all argue that as in 2.11 (“how we dealt with 
each one of you”) Paul is stressing here in 5.11 the individualistic nature of this ministry. In other words, 
Paul had claimed in 2.11 that he had treated his converts as individuals; now, he expects them, as 
individuals, to build up other individuals just as he has done.  
741 See Weima, Thessalonians, 373, for further discussion.  
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have seen, with its parallel syntax the παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους in 5.11 picks up the note of 
comfort that is advocated in 4.18. However, it is noteworthy that here in 5.11 the ἐν τοῖς 
λόγοις τούτοις of 4.18 is omitted, and that the παρακαλεῖτε is now instead deliberately 
juxtaposed with οἰκοδοµεῖτε—which thereby interprets it and nuances its import. For 
Paul, then, exhortation has to do with mutual spiritual edification. Yet since it is in 
consequence of being the eschatological community that the Thessalonians are to edify 
and upbuild one another, the διό παρακαλεῖτε ἀλλήλους, with its concomitant 
οἰκοδοµεῖτε, must relate not only to 5.1–10 but to the entire section, 4.13–5.10.742 As 
such, the consolation of 4.18 is an integral aspect of the broader ministry of mutual 
edification that Paul speaks of and calls the believers to in 5.11.  
This emphasis on mutuality is all the more striking when we compare Paul’s 
thinking to the type of sociality that his Stoic contemporaries like Epictetus were 
advocating. At first blush, the two frameworks seem broadly comparable: Epictetus 
affirms the social nature of humankind, and also teaches that one should fulfil one’s 
duties to others.743 However, any apparent similarities very quickly vanish, because 
absent entirely from Epictetus’ scheme is any notion of the corporate mutuality that is 
so central to Paul’s programme. For Epictetus, as for the Stoics generally, happiness 
emerges through the deliberate limiting of one’s desires to those things that are located 
within the sphere of one’s volitional autonomy, and which are therefore reasonable to 
possess.744 As such, a proper relationship consists only in what one can do for someone 
else; one is never dependent on that other person for anything, least of all one’s own 
happiness and well being. Long explains it well: 
The correct performance of one’s social roles … is both outwardly and inwardly 
oriented. It is outward in what it requires by way of sensitivity to the dignity and 
claims of other persons, but what it is about other persons that should concern us 
is not how they treat us … but only how we dispose ourselves in relation to them. 
The relevant relationship is entirely one-sided: us in relation to them, not them in 
relation to us. That is because, as Epictetus views the basis of proper relationships, 
they should be entirely translated, like everything we deal with, into the domain of 
our volition and integrity.745  
Thus, while the fulfilment of one’s duties to others is integral to Epictetus’ 
thought, one’s first responsility is to maintain the integrity of one’s own volition—the 
result of which is properly dutiful behaviour that reveals a remarkably high level of 
relational self-sufficiency. Paul’s emphasis on unity, mutual love, and reciprocity in the 
                                                
742 On this see Malherbe, Thessalonians, 300.  
743 Epictetus, Diatr. 3.2.4. See also the discussion in section 2.5.1.c above. 
744 Long, Epictetus, 191; see also section 2.2.1 above. 
745 Long, Epictetus, 237 (emphasis mine). See Epictetus, Diatr. 2.22.20 
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carrying out of responsibilties such as the ministry of consolation and the upbuilding of 
one another, takes the Thessalonian church in a completely different direction. There is 
no trace of Stoic self-sufficiency in Paul’s scheme; instead, what he promotes within the 
Thessalonians is a purposeful interdependence that is expressed through mutual 
ministry among them. Each person is to assume thoughtful responsibility for the 
spiritual nurture and upbuilding of others within the community of faith. In fact, we 
may go so far as to suggest that there is a sense in which Paul is saying that each 
member of the church needs the faithful, attentive ministry of other members, so that 
together they can more fully become the community that God has called them to be. As 
we have seen, this ministry, as Paul construes it, is both deeply individual and warmly 
reciprocal in nature; and in good paraenetic style he concludes this section by 
complimenting the Thessalonian for already demonstrating it in their relationships with 
each other (καθὼς καὶ ποιεῖτε, 5.11). The believers are apparently already actively 
engaged in ministry to one another—ministry that is to include the bringing of 
consolation and comfort to the bereaved among them.   
4.4.2.d. The Function of Consolation 
We turn, finally, to a consideration of the function of consolation in the letter. To 
be sure, Paul’s provision of feeling rules to the Thessalonians to manage their grief puts 
him in the company of many others in his day who sought to bring comfort to the 
bereaved. Whether one takes what Paul says to be an absolute prohibition against grief 
or otherwise, the fact remains that he prescribes strict qualitative limits on the extent of 
grief as it pertains to the death of other Christians. Why, however, is Paul so concerned 
about inordinate grief? Or, to ask a more pointed question: what would happen if the 
Thessalonians failed to console one another at this time of mourning?  
As Barton notes, the instructions issued by Paul place him at or near one end of 
the spectrum of the philosophical (and general) debate as to whether grief and its social 
representation in mourning were reasonable responses to death for those who thought 
themselves to be truly wise and virtuous. He goes on to suggest that Paul’s consolatory 
approach very likely carried moral and rhetorical weight with its recipients at least in 
part because it accorded with the strong emphasis on the control of the emotions within 
Stoic therapeutic paraenesis.746 Certainly, there are some interesting parallels—at least 
                                                
746 Barton, “Eschatology,” 587–588.  
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at a superficial level—between Paul’s teachings and that of his Stoic contemporaries on 
the subjugation of grief. In different ways, both Paul and the Stoics locate the possibility 
of consolation within a thoroughgoing rational dismantling of the usefulness and 
appositeness of grief in the face of death. A recapitulation of Stoic thinking about grief 
and its cure is helpful at this point.  
In Stoicism, grief (λύπη) is the opinion that some present thing is an evil of such a 
sort that one should be downcast about it (see section 2.3.3.a). More specifically, grief is 
the result of the combination of two related value judgements: an evaluation of an 
external object as being injurious to oneself, and a belief in the appropriateness of a 
predicative reaction to it. However, since it is irrational to think that external objects are 
of any significance to one’s state of well-being, both sets of judgements are 
systematically misguided. Therefore on the Stoic account, grief—being the consequence 
of fallacious reasoning—is a passion to be extirpated. As such, integral to Stoic 
philosophical teaching and therapeutic intervention is the insistence that the judgements 
with which the passions are identified are erroneous, since all externals do not carry any 
intrinsic value whatsoever.  
Thus, as we have seen earlier (see section 2.5.1.b), Seneca freely harnesses 
several stock philosophical arguments in his efforts to attenuate the grief that the 
addressees of his letters are experiencing: for instance, that death is inevitable for all, 
that it delivers those who have died from both present and future misfortunes, and that 
grief is of no use whatsoever—benefitting neither oneself nor the person for whom one 
mourns. Outwardly, his consolatory strategies share many similarities with Greco-
Roman consolation in general,747 especially in regard to their ideological neutrality and 
highly practical bent. Embedded within Seneca’s thought, however, is also some 
quintessentially Stoic thinking, at the heart of which is the conclusion that grief is 
inherently irrational because it is fuelled by a false opinion about the state of matters in 
which the individual finds himself. Yet, as I have argued, Seneca’s view of grief and its 
expression is a multi-faceted one. On the one hand, though he acknowledges that grief 
is a naturally reflexive and therefore unavoidable response to the tragedies that 
inevitably encroach on human life, he calls for a carefully deliberate application of 
                                                
747 As Paul Holloway observes, popular arguments against grief took various conventional forms: “(1) 
time heals all things, (2) death is common to all, (3) grief does not avail the dead and is detrimental to the 
living, and (4) the proper response is gratitude for the life lived”; “Left Behind: Jesus’ Consolation of His 
Disciples in John 13,31–17,26,” ZNW 96 (2005): 4. 
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reason to curb any grief that becomes uncontrollably excessive.748 Seneca apparently 
champions, at least in relation to grief, a form of metriopatheia. On the other hand, he 
also seems to want to uncover within the boundaries of Stoicism the possibility of the 
presence of a specific type of grief that is not incompatible with virtuous thinking and 
living, or, in other words, the wise person’s grief—one that emerges not because of 
some involuntary emotional reflex but because of positive, voluntary feelings that are 
based on fully veridical assessments of one’s circumstances.749 As we have noted, such 
a “proper” grief might be considered a eupathic antithesis to pathological grief. 
Seneca’s multivalent understanding of grief stands in contrast to that of Epictetus, 
whose perhaps more straightforwardly Stoic reading of the passions construes grief as 
the result of the wholly mistaken judgement that death is something dreadful for the 
human person (see section 2.5.1.c). Simply put, then, the Stoic wise person would not 
experience nor exhibit grief of the kind that would compromise his state of rational 
equanimity. Yet even though Epictetus, unlike Seneca, does not show much interest in 
how one might bring consolation in practical ways to someone who was grieving, it is 
noteworthy that he mentions that one should not hesitate to show sympathy to such a 
person. However, any demonstration of affective solidarity must not result in sorrow 
that causes a disruption in one’s control over one’s own mind and thinking.750 For 
Epictetus, the maintaining of the integrity of one’s self-autonomy and volition is of the 
utmost importance.751 Thus we see that both Seneca and Epictetus are seeking to work 
out and promote, within the Stoic philosophical framework, a rational basis for the 
management of grief. Since death is a natural phenomenon that lies beyond the ability 
of humans to control, it is to be accepted dispassionately. What is important is the 
manner in which one chooses to live. 
That Paul has an equally reasoned interest in what makes consolation efficacious 
in the constraint of grief is hinted at in his choice of words relating to knowledge, belief, 
and the mind—οὐ θέλοµεν δὲ ὑµᾶς ἀγνοεῖν (4.13), εἰ γὰρ πιστεύοµεν (4.14)—and 
immediately confirmed when he discloses the theological rationale for his approach. 
The Stoics located their solution wholly within the human person’s own internal 
resources, or more specifically, within his or her powers of right reason, but Paul has 
cast his gaze elsewhere—to God’s action in human history in the past, present, and 
                                                
748 See esp. Seneca, Polyb. 18.4–7.  
749 See Seneca, Ep. 99.18–21.  
750 Epictetus, Ench. 16.  
751 See also section 2.5.1.c above.   
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future. As Paul sees it, for the Christian to grieve in the manner of unbelievers is wholly 
irrational: not because death is an external good that is devoid of any intrinsic value, but 
because death will give way to life with other believers and with Christ at the eschaton. 
At its core, then, Paul’s consolatory strategy is rooted in his theological worldview—in 
the hope of a cosmic union at the parousia, one so powerful that it overcomes both 
physical and mortal separation and thereby reinterprets, and indeed relativizes, death 
itself.752 Thus, for believers to grieve καθὼς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ οἱ µὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα (4.13b) 
would be to misrepresent the grand, overarching eschatological narrative which 
encompasses their individual life histories, and thus misunderstand the true nature of 
their Christian identity. For as Christians, their destinies are eternally secure: the 
dislocation that death produces is only temporary, because Christ will return to bring to 
himself those who are his.  
This, I suggest, points us towards the answer as to why Paul is so concerned 
about inordinate grief in the Thessalonian church, and why he takes such care to deal 
with what is happening among his new converts. Simply put, for Paul, how one grieves 
is inextricably related to what one truly believes about death and therefore also to the 
entire system of Christian theological understanding that underpins and sustains these 
beliefs. The Stoics, too, thought that grief, like other passions, could be assuaged 
through a process of corrected cognitive evaluation. However, though both frameworks 
evince a rigorously reasoned approach to the therapy of grief, there are fundamentally 
different ideological bases for the consolation that they each offer. Furthermore, why 
such consolation is important is also not the same. Paul does not share the Stoics’ 
overriding concern for inner serenity and rational imperturbability; instead, he is 
interested in the creation and maintenance of a robust Christian self-identity which will 
thereby foster the stability of the community of believers as a whole. Hence, for Paul, 
excessive grief is highly problematic not only because it betrays in the individual an 
inadequate understanding of Christian death, but because it threatens the ethos of the 
young church at Thessalonica. In fact, as Paul might see it, any failure of the 
Thessalonians to bring consolation to each other could be potentially disastrous; for if 
they were to waver in their Christian faith because of despairing grief, they would 
surely find it increasingly difficult to bear up under the social conflict in which they 
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were embroiled—social conflict which had arisen precisely because of their allegiance 
to this faith.753  
Given Paul’s interest in safeguarding the health of the church at large, it is not 
surprising that while the feeling rules concerning grief that he gives to the 
Thessalonians are certainly premised on the specifics of his eschatological vision, these 
rules have also a distinctively sociological cast in that they reveal a powerful potential 
to establish clear group boundaries, thereby helping to structure both individual and 
corporate self-definition along distinctively Christian lines.   
As we have noted earlier, in Paul’s theological framework, all of humanity may 
be located in one of two categories: those who have eschatological hope, because they 
follow Christ; and everyone else—somewhat unceremoniously dismissed as “the rest” 
(οἱ λοιποί, 4.13)—i.e., those who are without this hope. There are no exceptions to the 
complete polarizing of humanity on this basis. Perhaps because he wishes to drive home 
the point, in several places but especially in ch. 5, Paul contrasts these two categories of 
humanity in starkly antithetical terms, often using metaphorical language. On the one 
side are the believers, ἀδελφοί754 loved and chosen by God (1.4), to whom knowledge of 
“the times and seasons”—a stock phrase relating to the timing of apocalytic events755—
has been disclosed (5.1–2).756 In Paul’s eschatological drama, they are cast in approving 
terms as “children of light” (5.5) and “children of the day” (5.5; cf. 5.8) who remain 
awake and sober (5.6); ultimately, they obtain salvation through Christ (5.9). On the 
other side lies the rest of humanity: they are “outsiders” (4.12) who do not know God 
(4.5) nor anything of his eschatological agendum (5.3). Depicted as a negative foil to 
believers, such people are “of the night and of darkness” (5.5; cf. 5.4), being drunk and 
asleep (5.7). In the end, lacking sober vigilance, they, unlike the believers, are unable to 
escape God’s wrath (5.3, 9).757  
                                                
753 Barclay, “Conflict,” 516–518, argues convincingly that the Thessalonians’ apocalyptic worldview 
and their experience of social alienation reinforced each other in a complex dialectic: their apocalyptic 
perspective helped them to see their sufferings as something that was to be expected but also temporary; 
conversely, every experience of social conflict only reinforced the truth of the apocalyptic teachings that 
they had adopted.  
754 See n.622 for the other occurrences in 1 Thess.  
755 On this see the discussions and similar conclusions in Weima, Thessalonians, 344; Malherbe, 
Thessalonians, 288–289; Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 177–178.  
756 Whether οὐ χρείαν ἔχετε ὑµῖν γράφεσθαι (5.1) is indeed a case of paralipsis (Weima, 
Thessalonians, 345) or not (Malherbe, Thessalonians, 289) does not affect the interpretation of 5.1–2: 
Paul is saying that the Thessalonians already know that the coming of the parousia is certain but that it 
will be unexpected.   
757 See further Barclay, “Death,” 225–227. 
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One cannot fail to notice the care with which Paul distinguishes the believing 
community from the rest of humanity on the basis of their wholly different 
eschatological destinies. Barclay argues rightly that “[t]he crucial move that Paul makes 
here is to adjust this differentiation so as to take account of death, indeed to direct 
believers into making death itself—how they mark it and how they view it—a symbol 
of their distinction.”758 In other words, the manner in which a Christian grieves can 
reveal a great deal about what he or she truly believes concerning the eternal destiny of 
the believer. On this view, eschatological confidence (or its lack thereof) becomes an 
important Pauline boundary marker of identity and self-definition on both the personal 
and corporate planes of Christian self-understanding. Putting it another way: for Paul, 
attitudes towards grief function to differentiate believers from the people around them, 
and thereby become intrinsic to the proper formation of Christian identity.  
We may therefore conclude that for Paul consolation plays a highly distinctive 
role in the upbuilding of the Thessalonian church. Since consolation has to do with 
having a right knowledge of eschatological reality, Paul carefully summarizes the 
teaching of the church concerning the events at the parousia. That which is certain to 
happen in the future has momentous ontological and ethical implications for the present 
state of bereavement in which the believers find themselves, in relation to their self-
identity and to how they are to grieve. As Beverly Gaventa writes:  
What Paul affirms regarding the relationship of believers with one another and 
with their Lord reaches well beyond a social relationship confined to this place and 
time. Those who are bound together remain so, even after death. The boundary 
Paul has drawn around the church is a boundary that extends into the future. 
Although a boundary separates believers from non-believers, it does not separate 
the living from the dead. The social world created in the church runs in two 
directions—believers’ association with the Lord and their association with one 
another.759  
For Paul, consolation both expresses and is itself embedded within this extraordinary 
multi-dimensional sociality. It simultaneously brings comfort and assurance, because it 
occurs within and speaks of relationships that do not end with death, and because this 
felicitous state of affairs is grounded in a hope that is certain. It is interesting that this 
hope is directed towards an ultimate goal that is thoroughly social: eternal life lived 
with Christ, in the company of other believers.  
 
                                                
758 Barclay, “Death,” 227. Though I am not persuaded by Barclay’s interpretation of 1 Thess 4.13 as 
an absolute prohibition against grief (see section 4.3.4), in the main his thesis about a Pauline 
“christianizing” of death is highly compelling; on this see esp. 227–228, 234. 
759 Gaventa, Thessalonians, 68.  
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4.5. Conclusion 
In 1 Thessalonians, Paul responds to a beleaguered church that has also recently 
been thrown into grief because of the unforeseen deaths of some of its members. 
Several factors contributed to the opprobrium and oppression that the Thessalonians 
have had to endure, including, most notably, their rejection of traditional Greco-Roman 
religious beliefs, the social disruption resulting from their conversion experience, and 
the political overtones of the Christian message—all of which led to their being 
stigmatized as socially and ideologically deviant. These sufferings are now exacerbated 
by the heartache of bereavement; and there is a sense in which the deaths of their 
members represented a double crisis—of loss as well as faith—because the already 
emotionally fragile Thessalonians have been hit by deaths that they could not reconcile 
with what they knew of the Christian’s identity and destiny. Unable to return to 
Thessalonica in person, Paul writes this letter to encourage them in their convictions 
and also to comfort them in their grief, which he presupposes is symptomatic of a 
confused or incomplete eschatology.  
The painstaking care with which Paul addresses the Thessalonians’ grief indicates 
how serious the matter is to him. At one level, there is the searing pain of personal 
loss—perhaps all the more acute given the close bonds of affection among the believers, 
and the fact that relationships within the church were probably particularly valued 
because of the social dislocation that scarred their lives. However, at another level, at 
stake is nothing less than the long-term stability of the Thessalonian church, because 
protracted and untreated sorrow that stemmed from an inadequate understanding of 
death would surely undermine the believers’ confidence in the future and hope in God.  
Like others in his day, Paul therefore imposes feeling rules to control grief; and 
like much of contemporaneous philosophical thought, these consolatory principles take 
their cue from some form of cognitive evaluation as to what death actually is. However, 
the ideological roots of Paul’s injunctions are entirely unique: thus, where for example 
the Stoics reject grief because they see it as a completely misjudged and therefore 
wholly irrational affective response to death, which lies beyond one’s ability to control, 
Paul instead grounds his consolatory instructions in a theological rehearsal of the events 
surrounding the parousia. The death of fellow Christians is not an occasion for 
inordinate grief, because their eternal destiny is secure: the resurrection of Jesus is a 
guarantee of the resurrection of dead believers. Thus, as Paul seems to see it, a forward-
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looking confidence that is based on sound eschatological expectation can help to 
immunize believers against excessive grief, thereby making their response to death 
itself a powerful symbol of Christian distinctiveness.  
At the same time, Paul charges the Thessalonians with the task of bringing 
comfort to one another in their grief, thus deliberately situating this shared 
responsibility for consolation within the locus of the remarkable sociality that their 
common life is to embody and manifest. The effect of all this is to foreground the 
distinctiveness of their faith, and with it the distinctiveness of their eschatological 
identity and corporate ethos, in two important ways.  
First, the profoundly relational nature of the Christian life is emphasized. While a 
believer’s identity certainly derives primarily from his or her relationship with Christ, it 
is reinforced and even vivified in community as individuals take seriously their 
responsibility to nurture and upbuild one another. Paul’s summons to the Thessalonians 
to continue their ministry of mutual spiritual edification seems to imply that they 
require each other’s ministry in order to develop and live out their Christian identity. 
Such a network of interdependent relationships would be unimaginable for a Stoic, in 
whose eyes the presence of others might possibly be instrumentally necessary for the 
exercise of virtue, but is never constitutive of it. For Paul, however, there is an 
intrinsically social dimension to the Christian’s proper flourishing: it is in relationship 
with Christ and with other believers that one reaches one’s fullest potential.  
Second, and related to the foregoing, the permanence of these sets of relationships 
is highlighted. It is precisely because death results in only a temporary disruption of 
these bonds that consolation makes any sense at all. The Christian hope is that at the 
return of Christ, death will give way to life with him and with other believers. Therefore 
consolation, for Paul, has to do with believers reminding one another during times of 
grief—no matter how severe—that this beatific vision of consummate sociality is also 
an eschatological reality that awaits them. 
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Chapter 5. The Pauline Emotional Regime 
5.1.  Introduction 
Our study of two key emotional stances in Paul’s writings—joy, and the 
consolation of grief—has shown that far from being related only to the individual’s 
inner states, emotion has also a distinctively social cast: there are fundamental ways in 
which emotion is both socially constructed and socially promulgated. Moreover, an 
emotion is not a subjective paroxysmal response to an external trigger, but is connected 
deeply to, and in fact generated from, fundamental dispositions of thought and belief. 
To the extent that all this is so, specific emotional states can therefore be commanded, 
and hence also be learnt and regularly practised. Within the church, emotions such as 
joy are to be actively encouraged, while other emotional patterns such as inordinate 
grief are to be jettisoned from the life of the believer. Paul takes pains to carefully put 
into place and to promote certain ways of feeling and means of affective response; in a 
highly pragmatic sense he is teaching his followers how they should feel—just as he 
constantly teaches them how they should think and act. All this suggests that in his 
overarching scheme, emotion plays a substantial role in helping to shape and stabilize 
key aspects of Christian identity at both the individual and corporate level. Right 
emotion can embody, and thereby reinforce, modes of cognition and thinking that are 
consonant with what it means to be a believer amidst other believers; conversely, 
uncontrolled displays of affect can severely compromise or even destroy the believer’s 
self-identity and witness. The stakes could not be any higher.  
What I am therefore proposing is that for Paul, patterns of feeling are to go hand 
in hand with patterns of belief; and that these patterns of feeling, like the patterns of 
belief with which they are intertwined, have a social context and function. To use a term 
that we shall explain fully in due course, through what he is doing (i.e. encouraging 
certain emotions and discounting others) Paul is in effect inculcating in his churches 
what some sociologists have called an “emotional regime”—an ordering of emotion, 
closely bound up with the social world of which it is a part and informed by the system 
of religious symbols to which it is intricately connected, that simultaneously structures 
and regulates the emotional responses of its members in accordance with the reality 
framework that is deemed as normative for them. Since this deliberate control of 
emotion has a set of functions or effects that are targeted at the upbuilding of the 
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community of believers, there is ample justification to regard emotion as a key 
dimension of the social formation of the early Church—a dimension that has yet to be 
fully explored in current NT scholarship. Far from being only incidental in the effort to 
understand the lives of the first believers, a rigorous engagement with emotion—which 
encodes and communicates theological beliefs and moral judgements, and thus 
expresses individual and group identity in the everyday context of social relationships 
and cultural engagement—can only contribute to a fuller appreciation of Pauline 
Christianity.   
In 1983, Wayne Meeks published his The First Urban Christians—an innovative, 
wide-ranging, and yet meticulous reconstruction of the social realities of the Pauline 
assemblies that placed early Christianity squarely in its sociocultural setting and 
signalled the fact that social-scientific approaches to the study of the NT had come to 
substantial maturity. Meeks’ landmark work (now in its second edition760) arguably 
heralded a new era in scholarship on Paul, and numerous subsequent studies reveal the 
breadth and depth of his enduring influence. Of particular relevance to my study is 
Meeks’ correlating of the beliefs and doctrines of the early Church with the social 
structures within which the early Christians operated and with certain aspects of their 
social experience. In the following section, I will outline Meeks’ proposals in this area. 
However, highly influential though his proposals have been, next to nothing is said 
about the emotional life of the believers. I suggest that the inclusion of the role of 
emotion would flesh out more fully Meeks’ account of the socialization of Paul’s 
converts in line with their newfound faith, and thereby help to move us towards an even 
more robust and full-orbed understanding of early Christianity.  
This chapter will be laid out in the following manner. First, as mentioned, I will 
outline Meeks’ ideas concerning the two-way relationship between what a typical 
member of a Pauline congregation believed in regard to doctrine and the social force or 
effects of that belief. As a corollary I will very briefly trace selected trajectories of 
scholarship that develop Meeks’ basic ideas, where these studies contribute to our 
appreciation of Paul’s understanding of the function of emotion. Next, I will explore in 
detail the sociological concept of the emotional regime as a heuristic tool for our 
investigation of Paul and emotion. Finally, bringing all these aspects together—and 
building on, and going beyond, the earlier work of others—I will provide an account of 
                                                
760 Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul, 2nd ed. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 
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the function of emotion in Paul’s churches, and argue that for Paul how the believer is 
to feel is intimately related to what he or she thinks about crucially important matters of 
faith, life, and death, and that a certain set of prescribed, right feelings must therefore be 
placed within that larger set of prescribed, right beliefs and behaviours that distinguish 
those who pledge their allegiance to Christ from others who do not belong to the 
community of faith. As with the right beliefs that constitute and animate them, right 
emotions have both a socially integrating and a differentiating function: a set of 
endorsed, taught, learnt, and mutually experienced emotions strengthens a group’s 
solidarity while at the same time clearly demarcating its boundaries. For Paul, emotion 
is an important aspect of the complex composite of Christian belief and sociality, and 
thus an integral aspect of what it means for a believer to be in community with other 
believers, and for that community to be in the world.  
 
5.2. The Early Christians and Emotion 
5.2.1. Wayne Meeks’ The First Urban Christians 
In his study of the social world of the Pauline congregations, Meeks draws on a 
range of anthropological and sociological insights, on Roman social history, as well as 
NT studies, to elucidate what life was like for ordinary Christians. Certainly, his study 
was part of a burgeoning body of scholarly work which, beginning in the 1970s, had 
incorporated social-scientific criticism in the study of early Christianity. Yet the 
creative ways in which Meeks consolidated much of the early scholarship on the 
Pauline churches (perhaps most notably Gerd Theissen’s work on social stratification in 
Corinth) and also championed important new ideas (e.g. concerning the purpose of 
ritual, and the role of “status inconsistency” in attracting would-be converts) led to the 
widespread recognition that his study represented a milestone in NT scholarship, a 
mature flourishing of studies in this area.  
Methodologically, Meeks regards himself as a social historian of early 
Christianity whose general approach is aimed at producing what is in effect a Geertzian 
“thick description” or interpretative ethnography of the social world of the Pauline 
congregations.761 Adopting what he takes to be an increasingly shared view among 
                                                
761 Meeks, Christians, 5–6. Meeks declares that his approach is “analogous to Clifford Geertz’s 
description of the social anthropologist’s task as an ethnographer, a describer of culture” (6).  
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social scientists and historians of religion, for Meeks “[s]ociety is viewed as a process, 
in which personal identity and social forms are mutually and continually created by 
interactions that occur by means of symbols.”762 Hence, social and symbolic structures 
are related in a real but complex way, and religion is an integral part of the sociocultural 
web.763 Within this general context, Meeks styles himself a “moderate functionalist;” in 
his own words, the comprehensive question guiding the reading of his primary sources 
has to do with “not only what each one says, but what it does.” For him, such a 
theoretical stance sidesteps the reductionism that would result from a purely 
functionalist, Durkheimian, reading of the function of religion.764  
Meeks’ avowedly eclectic and piecemeal use of the social sciences parades a 
deliberate yet shrewd pragmatism in which a theory is employed as needed when it can 
help to shed light on some aspect of the social lives of the early Christians.765 
Accordingly, he borrows and carefully applies insights from a wide assortment of 
approaches,766 with impressive results. For example, in the second chapter of his study, 
where he discusses the social level of Pauline Christians, Meeks suggests that an 
individual’s social profile was a multidimensional composite of diverse indicators 
beyond merely economic ones, such as ethnic origin, ordo, citizenship, personal liberty, 
wealth, occupation, public offices, and others.767 Furthermore, the person’s relative 
status within each of these categories was often very different—leading to what 
sociologists term as “status inconsistency” or “status dissonance.”768 Meeks argues that 
the nascent Christian movement was attractive to those of high status inconsistency 
because it offered them the resources to resolve the perceived ambiguities in their social 
positioning.769  
Especially germane to my study is Meeks’ exploration (in ch. 6 of his book) of 
the relationship between the systems of doctrine reflected in the Pauline letters and the 
systems of social relations experienced by those to whom these letters are addressed. In 
Meeks’ view, there are discernible correlations between these “patterns of belief” and 
                                                
762 Meeks, Christians, 6.  
763 Meeks, Christians, 6.  
764 Meeks, Christians, 6–7.  
765 Meeks, Christians, 6.  
766 E.g. Victor Turner (Meeks, Christians, 88–89, 157), Mary Douglas (97, 141), and Melford E. 
Spiro (140–141) on aspects of ritual; Tony Reekmans (22–23), P. R. C. Weaver (22–23), and Seymour 
Martin Lipset (54) on questions of social status and social mobility; Leon Festinger (85) on social 
cohesion; and Brian Wilson (85) on sects.   
767 Meeks, Christians, 55. 
768 Meeks, Christians, 22–23, 54–55.  
769 Meeks, Christians, 72–73.  
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“patterns of life”: the term “correlation” is specifically chosen to indicate that one can 
speak of how belief structures match social forms without needing to assume that there 
is a direct causal relationship in either direction.770 He concludes his discussion by 
outlining four areas where the correlations between symbolization and socialization 
seem particularly apparent. First, the unity of the one God of Pauline Christianity is 
correlated with the unity that is to mark the entire body of believers, i.e., in each local 
congregation and in the connections between them. Second, the belief that God is 
personal and active is correlated with the nature of the relationships within the local 
assembly of believers, which are to be marked by intimacy, mutual commitment, and 
the expectation of a high degree of interpersonal engagement. Third, Pauline 
eschatology is matched with, and thus helps the Christians to make sense of, the social 
experiences that have come in the wake of conversion. Fourth, the social contradictions 
experienced by the group and embodied personally by its members find their correlate 
in the contradictions experienced and embodied by Christ.771 At this juncture Meeks 
reiterates his earlier proposal concerning how the status inconsistency that characterized 
the lives of the new converts would have drawn them deeper into Christianity, with its 
powerful symbols of a divine ordering of the world and of personal and communal 
transformation, and its enticing promises of a sense of belonging and of relational 
intimacy.772  
In summary, then: for Meeks, belief structures and sacred symbols (patterns of 
belief) affect social reality and socialization (patterns of life) in profound ways, and vice 
versa. Moreover, it is precisely this complex dialectic that helps to explain why typical 
converts to Pauline Christianity were attracted to it in the first place; for Meeks, matters 
concerning the societal status of the individual play directly into the question of how 
Christianity was viewed and accepted and its teachings legitimated. All this has led to 
the common acknowledgement that one of the most significant contributions that 
Meeks’ work has made to the study of the NT is in its consideration of the extent to 
which the growth of first century Christianity in its urban setting was assisted by socio-
economic factors.773  
                                                
770 Meeks, Christians, 164.  
771 Meeks, Christians, 190–191.  
772 Meeks, Christians, 191.  
773 So e.g. Bruce W. Longenecker, “Socio-Economic Profiling of the First Urban Christians,” in After 
the First Urban Christians: The Social-Scientific Study of Pauline Christianity Twenty-Five Years Later, 
ed. Todd D. Still and David G. Horrell (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 36–37. 
Chapter 5. The Pauline Emotional Regime 
 176 
Not unexpectedly, Meeks’ proposals have also aroused much debate, perhaps 
especially in regard to his methodological stance on the social-scientific study of the NT 
and his use of status inconsistency to explain in socio-economic terms the allure of early 
urban Christianity.774 Nonetheless, Meeks’ legacy is immense, and his work has hugely 
influenced subsequent generations of scholars and galvanized numerous studies.775 Of 
course, all this scholarly activity must be placed in its broader context: in the three 
decades since the publication of The First Urban Christians, there has been a continued 
diversification in both the range of approaches and types of concerns associated with 
efforts to engage with and understand the NT in social-scientific terms—and to such a 
diffuse degree that that it impossible to speak today of any kind of common approach, 
method, or focus to define the field.776 Nonetheless, Meeks’ work has in many ways 
remained highly seminal.  
5.2.2. Moving Beyond Meeks: The Social Function of Emotion 
As I have earlier mentioned, the aspect of Meeks’ work that I want to focus on for 
the purposes of my study has to do with how he correlates the social experiences of the 
Pauline Christians with the structures of belief that were integral to their resocialization 
as members of a new social organization. The dialectical relationship that Meeks 
identifies between patterns of belief and patterns of life is extremely helpful in opening 
up the question of the social force of doctrine in relation to the formation of a 
distinctively Christian identity at both the individual and group level. Yet I wish to 
suggest that Meeks’ account would be enriched, and perhaps to no small degree, if it 
incorporated an explicit consideration of the function of emotion in the socialization of 
these new converts, especially given what recent developments in cognitive science and 
in social-scientific research suggest about the nature and construction of emotion (see 
section 1.3 above).  
                                                
774 For a concise summary of the reactions to Meeks insofar as they relate to methodological 
considerations, see David G. Horrell, “Whither Social-Scientific Approaches to New Testament 
Interpretation? Reflections on Contested Methodologies and the Future,” in After the First Urban 
Christians: The Social-Scientific Study of Pauline Christianity Twenty-Five Years Later, ed. Todd D. Still 
and David G. Horrell (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 7–8. On the debate over Meeks’ approach to social 
profiling, see Longenecker, “Profiling,” esp. 38–45. 
775 See esp. the essays in Todd D. Still and David G. Horrell, eds., After the First Urban Christians: 
The Social-Scientific Study of Pauline Christianity Twenty-Five Years Later (London: T&T Clark, 2009). 
776 Horrell, “Contested Methodologies,” 8. See 8–11 for a useful overview of key developments in 
social-scientific approaches to the NT since the 1980s.  
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To be sure, at a number of points in his study Meeks seems to acknowledge that 
emotion has some sort of role in this process, at least in connection with the use of 
language. For example, in his discussion of the formation of the Pauline communities, 
Meeks stresses that boundaries were drawn to help the groups identify themselves as 
groups and as a broader movement. These boundaries included “aspects of language, 
practice, and expressed sentiments and attitudes that gave the group internal 
cohesion”;777 and among the aspects of language that Meeks highlights is the 
emotionally-charged, fictive use of kinship terms within the group—which he 
understands to play a role in cementing a believer’s new identity and thus in reinforcing 
the communitas of the Christian groups, especially when such use is accompanied by 
special terms for “the outsiders” and “the world.”778 Noting the extremely unusual 
frequency and intensity of affective phrases in the Pauline corpus when compared to 
other ancient letters, Meeks cites several examples from 1 Thessalonians and 
Philippians and concludes that “[t]he Pauline letters are unusually rich in emotional 
language—joy and rejoicing, anxiety, longing.”779 Nowhere, however, does Meeks treat 
emotion independently of language as a separate aspect of the resocialization of the new 
believers.  
Thus, later in his study (and still with reference to the function of language) 
Meeks makes the observation that  
“not just the shared contents of beliefs but also shared forms by which the beliefs 
are expressed are important in promoting cohesiveness. Every close-knit group 
develops its own argot, and the use of that argot in speech among members knits 
them more closely still.”780  
In his discussion, Meeks has in mind such things as in-group jargon and special 
nuances, syntactical patterns of speech, slogans, and ritual language.781 But while his 
wide-ranging focus on the function of language as a repository and carrier of belief is 
salutary, one wonders if his conclusions might be reinforced by an exploration of 
emotion itself as a site for the expression—linguistic or otherwise—of shared beliefs. 
Elsewhere, Meeks concludes in his analysis of 1 Thess 4.13–5.11 that the function of 
Paul’s apocalyptic language here and in the letter as a whole is to reinforce the sense of 
uniqueness and cohesion of the community, which in turn produces a disposition to act 
                                                
777 Meeks, Christians, 85.  
778 Meeks, Christians, 85–86, 94–95; see also 88–89.  
779 Meeks, Christians, 86–87 (quote from 86).  
780 Meeks, Christians, 93.  
781 Meeks, Christians, 93–94.  
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in a way appropriate to its well-being. Meeks sets out what such appropriate behaviour 
is: it “includes internal discipline and obedience of leaders (5.13–22), a quiet life that 
will seem benign to outsiders (4.11f.).”782 While it seems right to think that it is not 
Meeks’ intention to be exhaustive here, it is still rather surprising that a properly 
Christian response to the untimely death of other believers is omitted from this rehearsal 
of appropriate behaviour patterns—for after all, it was the issue of grief which 
precipitated the writing of 1 Thessalonians in the first place. Furthermore, as we have 
seen earlier, Paul takes painstaking care to bring consolation to them because, left 
untreated, such grief—which stemmed from a deficient understanding of eschatology—
would surely rupture the self-identity and thus the well-being of the believing 
community. Again, it seems to me that attention to the function of emotion would 
further strengthen Meeks’ fine arguments concerning the socialization of Paul’s new 
converts.  
My point, however, is not so much to try to identify gaps in Meeks’ approach as 
to use it as a kind of launch pad for my suggestion that there is much to be gained in 
placing emotion alongside belief when asking questions about the ways in which the 
early Christians were formed into communities, and into a movement, and about how 
these social structures acquired such stability and longevity. What can be added to what 
we already know about the socialization of new believers in the first century milieu of 
Pauline Christianity through a considered exploration of the role of emotion? I suggest 
that like the beliefs with which they are associated (and like the structures of language 
and ritual within which such beliefs are encoded), emotions as Paul sees them play a 
crucial role in staking the boundaries, personal as well as corporate, between believers 
and the world around them, and therefore in reinforcing the internal social cohesion of 
the Christian groups. Emotions are able to perform this role because, as we shall see, 
they can have a socially integrating or a socially differentiating function. The patterns of 
feeling that Paul seems to want to promote are related closely to the patterns of belief 
that mark out what it means to be a Christian.  
It is at this point that I wish to introduce, from recent social-scientific thinking, 
the notion of the “emotional regime” as an analytical framework for our heuristic 
engagement with emotion in Paul. Our reading of what he says about joy and grief and 
consolation in two of his letters has demonstrated that there is very clearly a social 
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dimension to these states of emotion: they are socially generated and socially expressed, 
and they also influence and shape Christian sociality itself. As such, a tool that can help 
us to investigate in comprehensive terms the social dimensions of emotion, without 
losing sight of the fact that emotion is at the same time something intrinsic to the 
individual, will be very useful; and in what is to follow I will describe the sociological 
concept of the emotional regime (first introduced at section 1.3.2) in some detail.  
 
5.3. The Sociological Concept of the “Emotional Regime” 
5.3.1. The Emotional Regime 
In their multidimensional account, Riis and Woodhead posit emotion as being 
produced in the interactions between (1) self and society, (2) self and symbol, and (3) 
symbol and society. Each of these three sets of relationships are dynamic, two-way, 
dialectical processes in which the relata are themselves shaped by the relationship. At 
the same time, these three sets of relationships are inherently interdependent and 
therefore mutually constitutive.783 For example, while cultural and religious traditions 
set broad communal parameters and continuities, the symbols associated with these 
traditions can be interpreted and shaped by individuals in ways that give purchase over 
their own personal dramas. At the same time, these individuals also place these symbols 
within, and relate them to, wider webs of symbolic and social significance.784 Thus 
these three sets of dialectical relationships come together to form an entity that is more 
than the sum of its parts, because novel processes emerge from the interaction of the 
parts that are irreducible to those parts.785  
Conceptually, this entity—which Riis and Woodhead call an “emotional 
regime”—captures how these dialectical processes come together in the construction of 
emotion. It brings together the personal, symbolic, and social aspects of emotion, and 
discloses how emotions are integral to the structured social and material relations that 
constitute a particular social unit or context.786 In the authors’ view, emotional regimes 
exist in every type of society or interactive system, from a family to nation; and in fact 
there can be a plurality of overlapping and even contradictory emotional regimes in a 
                                                
783 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 7–9, 95. 
784 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 8.  
785 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 95. 
786 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 10.  
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single time and place.787 In addition—and as a corrective to behavioural studies that see 
emotion as episodic and delimited by particular situations—the concept of an emotional 
regime also opens up to tradition and the past, since habituated patterns of emotional 
engagement actually mediate between past, present, and future. As such, an emotional 
regime carries patterns of relating across history by linking habitual personal emotional 
responses to broader social and cultural arrangements—not in a static way, but in a way 
that develops out of what has been in relation to it.788  
As Riis and Woodhead see it, an emotional regime characteristically “holds 
together a repertoire of different emotions, and specifies their rhythm, significance, 
mode of expression, and combination.”789 By so doing, it “captures the way in which 
emotions relate embodied agents to their wider social and material-symbolic 
interactions, anchor and communicate the emotional agenda, and serve as normative 
points of reference.”790 Like the social ordering that it is part of and bound up with, an 
emotional regime has an internal coherence, but it can often be in a state of flux—or 
even enter a state of imbalance or disintegration. Nonetheless, emotional regimes 
“persist over time and transcend individuals, shaping what they feel and how they feel 
it, and the way they can express their feelings, and hence the form of social relationship 
and course of action that are open to them.”791 Notably, the authors, following the lead 
of a growing number of sociologists and political theorists, argue for the significance of 
personal and collective emotion in shaping and reproducing structures of power.792  
For Riis and Woodhead, the way their tripartite scheme conceives of the 
relationships between self, symbol, and society serves to prise apart processes that are in 
reality closely bound up with one another while all the while respecting their 
interwoven nature. By isolating these dialectical exchanges in order to understand them 
better, and then putting them together and showing how they relate (or fail to relate) to 
one another, a richly textured analysis of the cultivation of emotion becomes possible. 
The authors argue that such an approach, for example, helps to clarify instances of one-
sided dialectics between relata and to identify not only the elements that are present in 
an emotional situation, but what is absent—since there are numerous social, 
psychological, cultural, and material factors that can influence an emotional pattern. 
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Attention to the presence of any relational disconnections and the study of unbalanced 
dialectics can help in the understanding of why expected emotional responses fail to be 
evoked in a particular setting. The framework thus helps one to investigate not only why 
emotions occur, but also why they do not.793 
5.3.2. Religious Emotional Regimes 
Riis and Woodhead further propose that religious emotional regimes—which 
have their basis in an ideal ordering of reality—confront the everyday empirical world 
with this ostensibly perfected social and material order, and interpret the one in relation 
to the other. All aspects of personal and social life and interaction are viewed and 
evaluated in the light of this ideal ordering. Hence a religious emotional regime 
embodies and regulates the standards by which certain emotions are promoted and 
others are abased, so that the emotional lives of the adherents of the religion are formed 
according to an approved pattern of coherence.794 Such training of the emotions occurs 
through both formal and informal mechanisms: emotional standards may be imposed 
through hierarchical structures, the promotion of authoritative, prescriptive teaching, 
and the meting out of punishment for disobedience; they can also be established through 
less formal means such as observation and imitation, and the use of more subtle 
obstacles to non-compliance. An emotional regime therefore subjugates errant 
unauthorized emotions, while at the same offering rewards for following emotional 
conventions.795 
By promulgating and enforcing a unique emotional programme that guides how 
its adherents are to feel about themselves, one another, and their wider circumstances, a 
religious emotional regime educates and structures sensibility in profound ways. 
Through its promise to reconfigure emotional response according to the ordering that is 
embodied by a religious group, its members, and its symbols, an emotional regime helps 
those within the group not only to cope with the everyday demands of life, but to 
navigate its transitions and crises. Religious emotional regimes therefore inculcate long-
lasting moods and motivations, and provide anchorage for meaning, moral identity, and 
choice-making.796 
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A religious emotional regime, then, may be described as a framework which 
conditions the way in which emotion is produced, amplified, or modified in the context 
of the dialectical relations between self, society, and symbol, leading to a structuring of 
the emotional life of participants and the social whole in accordance with the ordering 
of reality that the religion prescribes as normative for its adherents. The concept of a 
religious emotional regime makes possible a synthetic analysis of the dialectical 
interrelations among its constituent elements and the systems of morality and meaning 
to which emotions are integral.797 In addition, it can serve as a useful organizing 
framework for thinking about emotion and power, since, like any emotional regime—
i.e. by shaping what and how individuals and societies are to feel, and hence the forms 
of sociality and courses of action that are open to them—a religious one helps to 
structure and reproduce power relations.798  
5.3.3. Key Characteristics of Religious Emotion 
From their discussion of religious emotional regimes, Riis and Woodhead outline 
three main features that they see as being particularly characteristic of religious 
emotion: “emotional ordering,” “emotional transcendence-transition,” and “inspiration-
orientation.”  
5.3.3.a. Emotional Ordering 
In a similar way to how everyday emotions are configured in relation to situations 
composed of symbolic, material, and social elements, religious emotions are structured 
according to a symbolically mediated ideal framework, or “alternate ordering.” Such an 
ordering “shapes an emotional template that may extend over the whole of life, and 
override other emotional programmes.”799 Emotional ordering occurs at the individual, 
group, or societal level, or all three. It implies offering a coherent programme—
involving components such as guidance, inspiration, ritual, symbolism, and living 
example—in which emotions embody normative patterns of feeling and relating that 
shape both personal and collective life. This means that over time, and with appropriate 
religious disciplines, discordant emotional notes can be removed in favour of the 
dominant ones that should sound within the religious emotional regime. Moreover, 
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because religion has a reference point beyond the here and now, religious emotional 
orderings also integrate and reorient feelings related to death and bereavement. Such 
emotional ordering is not static, but is constantly produced, consolidated, and 
reproduced (often through innovation and adjustment below a fully conscious level) in 
the lives of religious communities and their members. In addition, religious emotions 
serve also as markers of identity: those who respond emotionally in ways that are in line 
with a group’s emotional orderings are taken as genuinely belonging to that group, 
while those who do not are decried as outsiders.800   
5.3.3.b. Emotional Transcendence-Transition 
Religious emotional regimes enable transcendence over everyday emotional 
states, at both personal and collective levels. As Riis and Woodhead put it, “[b]y 
multifarious means, religions offer some distance from everyday emotions, some 
critical purchase over them, some ability to review, alter, or selectively confirm 
them.”801 Emotional transcendence has to do with the bringing of emotions into relation 
with alternate orderings and their structures and symbols in a ways that enhance order, 
control, and change.802 Related to transcendence is “emotional transition”: a significant 
shift in the structure of personal sensibility that involves a de-patterning and re-
patterning of emotion. Emotional transition is thus a dramatic form of transcendence 
that occurs over a much shorter time and involves more intense emotions. The authors 
posit that most religions combine routine, ritualized means of patterning religious 
sensibility with dramatic rites and techniques to make and mark more dramatic shifts. 
They use the term “emotional transcendence-transition” in order to hold these two 
aspects together, though they can be distinguished from each other.803  
5.3.3.c. Inspiration-Orientation 
Riis and Woodhead observe that although religions can produce short-lived 
moments of emotional intensity, it is their ability to shape long-term emotional 
dispositions and thus influence both human character and relational stances that is more 
notable. Religious emotional regimes have an active and inspiring quality through the 
                                                
800 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 77–79.  
801 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 81–82.  
802 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 82.  
803 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 82. 
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way that they promote certain specific feelings and spur the actions that correspond to 
them. At the same time, 
[s]ince emotions are what orient us within our life worlds, and since religions 
claim to reveal what is truly sacred, valuable, and meaningful, the emotional 
orientation they provide often has a particularly strong bearing on how adherents 
live out their lives, and what inspires their ultimate loyalty.”804  
In addition to providing fundamental inspiration, religious emotions also play an 
important role in value direction, for example by training emotions of love to become 
attached to their proper objects and detached from inappropriate ones. They provide 
orientation by providing a focus not only of devotion, but of such things as fear, 
anxiety, and aversion. Rogue emotions within a religious emotional regime are abjured, 
and internal deviants are castigated or stigmatized.805   
5.3.4. Dialectical Relationships within an Emotional Regime 
Having established what they mean by emotion and an emotional regime (ch. 1), 
and having indicated some of the characteristic features of religious emotion (ch. 2), in 
chs. 3–5 Riis and Woodhead put their model to work in their analyses of the 
connections and disconnections of self, society, and symbols (chs. 3–4) and the power 
of religious emotion (ch. 5), before concluding with an analysis of religious emotion in 
late modern society (ch. 6).  
5.3.4.a. Connections of Self, Society, and Symbol 
As we have seen, Riis and Woodhead’s model involves three relata—agent, 
symbol, and community—which are affected and shaped by the dialectical relationships 
between them. The authors depict their concept diagrammatically as follows (see Figure 
1): 
 
                                                
804 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 89.  
805 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 89–90.  
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     Figure 1. Dialectical Relationships within an Emotional Regime.806      
Located between agent and symbol are the processes of “objectification” and 
“subjectification.” Objectification is the production or appropriation of a religious 
symbol by an agent. An example is given of a devout woman’s visit to an Orthodox 
church: when she kisses an icon, it seems to provoke tears by its own power rather than 
her volition. The power of such objects is enhanced by personal and collective 
associations and memories. Other examples of objectified religious emotions include 
sacred art, buildings, and rituals, and less tangible forms such as telling a myth or 
singing a song. Through acts of objectification, emotional expressions become fixed 
and communicable, and outsiders and new generations can be affected by the objects.807  
On the other side of the dialectical relation, “subjectification” occurs when a symbolic 
object provokes in an individual an emotional reaction that is considered religious. In 
many religious contexts, the ability to feel emotions sanctioned by the wider regime 
when in the presence of its sacred objects is proof of piety. So, for example, the tears 
shed before a religious icon confirms that one is a true believer, and simultaneously 
confirms the holiness of the icon and the saint it represents.808  
                                                
806 This is my reproduction of the figure in Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 118. 
807 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 96–99.  
808 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 99–100.  
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These two processes have their parallels in the dialectic between community and 
symbol. “Consecration” refers to the process in which a religious community (or its 
elite) legitimates an object as a religious sign that binds the community and helps define 
its identity. “Insignation,” on the other hand, is the process whereby a community is 
moved and inspired emotionally by a religious symbol. A strong form of consecration 
occurs when a state establishes standards for religious symbols, such as, for example, a 
law against blasphemy. Other examples of consecration include the harnessing of a 
group’s stories, symbols, or rituals as focal points in its emotional programme.809  
The final two processes of “internalization” and “externalization” are derived 
from Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann’s cognitive theory, in which they 
demonstrate how society makes an impression on the minds of individuals 
(internalization), and individuals give their ideas social expression (externalization).810 
Riis and Woodhead apply this analysis to emotion, since they believe individual 
emotional experiences and social sentiments to be closely related. Internalization refers 
therefore to the ways in which a community influences individuals’ emotional lives. Its 
opposite, externalization, occurs when an individual’s felt emotions are noticed.  To 
externalize emotion by creating a communal sentiment involves the encouraging of 
appropriate individual emotions, and the curtailing of deviant ones.811  
In an emotional regime characterized by balanced dialectical connections, the 
relations between agents, symbols, and the community are mutually constitutive, and 
there is a correspondence between the emotional symbols, the community’s emotional 
programme, and the individual emotions of the participants. As Riis and Woodhead 
express it,  
the power of the symbols is strengthened as they are venerated by the community 
and subjectified by individuals, the power of the community to move its members 
is enhanced as it refers to accepted symbols and as members participate in it, and 
religious emotions among participants are intensified as they participate in 
collective rituals or relate to established symbols.812 
                                                
809 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 102–104.  
810 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 109, referring to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social 
Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1966). 
See esp. 78–79, 121–122, 149–193. 
811 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 109.  
812 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 121.  
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5.3.4.b. Disconnections of Self, Society, and Symbol 
Using the same framework, Riis and Woodhead demonstrate how one may also 
analyze imbalances in emotional regimes. This is because relations between a 
community, agents, and symbols often do not tend towards a state of equilibrium. For 
each of the three dialectical relationships identified earlier, there are two ways in which 
the balance can tilt. 
In the relationship between a community and its members, “ultra-internalization” 
occurs when a regime considers that the only normative emotions are those that it 
sanctions; personal feelings are suppressed and the collective mood overwhelms. The 
contrasting emotional balance is “ultra-externalization,” which takes place when 
members are encouraged to freely express their emotions without any inhibitions. In 
such a setting, extraordinary and even extreme emotions are allowed and even 
welcomed.813  
If a human agent is not emotionally affected to any significant degree by a 
symbol, the dialectical relation weakens to a case of “ultra-objectification.” On the other 
hand, the individual may be so overcome by emotions that arise in relation to a religious 
symbol that the symbol appears to be a powerful agent in its own right: this represents a 
case of “ultra-subjectification.” Examples of ultra-objectification—an emotional 
distancing from religious symbols—are artefacts considered “kitsch” by cognoscenti, or 
religious art that is appreciated purely for its aesthetic or economic value. Ultra-
subjectification can be observed, for example, in what might be termed “fetishism”—
where memorabilia of celebrities like Elvis evoke extremely strong passions.814  
In the relationship between a community and its collective religious symbols, if 
these symbols are regarded as purely instrumental objects that can be changed to suit 
the needs of the regime with little reference to collective emotions, the dialectic is 
tipped towards “ultra-consecration.” This is less common that “ultra-insignification,” 
where collective symbols have a power that overwhelms individuals, but may bear no 
relation to authorized consecration. Riis and Woodhead highlight also the interesting 
instance of a “desecration,” which takes place when a symbol that has intense emotional 
power for religious people is ridiculed or attacked. Desecration, or iconoclasm, in a 
narrow sense refers to the banning or destruction of visual symbols. However, 
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iconoclasm may be used to purify emotional life by excluding emotionally evocative 
symbols that are deemed to be incompatible with the regime’s ordering, and is typically 
a consequence of enhancing the status of texts, doctrines, and their interpreters.815 
5.3.5. The Power of Religious Emotion 
Riis and Woodhead argue that the potency of emotions becomes clear once 
emotions are understood as feelings, motivations, and relational stances, rather than as 
merely private and subjective impressions. In their account, emotions move or inhibit 
people, help to bind and coordinate social groups, and attach them to certain symbolic 
objects and repulse them from others. As they acknowledge, a comprehensive analysis 
of power involves much more than an investigation of emotion, since the capacity of 
individuals and groups to act is affected by a whole range of factors—but emotions 
certainly have a place.816 They propose that the concept of an emotional regime is a 
helpful way of understanding power and emotion, since the idea of emotional norms 
and standards sanctioned and enforced by social and symbolic means is integral to it. 
The concept also helps to frame discussions of relations between different emotional 
regimes, including means of emotional boundary reinforcement. Most importantly, an 
emotional regime makes possible an analysis of the dialectical relations between 
agential, social, and symbolic power.817  
Since emotions are embodied stances by means of which individuals and groups 
“actively negotiate their relational standing, as well as monitoring and reacting to their 
social and material-symbolic positioning,” emotional power is inherent in the relations 
between actors, groups, and symbols. Hence “all emotions, even the most personal, 
register and ‘set’ a relationship—whether with self, others, or symbols.”818  To feel 
proud or ashamed, for example, is to rank oneself relative to other people, symbolic 
benchmarks, or one’s own standards. Since emotions are the product not only of 
particular encounters but also of individuals’ positioning within social and symbolic 
structures, they are not merely episodic but can develop into habitual dispositions—with 
either crippling or enabling consequences. For example, status quos may be reinforced, 
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816 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 147.  
817 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 151.  
818 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 152. 
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or the standing of persons or groups relative to one another is either enhanced or 
diminished.819  
The power of a religious group is likely to be heightened when emotional 
dialectics are in balance. In such a situation, individual participants are in solidarity with 
one another and with the group as a whole; personal emotions find their resonance in 
the feelings of others, and these feelings are experienced as authentic. This state of 
harmony is structured also by consecrated symbols that provide the focus of devotion 
and action. Feelings of kinship are thereby strengthened through the ways in which 
group members are united in their aspirations. The experiences of individuals vivify the 
collective experience, reinforce it, and feed its emotional energy.820 In ideal situations of 
dialectical balance, “each ‘node’ is empowered by being brought into relation with the 
other: each is able to ‘move’ to a greater extent than would otherwise be possible; hence 
each is empowered.”821 This experience is maximized when an emotional regime is 
abutted by compatible emotional regimes in other social domains. But religion can 
flourish even in competitive, pluralistic situations; its power then resides in its ability to 
provide a space for the cultivation of feelings not permitted elsewhere, such as 
solidarity and hope in the midst of grindingly hard conditions.822 In fact, it is the power 
of a religion to focus, contain, and transform powerful emotions that lends that religion 
wider social power.823  
Riis and Woodhead draw attention to the vital role of symbols in this process: 
“Symbols have power by representing an agenda in concentrated form and focusing 
feeling towards it.”824 The power of symbols is related to how people feel about them, 
and to the number of people who feel this way. Religious symbols are especially 
significant in relation to power because they represent a higher, other-worldly power; 
more importantly, they are experienced as placing those who give assent to them in a 
direct relation with such power. 825 In other words, once consecrated, religious symbols 
bind the emotional regime of a group and cannot easily be separated from it; they accrue 
enormous power over the group and its members. The authors argue that  
                                                
819 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 152–153. See also 50–51 for a discussion of context-dependent 
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820 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 157–158 
821 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 158.   
822 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 169.  
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[i]n the right context, the most powerful of sacred symbols are the monotheistic 
Gods. Their power is related to the emotions of terror, awe, and surrender that they 
may evoke, and the counterbalancing feelings of joy, assurance, security, and 
power that come from knowledge of their protection and blessing.826  
Accordingly, such symbols help individuals, groups, and nations gain a sense of 
control, meaning, and power, in life, while helping them to sacralize their agendas.827  
5.3.6.  Conclusion 
Riis and Woodhead’s account is a multidimensional, far-reaching, yet supple 
understanding of the construction of emotion. Rather than privileging the self as the 
only site of emotional life, their approach contextualizes feeling within a framework of 
dialectical inter-relations between the individual, society, and religious and cultural 
symbols. Every social unit in society has a unique emotional programme in which 
certain emotional notes are encouraged and others repudiated; and when these patterns 
of affect are enforced in some way, an emotional regime comes into being. Religious 
emotional regimes are those that make reference to an alternate ordering of reality that 
is seen to be foundational to life, and thereby offer transcendence over everyday 
emotional states, as well as long-term emotional inspiration. 
 
5.4. The Function of Emotion in the Pauline Congregations 
5.4.1. Introduction 
In what follows in this chapter we shall elucidate how, for Paul, right emotions 
help to forge and cement a distinctive and robust Christian identity in the individual 
believer as well as in the community of faith to which he or she belongs. As I shall 
suggest, in the way they embody structures of belief and promote patterns of sociality, 
emotions take on crucial integrating and differentiating roles in both the personal and 
corporate spheres of the believer’s life. Clearly, Paul’s therapeutic engagement with the 
emotions—his careful efforts to put into place an emotional regime—is aimed at the 
upbuilding of the congregations that he has established. We shall seek to uncover, with 
the aid of sociological analysis, how precisely Paul aims to achieve this. 
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5.4.2. The Integrating and Differentiating Functions of Emotion 
For Paul, how the believer is to feel is correlated at a fundamental level with the 
beliefs that form the basis for the Christian faith. Putting this another way, one might 
say that sanctioned emotions, such as joy in the midst of suffering, align the believer’s 
experiences of life with the reasoned evaluation of those experiences in the light of the 
various interlocking theological convictions that together frame a portrayal of true 
reality. For the individual believer, right emotion therefore expresses the squaring of felt 
experience with belief; in this way it is a uniquely tangible, psycho-somatic reification 
of sometimes abstract, and certainly slippery, Christian ideals concerning affect and its 
relation to belief and behaviour. At the same time, the theologically informed and 
socially structured reading of these personal felt experiences—resulting as they do in 
the promotion of emotional dispositions and patterns that are held in common as being 
normative—serves to integrate the believer with other believers by reinforcing 
individual as well as corporate notions of what it truly means to be a follower of Christ. 
Hence, through the bringing together of the experiential with the cognitive, there is a 
powerful, integrating dimension to emotions: at the level of the individual, right 
emotions embody the integration of felt experience with cognitive belief, while at the 
societal level they simultaneously signal the integration of personal subjectivity with 
group norms in regard to authorized patterns of feeling; and in both cases, the result is a 
strengthening of Christian identity and community.  
Emotions have also a corresponding differentiating function; thus, when right 
emotions are given expression or when inappropriate ones are rejected, a similar result 
ensues. A clear example is found in relation to Paul’s order to the Thessalonians not to 
grieve as those around them do. It is noteworthy that Paul here makes explicit his efforts 
to engineer a type of behavioural differentiation, that, for the Thessalonians, requires on 
their part a profound relativization of grief that is more than a little counterintuitive, 
especially given the already very challenging circumstances in which they seek to live 
out their faith. Yet it is precisely the counterintuitive, and indeed, countercultural, 
nature of such an emotional response that marks the divide between the believing 
community and the people around them, and showcases both the uniqueness of the 
Christian way of life and the audaciousness of its claims to truth.  
It is important to note, however, that it is not as if such authorized emotional 
dispositions carry only either an integrating or differentiating function. In my view, 
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these functions are actually the two sides of the same coin; and as such, right emotion 
incorporates facets of both functions. It is likely though that with a particular emotion 
the working of one of the two functions is more evident, at least on the surface. To 
illustrate, using the example in the preceding paragraph: as we have seen, the 
prohibition against uncontrolled grief embodies a marked differentiating function in 
how it stakes the boundaries, both social and theological, between believers and others. 
Yet at the same time the imposition of such a feeling rule helps to bolster the 
Thessalonian believers’ sense of group belonging and identity by specifying and 
reinforcing the possibility of a specific form of normative affective behaviour for 
Christians in a particular context (the death of a fellow believer) and locating the 
warrant for such an emotional stance in eschatological reality; and as such, it 
incorporates also a possibly less obvious socially integrating function.  
My contention, then, is that emotion in Paul’s letters—at least based on the 
evidence of joy in Philippians and grief and consolation in 1 Thessalonians—plays an 
important role in the social formation of the believers in the congregations that he had 
planted. By issuing specific feeling rules to his followers, Paul is in fact creating an 
emotional regime in which cognition, reason, and emotion commingle to produce a 
distinctive Christian sociality that has its basis in his understanding of God’s work in 
the past, present, and future—or, in other words, in an alternate, and explicitly 
theological, conception of reality. For Paul, right emotions are related to, and are to be 
in sync with, right beliefs; and such emotions—which, as we have seen, exhibit a mix of 
socially integrating and differentiating functions—are therefore integral to the 
socialization of his converts and to the ongoing development and safeguarding of their 
Christian identity. However, how exactly are these right emotions produced? What 
sustains their ongoing activity and functional potency? An exploration of the Pauline 
emotional regime, in which we combine our findings thus far with careful sociological 
analysis, will shed further light on how authorized emotions are generated and maintain 
their vigour, and also help us to answer in a fuller way the question of the role of such 
emotions in the early Church.  
 
5.5. Exploring the Pauline Emotional Regime 
To recap: in Riis and Woodhead’s account of religious emotion that was outlined 
earlier, emotions are seen to be generated within a framework of mutually shaping 
Chapter 5. The Pauline Emotional Regime 
 193 
interactions between (1) individual agents, and the communities to which they belong; 
(2) agents, and the cultural and material symbols that are attached to religious life; and 
(3) communities, and these sacred symbols. The interplay of these three sets of 
dialectical relationships between self, society, and symbol forms a religious emotional 
regime, which, since it takes as normative a certain ideal ordering of reality, shapes and 
modifies emotion in line with this reality and so plays a decisive role in the inculcation 
of long-term affective moods and motivations. Furthermore, through the way in which 
emotional norms are promoted and maintained, an emotional regime provides a 
mooring for abstract things such as meaning and morality, and also plays a key role in 
shaping sociality and structures of power.   
It almost goes without saying that Riis and Woodhead’s ideas seem extremely 
useful as a way into our inquiry into the nature and function of emotion in the Pauline 
churches. Our exegetical exploration of joy in Philippians and grief and consolation in 1 
Thessalonians has highlighted that emotion does not merely involve personal, inner 
states, but is also generated in a social context. Riis and Woodhead’s theories are 
particularly helpful for our purposes because they propose a social basis for emotion 
without discounting the importance of the individual agent’s decisions. To adopt Riis 
and Woodhead’s conceptual tool: the Pauline emotional regime, then, is the framework 
within which emotion is generated, shaped, or transfigured in the context of the 
tripartite inter-relationships between the individual believer (i.e., “self”), the church to 
which he or she belongs (“society”), and such things as the Christian concepts of God, 
Christ, the Spirit, and the gospel (“symbol”). Rooted deeply in, and therefore 
comprehensively informed by, Paul’s understanding of reality, the emotional regime 
prescribes and reinforces certain modes of feeling that are open to his converts, and so 
profoundly influences such things as Christian self-understanding and corporate identity 
formation. In what is to follow, we shall examine several key aspects of the Pauline 
emotional regime.  
5.5.1. Emotional Ordering 
Central to the concept of a religious emotional regime is the premise that a 
symbolically-mediated ideal ordering is at work to structure the emotional lives of 
participants in accordance with the alternate, transcendent reality that the religion in 
question holds to show the true state of life as it is lived in the here and now. Certainly, 
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for Paul the unseen reality against which he lives his life and carries out his evangelistic 
mission is never far from his mind. It is clear that in Paul’s missive to the Philippian 
Christians, the idea of an alternate ordering is foregrounded whenever he makes 
mention of matters and events that relate to what he understands to be eschatological 
reality. Throughout the letter we find references to the parousia and to the events 
surrounding it (1.6, 10; 2.16; 3.10–11, 14); to the ultimate lordship of Christ (2.9–11; 
3.20–21); to God’s ongoing ministry in the lives of believers to achieve his purposes 
(2.13); and to the fact that the Philippians are citizens of heaven who are destined for 
eternal glory (3.20–21)—an eschatological fate that stands in stark contrast to that of 
those whom Paul lambastes as “enemies of the cross of Christ,” whose sure end is 
destruction (3.18–19). It is apparent that Paul is repeatedly reminding the Philippians 
that life is much more than what they experience with their physical senses, and that 
they are to understand that their life stories are part of a greater, transcendent 
metanarrative; for as he sees it, behind all that is happening to his readers is the 
providential hand of God, who is faithfully working to bring to eschatological 
completion the good work that he has begun in their lives (1.6).  
If Philippians is rich with eschatological ideas and allusions, 1 Thessalonians—
where these motifs are writ especially large—is at least equally so. Quite apart from the 
major apocalyptic pericopes of 4.13–18 and 5.1–11, in which he deals with the question 
of how the return of Christ will correlate with the eternal destinies of believers dead and 
living, Paul elsewhere also makes mention of the certainty of the parousia (2.19; 3.13; 
5.23) and assures the Thessalonian believers that on that day, they would be judged to 
be blameless in holiness before God (3.13; cf. 2.19–20 where Paul describes them as 
being his hope or joy or crown of boasting at that event) and thus be spared God’s wrath 
(1.10), since they had been called to his kingdom and glory (2.12). By threading 
eschatological motifs right through the letter and tying them together, Paul obviously 
wants to bring to the attention of his readers the presence of another reality in their 
lives—one that reveals the true contours of human history, and in fact governs its very 
course.  
In the light of this alternate understanding of reality, Paul puts into place an 
emotional programme through which he seeks to educate the sensibility of his converts 
and to instil feeling patterns that reflect, as well as legitimate, this ideal ordering of life. 
As far as we may ascertain from the evidence in our two Pauline letters, the emotional 
programme includes such inter-related elements as the use of religious symbols, 
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exhortation and instruction, the offering of exemplars, and participation in ritual 
action—all of which combine to shape an emotional template that extends over the 
whole of life. An investigation of each of these major aspects will, as we shall see, reap 
ample dividends in terms of helping us to understand how Paul’s emotional programme 
is effected, and maintains its efficacy and longevity.  
5.5.2. Symbols and Emotional Ordering 
In order to appreciate more fully the ways in which symbols play their role in 
Paul’s scheme, we need to look more deeply at their social significance for emotional 
life. Once again, Riis and Woodhead offer us a helpfully illuminating perspective. As 
we have seen, their analytic framework sets out a view of religious emotion in which 
the symbolic and cultural dimensions of emotion are integrated with personal 
experience and social life. Against the tendency of some philosophers and sociologists 
of emotion to overlook the importance of symbolic and material settings for emotion, 
Riis and Woodhead argue that an account of religious emotion must take into 
consideration the symbolic and material contexts and manifestations of emotional life, 
partly because religious emotions are so bound up with sacred symbols and places, and 
partly because they go beyond ordinary social relations to include relations with deities, 
ancestors, and other symbolically mediated beings.828 Their approach to symbols is 
markedly synthetic but also sympathetic to the influences which shape their thinking; as 
such, an outline of these influences is helpful in order for us to both understand where 
they are coming from and to help us to use some of their key ideas in a heuristic 
manner.  
Riis and Woodhead canvass a range of viewpoints in order to construct their 
framework. From Émile Durkheim and Randall Collins comes the notion that symbols 
somehow store emotions between the ritual interactions of a group, and act as a shared 
focus for its emotions.829 As Riis and Woodhead see it, these ideas are taken further by 
Maurice Halbwachs, who emphasizes that it is not only the collective representation of 
the present, but also the remembered past, that shapes social action and emotion. Thus 
there is, as Riis and Woodhead understand it, a dialectical relationship between present-
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Religious Life, trans. Carol Cosman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Randall Collins, 
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day concerns and collective memories; furthermore, abstract thought becomes potent 
only when related to concrete figures, symbols, and stories, particularly those whose 
existence is memorialized by rituals and symbols.830 However, they go beyond a 
Durkheimian understanding of the power of collective symbols for collective sentiment 
and acknowledge also that there is an interplay between personal and collective 
emotions in relation to a symbol. Hence symbols—which can carry also intensely 
personal meanings—may not always act in a uniform way to stir some sort of collective 
mood.831 Thus, lying near the heart of Riis and Woodhead’s scheme are the symbolic 
dimensions of both personal and collective experience. Such an integrative approach 
recognizes that a symbol’s meanings are shaped both by the social relations in which it 
is embedded and by its relationship with other symbols. With Talal Asad they opine that 
“a symbol is not an object or event that carries a meaning but a set of relationships or 
events coming together as complexes or as concepts, having at once an intellectual, 
instrumental, and emotional significance.”832 The connective role of symbols is 
enshrined by such things as established authority, tradition, ritual practice, and familial 
and societal conventions.833  
For Riis and Woodhead, the way that specifically religious emotions are 
interlinked to symbol and social relations is shown most clearly in the work of Georg 
Simmel, Mary Douglas, Clifford Geertz, and Gananath Obeyesekere.834 Riis and 
Woodhead note that for Simmel, social relations are characterized by certain emotions, 
and from these develop a symbolic content, such as gods who protect these relations—
or in other words, that from a subjective faith process there develops an object for that 
faith, which then impacts back on the faith experience.835 For them, Douglas’ discussion 
                                                
830 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 38–39, citing Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, trans. 
Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
831 See Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 39–41.  
832 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 64, quoting Talal Asad, “The Construction of Religion as an 
Anthropological Category,” in Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity 
and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 28. 
833 See Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 41.  
834 See Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 65–69, referencing in particular Georg Simmel, “A 
Contribution to the Sociology of Religion,” in Essays on Religion, ed. and trans. Horst Jürgen Helle (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1898), 101–120; Georg Simmel, “Religion,” in Essays on Religion, ed. and 
trans. Horst Jürgen Helle (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), 137–214; Mary Douglas, Natural 
Symbols: Essays in Cosmology (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970); Mary Douglas, Implicit Meanings: 
Essays in Anthropology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a 
Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 87–125; Gananath 
Obeyesekere, Medusa’s Hair: An Essay on Personal Symbols and Religious Experience (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981); Gananath Obeyesekere, The Work of Culture: Symbolic 
Transformation in Psychoanalysis and Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
835 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 65.  
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of the correspondence of religious symbols and rituals with social structures goes 
further than Durkheim in appreciating the socially and culturally inflected diversity of 
religious emotion. From Geertz’s famous definition of “religion as a cultural system”836 
Riis and Woodhead highlight the way in which the conviction and power of a symbolic 
system are tied up with the emotions it inspires, while the emotions it inspires give it 
power and conviction. Indeed, as they see it, “[t]he process is dialectical: our feelings 
shape our reality, and what we take to be real shapes our feelings.”837 Finally, they look 
to the work of Obeyesekere, whose psychologically informed approach to anthropology 
emphasizes the deeply felt and highly personal religious emotions bound up with unique 
autobiographies, in the wider social and symbolic contexts to which they relate. Thus, 
for Riis and Woodhead, while religious emotion is inspired by and related to symbols, 
the symbolic and cultural dimensions of religious emotion are at once social and 
personal, collective and individual.  
We turn now to a consideration of the role of symbols in the cultivation of joy in 
Philippians and in the appeal against excessive grief in 1 Thessalonians.  
In our exegetical analysis of joy in Philippians, we concluded that the joy about 
which Paul writes has three main dimensions. The first is the co-participation of Paul 
and his converts in the gospel mission. As he begins his letter to the believers at 
Philippi, Paul speaks of the prayers of joy that constantly occur together with his 
thankful remembrances to God for the profound partnership in evangelism that he 
shares with them (Phil 1.3–5). For Paul, this is certainly a partnership that is based on 
shared beliefs and convictions, but it is also a partnership that is disclosed in concrete 
ways, one of which—as Paul acknowledges and expresses great joy over—has to do 
with how the church in Philippi has renewed its concern and support for him through a 
recent monetary gift to him (4.10). Thus, for Paul, joy emerges from the ongoing 
partnership that he and the Philippians have in the advancement of the gospel—a deep 
and mutual participation that reveals both a spiritual and a material commitment to 
God’s work.  
The second main dimension of joy in the letter is related to the actual 
advancement of the gospel itself. This itself has several sub-dimensions. That the gospel 
                                                
836 For Geertz, religion is “(1) a system of symbols (2) which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and 
long-lasting moods and motivations in men (3) by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence 
and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations 
seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz, “Religion,” 4, quoted in Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 67). 
837 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 67.  
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is being preached in Rome, even if by those who are his rivals and who are taking 
advantage of the fact that he is in prison, is for Paul a cause for joy (1.15–18). Yet, 
despite his present circumstances, Paul remains joyfully confident that his deliverance is 
at hand, and that his ministry will continue to bear fruit in the lives of the Philippians, as 
will be evidenced by their continued growth in the faith and by the joy that accompanies 
it (1.18–26). These notions anticipate the emphatically mutual joy in serving the gospel 
that Paul speaks of in 2.17–18. It is clear that in Paul’s mind the advancement of the 
gospel itself forms the basis for joy—joy that is also to be reflected to, and shared with, 
other believers.  
The third dimension of joy concerns its eschatological origin and object. For Paul, 
as he makes clear at several points in his letter, joy is “in the Lord” (3.1; 4.4; see also 
4.10). Such joy should emerge in the life of the believer no matter how adverse his or 
her circumstances may presently be, because it has its basis in God’s ongoing work, 
through Christ, of redemption and renewal in the world. That work will reach its final 
fruition on the day of Christ’s return, when all who follow Christ will receive 
eschatological vindication and share in his glory. For Paul, present suffering must be 
read in the light of this grand perspective of true reality. Thus Paul summons the 
Philippians to joy “in the Lord,” because Christ is very much the ground and occasion 
for the believer’s joy in the here and now.  
Turning now to consolation in 1 Thessalonians: our findings earlier led us to see 
that Paul’s instructions are premised firmly on the eschatological realities which he is 
calling his grieving readers to understand and embrace fully. At the centre of these 
realities is the work of Christ, in consequence of which a hopeless sorrow is not only 
unnecessary but entirely baseless, because the resurrection of Christ serves as a sure 
guarantee of the resurrection of Christians and their presence at the parousia, and 
because is it clear that at that great event those believers who are dead will not be at any 
disadvantage compared those who remain alive.  
To summarize at this point in our discussion: we observe that the three 
dimensions of joy that we identified are coordinated with two basic symbols—the 
gospel, and “the Lord” (i.e. Christ). The possibility of consolation, meanwhile, is 
mediated by the symbolic content associated with Christ and his resurrection. Hence, 
taking Philippians and 1 Thessalonians together, it would seem that the two major 
symbols that we need to concern ourselves with in our discussion here are the gospel, 
and Christ. It is pertinent to note also that these two symbols are, of course, related 
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intrinsically to each other: the former chronicles the story of the latter, i.e. the gospel is 
the story of the good news that Christ has come, and that he is coming again in 
eschatological glory.  
Riis and Woodhead’s conceptual framework offers us some helpful ways to 
understand the importance of these symbols in emotional life and their role in emotional 
ordering. Several observations can, I think, be put forward with profit.  
First, and perhaps rather obviously, the emotions that Paul is promoting are 
directly inspired by, and related to, these symbols. The extent and quality of a believer’s 
joy is commensurate with the degree to which the believer is influenced by, and 
participates in, the story of Christ—by seeking to understand, live according to, and 
make known to others the truths that he or she believes as a follower of Christ. 
Similarly, the believer’s attitude to grief is also connected intimately to and therefore 
reflective of his or her theological understanding and intellectual appropriation of the 
work of Christ at the eschaton. In both scenarios we observe something about the 
connective role of symbols in emotional cultivation. Symbols seem to serve as means 
through which individual states of feeling are brought into relation with collective 
sentiments and memories, thereby connecting believers to a living tradition or way of 
looking at the world.838 Thus we see that the sufferings of a believer in Philippi and the 
grief of a bereaved Christian in Thessalonica are both brought to a symbolic focus and 
articulated with some corporately-held Christian ordering of reality. The results are joy, 
in the former instance, and the expulsion of inordinate sorrow in the latter one.  
Second, and related to the above, these authorized emotions act back upon the 
symbolic structures from which they are generated. In other words, a particular dialectic 
is at play: one’s perception of reality produces certain feelings, and these feelings in 
turn confirm and further shape that perception of reality, which then reinforces those 
feelings, and so on. Thus, for example, in the case of joy: the believer whose 
perspective on suffering is framed by a thoroughgoing appreciation of the 
eschatological reality that is mediated through God’s actions in Christ is imbued with 
the necessary inner resources to relativize his or her suffering in the light of this 
ultimate reality. This engenders joy; and the felt experience of this joy works in turn to 
validate and even cement the believer’s perspective on what he or she takes to be the 
true state of affairs here on earth.  
                                                
838 See further Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 90–93.  
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Third, we note that the symbols of the gospel and of Christ express and influence 
the course of social relations and can thus be said to be integral to them. A particularly 
clear instance of this is found when Paul tells the Philippians that his joy will be 
enlarged through their growth in likeminded unity and unselfish concern for one 
another—a mindset that is modelled for them by Christ (see Phil 2.1–8). As we 
concluded earlier, the social basis of joy is depicted here: there is a sense in which joy is 
directly correlated to the nature and quality of relationships amongst the believers. 
Hence the symbolic paradigm of Christ helps to establish and consolidate new 
solidarities and shape social relations and even take them in new directions, all the 
while also contributing to the promotion of joy within the church. Noteworthy also for 
our purposes is how an emotional norm is articulated through a particular socio-
symbolic structure.  
Fourth, for the believer, the symbols of Christ and his gospel are freighted with 
associations to divinity and transcendence, and represent a higher power that surpasses 
all earthly ones. Furthermore, these symbols are experienced as placing those who give 
assent to them in a direct relation with this transcendent power—a power that is able to 
command a level of fealty and commitment that can trump all other personal interests 
and loyalties.839 And because they shape social relations and act as a focus for feeling, 
these symbols potentially exert enormous influence and power over a church and its 
members, especially as the symbols acquire ever-increasing power by being repeatedly 
consecrated and objectified840 in various settings such as, for example, ritualized 
gatherings involving acts of worship, teaching, corporate prayer, and the receiving of 
communion, or informal, personal moments of reflective meditation and devotional 
prayer. Such power can profoundly inspire not only shared patterns of emotion, but also 
collective action.  
5.5.3. Instruction, Imitation, and Emotional Ordering 
It is not only religious symbols that help to determine patterns of feeling in an 
emotional regime. What we might term generally as human authorities also play 
decisive roles in setting emotional standards, and in training and enforcing emotional 
norms. These human authorities include formal means such as hierarchical structures 
                                                
839 On this see Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 155–156; and also section 5.3.5 in this study. 
840 Using Riis and Woodhead’s terminology; see section 5.3.4.a above.  
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within which figures of influence such as community leaders, religious teachers, or even 
parents prescribe what emotions should be felt (and proscribe what cannot be felt), and 
less formal mechanisms such as personal guidance, advice, and the pervasive presence 
of subtle societal sanctions against non-conforming patterns of affect and behaviour.841 
In addition, as Riis and Woodhead also suggest, “[m]uch emotional training occurs 
through observation and imitation rather than through overt instruction.”842 
In both Philippians and 1 Thessalonians some of the abovementioned elements of 
an emotional programme are clearly in evidence. We have already seen how the theme 
of joy pervades Philippians and lies at the heart of much of its hortatory material—so 
much so that one may well say that Paul is offering his readers “a pedagogy in joy.”843 
And as we have also seen, through careful teaching Paul sets emotional standards for 
the Thessalonian believers in relation to grief. Certainly, it seems clear that what Paul 
says carries significant weight; he is not only the founder of the churches that he is now 
writing to, but also one who claims apostolic authority from none other than the Lord.844 
He therefore wields considerable influence over his churches through his teaching as 
well as through his personal example, which he calls his converts to imitate.845  
Paul makes specific laudatory mention of the fact that the Thessalonians have 
become imitators of both him and the Lord, in how they had accepted the gospel with 
joy846 in the face of considerable affliction (Καὶ ὑµεῖς µιµηταὶ ἡµῶν ἐγενήθητε καὶ τοῦ 
κυρίου, δεξάµενοι τὸν λόγον ἐν θλίψει πολλῇ µετὰ χαρᾶς πνεύµατος ἁγίου, 1 Thess 1.6). 
In fact, their conduct has been so exemplary that they, in turn, are now a model (τύπος) 
for other believers (1.7)—which says a great deal about the powerful, far-reaching 
influence of Paul’s example and witness.847 However, it is in Philippians that the motif 
of imitation comes into its own; and here it becomes readily apparent how central the 
                                                
841 See Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 48–49, 7l; and section 5.3.2 above.  
842 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 48.  
843 Barton, “Spirituality,” 185. See also section 3.4 above.  
844 On Paul’s apostolic authority see esp. John Howard Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic 
Authority, SNTSMS 26 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), in which the sociology of 
charismatic authority is brought into conversation with a theologically-informed reading of the relevant 
Pauline texts.   
845 The express language of mimesis occurs several times in Paul: in the undisputed letters 1 Cor 4.16; 
11.1; Phil 3.17; 1 Thess 1.6; 2.14; cf. also Eph 5.1; 2 Thess 3.7, 9. On its use, see esp. Brian J. Dodd, 
Paul’s Paradigmatic ‘I’: Personal Example as Literary Strategy, JSNTSup 177 (Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1999); and also the survey in Andrew D. Clarke, “‘Be Imitators of Me’: Paul’s Model of 
Leadership,” TynBul 49 (1998): 329–360.  
846 It is noteworthy that Paul in 1.6 singles out joy as that affective posture that has characterized the 
Thessalonians’ reception of the gospel; this confirms our finding in Philippians that Paul correlates joy 
with the advancement of the gospel, among other things. 
847 Cf. 1 Thess 2.14 where Paul commends the Thessalonians for imitating the churches in Judea in 
suffering for the sake of the gospel. 
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use of imitation is for Paul, especially when it is combined with instruction—which 
suggests that Riis and Woodhead may perhaps be driving a little too sharp a wedge 
between these practices in terms of their relative importance in influencing emotional 
ordering. At least from what we observe in Paul’s letter, they seem to go hand in hand 
and may even be said to reinforce each other. The two key texts that we shall look at in 
closer detail are Phil 3.15–17 and 4.8–9; to understand the full import of these texts we 
need to see how Paul sets the stage for what he wishes to say.  
Earlier, at 1.12–26, Paul has spoken paradigmatically of his own experiences, 
which includes joy in how the gospel is being advanced in spite of his incarceration 
(1.12–18), and the possessing of a joyful confidence that divine deliverance lies on the 
horizon and that he would be able to resume his ministry among the Philippians (1.18–
26).848 A showcasing of several exempla follows: superlatively, Christ (2.5–8),849 and 
next, Timothy and Epaphroditus (2.19–30), who both illustrate in their lives a Christ-
like mindset.850 Then, at 3.4–14, Paul gives a heartfelt testimony of how Christ has 
shaped his own mindset; Paul is “one who not only rejected his Jewish privileges for the 
gospel but also lives in the present totally orientated to the future.”851 
Now, in Phil 3.15–17 Paul enjoins his readers to follow his example and thus to 
grow in their personal appropriation of the life of Christ. At 3.15, Paul invites those who 
are mature to adopt his mindset (Ὅσοι οὖν τέλειοι, τοῦτο φρονῶµεν); here τέλειοι is best 
taken in its normal Pauline sense to refer to spiritual maturity, rather than to connote 
some use of the language of the Mystery cults.852 Several commentators rightly note 
that Paul’s use of τέλειοι is a play on Οὐχ ὅτι ἤδη ἔλαβον ἢ ἤδη τετελείωµαι (3.12), i.e., 
those who are mature recognize that they have not yet been brought to completion in an 
eschatological sense.853 In essence, Paul is therefore saying, “let ὅσοι τέλειοι recognize 
that οὐ τετελειώµεθα.”854 For a number of reasons—not least because Paul’s language is 
inclusive and non-polemical (note his use of the first person plural hortatory subjunctive 
                                                
848 See sections 3.3.2.a and 3.3.2.b. 
849 See section 3.2.3. 
850 See section 3.2.4. 
851 Fee, Philippians, 351.  
852 See the discussion and references in Hellerman, Philippians, 206; Fee, Philippians, 343 n.23; cf. 
Paul’s similar use of the term in 1 Cor 2.6 and 14.20.  
853 So e.g. Fee, Philippians, 355. 
854 Similarly, Friedel Selter and Colin Brown, “Other, “ NIDNTT 2.739–742, at 741. As Fee rather 
nicely puts it: “Thus teleioi probably means ‘mature’ in the sense outlined in v.16; those who live in 
keeping with what they have already attained are thus ‘complete’ to that degree, even though the final 
completion, when all are fully conformed into the likeness of the Christ whom they desire to know above 
all else, still remains.” (Philippians, 355). 
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φρονῶµεν, which places himself amongst the τέλειοι;855 and the correlative conjunction 
ὅσοι, which tends to be used inclusively856)— it is improbable that any irony or polemic 
is intended.857 The τοῦτο likely refers to 3.12–14 rather than to the entirety of Paul’s 
autobiographical narrative in 3.4–14:858 “this” mindset, which Paul wants the 
Philippians to adopt, has to do with the eschatological orientation that he is modeling; 
not yet having been made perfect, he is pressing on to win the promised prize that 
awaits all believers (3.12–14). 
After a qualification (καὶ εἴ τι ἑτέρως φρονεῖτε, καὶ τοῦτο ὁ θεὸς ὑµῖν ἀποκαλύψει, 
3.15), which is best understood as Paul’s allowing that some within the church might 
see things differently from himself but expecting that God will redirect their thinking,859 
Paul reaffirms the exhortation of 3.15: Christians are to keep in step with what they 
have already attained (πλὴν εἰς ὃ ἐφθάσαµεν, τῷ αὐτῷ στοιχεῖν, 3.16).860 Then, at 3.17, 
using the express language of imitatio, Paul reiterates his call to the Philippians to 
embody the way of thinking and living that he exemplifies: Συµµιµηταί µου γίνεσθε, 
ἀδελφοί, καὶ σκοπεῖτε τοὺς οὕτω περιπατοῦντας καθὼς ἔχετε τύπον ἡµᾶς (3.17). They are 
to “be fellow imitators of him”861—Paul’s innovative terminology likely stresses his 
desire that there be a community effort in following his example862—and also to take 
note of others who are walking according to his pattern of life. To drive the point home, 
Paul goes on to warn the Philippians about others who live contrary to this pattern 
(3.18–19). It is important to note that Paul’s charge to the Philippian believers to imitate 
him is based squarely on his own imitation of Christ as one who gave up privilege and 
power for the sake of others; thus, to assert that what Paul says is a defence of his own 
                                                
855 So e.g. Fee, Philippians, 355, and esp. n.17 where he notes also the presence of the first person 
plural verb ἐφθάσαµεν at 3.16. 
856 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 225–226, citing BAGD 586. 
857 See further Bockmuehl, Philippians, 225–226. To be sure, however, the question is not at all 
settled: Fee, Philippians, 353 n.10 lists scholars holding contrary views.  
858 So many commentators, e.g. recently Hellerman, Philippians, 207, who argues that the 
τετελείωµαι/τέλειοι shows that τοῦτο refers primarily to what Paul has emphasized in 3.12–14; pace Fee, 
Philippians, 356–357. 
859 See esp. the discussion in Hellerman, Philippians, 208–210.  
860 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 228.  
861 The compound verb συµµιµηταί is found only here in the NT, and indeed only here in all of Greek 
literature; on its precise meaning see esp. the discussions in Hellerman, Philippians, 212–214; Hawthorne 
and Martin, Philippians, 217.  
862 Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 217; citing among others Hans D. Betz, Nachfolge und 
Nachahmung Jesu Christi im Neuen Testament, BHT 37 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967), 145–153; 
Willis Peter De Boer, The Imitation of Paul: An Exegetical Study (Kampen: Kok, 1962), 169–188. 
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apostleship863 or a way to shore up power via the “hierarchy Christ-Paul-Christians”864 
is to misread him.865 
In ch. 4 of the letter, Paul again sets himself up as a model for imitation. He tells 
the Philippians in explicit terms that they are to put into practice those things that they 
have learnt from his teaching and observed in his conduct (ἃ καὶ ἐµάθετε καὶ παρελάβετε 
καὶ ἠκούσατε καὶ εἴδετε ἐν ἐµοί, ταῦτα πράσσετε, 4.9).866 Paul is doubtless relating their 
mimetic practice to the morally excellent and praiseworthy mindset that he has just 
described and instructed them to take account of (Τὸ λοιπόν, ἀδελφοί, ὅσα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, 
ὅσα σεµνά, ὅσα δίκαια, ὅσα ἁγνά, ὅσα προσφιλῆ, ὅσα εὔφηµα, εἴ τις ἀρετὴ καὶ εἴ τις 
ἔπαινος, ταῦτα λογίζεσθε, 4.8), but there is some debate over how 4.8 and 4.9 are linked 
syntactically,867 as well as disagreement concerning the background of the virtues that 
Paul lists in 4.8.868 On balance, a mediating view seems best: following Reumann, I see 
4.8 as a call to reflection over “norms in the world of the day that Christians too can 
practice”; and in this, the apostolic tradition and Paul himself serve as criteria (4.9).869 
From the foregoing discussion it is clear that Paul’s call to the Philippians to 
follow his example is closely linked to his pedagogical aims. As Bockmuehl notes:  
                                                
863 A. Reinhartz, “On the Meaning of the Pauline Exhortation: ‘mimētai mou ginesthe’ — Become 
Imitators of Me,” SR 16 (1987): 393–404. 
864 Elizabeth A. Castelli, Imitating Paul: A Discourse of Power (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
1991), 96. 
865 Hansen, Philippians, 261–262. 
866 The four verbs are variously grouped together, producing slightly different nuances in the resultant 
meaning: Hansen, for example, takes the first two to refer primarily to Paul’s teaching of the gospel and 
the remaining two to refer to the paradigmatic value of his life (Philippians, 300). See the discussion in 
Hellerman, Philippians, 249; I follow Hellerman who suggests that it may be best however to leave the 
issue open by simply stringing the verbs together, as most English translations do, which preserves the 
staccato effect of the repeated καί (Philippians, 249, quoting BDF §460(3): “polysyndeton produces the 
impression of extensiveness and abundance by means of an exhausting summary”). 
867 Chiefly over whether the definite relative pronoun ἃ in 4.9 relates to (a) the antecedent ταῦτα of 4.8 
(so Hansen, Philippians, 300, referencing Bockmuehl, Philippians, 254, who notes that sentences 
beginning with ἃ καὶ usually “introduce a further and specific elaboration of the preceding subject at 
hand”)—which means that 4.9 is an elaboration of 4.8, i.e. that Paul’s teachings and way of life exemplify 
these things that are excellent and praiseworthy; or to (b) the subsequent ταῦτα within the same verse (so 
Fee, Philippians, 413 n.5)—in which case the ideas of 4.8 are put into perspective in 4.9; i.e. that the list 
of virtues is to be understood and practised in light of Paul’s instructions and example.  
868 Attempts to read 4.8 as emerging from Jewish moral thinking have generally been criticized (see 
the discussion in Reumann, Philippians, 638). Many commentators argue that Paul’s language broadly 
affirms values that are commonly seen in Greco-Roman, and especially Stoic, moral discourse, so e.g. F. 
W. Beare, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians, HNTC (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 
148; Sevenster, Paul, 156; their views are representative of many others. More recent scholars adopting 
this basic position include Bockmuehl, Philippians, 250–251; Reumann, Philippians, 638–640; 
Hellerman, Philippians, 244–245. However there are a few scholars who demur and hold that Paul’s 
language here is his own, despite apparent correspondences to Hellenistic moralism and Jewish wisdom; 
so e.g. Fee, Philippians, 416–417, 419–420; Witherington, Philippians, 249–253. 
869 Reumann, Philippians, 640.  
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While the invitation to imitate one’s teacher or rabbi was of course standard 
Graeco-Roman as well as Jewish didactic procedure, in Paul’s case that invitation 
derives both its authority and its limitations from his own faithfulness to the prior 
example of Christ, who is himself the prototype and measure of all Christian 
discipleship (2.5ff and passim). Paul’s own ministry is merely the apostolic 
illustration and exemplification of that mind in Christ: it “makes the truth visible” 
(cf. 2 Cor. 4.2).870  
The mind of Christ—that remarkable, selfless, and self-giving φρόνησις that Paul 
patterns his own example after—is something that Paul delineates throughout the letter, 
along with an interest in cognition and a focus on right thinking in general.871 As his use 
of the verb φρονέω in connection with Christian maturity (Phil 3.15) makes clear, what 
is at stake for Paul is “a basic frame of mind, a way of looking at everything, which in 
turn leads to a way of behaving.”872 Indeed, the frequency with which φρονέω occurs in 
the letter, and the way it is used, support Meeks’ proposal “that this letter’s most 
comprehensive purpose is the shaping of a Christian phrōnesis, a practical moral 
reasoning that is ‘conformed to [Christ’s] death’ in hope of his resurrection.”873 As the 
Philippians conform their character and practice to the moral exemplar of Christ (and to 
others who take Christ as their model), they cultivate the virtues that are embodied in 
him and given expression in his life, such as humility, other-regard, confidence, and joy 
in suffering.874  
We therefore observe that in Philippians and 1 Thessalonians, Paul combines 
careful theological instruction with explicit appeals to imitate exemplars in the faith in 
order to fashion the Christian mindset that he wants to see in his converts. And it seems 
readily apparent that with its inculcation comes, among other things, the fostering of an 
emotional programme that promotes emotional dispositions that reflect the beliefs upon 
which such a mindset is formed.  
                                                
870 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 254. 
871 As noted earlier; see section 3.1.4.b and the end of section 3.3.1. 
872 Fee, Philippians, 356.  
873 David G. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul’s Ethics, 2nd ed. 
(London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2016), 235, citing Meeks, “Man from Heaven,” 110. 
For a lucid overview and analysis of the appearances of φρονέω in Philippians together with a 
comparison of how the verb features in Greco-Roman thought, see Craig S. Keener, The Mind of the 
Spirit: Paul’s Approach to Transformed Thinking (Grand Rapids: Basic Books, 2016), 217–236. 
874 See Horrell, Solidarity, 235.  
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5.5.4. Ritual and Emotional Ordering 
Another potentially far-reaching influence on emotional ordering is ritual.875 As 
Riis and Woodhead observe: 
Ritual engages individuals in orchestrated and formalized social performances, and 
serves to coordinate bodily movements in synchronized and harmonious ways that 
can often reinforce and intensify certain feelings, and banish others. Emotion may, 
thereby, be focused more effectively by and upon certain symbols and myths.876 
Citing the work of Jonathan Z. Smith, they argue that ritual creates a controlled 
environment that can simplify and concentrate the confusion of everyday experience, by 
focusing attention on what really matters and how one should feel about it.877 In this 
way, “ritual brings an alternate ordering to life.”878 Noting that the category of ritual is 
not clear-cut, Riis and Woodhead follow Catherine Bell in suggesting that is useful to 
think in terms of “ritualization” instead of taking ritual as a fixed category involving a 
special place in social life; for them, this also helps to avoid isolating ritual from the 
other aspects of religious life in relation to which it makes sense.879 Understood this 
way, the category of ritual can be broadened to include not only orchestrated public 
ritual practices, but also domestic practices that may have profound emotional 
significance for participants.880 Thus, in ritual, “emotional cultivation has to do with not 
only crowds and intensity and authorized orchestration, but also with duration, 
repetition, and reinforcement.”881 
All this is most helpful when we turn to Paul’s letters and ask questions about the 
role of ritual in the ordering of emotion within his churches.882 David Horrell has 
                                                
875 For a helpful survey of scholarly discussion on the application of ritual theory to emotion, see 
Dorothea Lüddeckens, “Emotion,” in Theorizing Rituals: Issues, Topics, Approaches, Concepts, ed. Jens 
Kreinath, Jan Snoek, and Michael Stausberg (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 545–570.  
876 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 92. 
877 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 92, referencing Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From 
Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
878 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 92.  
879 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 92, referencing Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and 
Dimensions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). On “ritualization,” see further Catherine Bell, 
Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), esp. 74, 88–93; Bell uses the 
term to highlight how certain social actions differentiate themselves from others. Thus, “ritualization is a 
way of acting that is designed and orchestrated to distinguish and privilege what is being done in 
comparison to other, usually more quotidian, activities. As such, ritualization is a matter of various 
culturally specific strategies for setting some activities off from others, for creating and privileging a 
qualitative distinction between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘profane,’ and for ascribing such distinctions to 
realities thought to transcend the powers of human actors” (74).  
880 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 92–93, referencing Meredith B. McGuire, Lived Religion, Faith 
and Practice in Everyday Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
881 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 93. 
882 NT scholarship is only just beginning to embrace the field of ritual studies, which has come into its 
own in recent years due to a recognition that ritual plays a central role in human societies. For useful 
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suggested that the Pauline material should be seen as the development of a body of 
tradition based on a specific narrative myth which, when enacted in ritual performance, 
gives meaning to, and shapes, the lives of its adherents. Attention to ritual activity 
reminds us that early Christian faith was not just “believed,” but also performed; and 
indeed, it is not least through such ritual performance that myth exercises its 
community-forming power.883 Following Meeks, Horrell argues that due emphasis 
should be placed not only of what each Pauline text “says, but what it does,”884 since the 
Pauline texts “are intended not only to inform, or to convey content, but quite clearly to 
persuade, and to shape the social practice of those to whom they are directed.”885 Such a 
practice-based approach to understanding ritual886 dovetails very neatly with Riis and 
Woodhead’s proposals concerning how ritual practices can help to mold and reinforce 
an emotional programme, especially if over time such practices become increasingly 
entrenched, habituated patterns of behaviour.887  
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine every occurrence of ritual activity 
in Philippians and 1 Thessalonians; such an effort would, in any case, be stymied at the 
onset because of the lack of a coherent taxonomy of ritual in Paul’s letters, given the 
embryonic state of ritual criticism of the NT (see n.882).888 For my purposes, however, 
it is sufficient to draw attention to representative examples of ritual practices.   
In Philippians and 1 Thessalonians, perhaps the most common mention of what 
we may term as “ritualization” has to do with prayer. Paul speaks of his own 
impassioned prayers for the believers (Phil 1.3–6, 9–11; 1 Thess 1.2–3; 3.10), reminds 
them of the importance of prayer concerning all things (Phil 4.6) and at all times (1 
                                                                                                                                          
overviews of scholarly work on key ritual themes in the NT, see Richard E. DeMaris, The New Testament 
in Its Ritual World (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 1–10; and Louise J. Lawrence, “Ritual and the First 
Urban Christians: Boundary Crossings of Life and Death,” in After the First Urban Christians: The 
Social-Scientific Study of Pauline Christianity Twenty-Five Years Later, ed. Todd D. Still and David G. 
Horrell (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 99–115. 
883 See Horrell, Solidarity, 99–100. Horrell’s notion of “myth” follows the use of the term in the study 
of religion in general, i.e. to refer to a means by which truth is conveyed (93–94). For Horrell, “the centre 
of the myth which Paul’s letters reflect is undoubtedly the Christ-event, that is the descending, dying and 
rising of Jesus Christ, which represents the saving action of God in which believers participate” (95). 
884 Horrell, Solidarity, 100, quoting Meeks, Christians, 7. See also Meeks, Christians, 142.  
885 Horrell, Solidarity, 100. 
886 On this see esp. Bell, Ritual Theory, 81–88.  
887 See also Douglas J. Davies, Emotion, Identity, and Religion: Hope, Reciprocity, and Otherness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 37–67. Davies shows that the meanings and values that are 
inherent in ritual practice help to generate and sustain an identity that is replete with emotion.  
888 DeMaris, Ritual World, 5–6, has suggested that Christian Strecker’s observations concerning how 
rites and text are interwoven (in his Die liminale Theologie des Paulus: Zugänge zur paulinischen 
Theologie aus kulturanthropologischer Perspektive, FRLANT 185 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1999], 78–80) could form the basis of a programme of analysis of ritual in the NT, and that this 
could be developed into a full-scale study of ritual, if it were coupled with a theoretical framework.  
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Thess 5.17), and solicits their prayers for himself and his coworkers (1 Thess 5.25).889 
Paul’s repeated mentions of intercession are highly suggestive of a sustained effort to 
highlight its central importance in the life of the Christian. Certainly, in his own life and 
practice Paul exemplifies the believer who prays—and one who does so regularly (1 
Thess 1.2–3; 3.10; implied strongly in Phil 1.3–4); and, having set an example for his 
readers, he mandates that they too adopt this attitude of constant prayer (1 Thess 5.17). 
The fact that Paul does not urge prayer without also stressing the need for its regular 
practice suggests that he is intimately familiar with the danger of diminished enthusiasm 
and the eventual abandonment of prayer, whether from weariness, apathy, cynicism, or 
creeping unbelief; for him, persistent prayer characterizes the faithful.890   
Drawing insights from cultural anthropology, Bruce Malina offers a useful 
definition of prayer that weaves together certain key emphases:  
Prayer is a socially meaningful symbolic act of communication, bearing directly 
upon persons perceived as somehow supporting, maintaining, and controlling the 
order of existence of the one praying, and performed with the purpose of getting 
results from or in the interaction of communication.891 
Since prayer involves communication with a divine being who is thought to be able to 
shape one’s “order of existence,” it presupposes the presence of certain attitudes related 
to dependence on, and trust in, that being, as well as the belief that some kind of 
tangible change can be truly effected within the ordering of reality that the one praying 
believes to be in force in the world. Applied to our context here, for Paul, prayer 
represents a renewed trust in God and in his ability to work in the world to achieve his 
divine will. Expressing this thought a little differently: prayer entails the believer’s 
deliberate reorientation of himself or herself towards God, in the light of the symbolic 
structure that frames and gives shape to his or her conception of true reality. The result 
is a reaffirmation of one’s identity and status, and with this, a recalibration of one’s role, 
within this theological ordering of life.892  
Malina’s succinct definition also alerts our attention to the social dynamics 
surrounding the practice of prayer. To be sure, Malina’s focus on prayer as 
                                                
889 The same thoughts are found frequently in his other letters too; for references see Weima, 
Thessalonians, 400.  
890 David Crump, Knocking on Heaven’s Door: A New Testament Theology of Petitionary Prayer 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006), 215. 
891 Bruce J. Malina, “What Is Prayer?,” The Bible Today 18 (1980): 215; quoted in Jerome H. Neyrey, 
“Prayer, in Other Words: New Testament Prayers in Social-Science Perspective,” in Social Scientific 
Models for Interpreting the Bible: Essays by the Context Group in Honor of Bruce J. Malina, ed. John J. 
Pilch (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 351. 
892 Neyrey refers to the ritual “status transformation” that petitionary prayers are associated with; 
“Prayer,” 376. 
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communication between someone from a lower social standing and someone with a 
higher social power comes from how societal structures provide models for the 
language and ideology of prayer.893 But there is another social aspect of prayer that has 
to do with its effect on relationships: it may be argued that intercessory prayer for others 
predisposes the one praying to experiencing heightened feelings of mutuality, affection, 
and solidarity of purpose towards those being prayed for (so Paul in Phil 1.3–8 and in 1 
Thess 1.2–3, 9–10),894 which would surely help to affirm and fortify social ties and thus 
strengthen the community as a whole.  
We shall take 1 Thess 5.16–18 by way of illustration. Here Paul instructs the 
believers to pray constantly (ἀδιαλείπτως προσεύχεσθε, 5.17),895 sandwiching this 
command between two other commands, to rejoice always (Πάντοτε χαίρετε, 5.16),896 
and to give thanks in all circumstances (ἐν παντὶ εὐχαριστεῖτε, 5.18a).897 These three 
commands are so general and terse, and form such a brief unit, that it is difficult to 
relate them to a specific situation in the Thessalonian church that Paul might want to 
address. Yet the contextual locale of these injunctions indicates that he continues to cast 
his gaze on the Christian community as a whole, though his instructions are certainly 
pertinent also to the devotional life of the individual believer. The surrounding sections 
of the letter all have to do with the ordering of various aspects of church life and the 
relations within it: proper attitudes towards leaders (5.12–13); ministry to troubled 
                                                
893 See Rodney A. Werline, Pray Like This: Understanding Prayer in the Bible (New York: T&T 
Clark, 2007), 10. 
894 As John Koenig, Rediscovering New Testament Prayer: Boldness and Blessing in the Name of 
Jesus (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 91, observes: “Intercession creates a deep connection with others 
and a mutual caring that often leads to active ministry.” 
895 Paul has earlier in the letter repeatedly demonstrated the centrality of constant prayer in his own 
life, using different verbs for prayer and qualifying them with different adverbs: Εὐχαριστοῦµεν τῷ θεῷ 
πάντοτε … ἀδιαλείπτως µνηµονεύοντες (1.2–3); εὐχαριστοῦµεν τῷ θεῷ ἀδιαλείπτως (2.13); νυκτὸς καὶ 
ἡµέρας ὑπερεκπερισσοῦ δεόµενοι (3.10) (Malherbe, Thessalonians, 329). In several other letters in 
addition to this one, he likewise instructs his readers to devote themselves to prayer (2 Thess 3.1; Phil 4.6; 
Rom 12.12). It should be obvious that here in 1 Thess 5.17 (and elsewhere) Paul does not expect 
ἀδιαλείπτως to be taken literally; as Weima (Thessalonians, 400) notes, the adverb is formulaic and 
somewhat hyperbolic. Nonetheless it is clear that Paul expects the believers to take prayer seriously and 
to pray frequently for themselves and others, presumably whether in private or corporately.  
896 This echoes Paul’s earlier mentions of joy in the letter (1 Thess 1.6; 2.19–20); and as we have 
discussed earlier, joy is an important theme in his writings generally (see section 3.1.4.a). 
897 I take ἐν παντί (5.18) to mean “in everything,” i.e. in every situation, rather than the temporal idea 
of “always”; for an outline of the debate see Weima, Thessalonians, 401. However, as Marshall, 
Thessalonians, 155 rightly points out, this is “surely a pointless controversy, since either translation is 
virtually equivalent to the other. Believers are to find reason to praise and thank God in whatever 
situation they may find themselves and thus at all times” (quoted by Weima, Thessalonians, 401).  
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members (5.14–15); and living in the Spirit, which includes handling prophecy in the 
setting of worship (5.19–22).898  
To be sure, this is not the only place in Paul’s letters where prayer is placed 
alongside rejoicing and thanksgiving; see earlier in the letter at 1 Thess 3.9–10, and also 
Phil 1.3–4 and 4.4–6. In fact, their recurrent, deliberate juxtaposition surely implies that 
Paul considers it important that these practices flourish in tandem in the life of the 
believer. For Paul, to rejoice is to acknowledge God’s sovereignty in all of life and to 
remain certain of God’s eschatological salvation. Prayer is grounded in the Christian’s 
relationship with God and communicates his or her trust in God to achieve his perfect 
and sovereign will. Thanksgiving is the proper response of believers to God’s gracious 
work and saving action in their lives and in the world. That Paul considers these three 
related directives to be of crucial importance is made clear through how he anchors 
them in the very will of God for the believer, and thereby imbues what he says with the 
greatest authority (τοῦτο γὰρ θέληµα θεοῦ ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ εἰς ὑµᾶς, 5.18b).899  
In this, we have an explicit portrayal of how prayer is integral not only to the 
social ordering of the Christian community but to its emotional ordering as well. While 
we cannot be completely sure as to how prayer was actually carried out whether 
privately or in corporate worship,900 on Paul’s part there is certainly an intentional, 
sustained effort to lift up prayer as what is, in effect, a ritual practice that covers all of 
the Christian life and helps to sustain it. Here, François Berthomé and Michael 
Houseman’s recent analysis of the connection between ritual and emotion may help to 
illuminate matters further.901 In regard to prayer, they argue that it is precisely its 
performative and self-referential property that makes it so emotionally exceptional in 
devotional practice. As they see it, in prayer,  
[t]he perfect relationship devotees aim for, and the sequence of actions and 
dispositions that are held to embody it, are maximally fused, in stark contrast with 
the constant negotiation characteristic of the daily emotional grind. In this light, 
what ritual episodes achieve is probably less an incorporation of enduring 
dispositions than a fragile instantiation of exemplary … relationships. Such 
                                                
898 Weima, Thessalonians, 381, 398; see also Wanamaker, Thessalonians, 190–191. 
899 With most commentators I take the phrase to look backwards to embrace all three commands. 
There are a few scholars who see it as referring to only the final directive (so e.g. Malherbe, Philippians, 
330); however the parallel structure of the three commands and their co-appearance elsewhere (see 
discussion earlier) suggests that the majority view is to be preferred (so e.g. Weima, Philippians, 402). 
900 See e.g. Koenig, Prayer, 129–134, for an attempt to elucidate the circumstances, times, and 
postures of corporate prayer in the early Church.    
901 François Berthomé and Michael Houseman, “Ritual and Emotions: Moving Relations, Patterned 
Effusions,” Religion and Society: Advances in Research 1 (2010): 57–75, doi:10.3167/arrs.2010.010105 
(esp. 66–69). 
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compressed, rarefied moments, which act as benchmarks for what it is for God to 
be present, may subsequently be used as a sounding board to navigate through the 
everyday, as long as certain reminders are close at hand.902  
If this is so, then we may have another way to understand why Paul emphasizes not 
only the need to pray but also the importance of doing so frequently. As Berthomé and 
Houseman seem to see it, episodic prayer may not bring about a thoroughgoing 
inculcation of preferred long-term emotional dispositions. Yet, on the basis of their 
analysis, it seems fair to infer that an intensification of prayer—i.e., by practising it 
deliberately and frequently, until it becomes a habituated form of behaviour—would 
help to school an appropriate repertoire of affective states. Furthermore, Berthomé and 
Houseman’s perspective on prayer helps us to be alert to the presence of those “certain 
reminders”—other forms of ritual activity, or media rich in symbolic content—that help 
to strengthen its efficacy as a way of making sense of quotidian experience.  
There are in Philippians at least two other possible allusions to practices of 
ritualization. One is the Christ poem of Phil 2:6–11: while there is widespread 
agreement that “exalted, lyrical, quasi-credal language” is found here,903 the matter of 
whether the passage constitutes a “hymn” and thus comes from actual use as such is 
contentious.904 Yet even if we take the passage to not be a hymn, its distinctively credal 
qualities surely suggest a connection to liturgical practice905 and thus also to its function 
within some kind of ritual process.906  
Another allusion to ritualization comes from a reference that Paul makes in Phil 
3.3 to the service of God as one of the defining characteristics of those who have faith 
in Christ, within his scathing indictment against his Judaizing adversaries (3.2–4a). The 
use of the verb λατρεύω in 3.3 (ἡµεῖς γάρ ἐσµεν ἡ περιτοµή, οἱ πνεύµατι θεοῦ 
λατρεύοντες) comes from the LXX, where it is widely used as a cultic term; and in both 
                                                
902 Berthomé and Houseman, “Ritual and Emotions,” 68.  
903 Bockmuehl, Philippians, 116. 
904 Since the publication in 1928 of Lohmeyer’s thesis Kyrios Jesus, the majority of scholars have 
assumed that we are dealing in Phil 2.6–11 with an early Christian hymn (whether of Pauline origin or 
not). However, there is no agreement on the passage’s poetic structure, see e.g. the recent discussion in 
M. Sydney Park, Submission within the Godhead and the Church in the Epistle to the Philippians: An 
Exegetical and Theological Examination of the Concept of Submission in Philippians 2 and 3, LNTS 361 
(London: T&T Clark, 2007), 12–13. Furthermore, contextual evidence is lacking that the passage was 
actually sung in some setting or other (see Bockmuehl, Philippians, 116–117). In recent years several 
scholars have argued against taking the passage as a hymn, e.g. Fee, Philippians, 192–193; Bockmuehl, 
Philippians, 116–117; however others continue to argue that it is such (e.g. Hansen, Philippians, 122–
123; Hawthorne and Martin, Philippians, 101, who find it “beyond doubt that these verses constitute an 
early hymn, or at least part of an early hymn”).  
905 Perhaps as an encomium that the Philippians had worked out to use in mission proclamation (so 
e.g. Reumann, Philippians, 333, 365–366; see also Hellerman, Philippians, 106).  
906 See also Meeks, Christians, 144–145. 
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OT and NT the verb signifies divine service either to God or to pagan deities.907 Fee 
observes that Paul’s usage stands in ironical contrast to 3.2, where he decries the 
illegitimate service rendered by those whom he pejoratively labels as the “mutilation” 
—the “workers of evil” who are engaged in doing the very thing that was forbidden in 
the temple cultus. It is the believers who are the true circumcision, who “serve” by the 
Spirit, over against serving by the flesh. Hence the verb refers not to the worship offered 
to God as a gathered people, but rather represents “the ‘service’ of God’s people in 
terms of their devotion to him as evidenced in the way they live before him.” As Fee 
summarizes: Paul is contrasting “not external rite over against internal ‘spiritual’ 
service,” but rather life in the flesh against life “as the eschatological people of God, 
evidenced to be so by the Spirit of God, through whom all life in the present is now 
service and devotion to God.”908 Here we are perhaps on less firm ground when it 
comes to identifying obvious ritual activity; but if we take what Paul says to be an 
emphasis that for the believer every activity in every sphere of life is to be an act of 
worship, consecration, and service to God (Rom 12.1), then what we have here is 
tantamount to a view of life itself as a deliberate, wholehearted, and also “ritualistic” 
offering of oneself to God, in so far as devotion and duty are brought together in both 
the privately expressed and publicly performed contexts of a vital, ongoing relationship 
with God.  
Furthermore, on the basis of the evidence of passages such as Acts 2.42–47 (a 
vignette of life in the early church that highlights, among other things, the importance of 
the Lord’s Supper, prayer, and worship for the first Christians) and Acts 16.13–15 
(which narrates the story of the baptisms of Lydia and the members of her household at 
Philippi) and parts of Paul’s letters in addition to Philippians and 1 Thessalonians that 
relate to these same patterns of activity, i.e. baptism (e.g. Rom 6.4), the Lord’s Supper 
(e.g. 1 Cor 11.17–34), prayer (e.g. Rom 12.12), and worship (e.g. 1 Cor 14.26–40), it 
seems entirely reasonable to suppose that all these practices were regarded as being 
integral to the proper functioning of each of Paul’s churches. As such, there is in place 
in the Pauline churches a regular and highly variegated ritual embodiment and 
                                                
907 Hellerman, Philippians, 173–174, noting also that in the LXX λατρεύω is applied to the cultic 
service of the people as a whole, versus λειτουργέω, which is restricted to priestly functions. See also 
BDAG 587: “in our lit. only of the carrying out of religious duties, esp. of a cultic nature, by human 
beings.” 
908 Fee, Philippians, 299–300 (all quotes are from 300); see also Bockmuehl, Philippians, 192. 
Similarly Hellerman, Philippians, 174, notes that λατρεύοντες functions here in a broadly metaphorical 
sense to denote the entirety of Christian existence, i.e. the “cultic concept is now spiritualized” (quoting 
Hermann Strathmann, “λατρεύω, λατρεία,” TDNT 58–65, at 65). 
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expression of the beliefs that arise in relation to the Christ story.909 From an 
anthropological perspective, one might say that these practices of ritualization are in 
fact “bodily and collective means of meaning making” that “allow actions to become 
part of the very essence of people’s identities.”910 All these practices help to schematize 
an emotional programme and thereby instil and manage appropriate emotional 
repertoires; and there is a profound resultant impact on individual and corporate identity 
formation. As Davies maintains: “Ritual, by bonding a group’s core values with its 
preferred emotions in response to life’s reciprocal obligations and opportunities, fosters 
identity by giving meaning and hope to life.”911  
5.5.5. Language and Emotional Ordering 
Riis and Woodhead argue also that “[j]ust as emotions can be stabilized, 
objectified, communicated, and shaped by symbolic-material objects, so they can be by 
language.”912 Further, they emphasize that there is no need to make a sharp distinction 
between linguistic and non-linguistic forms of communication, since both arise from the 
“felt sense” of a situation which is associated with the “continent of feeling” that 
underlies all meaning, thought, and symbolically-mediated expression.913 As Riis and 
Woodhead see it, this felt sense of life—the elemental form of engagement with the 
world—is full of proto-linguistic possibilities relating to the patterned, recurring 
relations between oneself and one’s social and material settings, which take shape as 
structures of meaning through which one’s world acquires coherence and intelligibility. 
While visual images may be the most basic means by which such patterns are brought to 
consciousness, they can also be articulated by way of words; in fact, as already noted 
the two are closely linked, since language works through metaphor by articulating felt, 
embodied, understandings of the world through words. Thus it becomes apparent that 
one’s felt sense of life is shaped significantly by language. Furthermore, there is a 
                                                
909 See the still useful discussion in Meeks, Christians, 140–163. However, Meeks’ influential 
schematic classification of rituals as major (baptism and the Lord’s Supper), minor (most other ritualized 
actions), and unknown and controverted (e.g. funeral rites and baptism for the dead) has been questioned 
by certain scholars; for discussion see Lawrence, “Ritual,” 102–105.  
910 Louise J. Lawrence, Reading with Anthropology: Exhibiting Aspects of New Testament Religion 
(Bletchley: Paternoster, 2005), xvi, drawing on the work of Ronald Grimes, Deeply Into the Bone: Re-
Inventing Rites of Passage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
911 Davies, Emotion, Identity, and Religion, 37.  
912 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 44. 
913 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 44–45, citing the work of Eugene T. Gendlin, Experiencing and 
the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and Psychological Approach to the Subjective (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1997). 
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profound connection between language and emotion. When personal feelings are 
expressed using a common language, these feelings are interpreted and presented within 
the shared framework of emotional language. As Riis and Woodhead observe, “[j]ust as 
meaning can be concentrated material symbolization, so sets of words can become 
cultural objects with the same power to move and motivate.”914  
Riis and Woodhead go on to make the important point that  
[t]his discussion of emotions, cultural symbols, and language reminds us that 
human lives are characterized by emotional indeterminacy, which articulation in 
words and images helps us to control. In reality we are uncertain about how we 
feel, and need help to work it out. Even when we have some grasp on how we feel, 
we may struggle to clarify our emotions and their consequences … We have no 
clear touchstones by which to identify our feelings; the causes of those feelings are 
often mixed or unclear, and our language for expressing them is inadequate. 
(Sociology, 46) 
For them, it is precisely this emotional indeterminacy that explains why the tendency of 
many theorists to treat emotions “like stones or ponds or static objects that are given 
labels” is so misleading.915 Moreover, it is also mistaken to think that the general field 
of emotion can be subdivided into ever more complex general classifications of 
emotions, because emotions such as fear, shame, and so on “are culturally contingent 
words with which we try, with varying degrees of inadequacy, to capture aspects of 
shifting social and material relationships and associated image-schema that always 
exceed the capacity of our words.”916 
Riis and Woodhead’s ideas regarding the connection between language and 
emotion are helpful for our exploration of the Pauline emotional regime in at least two 
ways. First, the importance of language in articulating and even concretizing an 
emotional stance is highlighted. So, for instance, by referring to his own joy and 
stressing to the Philippian believers the basis for this joy (1.3–5, 15–19; 2.1–4, 17–18; 
4.10–19), or by issuing to the Thessalonians a prohibition against inordinate grief and 
explaining why such grief is not appropriate (1 Thess 4.13–17), the literary formulations 
with which he communicates with them become the media through which theologically-
rich symbolic content that helps one to make sense of one’s felt reality is shared and 
given expression. As discussed earlier (see in particular sections 3.4.1 and 4.4.1), Paul 
                                                
914 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 44–45 (quote from 45).  
915 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 46, quoting Norman K. Denzin, On Understanding Emotion (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1984), 26. As Denzin notes here, those who take this view locate the 
explanation of emotion in the development and appearance of the emotion as that development is shaped 
by factors external to the person, instead of treating emotions as processes lived by self-reflective 
individuals in interactional experiences. 
916 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 46.  
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seems to expect this material to influence strongly his readers’ ways of thinking and 
thereby shape the concomitant emotional dispositions that emerge as a result of their 
excogitations concerning their new terms of engagement with their surroundings. Thus, 
he is able to confidently adjure the Thessalonians to bring encouragement to one 
another in the very words with which he has just emphasized the theological ground for 
consolation (1 Thess 4.18); in this we see further reinforcement of Riis and Woodhead’s 
idea that language functions as a repository of symbolic meaning that, through 
articulation, can motivate emotional change.  
Second, and related to the above, it may be that we perhaps underestimate the 
importance of Paul’s use of language in fostering greater emotional determinacy. 
Taking the example of joy: throughout the letter, as we have seen, Paul makes much of 
his joy and correlates it to the new ordering of reality that is to govern the lives of those 
who follow Christ. Then, at 3.1 and 4.4, he expressly commands joy from the 
Philippians. While the use of the imperative recalls its earlier appearance at 2.18, where 
Paul calls the believers to mutual joy in the face of suffering, here at 3.1 and again 
(twice) at 4.4, the joy that the Philippians are told to show forth is ἐν κυρίῳ. It seems 
likely that Paul’s language comes from the Psalms;917 and if so, this imperative refers 
not only to an inward feeling but to an outward display or action—“to verbalize with 
praise and singing.”918 In both these cases (i.e., in Paul’s descriptions of his own joy and 
in his explicit behests concerning the social display of joy) it seems apparent that there 
is at work a deliberate effort—through the use of symbol-laden written language and 
rhetorical formulations—to achieve a heightened, fuller sense of emotional determinacy 
in regard to the precise nature of joy (and its expression) that should characterize the life 
of the believer.   
5.5.6. Letters and Emotional Ordering  
It is helpful at this juncture to make some remarks concerning the nature of Paul’s 
own role in the ordering of his churches. One of his major concerns was that they would 
not just survive in what was often a belligerent social environment, but thrive as unified, 
Spirit-filled communities of love, grace, goodness, and joy (so e.g. Phil 1.9–11; 2.1–4; 1 
Thess 5.14–24). However, Paul has a great many things to do as a community 
                                                
917 See earlier section 3.3.3. 
918 Fee, Philippians, 291; cf. Hansen, Philippians, 288, who relates Paul’s language to the joyful 
corporate worship of the Lord in the Psalms.  
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organizer: he has to acquaint himself with the particular problems faced by each 
congregation, solve conflicts, deal with false teachings and troublemakers, build unity 
between the believers, strengthen them in their faith, and comfort the afflicted and the 
grieving—in short, to do everything necessary to upbuild the fledgling churches. That 
for the most part all these things have to be accomplished from a very great distance 
only multiplies the challenges that are involved in what are already complex tasks. To 
accomplish his plans, Paul seems to depend on three main instruments: prayer to God 
concerning the believers, letters that he pens to his churches, and emissaries such as 
Timothy and Epaphroditus who are sent to them on his behalf. It is in his letters that 
these elements come together: in addition to the encouragement and instructions that 
Paul gives to the believers, he makes mention of them his prayers, thereby further 
revealing his deep concern and enduring affection for his converts (Phil 1.3–11; 1 Thess 
1.2–3), and refers to the previous or impending pastoral visits of his coworkers, which 
again signals to them his anxiety over their well-being (Phil 2.19–30; 1 Thess 3.1–10).   
In antiquity, letters were regarded as a means of mediating one’s actual physical 
presence,919 and scholars have sought to apply findings from the study of ancient 
epistolography to Paul’s epistles.920 In particular, Robert Funk’s form-critical study of 
Paul’s “apostolic parousia” remains influential:921 as Funk sees it, Paul’s presence by 
letter is a manifestation of the apostolic parousia in and of itself, even though it is not as 
powerful an expression of it when compared to Paul’s personal presence. There is in the 
apostolic parousia a hierarchy of authoritative communication: the weakest is the letter; 
stronger than this is the emissary; while the most powerful is the personal visit.922 While 
not all scholars have accepted Funk’s precise conclusions,923 the tendency to relate 
                                                
919 The topos of parousia in ancient epistolography was identified several decades ago by Heikki 
Koskenniemi (Studien zur Idee und Phraseologie des griechischen Briefes bis 400 n. Chr., AASF, Series 
B, vol. 102.2 [Helsinki: Finnish Academy, 1956], 38–42). For examples of ancient letters which 
functioned as a mode of personal presence see Hans-Josef Klauck, Ancient Letters and the New 
Testament: A Guide to Context and Exegesis (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2006), 192–193; Stowers, 
Letter Writing, 59–60.  
920 For example, Malherbe (Pastoral Care, 72–73) has argued that the theme of bodily absence but 
spiritual presence is a standard feature of epistolographic theory, and that Paul consciously uses the 
literary conventions of his day to communicate his anxiety about the Thessalonians and to guide their 
religious and moral development; cf. Stowers, “Friends,” 109.  
921 Robert W. Funk, “The Apostolic Parousia: Form and Significance,” in Christian History and 
Interpretation: Studies Presented to John Knox, ed. W. R. Farmer, C. F. D. Moule, and R. R. Niebuhr 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 249–269. 
922 Funk, “Apostolic Parousia,” 258–259, following the conclusions of Koskenniemi, Studien, 38–42, 
172–180. 
923 See esp. Margaret M. Mitchell, “New Testament Envoys in the Context of Greco-Roman 
Diplomatic and Epistolary Conventions: The Example of Timothy and Titus,” JBL 111 (1992): 641–662, 
esp. 642–643, who contests Funk's conclusions, noting that Paul's own comments (2 Cor 10.10) reveal 
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Paul’s sensitivity to the effects of personal presence to matters of epistolary form has 
persisted;924 and certainly, the evidence of passages such as 1 Cor 5.3–4 seems to 
demonstrate that Paul himself sees a consistency between his letters and his personal 
presence.925  
Jane Heath has helpfully nuanced the debate over the relevance of the epistolary 
topos of personal presence by exploring the literary and rhetorical concept of enargeia 
in 1 Thess 1.2–2.16.926 Heath argues that the effect of Paul’s prompting of the believers’ 
memories of his missionary visit “is likely to have been experienced as making that 
absent past experience present and vivid to the senses and emotions.”927 For the 
Thessalonians, this past event had to do with their experience of God’s saving love as it 
was made known to them through the teachings of Paul and his coworkers; their 
experience also pointed to and anticipated the parousia of Christ, since this was the 
focus of the gospel proclamation. Now that Paul is absent, this experience has to be 
supplied by memory—which makes vivid the truth of the gospel while also arousing 
desire for renewed personal contact.928 Heath concludes that  
Paul’s purpose is understood to be a making present of the absent apostles with 
cognitive and emotional intent, directed essentially not on their relationship to him 
and the other missionaries, so much as on their relationship to God and anticipation 
of the parousia as it was experienced through the missionaries. The effect is to 
strengthen faith and Christian love … Remembering Paul effects and strengthens a 
relationship to God and to Christ, as well as to Paul and his companions 
themselves, as the visible, perceptible link to that divine Other.929  
As we have seen, there is broad agreement that Paul in his letters seems to 
believe, and even assume, that he is making his presence felt in ways that reveal a 
certain continuity with his personal presence. The view that Paul’s presence via the 
                                                                                                                                          
that he privileges his letters over his personal presence, and suggests that Paul in each situation chooses 
which one of the three modes of communication (letter, envoy, and personal presence) would best suit his 
purposes; see further Lee A. Johnson, “Paul’s Epistolary Presence in Corinth: A New Look at Robert W. 
Funk’s Apostolic Parousia,” CBQ 68 (2006): 481–501. 
924 See Jane M. F. Heath, “Absent Presences of Paul and Christ: Enargeia in 1 Thessalonians 1–3,” 
JSNT 32 (2009): 6; see also the references here.  
925 See Peter Orr, Christ Absent and Present: A Study in Pauline Christology, WUNT 2.354 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 132. 
926 Heath, “Absent Presences.” 
927 Heath, “Absent Presences,” 28 (emphases original).  
928 Heath, “Absent Presences,” 28, see also 20. As Heath notes: “To the ancient mind, enargeia was 
achieved through memory even when the subject portrayed was something beyond the previous 
experience of the audience. This was because the ancient understanding of imagination was not creative 
but mimetic: it drew on preconceived notions of reality and values concerning it, lying within a common 
cultural experience” (11, referencing Ruth Webb, “Imagination and the Arousal of Emotions in Greco-
Roman Rhetoric,” in The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature, ed. Susanna Morton Braund and 
Christopher Gill [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997], 123–124). 
929 Heath, “Absent Presences,” 29.  
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written word is but a weak substitute for a personal visit has not gone unchallenged; and 
it must be noted in any case that scholarly discussions of “absent-presences” in Paul 
have taken place in the light of epistolary conventions—a premise which itself has been 
called into question by those who define the apostolic parousia as a literary rather than 
an epistolary topos.930  
Heath’s insightful analysis of enargeia in 1 Thessalonians helps to move the 
discussion forward: by focusing on a significant phenomenon in the social discourse 
and experience of the day and judiciously sidestepping the debates over such matters as 
the literary or rhetorical categories that can be applied appropriately to the study of the 
letter, a rich and potentially highly fruitful hermeneutic emerges with which one can 
examine Paul’s power of drawing significance from absent presences. Paul’s words 
make vivid the apostolic presence and thus also God’s past work and Christ’s parousia, 
which in turn prompts both awareness of the immediacy of the divine and longing for 
its fuller realization.931 If this is so, it then seems entirely reasonable to conjecture that 
these cognitive and emotional associations would have been taken up along with Paul’s 
instructions later in the letter concerning such matters as community ethics (1 Thess 
4.1–12; 5.12–15) and eschatology, along with the proper handling of grief (4.13–5.11), 
and helped to form the “lived” context in which these teachings were appropriated 
through belief, praxis, and feeling.  
All this interfaces rather nicely with what Judith Lieu has recently highlighted 
about the symbolic significance of early Christian letters: while they were grounded in 
the letter-writing conventions of the day, these letters—which instantiated and gave 
expression to new, Christian, modes of being and relating—were powerful cultural 
symbols that were instrumental in shaping an alternate worldview.932 In the very 
articulation of standard epistolary topoi such as matters concerning distance, 
relationality, and intimacy, letters were actually cultural strategies that had to do with 
performance and ritual, and with these, the ritualization of relationships.933 It seems 
evident that in 1 Thessalonians these social and ritual dynamics come into play, and in a 
rather pronounced way. Paul describes a new worldview—a Christian symbolic 
                                                
930 So Terrence Y. Mullins, “Visit Talk in New Testament Letters,” CBQ 35 (1973): 350–358; David 
E. Aune, The New Testament in Its Literary Environment, LEC 8 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987), 190. 
931 Heath, “Absent Presences,” 26. 
932 Judith M. Lieu, “Letters and the Topography of Early Christianity,” NTS 62 (2016): 167–182. 
933 Lieu, “Letters,” 181. Lieu observes also that even the materiality of letters has its own intrinsic 
power: “Like a bundle of love-letters tied with a ribbon, the letter almost embodies the affective 
dimensions of its contents, even beyond those whom it initially bound together” (182). 
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universe in which new patterns of thinking, feeling, and relating are to hold sway; and 
his letter is thus itself a “performed,” symbolic expression of this alternate reality. At 
the same time, if Heath is correct, Paul’s presence with the Thessalonians is supplied 
not only by means of what he writes, but through vivid memory—which, in turn, 
triggers for the believers cognitive and emotional associations related to God’s 
continuing dealings with them. Furthermore, in the foregoing we might see some 
vindication of Riis and Woodhead’s understanding of the interplay between symbols 
and collective memory in the formulation of the framework of a religious emotional 
regime: bringing together the work of Durkheim, Halbwachs, and others, they propose 
that present-day concerns and the remembered past (both of which are mediated by 
sacred symbols and stories) shape social action and emotion.934 All this goes some way 
towards helping us to understand how Paul is able in his churches to play the role of 
community organizer with such effectiveness, even to the extent of being able to pull 
the emotional strings of his converts from a great distance.935  
5.5.7. Conclusion 
It remains for us to pull together the different but closely related strands of our 
investigation into how authorized emotions are constructed and shored up in the Pauline 
communities. Key to Paul’s strategy is the putting in place of an emotional programme 
in which a symbolically-mediated emotional ordering operates to guide and also 
reinforce the emotional notes that are to be sounded, in line with the eschatological 
reality framework that is seen to govern all of life and human existence. Emotional 
ordering involves aspects such as inspiration and instruction, personal exemplification, 
ritual practice, language, and most of all the pervasive use of symbols. And as we have 
seen, the harmonized interplay of the symbolic, material, and social elements within an 
emotional regime has a profound effect on feeling and sensibility.936 A particularly 
striking example of this comes from Paul’s delimiting of the grief of the Thessalonian 
believers in 1 Thess 4.13–18 in the light of the eschatological ordering of reality: it 
would seem that here there is every possibility that the Thessalonian believers can 
                                                
934 See section 5.5.2. 
935 The reader will be aware that our conclusions here emerge primarily from an investigation of 1 
Thessalonians. Given the presence of thematically parallel (and similarly interlocking) motifs in 
Philippians, an investigation of it along the same lines is very likely to only bolster our findings, and will 
therefore be foregone in the interest of space.   
936 Riis and Woodhead, Sociology, 71.  
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achieve an unusually high degree of emotional transcendence937 through a deliberate 
cauterization of excessive grief.  
The application to the above of Riis and Woodhead’s understanding of balanced 
dialectics within an emotional regime makes this even clearer.938 Based on the evidence 
in the letter, we may well imagine the following (not unlikely) scenario taking place. 
The believers in Thessalonica—reeling from the shock of the unexpected deaths of a 
number of their brethren, and plunged into grief—receive and read Paul’s letter. They 
are confronted anew and deeply encouraged by the symbol-charged theological realities 
that he espouses and which they remember as being integral to the Christian vision of 
life after death. Processes of objectification and consecration begin to gain momentum 
as individuals, along with the wider body of believers to which they belong, look afresh 
to Christ to fashion their mindsets—through prayer, worship, and other ritual 
enactments, the recollection of memories and their articulation through shared language, 
a readiness to follow Paul’s directives, and the adoption of exemplars as models for 
imitation. As objectification (in individuals) and consecration (in the church) occur, the 
corresponding dialectical processes of subjectification and insignation come into play as 
individual believers and the church as a whole, respectively, are inspired and moved by 
symbols that are the very objects of devotion and reverence (here, in the main, Christ), 
and by the eschatological realities that these symbols reference (principally, the 
resurrection of believers at the parousia of Christ, and the promise of eternal life with 
him). The remaining pair of dialectical relationships, internalization and externalization, 
are simultaneously given expression as the renewed emotional stance of the 
individual—characterized in particular by the excision of inordinate grief and the 
repristination of true joy—influences and vivifies the affective experiences of the 
collective whole, which in turn acts back upon and further enlivens the individual 
believer’s experiences.    
This illustration of balanced dialectics within the emotional regime of the church 
at Thessalonica demonstrates clearly a situation in which authorized emotions acquire 
great stability and power. Our reconstruction coheres remarkably well with, and is 
amplified further by, Riis and Woodhead’s description of balanced emotional dialectics 
that reinforce one another: 
                                                
937 See section 5.3.3.b. 
938 See section 5.3.4.a. 
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Individual participants are in solidarity with one another and with the group as a 
whole. Their feelings are amplified by being reflected in the feelings of other 
participants. Whether metaphorically or literally, everyone is dancing to the same 
tune, their bodies, thoughts, and feelings echoing and reinforcing one another. 
Feelings are experienced as authentically personal, not as externally imposed. 
There is harmony between the group and its leaders: they are all parts of the same 
whole, participating in the same experience. The experience is not amorphous, but 
structured by consecrated symbols that provide the focus of attention, devotion, 
feeling, and action. Because participants feel equally about their focus of devotion, 
their sense of harmony and kinship with their fellows is heightened; they are united 
by common inspiration and commitment. (Sociology, 157–158).  
To conclude our discussion at this point: the conceptual apparatus of the 
emotional regime allows us to explore emotion in Paul’s letters in dialogue with the 
increasingly widespread argument that emotion is as much a social and relational 
construct as it is a private, inner state. Furthermore, careful attention is paid also to the 
effect of symbolic relations, since an emotional regime presupposes the presence of a 
symbolically-charged alternate ordering of reality that embraces all of existence and 
helps individual believers and the churches to which they belong gain a deeper sense of 
meaning and purpose in life. Such an ordering implies the offering of an emotional 
programme that regulates affect, promoting sanctioned emotions such as joy and 
stigmatizing rogue ones like uncontrolled grief. As we have seen, when balanced 
dialectics are at work within an emotional regime, its emotional programme is given full 
sway to establish and police normative patterns of feeling. 
 
5.6. Comparing the Pauline and Stoic Emotional Regimes 
As we conclude our study, it is helpful to place the Pauline emotional regime 
alongside our earlier findings concerning Stoic thinking on emotion, and to identify 
their major points of similarity and contrast. By doing so we are able to see especially 
clearly the sharp edges, as it were, of Paul’s account of emotion, since Stoic ethics 
offers a powerful alternative to it. We begin by briefly summarizing Paul’s, and then the 
Stoics’, attitude to joy and grief.  
5.6.1. Paul on Joy and Grief 
For Paul, the basis of joy is irreducibly theological: it is premised entirely upon 
God’s work—past, present, and future—of radically renewing all of creation in the light 
of the death, resurrection, and coming again of Christ, and the sending of the Spirit. It is 
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of course the gospel that announces these realities; and as such, joy is correlated in 
profound ways to the believer’s understanding of and involvement in the kerygma, in 
the sense of how its truths come to authentic, “lived” expression within the life of the 
believer. Indeed, as Fee expresses it, “joy is the distinctive mark of the believer in 
Christ Jesus.”939 Putting it another way: to the degree that the Christian is able not only 
to discern, but to participate in, this all-encompassing metanarrative that envelopes and 
gives meaning to all of life, and which is thus that overarching story within which all 
other life stories are to be located and made sense of, joy—“the felt form of Christian 
hope”940—may be found.  
However, as Paul repeatedly demonstrates, far from being only a private 
experience for the individual, Christian joy is simultaneously also very much a social 
phenomenon: it emerges and flourishes within the context of active participation with 
others in the advancement of the gospel. For Paul, there is thus an important sense in 
which joy is understood to be both socially generated in relationship with fellow 
believers and also socially embodied through expressions of mutual joy. This decidedly 
social dimension to joy seems to reinforce the fact that the Christian life is not to be 
lived alone, but in community—a community whose raison d’être is centred squarely on 
the gospel of Christ and whose mission is fully bound up with its faithful proclamation 
in word and deed.  
Turning now to grief: in the light of the above, it is perhaps not at all surprising 
that inordinate, runaway grief over the death of other believers has no place in Paul’s 
thinking concerning the believer’s proper emotional constitution. For as he sees it, such 
excessive grief exposes a serious lack of understanding as to what death actually is for 
Christians, and thus also a grossly inadequate eschatology. To counter the problem, 
Paul issues loving yet firm instructions: he does not expect his converts to stop grieving 
entirely, but asks that they temper their sorrow in the light of the true, eschatological 
state of affairs. The demise of another believer should not, and indeed must not, trigger 
uncontrolled outpourings of grief, because the resurrection of Christ renders certain the 
resurrection at the parousia of the dead who have put their trust in him.  
Paul’s consolatory strategy, like his attitude towards the promotion of joy, reveals 
a perceptive awareness and appreciation of the inherently social nature of the Christian 
life. The onus for bringing comfort, perspective, and encouragement to the bereaved 
                                                
939 Fee, Philippians, 53.  
940 Lash, Seeing, 201 (see also n.567 above). 
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rests not on his shoulders alone, but jointly on those of each member of the community 
of faith. As Paul understands it, then, the task of consolation is undeniably a shared 
responsibility, one that falls within the broad sweep of the ever-growing, protean 
ministry of mutual upbuilding that is both to mark and to vivify the common life of 
believing community.  
5.6.2. The Stoics on Joy and Grief 
In Stoicism, joy is understood as an elevation of the material psyche that occurs 
in the wise person in response to present goods.941 It is one of the eupatheiai: that select 
trio of normative versions of emotions that are evoked through veridical judgements of 
value, and which are therefore the consistent experience of the wise person, since such a 
person’s behaviour is always wholly in keeping with the proper exercise of virtue. For 
the wise, virtue and the actions emanating from it are the only true goods towards which 
their perfected rational impulses are directed. 
In contrast, grief, the mistaken opinion that there is something in the present that 
is evil and therefore to be avoided, is classified as one of the passions: the group of 
rogue emotions that arise from erroneous evaluations of the value of external goods. 
Since grief, along with all the other passions, was the product of deficient processes of 
rationality and their concomitant false beliefs, it was to be not only repudiated but 
extirpated. The solution, as the Stoics saw it, was the treatment of the mind, because the 
passions were the direct result of faulty thinking. Their therapeutic arsenal comprised 
the careful application of philosophical teaching on the one hand, and cognitive tools 
such as psychagogy and the imitation of exemplar figures on the other; acting in 
concert, both approaches comprehensively targeted the person’s rational core in an 
effort to perfect it.  
5.6.3. Similarities 
To be sure, there are some apparent parallels, at least prima facie, between Paul’s 
and the Stoics’ approaches to emotion. First, they share a deep concern with the 
importance of right thinking as the basis for appropriate affective response. For the 
Stoics, the only thing that can bring mastery over the passions, and indeed over oneself 
in general, is the proper exercise of reason:  
                                                
941 Graver, “Anatomies,” 125. See also section 2.3.3.b earlier.  
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These passions, which are heavy taskmasters, sometimes ruling by turns, and 
sometimes together, can be banished by you by wisdom, which is the only true 
freedom. There is but one path leading thither, and it is a straight path; you will not 
go astray. Proceed with steady step, and if you would have all things under your 
control, put yourself under the control of reason; if reason becomes your ruler, you 
will become ruler over many. (Seneca, Ep. 37.4).  
Paul, too, shows a not dissimilar interest in the key role of cognition in emotion and in 
living life well. He stresses to the believers at Philippi that it is the adoption of a Christ-
like mindset, coupled with a right understanding of Christian truths, that would enable 
them to joyfully overcome their sufferings and trials. Likewise, the grieving 
Thessalonians are offered a thoroughly reasoned theological basis for consolation, and 
instructed to use this to encourage one another.  
Second, and related to the above, both the Stoics and Paul try to effect an active, 
comprehensive management of emotion so that transcendence over the emotional 
vicissitudes of day to day life is achieved.942  With both, emotion is brought into 
relation with an ideal, overarching ordering of life, and reordered accordingly; certain 
emotional dispositions or types of emotion are encouraged, and even prescribed or 
commanded, while others are censured and repudiated. Thus, the Stoics, and Paul, go to 
great lengths to establish and fortify their respective emotional regimes. The Stoics, as 
we have seen, utilized a wide battery of complementary philosophical, paraenetic, 
cognitive, and practical apparatus to reorient and then consolidate their students’ 
conceptual frames; the Stoic philosophers understood that repeated, systematic 
exhortation, and the judicious application of philosophical instruction, was needed to 
radically overhaul a person’s thought processes. The parallels with Paul’s general 
approach and methodology are apparent—Paul, too, employs similar types of tools to 
fashion in his converts the type of mindset that he wants to see in them. Both the Stoics 
and Paul seem to have fully appreciated the fact that a wide-ranging and yet carefully 
targeted approach was necessary precisely because it was aimed at bringing about a 
fundamental, and in many ways also counterintuitive, reconfiguration of a person’s 
value system.  
A third parallel is found in how the Stoics and Paul seem to assign a broadly 
similar place to the role of affect in their respective conceptions of human flourishing: 
both do not regard the achievement of complete emotional equanimity as a goal in and 
of itself, but instead see right feeling as the natural corollary of right thinking. To be 
                                                
942 On the concept of emotional transcendence, see section 5.3.3.b earlier.  
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sure, specific emotions were encouraged and others rejected in accordance with the 
emotional ordering that was at work; and it is clear that the possession of prescribed 
emotional dispositions was something that was aimed at. Yet this was so largely 
because emotion was seen to be a telling reflection of one’s innermost beliefs and 
values. In Stoicism, as Christopher Gill notes, emotions are not typically presented as 
aspirations in their own right.943 Furthermore: 
The appropriate target for aspiration is the development of the virtues, through 
ongoing transformation of one’s understanding, character, interpersonal 
relationships, and way of life, that is, through oikeiōsis, in its various strands. This 
transformation naturally or necessarily, on Stoic psychological assumptions, brings 
about the change of emotional inclinations, from foolish to wise, that forms part of 
developmental process.944 
To use joy as a specific example: for Seneca, the advent of joy is not the purpose of 
moral progress; instead, virtuous wisdom continues to be the aim of existence, and joy 
is, on Stoic principles, a further characteristic of the virtuous life.945 Paul, too, does not 
see the possession of joy as the chief aim of believers. For him, gaining Christ and 
being transformed into his likeness is the goal of life (Phil 3.21), and Christians are to 
think and act with this goal always before them.946 That such a goal (and its attainment) 
is at all possible in the first place is because of God’s work in the world through Christ 
and the Spirit; and therefore, as Paul sees it, joy flourishes to the degree that the believer 
is able to discern and participate in this work, even in the face of great adversity. Thus, 
for both the Stoics and Paul, regulation over the emotions is important, not as an end to 
itself, but because a person’s emotional repertoire—in particular, the presence in it of 
those dispositions that are encouraged, and the absence from it of those that are 
rejected—are clear indications of the extent to which any claimed allegiance to a system 
of beliefs has translated to actual, lived reality.   
5.6.4. Differences 
Though there are certain parallels between Stoic and Pauline thinking on emotion, 
a closer examination soon discloses, as in fact we have already begun to see, that the 
                                                
943 Christopher Gill, “Positive Emotions in Stoicism,” in Hope, Joy, and Affection in the Classical 
World, ed. Ruth R. Caston and Robert A. Kaster (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 149. 
944 Gill, “Positive Emotions,” 150.  
945 Graver, “Anatomies,” 140, see also 131–132 and references there. 
946 See Bradley Arnold, Christ as the Telos of Life: Moral Philosophy, Athletic Imagery, and the Aim 
of Philippians, WUNT 2.371 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 219–221 and passim. Arnold argues 
persuasively that in Philippians Paul uses the thought pattern in ancient moral philosophy, which posits 
that there is one τέλος of life that all choices and actions are to be made with respect to attaining, to 
structure his argument that the chief end of the Christian life consists in gaining Christ.  
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two traditions diverge in fundamental ways at the very places where they seem to 
exhibit some agreement. While there are what we might perhaps term, albeit 
inadequately, “structural” affinities in how they each conceive of emotion vis-à-vis their 
construal of reality and how it is schematized, the content of that reality in the two 
accounts is entirely different.  
In more specific terms: while the Stoics and Paul both demonstrate an interest in 
the cognitive dimension of emotion, locate emotion within a systematic ordering of life, 
and commandeer a broad range of philosophical, cognitive, and practical approaches to 
help their respective adherents to develop new ways of thinking and feeling that reflect 
and in turn validate such an ordering of reality, their arguments stem from intrinsically 
disparate ideological commitments. Taking centre stage in Stoic philosophical thought 
is, of course, reason: and it is reason, consistently and perfectly exercised in accordance 
with nature, or the order of the cosmos, that leads to a life of virtue and thus of 
eudaimonia. It is highly noteworthy that there is in Stoicism an unwavering confidence 
in the ability of humans to repair their own thinking and transfigure themselves in 
accordance with Stoic principles. As Rowe rather nicely describes it: 
The Stoic story of human reparation has at its heart the claim that the human being 
is its own resource and the resolution of its problem. As we progress further and 
further in the Stoic disciplines, we discover a deeper and more profound ability to 
rely on ourselves.947 
However, for Paul, nothing could be further from the truth: we human beings 
simply do not have the power ourselves to escape from the never-ending cycles of self-
defeating damage that we are tethered to because of sin. Such is the utter helplessness of 
the human condition that Christ was sent into the world to set humanity on a radically 
re-created foundation through his life, death, and resurrection. Again, quoting Rowe: 
In the Christian story, human reason is not capable of self-repair, indeed, left on its 
own, it will even lead one astray, mistaking foolishness for wisdom and wisdom 
for folly. Reason’s repair occurs only through knowing God in Christ—or, rather, 
being known by him—and the communal norms that inculcate reason’s right 
workings in a pattern of church life and public witness. The re-creation of reason is 
simultaneously the participation in the ecclesial form of life that matches the 
future’s arrival in the present—to be a people of the meantime is to learn how to 
know truth and love wisdom.948 
At the heart of Paul’s thinking, then, is the importance of an eschatological faith in God 
who is still at work to remake humanity and society. Completely absent from his 
account is the remarkable confidence that Stoic anthropology invests in the human 
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ability to find within oneself the resources necessary to transform one’s reason. Yet 
Paul’s interest in the mind and in correct thinking is just as deep-seated as it is for his 
Stoic contemporaries; both would certainly argue that what one believes is not only 
integral to emotion, but actually controls it. However, cognition itself is differently 
conceived in the two accounts: for the Stoics, right thinking stems from the exercise of 
reason in accordance with nature, while for Paul, right thinking has everything to do 
with the development of a wholly renewed mindset that is patterned after that of 
Christ—a process in which reason itself becomes re-created. 
A further key difference between Paul and the Stoics emerges in regard to how 
the two traditions relate emotion to social life. Paul firmly locates emotion in the 
context of the relationships within the believing community. As we have seen, for him, 
there is an unalienable mutuality and sociality in Christian joy, because it comes from 
the believers’ shared engagement with God’s ongoing redemptive work in the world. 
Similarly, consolation in grief, too, is located squarely within the ambit of the mutual 
responsibilities that believers have towards one another. Paul is very much aware of the 
communal dimension of emotion—that it is in community that right emotions are 
formed and expressed. All of this emphasizes the profoundly social nature of the 
Christian life: it is in relationship with one another that believers flourish both as 
individuals and as a community.  
Contrary to the popular but caricatured view of them that often gets bad press, the 
Stoics were not self-absorbed and unfeeling automata who cared nothing about the 
people around them. In fact, they understood that living according to nature’s design 
meant that each person should recognize that he or she had been given one or more 
roles to play in society, e.g., son, brother, father, town councillor,949 and that it was the 
person’s responsibility to “play admirably the role assigned you,” since “the selection of 
that role is Another’s.”950 However, the acknowledgement and carrying out of such 
natural duties was to be completely independent of how others might behave towards 
you. In other words, the Stoic’s conduct was to always emerge from, and be 
circumscribed by, his or her prohairesis, the sphere of one’s volition. Discharging one’s 
familial and societal obligations in a fitting manner entailed making correct evaluations 
concerning whether happenings were under one’s control or not, and acting in 
accordance with these decisions, thereby fulfilling one’s natural duties to others while 
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also preserving the integrity of one’s security and self-sufficiency.951 Thus, for example, 
the Stoics taught that it was entirely proper to come alongside a grieving person to offer 
solidarity and support. However, in showing sympathy, one must not be overwhelmed 
by the person’s grief—which, after all, came from his or her judgement about an event 
rather than from the occurrence of the event itself. For the Stoics, one’s inner 
imperturbability was never to be troubled or compromised.952 Hence, while a Stoic 
would not shirk from his or her responsibilities towards other people, in relating to them 
the Stoic would never allow false judgements to derail his or her self-sufficiency and 
emotional tranquillity.  
We see therefore that both the Stoics and Paul presuppose a certain relational 
embeddedness, and with it, the presence of a network of social duties towards others, 
which characterizes and dignifies human existence. Even so, the Stoics are able, through 
their craft of reason, to maintain and even entrench the self-sufficiency and serenity that 
have been hard won by their philosophy. Paul, too, through the consistent exercise of 
right thinking, achieves a kind of self-sufficiency—but it is entirely different from Stoic 
autarkeia, because he derives it from his relationship to Christ. One might argue that it 
is precisely because Paul’s inner security is so firmly anchored in Christ’s sufficiency in 
all things that he is able to allow his relational dealings with his converts to be shot 
through with a pronounced vulnerability that a Stoic would find decidedly alarming. So, 
for example, and as we have discussed earlier, the quality of Paul’s own joy is 
intentionally bound up with the progress of the Philippians in the faith and with their 
growth in like-minded unity, and indeed, with their joy as well. Paul sees Christian joy 
as being generated in relationship with other believers, because joy is a felt corollary of 
their shared commitment to the hope that they hold to be true reality.  
This brings us to the third key difference between the Stoic and Pauline emotional 
regimes. Each regards the right ordering of emotion as coming from, and in turn also 
validating, a particular conceptual framework that encompasses and seeks to make 
sense of all of life. However, the frameworks that the two traditions espouse, reflecting 
as they do mutually exclusive ideological interests, paint very different pictures of 
cosmological reality, not least in how it relates to humans and emotion.    
As Seneca explains it, the Stoics see the world as being beset by incursions of 
fortune (fortuna)—the myriad miscellaneous happenings, freakish or more ordinary, 
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baneful or salubrious, that bear upon humankind. Fortune thus represents “all that which 
touches and shapes our lives for good or for ill from somewhere beyond the reach of our 
control.”953 However, the Stoics are confident that humans possess within themselves 
the requisite resources to triumph over fortune. For the Stoics, there is an overarching 
governing principle over the entire universe, and this is nature, or divinity, which is 
constituted by reason; and since humanity is imbued with this same reason—for reason 
is, as Seneca variously defines it, “nothing else than a portion of the divine spirit set in a 
human body”954 and “copying nature”955—the natural goal of the human person is to 
exercise his or her reason in a life of virtue. It is precisely the following of this goal that 
produces in that person a rightly formed soul, one that will flourish in the very face of 
fortune’s capriciousness by forming correct judgements at all times.  
Yet it is important to note that as the Stoics see it—and notwithstanding the 
mercurial vagaries of fortune’s forays into the lives of people—the world, ultimately 
ordered as it is by divine rationality, is exactly as it should be. As Epictetus proclaims, 
there is every occasion for humankind to recognize the divine character of the 
providential ordering of the universe.956 As such, each human being’s path to happiness 
lies in internally reconfiguring his or her way of being in the world; and thus, the person 
who is wise “takes Nature for his teacher, conforming to her laws and living as she 
commands.”957 By doing so, i.e., by training the soul’s rational capacities and practising 
virtue in line with nature’s dictums, one frees oneself from the destructive power of the 
passions by submitting them to reason,958 and experiences instead their corrected 
versions, the eupatheiai. 
The Stoic view of the world and of humanity is manifestly out of kilter with 
Pauline eschatology, which describes instead how a thoroughly sick world and its 
inhabitants, who are marred by sin, mired in its deleterious effects, and rendered 
completely unable to help themselves, will one day be wholly and radically 
repristinated. God’s act of renewing creation was inaugurated at the first coming of 
Christ, and it will come to a glorious culmination at his return. This transcendent 
metanarrative of God’s ongoing work in the world should form the backdrop against 
which believers locate their own life stories, if they are to make sense of what they 
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believe to be true about their faith in Christ. Thus, even in present suffering the 
believing community can still experience joy: not because things are fine now, but 
because of the certain hope that things will be fine in the future. And even though some 
among them have unexpectedly died, they need not give rein to helpless grief: again, 
not because things are fine now, but because of the certain hope that things will be fine 
in the future. Joy celebrates the believer’s participation with other believers in the story 
of God’s re-creation of the cosmos—a story that reaches its zenith at the parousia, 
where death itself is finally and conclusively vanquished. We thus observe that layered 
deeply within Pauline Christianity are several distinctively forward-looking, storied, 
and social registers that have no echo in Stoicism. For the Stoics, the world is as it 
should be, and life is what one makes of it. For Paul, the world is not yet as it should be, 
but the time will come when the world is remade; and on that day, all who know Christ 
as Lord, who have allowed his life to map the course of theirs, will be united with him 
and with one another for all eternity.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
This study has argued that as Paul sees it, emotions are intrinsic to the proper 
formation and stabilizing of identity and community, because they emerge from and 
encode structures of belief, and also influence patterns of sociality. Right emotions have 
an important integrating function: for the individual, they bolster Christian identity 
through the squaring of felt experience with held beliefs; while for the believing 
community, they help to cement group belonging by reinforcing the shared 
eschatological realities upon which authorized norms of affect are based. At the same 
time, right emotions have an important differentiating function: the social expression of 
sanctioned emotional dispositions (particularly if they are countercultural) demarcates 
the social and theological boundaries between Christians and others, which further 
strengthens group solidarity within the church by accentuating the insider status of its 
members. 
For Paul, the management of emotion is therefore a crucial aspect of his efforts to 
establish his churches and resocialize his new converts. This explains why in his 
congregations he assiduously imposes feeling rules that specify not only which 
emotions are approved and which ones rejected, but also how those emotions that are 
approved are to come to expression within the community. The upshot of Paul’s efforts 
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is the crystallization of what is in effect an emotional regime: a framework of dialectical 
interactions between the self, society, and symbol, which produces and shapes emotion 
in accordance with a transcendent ordering of reality. Using the concept of the 
emotional regime as a heuristic tool, we discovered that the interplay of symbolic, 
ritual, and social elements within the eschatological ordering of reality has a remarkably 
profound influence on the construction and reinforcement of authorized emotions in the 
Pauline communities. All this helps also to explain how such emotions maintain their 
longevity and power. 
To be sure, Paul was not the only person of his time to establish feeling rules; his 
Stoic contemporaries, too, thought deeply about emotion and came up with a far more 
systematic way to approach the whole subject, particularly in regard to the passions—
those unruly, damaging patterns of affect that had no place in the life of the wise person. 
Throughout our study we have allowed both traditions to speak for themselves, and on 
their own terms; but we also made comparisons between them whenever appropriate, so 
that the distinctiveness of their respective views of emotion would come into sharp 
focus. Even though both the Stoics and Paul emphasize the centrality of right thinking 
as the means to control emotion, it is exactly at this point of similarity that the Stoics 
and Paul diverge, and fundamentally so, because their accounts are premised on 
completely different conceptions of reality.  
For Paul, as with the Stoics, right patterns of feeling come from right patterns of 
belief, and their social expression validates the truth-claims of these beliefs. However, 
as Paul sees it, these patterns of belief are rooted not in the workings of some cosmic 
rationality, but in nothing less than the epic narrative of how God is renewing his 
creation on the basis of Christ’s work—a story in which Paul’s converts are invited to 
anchor their own life stories. And it is indubitably because Paul himself has done just 
so, that he can instruct them, with untrammelled confidence and, perhaps, a certain 
exultation of spirit: Χαίρετε ἐν κυρίῳ πάντοτε· πάλιν ἐρῶ, χαίρετε (Phil 4.4).  
5.7.1. Suggestions for Further Research 
It is hoped that this study has helped to open up, in a fuller way than hitherto, the 
question of the social function of emotion in Paul’s letters, and also demonstrated one 
way in which a methodologically robust inquiry into this neglected aspect of early 
Christianity life might be conceptualized and conducted. It is hoped too that the findings 
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from this thesis show that there are useful gains to be had from such an approach. Yet I 
hasten to emphasize that this study represents only an exploratory effort in terms of 
mining emotion within the Pauline corpus, and that there is potential for much more 
work to be done. For example, one might explore the nature and function of joy or grief 
in Paul’s other letters (e.g. in 2 Corinthians, where grief is inflected in a variety of ways 
throughout the letter) to see how our account of emotion could be more finely nuanced. 
Alternatively, the scope of this study could be extended to include other affective 
dispositions as specific subjects for analysis, in order to build up a richer and more 
comprehensive understanding of emotion in Paul’s letters. Another worthwhile 
direction for research might be to investigate in a more systematic fashion how certain 
complexes of symbolic and social meaning are connected to the ordering and expression 
of emotion in Paul’s writings: particularly fruitful aspects of study might be the 
relationships between ritual and emotion (using ongoing research in ritual studies and 
the NT), or language and emotion (drawing on work in sociolinguistics and related 
fields). It will be interesting to see how NT scholars develop this necessarily 
interdisciplinary field of study in the future.  
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